Category: Labor & Employment

Resist the Urge to Access: the Impact of the Stored Communications Act on Employer Self-Help Tactics

As an employer or manager, have you ever collected a resigning employee’s employer-owned laptop or cellphone and discovered that the employee left a personal email account automatically logged in? Did you have the urge to look at what the employee was doing and who the employee was talking to right before resigning? Perhaps to see if he or she was talking to your competitors or customers? If so, you should resist that urge.

The federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., is a criminal statute that makes it an offense to “intentionally access[ ]without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided[ ]and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a[n] . . . electronic communication while it is in electronic storage  . . . .” It also creates a civil cause of action for victims of such offenses, remedied by (i) actual damages of at least $1,000; (ii) attorneys’ fees and court costs; and, potentially, (iii) punitive damages if the access was willful or intentional.

So how does this criminal statute apply in a situation in which an employee uses a personal email account on an employer-owned electronic device—especially if an employment policy confirms there is no expectation of privacy on the employer’s computer systems and networks? The answer is in the technology itself.

Many courts find that the “facility” referenced in the statute is the server on which the email account resides—not the company’s computer or other electronic device. In one 2013 federal case, a former employee left her personal Gmail account automatically logged in when she returned her company-owned smartphone. Her former supervisor allegedly used that smartphone to access over 48,000 emails on the former employee’s personal Gmail account. The former employee later sued her former supervisor and her former employer under the Stored Communications Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, arguing, among other things, that a smartphone was not a “facility” under the statute.

While agreeing with that argument in principle, the court concluded that it was, in fact, Gmail’s server that was the “facility” for purposes of Stored Communications Act claims. The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments (i) that because it was a company-owned smartphone, the employee had in fact authorized the review, and (ii) that the former employee was responsible for any alleged loss of privacy, because she left the door open to the employer reviewing the Gmail account.

Similarly, in a 2017 federal case, a former employee sued her ex-employer for allegedly using her returned cell phone to access her Gmail account on at least 40 occasions. To assist in the prosecution of a restrictive covenant claim against the former employee, the former employer allegedly arranged to forward several of those emails to the employer’s counsel, including certain allegedly privileged emails between the former employee and her lawyer. The court denied the former employer’s motion to dismiss the claim based on those allegations.

Interestingly, some courts, including both in the above-referenced cases, draw a line on liability under the Stored Communication Act based on whether the emails that were accessed were already opened at the time of access. This line of reasoning is premised on a finding that opened-but-undeleted emails are not in “storage for backup purposes” under the Stored Communications Act. But this distinction is not universal.

In another 2013 federal case, for example, an individual sued his business partner under the Stored Communications Act after the defendant logged on to the other’s Yahoo account using his password. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on that claim, and the defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendant argued that she only read emails that had already been opened and that they were therefore not in “electronic storage” for “purposes of backup protection.” The court disagreed, stating that “regardless of the number of times plaintiff or defendant viewed plaintiff’s email (including by downloading it onto a web browser), the Yahoo server continued to store copies of those same emails that previously had been transmitted to plaintiff’s web browser and again to defendant’s web browser.” So again, the court read the Stored Communications Act broadly, stating that “the clear intent of the SCA was to protect a form of communication in which the citizenry clearly has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Based on the broad reading of the Stored Communications Act in which many courts across the country engage, employers and managers are well advised to exercise caution before reviewing an employee’s personal communications that may be accessible on a company electronic device. Even policies informing employees not to expect privacy on company computer systems and networks may not save the employer or manager from liability under the statute. So seek legal counsel if this opportunity presents itself upon an employee’s separation from the company. And resist the urge to access before doing so.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on the Stored Communications Act, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

Happy New Year! – Prepare to Track Time of More Employees or Increase Salaries

The US Department of Labor finally released its highly anticipated changes to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This rule, which goes into effect on January 1, 2020, will make more employees eligible for overtime because it updates the minimum salary thresholds necessary to exempt certain employees from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime pay requirements, as it will:

