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USCIS Issues New Policy Guidance for O-1B Visas

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) recently issued policy guidance to clarify how to determine the appropriate visa classification for persons of extraordinary ability in the arts. Given the massive changes in the entertainment industry in the past year, including the increasing popularity of internet and streaming services, this guidance provides essential insight for those seeking to understand the nuances of O-1B nonimmigrant visas and determine which visa applies to their unique circumstances.

O-1 Visa Program for Individuals with Extraordinary Ability or Achievement

The O-1 nonimmigrant visa program provides nonimmigrant visas for individuals who possess extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, or who have demonstrated extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or television industry and been recognized nationally or internationally for those achievements.

The O-1 nonimmigrant visa program is broken down into the following classifications:

O-1A: Individuals with an extraordinary ability in the sciences, education, business, or athletics (not including the arts, motion pictures or television industry);
O-1B (Arts): Individuals with an extraordinary ability in the arts;
O-1B (MPTV): Individuals with extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or television industry.

Generally, to qualify for an O-1 visa, a beneficiary must demonstrate “sustained national or international acclaim” in their respective field. To prove this, applicants must provide evidence of their credentials, including national or international awards or prizes, membership in professional organizations in their respective field, published articles in notable trade publications, high salary for their services, as well as other relevant evidence of exceptional expertise.

Under the O-1B category, as noted above, individuals in the entertainment industry can demonstrate either extraordinary ability in the arts or extraordinary achievement in the motion picture and television industry. With the recent shifts in the entertainment industry, including the prevalence of household names from YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, etc., it has become increasingly common for applicants to possess qualities that fall under both the O-1B (Arts) and the O-1B (MPTV) categories.

Determining the Relevant Standard for Artists with Some Connection to MPTV

The USCIS Policy Manual acknowledges the difficulties associated with petitions that have elements of both O-1B (Arts) and O-1B (MPTV) classifications. According to the newly issued guidance, inclusion in the motion picture or television industry is not limited to whether artistic content will air on television or movie screens, noting that “USCIS considers streaming movies, web series, commercials, and other programs with formats that correspond to more traditional motion picture and television productions to generally fall within the MPTV industry’s purview.” Indeed, USCIS gives weight to whether an individual”s work aligns with industry organizations such as the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences.

However, under USCIS guidance, not all television stars are considered equal for the purpose of visa qualification. For instance, reality television poses an interesting problem because many of the “stars” are non-actors involved in a competition of some sort that takes place on television. According to USCIS, contestants on reality television programs fall outside of the MPTV industry, but judges, hosts, and those employed by the production company generally fall within industry parameters.

Video blogging, a staple of the increasingly popular YouTube and TikTok platforms, poses similar questions. However, USCIS makes clear that static web content, like video blogs, generally falls outside the O-1B (MPTV) classification and is more appropriate for O-1B (Arts) petitions. USCIS notes that if an artist’s work or appearance on an MPTV production is incidental to their non-MPTV work as an artist, the MPTV classification may not be appropriate.

Guidance for O-1B Visas

The newly-issued guidance provides some clarification of the nuances that distinguish O-1B (Arts) beneficiaries from O-1B (MPTV) beneficiaries. Potential beneficiaries and practitioners can continue to consult the USCIS Policy Manual for up-to-date guidance in this quickly changing industry.

Article By Raymond G. Lahoud of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more immigration legal news, visit the National Law Review.

Greenwashing and the SEC: the 2022 ESG Target

A recent wave of greenwashing lawsuits against the cosmetics industry drew the attention of many in the corporate, financial and insurance sectors. Attacks on corporate marketing and language used to allegedly deceive consumers will take on a much bigger life in 2022, not only due to our prediction that such lawsuits will increase, but also from Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations and penalties related to greenwashing. 2022 is sure to see an intense uptick in activity focused on greenwashing and the SEC is going to be the agency to lead that charge. Companies of all types that are advertising, marketing, drafting ESG statements, or disclosing information as required to the SEC must pay extremely close attention to the language used in all of these types of documents, or else run the risk of SEC scrutiny.

SEC and ESG

In March 2021, the SEC formed the Climate and Environmental, Social and Governance Task Force (ESG Task Force) within its Division of Enforcement. Hand in hand with the legal world’s attention on greenwashing in 2021, the SEC’s ESG Task Force was created for the sole purpose of investigating ESG-related violations. The SEC’s actions were well-timed, as 2021 saw an enormous increase in investor demand for ESG-related and ESG-driven portfolios. There is considerable market demand for ESG portfolios, and whether this demand is driven by institute influencers or simple environmental and social consciousness among consumers is of little importance to the SEC – it simply wants to ensure that ESG activity is being done properly, transparently and accurately.