  • Raise the salary level from the current $455 per week to $684 per week (or $35,568 per year for a full-year worker)
  • Raise the total annual compensation level for highly compensated employees from the current $100,000 per year to $107,432 per year
  • Allow employers to use nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) that are paid at least annually to satisfy up to 10 percent of the salary level
  • Revise the special salary levels for workers in US territories and in the motion picture industry

This means all employees who are paid a salary falling below the new salary threshold will be non-exempt beginning on January 1, 2020. Said another way, these employees will be eligible for overtime for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Remind Me About the Exemptions Affected

The FLSA generally requires employees to be paid at least minimum wage for every hour worked, and overtime (time and a half) for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Certain employees are “exempt” from the FLSA’s minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements. Key here are the “white collar” exemptions, namely the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions, which depend on three things:

  1. The employee must be paid on a “salaried basis,” meaning the employee receives a fixed, guaranteed minimum amount for any workweek in which the employee performs any work. This means there can be no change in salary regardless of the hours worked.
  2. The employee must be paid a minimum salary of, as of January 1, 2020, $684 per week ($35,658 annually).
  3. However, paying a sufficient salary is not enough — the employee must also perform exempt job duties under one of the exemptions to satisfy this test. (Notably, the new rule did not make any changes to the job duties test, despite ambiguity and years of employer confusion.)

Let’s reiterate this important point again: to be exempt under one of these exemptions, all three prongs above must be satisfied.

I’m Busy — Can I Deal with This Later?

We wouldn’t recommend that. It’s time to start preparing because there are many moving parts when making classification decisions, and, as we all know, 2020 will be here sooner than we think. Also, we suspect these won’t be unilateral decisions made by the human resources department but that others will need to be involved; for most companies, that won’t happen overnight, as it may require significant analysis of the budgetary impact of potential salary increases before employee classifications can be finalized.

So what can you do now? We suggest you start by identifying employees who are currently classified as exempt but whose salaries fall below the new $684 weekly salary. Then, try to estimate the number of hours worked by the employee each workweek, which may be more difficult than it sounds, since exempt workers typically don’t track their time. Depending on the employee’s salary and the number of hours worked, you’ll want to consider whether you’re going to raise the employee’s pay to meet the new threshold or reclassify the employee as non-exempt and pay overtime; and, if you’re going to reclassify the employee, you’ll have to determine how and what the employee will be paid. You should go through the same analysis for those employees who are classified as exempt under the highly compensated employee exemption if their annual salary falls below the new $107,432 threshold.

Think you’re done? Wait, there’s more! Once you identify employees who will be reclassified, you’re going to need to craft your message to explain the changes and new expectations. You may need to develop new policies and/or train the newly non-exempt employees (and possibly their supervisors) on the company’s timekeeping policies as well as on the consequences for failing to follow them. Remember that the FLSA provides strict record-keeping requirements for employers to track the working hours of non-exempt employees. And you may be faced with the need to soothe the egos of employees who feel like being paid hourly is beneath them. (We know this sounds silly, but these morale concerns are real.)

Finally, if you have concerns about the classification of any of your other employees, or if it has simply been awhile since your employee classifications were reviewed, this is a prime time to conduct a general audit of your wage and hour practices. With many employees across the country, and likely within your own organization, being reclassified and becoming eligible for overtime come January 1, you’ll be able to make changes to the classification of other employees who may not meet any exemptions while drawing less attention.

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP

For more on the New DOL Overtime Rule, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Job Applicant Pay History Inquiries Now Off-Limits in Illinois

As of September 29, 2019, Illinois employers may not ask job applicants or their prior employers about salary history. The change comes after Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed an amendment to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003.