Greenwashing and the SEC

The SEC has stated that in 2022, it will be taking direct aim at greenwashing issues on many different levels in the investment world. As corporations and investment funds alike increasingly put forth ESG-friendly statements pertaining to their actions or portfolio content, the law has thus far failed to keep pace with the increasing ESG statement activity. It is into this gap that the SEC sees itself fitting and attempting to ensure that the public is not subject to greenwashing. In order to tackle this objective, expect the SEC to focus on the wording used to describe investments or portfolios, what issuers say in filings, and the statements made by investment houses and advisors related to ESG.

From this stem several topics that the SEC’s ESG Task Force will scrutinize, such as: whether “ESG investments” are truly comprised of companies that have accurate and forthright ESG plans; the level of due diligence conducted by investment houses in determining whether an investment or portfolio is “ESG friendly”; how investment world internal statements differ from external public-facing statements related to the level of ESG considerations taken into account in an investment or portfolio; selling “ESG friendly” investments with no set method for ensuring that the investment continues to uphold those principles; and many others.

2022, the SEC, and ESG

Given the SEC’s specific targeting of ESG-related issues beginning in 2021, we predict that 2022 will see a great degree of SEC enforcement action seeking to curb over zealous marketing language or statements that it sees as greenwashing. Whether these efforts will intertwine with the potential for increased Department of Justice criminal investigation and prosecution of egregious violators over greenwashing remains to be seen, but it is nevertheless something that issuers and investment firms alike must closely consider.

While there are numerous avenues to examine to ensure that ESG principles are being upheld and accurately conveyed to the public, the underlying compliance program for minimizing greenwashing allegation risks is absolutely critical for all players putting forth ESG-related statements. These compliance checks should not merely be one-time pre-issuance programs; rather, they should be ongoing and constant to ensure that with ever-evolving corporate practices, a focused interest by the SEC on ESG, and increasing attention by the legal world on greenwashing claims, all statement put forth are truly “ESG friendly” and not misleading in any way.

Article By John Gardella of CMBG3 Law

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Sixth Circuit Clarifies When Statute of Limitations Commences in False Claims Act Whistleblower Retaliation Cases

On January 10, 2022, the Sixth Circuit held in El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 2022 WL 92565 (6^th Cir. Jan 10, 2022) that the statute of limitations period for a False Claims Act whistleblower retaliation case commences when the whistleblower is first informed of the retaliatory adverse employment action.

El-Khalil’s False Claims Act Whistleblower Retaliation Claim

While working as a podiatrist at Oakwood Healthcare, El-Khalil saw employees submit fraudulent Medicare claims, which he reported to the federal government. In 2015, Oakwood’s Medical Executive Committee (MEC) rejected El-Khalil’s application to renew his staff privileges. After commencing a series of administrative appeals, El-Khalil found himself before Oakwood’s Joint Conference Committee (JCC) on September 22, 2016. The JCC, which had the authority to issue a final, non-appealable decision, voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges. On September 27, 2016, the JCC sent El-Khalil written notice of its decision.

Three years later, on September 27, 2019, El-Khalil sued Oakwood for retaliation under the False Claims Act whistleblower retaliation law. Oakwood moved for summary dismissal on the basis that the claim was not timely filed in that the JCC’s decision became final when it voted on September 22, 2016 and therefore the filing on September 27, 2019 was outside of the 3-year statute of limitations. The district court granted Oakwood’s motion and El-Khalil appealed.

Sixth Circuit Denies Relief

In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that the text of the FCA anti-retaliation provision (providing that an action “may not be brought more than 3 years after the date when the retaliation occurred”) is unequivocal that the limitations period commences when the retaliation actually happened. It adopts “the standard rule” that the limitations period begins when the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief,” not when the plaintiff discovers the retaliation. The retaliation occurred on September 22 when the JCC voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges, and the JCC’s September 27 letter merely memorialized an already final decision.

In addition, the Sixth Circuit held that the False Claims Act’s whistleblower protection provision does not contain a notice provision. As soon as Oakwood “discriminated against” El-Khalil “because of” his FCA-protected conduct, he had a ripe “cause of action triggering the limitations period.” The court noted that if an FCA retaliation plaintiff could show that the employer concealed from the whistleblower the decision to take an adverse action, the whistleblower might be able to avail themself of equitable tolling to halt the ticking of the limitations clock.

Implications for Whistleblowers

Some whistleblower retaliation claims have a short statute of limitations and therefore it is critical to promptly determine when the statute of limitations starts to run. For most whistleblower retaliation claims that are adjudicated at the U.S. Department of Labor, the clock for filing a complaint begins to tick when the complainant receives unequivocal notice of the adverse action. Udofot v. NASA/Goddard Space Center, ARB No. 10-027, ALJ No. 2009-CAA-7 (ARB Dec. 20, 2011). If a notice of termination is ambiguous, the statute of limitations may start to run upon the effective date of the termination as opposed to the notice date. Certain circumstances may justify equitable modification, such as where:

the employer actively misleads or conceals information such that the employee is prevented from making out a prima facie case;
some extraordinary event prevents the employee from filing on time;
the employee timely files the complaint, but with the wrong agency or forum; or
the employer’s own acts or omissions induce the employee to reasonably forego filing within the limitations period.

See Turin v. AmTrust Financial Svcs., Inc., ARB No. 11-062, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-018 (ARB March 29, 2013).

When assessing the statute of limitations for whistleblower retaliation claims, it is also critical to calculate the deadline to timely file a claim for each discrete adverse action or each act of retaliation. However, in an action alleging a hostile work environment, retaliatory acts outside the statute of limitations period are actionable where there is an ongoing hostile work environment and at least one of the acts occurred within the statute of limitations period. And when filing a retaliation claim, the whistleblower should consider pleading untimely acts of retaliation because such facts are relevant background evidence in support of a timely claim.

Article By Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law

For more whistleblower and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

U.S. Supreme Court Lifts Preliminary Injunctions on Healthcare Worker Vaccine Mandate

On January 13, 2022, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Interim Final Rule (the “Rule”) in a 5-4 decision, staying the preliminary injunctions issued for 24 states by the District Courts for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Western District of Louisiana. Therefore, the CMS vaccine mandate is in full effect for all states except Texas, which was not part of the cases before the Court. The Rule requires nearly all workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities—whether medical personnel, volunteers, janitorial staff, or even contractors who service the facilities—to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption.

The Court based its holding on two main points. First, the Court held that Congress clearly authorized CMS to put conditions on funding it provides to the Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities. The Court opined that perhaps CMS’s “most basic” function is to ensure that regulated facilities protect the health and safety of their patients, noting that Medicare and Medicaid patients are often some of the most vulnerable to infection and death from COVID-19. Because CMS determined that a vaccine mandate is necessary to protect patient health and safety, the Court held the mandate “fits neatly within the language of the [authorizing] statute.” The Court acknowledged that CMS has never required vaccinations in the past, but attributed this in part to the fact that states typically already require necessary vaccinations like hepatitis B, influenza, and measles for healthcare workers.

Second, the Court held that the mandate is not arbitrary and capricious, and cautioned the district courts that their role is merely to make sure an agency acts within the “zone of reasonableness.” The Court found the administrative record sufficient to explain CMS’s rationale for the mandate and also accepted that getting the vaccine mandate in place ahead of winter and flu season satisfied the “good cause” standard for skipping the notice and comment period.

Healthcare employers subject to the Rule should immediately start implementing vaccine requirements if they have not already. It is anticipated that in all states but Texas, CMS will likely begin enforcement of the vaccine mandate in approximately 30 days. On December 28, 2021, CMS released guidance to state surveyors with enforcement standards to use starting 30 days from the memo, though at the time the memo only applied to the 25 states that were not enjoined. Healthcare employers should also keep in mind that this is not the end of the road: the Court’s holding only means that the CMS vaccine mandate is in force while the 5th and 8th Circuits complete their review of the underlying state challenges to the mandate. While the Supreme Court’s opinion sends a strong message that lower courts should uphold the mandate, there is no guarantee they will do so.

The legal landscape continues to evolve quickly and there is a lack of clear-cut authority or bright line rules on implementation. This article is not intended to be an unequivocal, one-size-fits-all guidance, but instead represents our interpretation of where applicable law currently and generally stands. This article does not address the potential impacts of the numerous other local, state and federal orders that have been issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including, without limitation, potential liability should an employee become ill, requirements regarding family leave, sick pay and other issues.