The New Requirements

The Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003 made it illegal to pay employees differently on the basis of sex or the employee’s status as an African American, subject to exceptions. The impetus behind the law is to address historic pay disparities for the same or substantially similar work. The amendment now takes the law a step further to address the practice of using pay histories of applicants to set wages (including benefits and other compensation). Specifically, the amendment makes the following additions to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003:

  • Employers, including employment agencies, may not screen out applicants on the basis of their current or prior wage history by setting a maximum or minimum wage level that applicants must satisfy.
  • Employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of employment.
  • More specifically, employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of being considered for employment, being interviewed, continuing to be considered for employment, or receiving a job offer.
  • Employers may not seek the wage history of an applicant from any current or prior employer.

If an applicant voluntarily discloses his or her pay history this does not create a violation. However, the employer cannot then use the voluntarily disclosed pay history in consideration of employment, an offer of compensation, or setting future wages, benefits, and other compensation.

What Are Employers Permitted to Do?

While employers cannot look into the wage histories of applicants, they are still permitted to share salary and benefit information about the position the applicant seeks. Employers can also discuss salary expectations with applicants without running afoul of the law.

Employers with Illinois employees should review their recruitment and compensation practices, including paper applications and online forms, to remove any references and requests regarding an applicant’s pay history. Further, human resources employees should be trained on appropriate recruitment procedures for Illinois employees.

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

For more state salary history bans, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Global Employment Contracts: The Modern Tower of Babel

Although multi-jurisdictional compliance is a challenge in relation to every aspect of employment law, the structure of employment contracts and the enforcement of global policies require particularly careful consideration.

The need to coordinate individual country compliance across numerous countries whilst still maintaining a common company culture requires extensive knowledge of national laws and considerable flexibility.

Contracts

US-based businesses will be used to working with at-will offer letters, but these are mostly unheard of elsewhere. In most jurisdictions, detailed employment contracts are not only customary, but are required by law. As you would expect, companies must ensure the legal compliance of their contractual documentation for each country in which they do business. This includes engagement letters, employment offers, employment contracts, bonus schemes, stock option plans, etc.

With employment contracts, the most common approach is to prepare a contract compliant with local law in accordance with best practices in the jurisdiction where the individual is to be employed. Contracts should incorporate crucial terms, such as probationary periods, termination grounds, working time provisions, and post-termination non-compete and/or non-solicitation provisions.

  • Countries have varying rules on the maximum duration of a probationary period. For example, France permits an eight-month probationary period, one renewal included, for executives under an indefinite-term contract (contrat à durée indéterminée); whereas a 90-day probationary period is standard in the United States.
  • Subject to applicable statutory restrictions in each country, termination provisions provide a good starting point to enforce the departure of an employee, for example in case of a violation of company policies, such as a code of conduct.
  • In France, where the legal working time is 35 hours per week, there is the option of entering into flat-rate pay agreements for autonomous executives whose roles and responsibilities do not permit alignment with the collective working time/office schedule. In the United Kingdom, there exist more flexible, zero-hours contracts, under which the employer is not obliged to provide any minimum working hours but, equally, the employee has no obligation to accept the work offered.
  • The rules on post-termination provisions, such as confidentiality, non-compete and non-solicitation restrictions, vary significantly. Some jurisdictions follow a reasonableness approach (Australia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom); others have outright prohibitions (India, Mexico, and Russia); and others mandate compensation for non-compete clauses (China, France, and Germany).

With so many nuances country-by-country, contract drafters often consider choice of law and jurisdiction clauses. Public policy considerations may, however, override such clauses. For an Italian citizen hired in Italy to work in Italy, it will be difficult to apply Australian law merely because the employer is an Australian corporation. The general rule is that the laws of an employee’s physical worksite will likely apply, regardless of such clauses.

The relevant law for all European Union countries is the Rome I Regulation. Under Rome I, foreign employees in Europe benefit from the mandatory laws of the country with which they have the closest connection, which will usually be the country where they normally work. Accordingly, a German employee working in France should receive a French law-governed employment contract, even if the employee works for a UK employing entity.

For highly mobile employees, however, the place of work is often debatable. For instance, English employment courts have decided that an employee working remotely in Australia has the right to bring an unfair dismissal claim in the United Kingdom if the work is done for a UK employer, regardless of the employee’s physical worksite.