Article By Keeley A. McCarty and Ashley T. Hirano of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The Legal Challenges to the OSHA ETS and CMS Vaccine Mandate Move to the Supreme Court

On December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States issued orders granting review of legal challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing Emergency Temporary Standard (“OSHA ETS”) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Omnibus COVID-19 Health Care Staff Vaccination Interim Final Rule (“CMS Vaccine Mandate”). In a rare move, the Supreme Court set an accelerated timeline for the cases, scheduling oral arguments in both cases on January 7, 2022.

Following a ruling out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on December 17, 2021, OSHA announced that it would not issue citations for non-compliance with any requirements of the OSHA ETS before January 10, 2022 and will not issue citations for noncompliance with testing requirements before February 9, 2022, so long as an employer is exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the OSHA ETS. While it is unknown whether the Supreme Court will be able to issue a ruling by OSHA’s January 10, 2022 compliance date, the Supreme Court’s expedited schedule seems to indicate that it is attempting to give employers some finality concerning their obligations under the federal mandates.

Article By Lilian Doan Davis of Polsinelli PC

For more COVID-19 legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

BREAKING: Seventh Circuit Certifies BIPA Accrual Question to Illinois Supreme Court in White Castle

Yesterday the Seventh Circuit issued a much awaited ruling in the Cothron v. White Castle litigation, punting to the Illinois Supreme Court on the pivotal question of when a claim under the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (“BIPA”) accrues. No. 20-3202 (7th Cir.). Read on to learn more and what it may mean for other biometric and data privacy litigations.

First, a brief recap of the facts of the dispute. After Plaintiff started working at a White Castle in Illinois in 2004, White Castle began using an optional, consent-based finger-scan system for employees to sign documents and access their paystubs and computers. Plaintiff consented in 2007 to the collection of her biometric data and then 11 years later—in 2018—filed suit against White Castle for purported violation of BIPA.

Plaintiff alleged that White Castle did not obtain consent to collect or disclose her fingerprints at the first instance the collection occurred under BIPA because BIPA did not exist in 2007. Plaintiff asserted that she was “required” to scan her finger each time she accessed her work computer and weekly paystubs with White Castle and that her prior consent to the collection of biometric data did not satisfy BIPA’s requirements. According to Plaintiff, White Castle violated BIPA Sections 15(b) and 15(d) by collecting, then “systematically and automatically” disclosing her biometric information without adhering to BIPA’s requirements (she claimed she did not consent under BIPA to the collection of her information until 2018). She sought statutory damages for “each” violation on behalf of herself and a putative class.

White Castle before the district court had moved to dismiss the Complaint and for judgment on the pleadings—both of which motions were denied. The district court sided with Plaintiff, holding that “[o]n the facts set forth in the pleadings, White Castle violated Section 15(b) when it first scanned [Plaintiff’s] fingerprint and violated Section 15(d) when it first disclosed her biometric information to a third party.” The district court also held that under Section 20 of BIPA, Plaintiff could recover for “each violation.” The court rejected White Castle’s argument that this was an absurd interpretation of the statute not in keeping with legislative intent, commenting that “[i]f the Illinois legislature agrees that this reading of BIPA is absurd, it is of course free to modify the statue” but “it is not the role of a court—particularly a federal court—to rewrite a state statute to avoid a construction that may penalize violations severely.”

White Castle filed an appeal of the district court’s ruling with the Seventh Circuit. As presented by White Castle, the issue before the Seventh Circuit was “[w]hether, when conduct that allegedly violates BIPA is repeated, that conduct gives rise to a single claim under Sections 15(b) and 15(d) of BIPA, or multiple claims.”

In ruling yesterday this issue was appropriate for the Illinois Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit held that “[w]hether a claim accrues only once or repeatedly is an important and recurring question of Illinois law implicating state accrual principles as applied to this novel state statute. It requires authoritative guidance that only the state’s highest court can provide.” Here, the accrual issue is dispositive for purposes of Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim. As the Seventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he timeliness of the suit depends on whether a claim under the Act accrued each time [Plaintiff] scanned her fingerprint to access a work computer or just the first time.”

Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit drew a comparison to data privacy litigations outside the context of BIPA, stating that the parties’ “disagreement, framed differently, is whether the Act should be treated like a junk-fax statute for which a claim accrues for each unsolicited fax, [], or instead like certain privacy and reputational torts that accrue only at the initial publication of defamatory material.”

Several BIPA litigations have been stayed pending a ruling from the Seventh Circuit in White Castle and these cases will remain on pause going into 2022 pending a ruling from the Illinois Supreme Court. While some had hoped for clarity on this area of BIPA jurisprudence by the end of the year, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling means that this litigation will remain a must-watch privacy case going forward.

Article By Kristin L. Bryan of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more data privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Court Rejects Netflix’s Challenge to Poaching Injunction

In the latest blow against Netflix’s aggressive recruiting practices, a California appellate court has affirmed a trial court’s injunction against Netflix and in favor of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”), thus permanently barring the streaming giant from poaching Fox executives by inducing them to breach their fixed-term employment contracts.

Netflix challenged the injunction, which was issued two years ago under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), on two grounds. Netflix argued that there are triable issues of fact as to whether: (1) Fox had suffered damages; and (2) Fox’s employment contracts were void as against public policy. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the extent of damages to Fox was not relevant to its UCL claim. The Court also rejected Netflix’s public policy arguments, noting that there is well-settled law that fixed-term contracts are beneficial to both employers and employees and that, in any event, the challenged contractual provisions can be severed, even if they are in any sense unenforceable or unlawful.

The Court of Appeal also rejected Netflix’s challenges to the trial court’s permanent injunction, which barred Netflix from soliciting employees who are subject to fixed-term employment contracts with Fox or inducing such employees to breach their fixed-term employment contracts. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that the injunction was vague or overbroad because Netflix had failed to explain the basis for the objection at the summary judgment hearing, despite having been given ample opportunity to do so. The Court also rejected Netflix’s argument that the injunction resulted in specific performance of personal services contracts, pointing out that the injunction only applied to Netflix’s tortious conduct—and did not bind any current or former Fox executives.

This decision follows a similar ruling late last year, when a trial court ruled in favor of our client Viacom in its anti-poaching lawsuit against Netflix.

A holding the other way for Netflix could have upended the way California employers solicit and retain employees, especially in the entertainment industry, where fixed-term employment agreements are relatively commonplace. Although the recent Court of Appeal decision is unpublished, it presumably sends a strong message to those who would poach the employees of a competitor who are subject to fixed-term employment agreements.

Article By Anthony J Oncidi, Philippe A. Lebel, and Dixie M. Morrison of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark Tower Decision, Ending Copyright Saga

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DuBay v. King marks an end to a 4-year copyright battle concerning the lead character of Stephen King’s acclaimed series, The Dark Tower. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirmed that the King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially similar to William DuBay’s The Rook comic book character, Restin Dane. The decision illustrates the complexity of literary copyright infringement disputes, where a claim is brought based on a mix of original and stock character elements.

In 2017 William DuBay’s heir, Benjamin DuBay, sued novelist Stephen King, Marvel Entertainment, Sony Entertainment, and others for various counts of copyright infringement, alleging that King copied DuBay’s artistic expression based on purported similarity between lead characters of The Rook (Restin Dane) and The Dark Tower (Roland Deschain). The district court granted summary judgment to King, determining (1) that any similarities between the characters comprise unprotectable general ideas and scènes à faire elements; and (2) that the protectable original character elements in dispute are different, such that “no reasonable jury…could find the works substantially similar.” DuBay appealed.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in assessing substantial similarity. DuBay argued that the characters were substantially similar based on several shared characteristics, including: (1) similar names; (2) interaction with time-travel related towers; (3) having a bird as a companion; (4) having knightly characteristics; (5) wearing Western-style clothing; (6) surviving a fictionalized interpretation of The Alamo; (7) the use of knives; and (8) traveling back in time to save a young boy who becomes a gunslinger. DuBay also argued that the unique combination of these elements made Dane a distinctive character, and that Deschain is a copy of DuBay’s artistic expression in that character.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed DuBay’s contentions in two parts.

First, the court assessed whether each of the claimed character elements merit copyright protection. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that “character names do not merit copyright protection,” since mere words and short phrases cannot be protected under copyright law. The court reiterated that only original elements of a copyrighted work can be afforded protection, and that certain claimed elements (i.e., “knightly heritage,” time travel to “different times and parallel worlds,” “western attire,” “fictionalized Alamo histories,” and “knife wielding”) are merely general ideas or scènes à faire that are “too general to merit copyright protection.” The court then reviewed the remaining elements to determine whether the shared characteristics rendered the characters substantially similar. Although both characters may be broadly similar in having bird companions, a relationship to towers and tower imagery, and past time travel experiences involving the rescue of a young boy, the court found that the depiction of these elements was different in each work. For example, whereas Dane lives in and travels via tower shaped structures shaped like the namesake chess piece, Deschain embarks on an endless mission to find an elusive Gothic tower that connects parallel worlds and time periods. Because the portrayals of each original element are distinguishable, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the works were similar.