Forum-selection provisions that call for a forum other than the place of employment tend to be unenforceable outside the United States. In London, US expatriates working under contracts with such clauses who sue before an English Employment Tribunal are unlikely to see their claim dismissed when their employer invokes the forum-selection clause.

In choice-of-forum situations, Europeans invoke the provisions of the “Recast Brussels Regulation.” These codify the general rule that employees rarely have to litigate employment disputes outside their host country place of employment, even if a choice-of-foreign-forum clause purports to require otherwise.

Communicating Global Policies

Every organisation has bespoke policies, employee handbooks, and a code of conduct. In addition, every organisation has its own HR practices, such as evaluation processes and training programmes, all dictated by the corporate culture and even corporate vocabulary. It can be challenging to extend those across borders and the legal systems of different countries.

In France, policies related to safety, disciplinary procedures, harassment, whistleblowing, etc., particularly if the policy provides sanctions, must be incorporated within internal rules (règlement intérieur), which must be filed with the employment court and inspectorate. If a company fails to file its policies correctly, it may not be able to discipline employees for violating the rules.

Country by country, companies must consider the interrelationship between the contract and the applicable policies. In some jurisdictions, it is advisable to incorporate relevant handbook policies into the contract. In the United Kingdom, for example, it is compulsory to mention disciplinary and grievances procedures in the contract.

Language Barriers

Where the policies are written is, however, merely the beginning. How they are written is much more complicated. Communicating clearly in multiple languages is now a core HR function for global entities. Many jurisdictions, such as Belgium, France, and Poland, require contracts to be in the local language, even for an employee fluent in the primary language used by the employer. If the contract is not in the local language, its provisions, the policies, and other elements, will be unenforceable, at least for the employer.

A typical example is a global bonus plan, where a failure by the employer to translate the target objectives can allow the employee to claim a bonus without needing to comply with the terms of the plan (i.e., without achieving the stated goals or objectives). This has been confirmed by French case law.

In some countries, such as Turkey, the local language will always prevail, regardless of what is provided for in the contract. In those cases, ensuring translation accuracy can avoid inadvertently granting employees more generous terms under a local translation than the company intended.

Local language translations are also required for other purposes. For instance, in Spain the employment contract needs to be filed with the government, in Spanish. In other countries, such as China, works councils and unions will need to be consulted on the implementation of policies, and submissions for those consultations will need to be in the local language.

As a result, businesses now often consider whether to create employment documents in the local language only, or in two languages. If a document is used that has two columns showing the corporate language and the local language, it is crucial to state which language prevails.

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery

For more on employment law, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

Legal Alert: Not So Fast: National Labor Relations Board Rejects Boeing S.C. Micro Unit

On September 9, 2019, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) clarified its test for unionizing “micro units” of employees within larger workforces, and prevented the International Association of Machinists from representing a small group of Boeing Co. technicians at a plant in South Carolina. The Boeing Company, 368 NLRB No. 67 (2019). In a three-to-one vote, the Board said a proposed bargaining unit consisting of about 175 flight-readiness technicians at Boeing’s Charleston Final Assembly operation does not meet federal standards for appropriate units, because the workers are not distinct from the site’s larger workforce of approximately 2,700 maintenance and production workers.

The International Association of Machinists won an election in May of 2018 to become the bargaining representative of this smaller unit of employees. This election followed an earlier election where a large unit of production and maintenance workers rejected the Union in a 2,087 – 731 vote. After the May 2018 election, the Company appealed the certification of the smaller unit of Boeing employees, arguing that the NLRB Regional Director had improperly approved the small unit of flight-readiness technicians.

In Boeing, the Board indicated that the standard it set forth for unionizing smaller bargaining units of employees in the PCC Structurals decision from December of 2017 was being misapplied. The standard for unionizing micro units of employees, as set forth in Boeing, requires a three-step legal analysis to determine the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. First, the proposed unit must share an internal community of interest. Second, the interests of those within the proposed unit and the shared and distinct interests of those excluded from that unit must be comparatively analyzed and weighed. Third, consideration must be given to the Board’s decisions on appropriate units in the particular industry involved.

Moving forward, unions will have to demonstrate a sufficiently distinct community of interest among the proposed bargaining unit as compared to excluded employees. And, excluded employees’ distinct interests will have to outweigh the similarity of interests that excluded employees share with members of the proposed bargaining unit. This decision strikes a strong blow against unions’ efforts to organize and represent smaller bargaining units.

Copyright © 2019 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

For more NLRB decision-making, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act May Endanger Economy

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act has passed the House of Representatives, and is pending before the Senate where it may pass by unanimous consent (i.e., with no actual vote or hearing).

On its face, the Fairness Act seems fair. By eliminating the 7% per country cap, Indian nationals and Chinese nationals who have been waiting and would continue to wait for years to capture green cards would be placed at the front of line. But this would be at the expense of workers from other countries who are also important to the United States.

About 25% of all STEM workers in the U.S., including those in the fields of healthcare, physical science, computer, and math, are foreign-born and that figure is on the rise. One quarter of all doctors in the U.S. are foreign-born — many from sub-Saharan Africa — and are particularly important in poor, rural areas of the country where physicians are scarce. One in five pharmacists and one in four dentists are foreign-born. Other types of healthcare workers come from Asia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean and our need for these workers rises as baby boomers age.

If the Fairness Act were to pass, recruiting from countries other than India and China might become more difficult, and this talent may well turn elsewhere. New Zealand, Ireland, Australia and the UK are also dependent on foreign-trained doctors.

High-tech workers from India and China are also important to the U.S. and its economy; but our current immigration system is driving them out as well. This started in 2008, when it became difficult for high-tech companies to get the number of H-1B visas they needed. That frustration has grown with the increased scrutiny of H-1B petitions and the long green card waiting lines. Indian and Chinese talent is heading for other countries, and Canada is welcoming them and their companies with open arms. South Africa, Argentina, India, Chile, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Israel, Australia, and Ireland also are popular competitors.

Quotas of one kind or another have been part of the U.S. immigration system since the early part of the 20th century. Literacy requirements limited immigration from some of the poorer countries of the world. Country-of-birth quotas benefited those from the UK, Ireland, and Germany at the expense even of those born in southern and eastern Europe. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Hart-Celler Act), which is the basis of our current system, abolished national origin quotas (to eliminate discrimination) and focused on family reunification. The 7% annual ceiling on the number of immigrants from any one country was established. The ceiling was not meant to be quota, but rather a “barrier against monopolization.”

Senator Rand Paul, who opposes the Fairness Act, introduced the BELIEVE Act (Backlog Elimination, Legal Immigration and Employment Visa Enhancement Act) (S. 2091) on July 11, 2019. That bill would simply quadruple the number of employment-based visas by doubling the number available annually and exempting dependents from being counted toward the annual quota of visas. His bill also would exempt all shortage occupations from green card limits.

The Fairness Act may be just an interim solution. Rather than pitting family-based immigration against employment-based immigration and rather than pitting one country against another or one industry against another, perhaps it is time for legislation like the BELIEVE Act that would simply increase the number of green cards available to everybody.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

For more on green card legislation, see the National Law Review Immigration law page.

The CCPA Is Approaching: What Businesses Need to Know about the Consumer Privacy Law

The most comprehensive data privacy law in the United States, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will take effect on January 1, 2020. The CCPA is an expansive step in U.S. data privacy law, as it enumerates new consumer rights regarding collection and use of personal information, along with corresponding duties for businesses that trade in such information.

While the CCPA is a state law, its scope is sufficiently broad that it will apply to many businesses that may not currently consider themselves to be under the purview of California law. In addition, in the wake of the CCPA, at least a dozen other states have introduced their own comprehensive data privacy legislation, and there is heightened consideration and support for a federal law to address similar issues.