Second, the court examined whether the characters are substantially similar based on each character’s combination of the claimed elements (or the “look and feel” of the characters). The Court recognized of the potential dangers of comparing works based on individual similarities alone because an original combination of unoriginal elements can potentially sustain a claim of copyright infringement. However, the court found that any similarities of combined elements were “superficial” at best, and that the “look and feel” analysis actually hurt, rather than helped, DuBay’s case by highlighting differences in expression of shared original character elements.

Takeaway:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that general ideas or scènes à faire cannot be protected by copyright. It also reminds litigants that although a combination of original and non-original elements can be protected under copyright law, broad similarities are usually insufficient to sustain a copyright infringement claim.

The case is DuBay v. King, 844 Fed. Appx. 257 (11^thCir. 2019), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).

Article By Spencer K. Beall and Margaret A. Esquenet of Finnegan

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The Time Has Come for Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

On Dec. 18, 2021, regulations implementing the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) went into effect. Trademark owners and practitioners should be aware of the new procedures and ensure they are ready for the changes.

Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

Our posts “Three Things to Know About the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020” and “The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: New Rules and Procedures” from March and May 2021, respectively, gave an overview of the changes that will be implemented with the act. Most notably, the TMA provides for new procedures to challenge trademark registrations based on nonuse – expungement, and reexamination. It is intended that the new ex parte expungement and reexamination proceedings will be faster and more efficient alternatives to cancellation procedures before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. You can read the final rule here.

Another significant change is the requirement for filers to verify their identity with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). This is part of the USPTO’s efforts to protect the integrity of the register and combat fraudulent filings, which have been on the uptick. Beginning in early 2022, the following must verify their identity with the USPTO using one of the verification options that includes an electronic process by ID.me

Trademark owners and corporate officers not represented by an attorney, US-licensed attorneys (including in-house counsel), and Canadian attorneys or agents are required to verify their identity. Paralegals and other support staff working for an attorney must be sponsored by a verified attorney. Trademark owners who are represented by an attorney do not currently need to verify their identities to sign electronic forms sent by their attorney; however, if the representation by that attorney ends, the owners will need to submit to the verification process.

It is important that trademark holders and practitioners prepare for these new policies and procedures to ensure they can complete filings on a timely basis.

Article By Danielle M. DeFilippis of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

EPA’s Stormwater General Permit is Safe. Does it Matter?

A Colorado-based NGO has dropped its 9th Circuit lawsuit challenging EPA’s Multi-Sector General Permit for stormwater discharges associated with industrial facilities.

On one hand, this is a victory for EPA which apparently offered nothing to settle the case before the NGO threw up its hands.

On the other hand, the General Permit is only applicable in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico, the three states that have not been delegated the authority to issue such a permit (as well as tribal lands and other lands not subject to state jurisdiction).

Why did the NGO bring this suit to begin with? Did it hope that the Biden Administration EPA would, when push came to shove, do something dramatically different than the Trump Administration EPA?

Whatever the reason, the NGO has apparently concluded that the current law and permit give it plenty of grounds to bring suits over stormwater discharges in the 9th Circuit and elsewhere. There are already several such imaginative suits pending on the west coast.

Are the regulators in Massachusetts less able to issue and enforce stormwater permits than than their colleagues in 47 other states? The answer is of course not. They are completely able and more able than most. And they already have authority under state laws and regulations that are broader in their reach than the federal law.

But the Massachusetts legislature has stood in the way, apparently because it doesn’t want to bear the costs of regulating in this area borne by 47 other states. Uncertainty and the threat, if not the actuality, of litigation has been the unfortunate result of this dereliction for the regulated community, including the municipalities in which we live.

We deserve better.

“The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is dropping its legal challenge to EPA’s industrial stormwater general permit that sought stricter regulation of plastics pollution after settlement discussions were unfruitful, according to an attorney familiar with the litigation.“

Article By Jeffrey R. Porter of Mintz

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Category: Legal News

USCIS Issues New Policy Guidance for O-1B Visas

O-1 Visa Program for Individuals with Extraordinary Ability or Achievement