Below, we examine the contours of the CCPA to help you better understand the applicability and requirements of the new law. While portions of the CCPA remain subject to further clarification, the inevitable challenges of compliance, coupled with the growing appetite for stricter data privacy laws in the United States generally, mean that now is the time to ensure that your organization is prepared for the CCPA.

Does the CCPA apply to my business?

Many businesses may rightly wonder if a California law even applies to them, especially if they do not have operations in California. As indicated above, however, the CCPA is not necessarily limited in scope to businesses physically located in California. The law will have an impact throughout the United States and, indeed, worldwide.

The CCPA will have broad reach because it applies to each for-profit business that collects consumers’ personal information, does business in California, and satisfies at least one of three thresholds:

  • Has annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; or
  • Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, the personal information of 50,000 or more California consumers; or
  • Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information

While the CCPA is limited in its application to California consumers, due to the size of the California economy and its population numbers, the act will effectively apply to any data-driven business with operations in the United States.

What is considered “personal information” under the CCPA?

The CCPA’s definition of “personal information” is likely the most expansive interpretation of the term in U.S. privacy law. Per the text of the law, personal information is any “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”

The CCPA goes on to note that while traditional personal identifiers such as name, address, Social Security number, passport, and the like are certainly personal information, so are a number of other categories that may not immediately come to mind, including professional or employment-related information, geolocation data, biometric data, educational information, internet activity, and even inferences drawn from the sorts of data identified above.

As a practical matter, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual consumer, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

When does a business “collect” personal information under the CCPA?

To “collect” or the “collection” of personal information under the CCPA is any act of “buying, renting, gathering, obtaining, receiving, or accessing any personal information pertaining to a consumer by any means.” Such collection can be active or passive, direct from the consumer or via the purchase of consumer data sets. If your business is collecting personal information directly from consumers, then at or before the point of collection the CCPA imposes a notice obligation on your business to inform consumers about the categories of information to be collected and the purposes for which such information will (or may) be used.

To reiterate, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

If a business collects personal information but never sells any of it, does the CCPA still apply?

Yes. While there are additional consumer rights related to the sale of personal information, the CCPA applies to businesses that collect personal information solely for internal purposes, or that otherwise do not disclose such information.

What new rights does the CCPA give to California consumers?

The CCPA gives California consumers four primary new rights: the right to receive information on privacy practices and access information, the right to demand deletion of their personal information, the right to prohibit the sale of their information, and the right not to be subject to price discrimination based on their invocation of any of the new rights specified above.

What new obligations does a business have regarding these new consumer rights?

Businesses that fall under the purview of the CCPA have a number of new obligations under the law:

  • A business must take certain steps to assist individual consumers with exercising their rights under the CCPA. This must be accomplished by providing a link on the business’s homepage titled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” and a separate landing page for the same. In addition, a business must update its privacy policy (or policies), or a California-specific portion of the privacy policy, to include a separate link to the new “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page.

A business also must provide at least two mechanisms for consumers to exercise their CCPA rights by offering, at a minimum, a dedicated web page for receiving and processing such requests (the CCPA is silent on whether this web page must be separate from or can be combined with the “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page), and a toll-free 800 number to receive the same.

  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request to delete personal information, the business must delete that consumer’s personal information within 45 days.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the collection of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Specific pieces of personal information that the business possesses about the consumer;
    • Categories of sources from which the business received personal information about the consumer;
    • A corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer; and
    • The categories of third parties with whom the business has shared the consumer’s personal information.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the sale of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Categories of personal information that the business has sold about the consumer;
    • Categories of third parties to whom the business has sold the consumer’s personal information; and
    • The categories of personal information about the consumer that the business disclosed to a third party (or parties) for a business purpose.
  • Finally, a business must further update its privacy policy (or policies), or the California-specific section of such policy(s), to:
    • Identify all new rights afforded consumers by the CCPA;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has collected in the preceding 12 months;
    • Include a corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has sold in the prior 12 months, or the fact that the business has not sold any such personal information in that time; and
    • Note the categories of third parties with whom a business has shared personal information in the preceding 12 months.

What about employee data gathered by employers for internal workplace purposes?

As currently drafted, nothing in the CCPA carves out an exception for employee data gathered by employers. A “consumer” is simply defined as a “natural person who is a California resident …,” so the law would presumably treat employees like anyone else. However, the California legislature recently passed Bill AB 25, which excludes from the CCPA information collected about a person by a business while the person is acting as a job applicant, employee, owner, officer, director, or contractor of the business, to the extent that information is collected and used exclusively in the employment context. Bill AB 25 also provides an exception for emergency contact information and other information pertaining to the administration of employee benefits. The bill awaits the governor’s signature – he has until October 13, 2019 to sign.

But not so fast – Bill AB 25 only creates a one-year reprieve for employers, rather than a permanent exception. The exceptions listed above will expire on January 1, 2021. By that time, the legislature may choose to extend the exceptions indefinitely, or businesses should be prepared to fully comply with the CCPA.

California employers would thus be wise to start considering the type of employee data they collect, and whether that information may eventually become subject to the CCPA’s requirements (either on January 1, 2021 or thereafter). Personal information is likely to be present in an employee’s job application, browsing history, and information related to payroll processing, to name a few areas. It also includes biometric data, such as fingerprints scanned for time-keeping purposes. Employers who collect employees’ biometric information, for example, would be well advised to review their biometric policies so that eventual compliance with the CCPA can be achieved gradually during this one-year grace period.

Notwithstanding this new legislation, there remains little clarity as to how the law will ultimately be applied in the employer-employee context, if and when the exceptions expire. Employers are encouraged to err on the side of caution and to reach out to experienced legal counsel for further guidance if they satisfy any one of the above thresholds.

What are the penalties for violation of the CCPA?

Violations of the CCPA are enforced by the California Attorney General’s office, which can issue civil monetary fines of up to $2,500 per violation, or $7,500 for each intentional violation. Currently, the California AG’s office must provide notice of any alleged violation and allow for a 30-day cure period before issuing any fine.

Are there any exceptions to the CCPA?

Yes, there are a number of exceptions. First, the CCPA only applies to California consumers and businesses that meet the threshold(s) identified above. If a business operates or conducts a transaction wholly outside of California then the CCPA does not apply.

There are also certain enumerated exceptions to account for federal law, such that the CCPA is pre-empted by HIPAA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act as it applies to personal information sold to or purchased from a credit reporting agency, and information subject to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.

Would it be fair to say that the CCPA is not very clear, and maybe even a bit confusing?

Yes, it would. The CCPA was drafted, debated, and enacted into law very quickly in the face of some legislative and ballot-driven pressures. As a result, the bill as enacted is a bit confusing and even contains sections that appear to contradict its other parts. The drafters of the CCPA, however, recognized this and have included provisions for the California AG’s office to provide further guidance on its intent and meaning. Amendment efforts also remain underway. As such, it is likely that the CCPA will be an evolving law for at least the short term.

Regardless, the CCPA will impose real-world requirements effective January 1, 2020, and the new wave of consumer privacy legislation it has inspired at the state and federal level is likely to bring even more of the same. It is important to address these issues now, rather than when it is too late.

© 2019 Much Shelist, P.C.

For more on the CCPA legislation, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law page.

A Dark Day for Franchising: Ninth Circuit Reinstates its Misguided Vazquez Decision, Undermining the Franchise Business Model

In the course of a politically-charged frenzy to eliminate the misclassification of employees as independent contractors, the franchise business model has been trampled without respect by both the courts and the legislature in California, disrupting commercial relationships that have been a vital driver of the state’s economy for more than fifty years.  Only five years ago, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the vital importance of franchising to the California economy in generating “trillions of dollars in total sales,” “billions of dollars” of payroll and the “millions of people” franchising employs.  Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 489.

Taking into account the “ubiquitous, lucrative, and thriving” franchise business model and its “profound” effects on the economy, the Patterson court held that the usual tests for “determining the circumstances under which an employment or agency relationship exists” could not be applied to franchises.  Id. at 477, 489 and 503.  To avoid disruption of the franchise relationship and turning the model “on its head,” a different test that took into account the practical realities of franchising had to be applied to franchise relationships.  Id. at 498, 499 and 503.  The “imposition and enforcement of a uniform marketing and operational plan cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility.”  Id. at 478.  A franchisor is liable “only if it has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.”  Id. at 497-98.  The special rule for franchising has been commonly referred to as the “Patterson gloss.”

On September 25, 2019, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court reinstated an opinion it had previously published on May 2, 2019, then withdrew on July 22, 2019, recklessly undermining the delicate framework of the franchise business model in derogation of the California Supreme Court’s “Patterson gloss.”  Vazquez v. Jan-Pro, 923 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. May 2, 2019), opinion withdrawn, 2019 US App. Lexis 21687 (July 22, 2019), opinion reinstated, 2019 BL 357978 (9th Cir. September 24, 2019).

The “Patterson gloss” arose from the California Supreme Court’s subtle appreciation for the historical development of the franchise business model.  At the heart of all franchise relationships is a trademark license.  At common law, trademark licenses were seen as a representation to the public of the source of a product.  An attempt to license a trademark risked the forfeiture of any right to royalties and the abandonment of the licensed mark.  See Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).

Although the Trademark Act of 1905 did not allow for the licensing of trademarks, the Trademark Act of 1946, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, did allow a trademark to be licensed, but only where the licensee was “controlled by the registrant. . . in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.   After the passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark could be licensed, as long as “the plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the public.”  Dawn Donut, at 367.  After the Lanham Act had legitimized trademark licensing, the franchise model began to emerge in the 1950s, as the Patterson court noted (at 489), leading to the explosive growth of franchising over the last seven decades.

“Franchising is a heavily regulated form of business in California.”  Cislaw v. Southland Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288.  Franchisors must provide prospective franchisees with detailed pre-sale disclosure documents under the California Franchise Investment Law, Corporations Code § 31000 et seq. and the FTC Rule, 39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974).  There are criminal, civil and administrative consequences for failure to comply.  Franchisees’ rights are protected by the California Franchise Relations Act, Business & Professions Code § 20000, et seq., which includes recently enhanced penalties for non-compliance.

Over the years, California courts have acknowledged the fundamental obligation of franchisors to impose controls over their licensees and have uniformly held that such controls do not create an employment or agency relationship.  See, e.g., Cislaw, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1295 (the owner of a brand may impose restrictions on a licensee “without incurring the responsibilities or acquiring the immunities of a master, with respect to the person controlled.”); Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 746, (“If the law were otherwise, every franchisee who independently owned and operated a franchise would be the true agent or employee of the franchisor.”).  This doctrine came to be known as the “Patterson gloss” and is the glue that holds the franchise business model together—allowing the franchisor to exert the controls necessary to license a trademark without incurring the responsibilities of an employer.

In its September 25, 2019 decision in Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit once again discarded the Patterson gloss like an extra part found in the bottom of an Ikea box after the hasty assembly of an end table.  According to the Vazquez court, Patterson had no relevance because it was just a vicarious liability decision, not an employment decision.  But Patterson was an employment case.

Patterson was a Fair Employment and Housing claim brought by a teenage girl after her supervisor had repeatedly groped her breasts and buttocks.  Patterson, at 479.  It is hard to understand why the Vazquez court considered the wage order claims before it to be more significant than Taylor Patterson’s right to pursue legal claims for sexual harassment.

Even more disturbingly, the Vazquez court disregarded the “Patterson gloss” because Dynamex [Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903] had favorably cited two Massachusetts decisions that applied the ABC test in the franchise context.  Id. at 39.  The Massachusetts cases were cited in Dynamex only as examples of cases where it had been more efficient to address “the latter two parts of the [ABC] standard” on a dispositive motion, rather than all three prongs.  Dynamex, 4 Cal.5th at 48.  The court never mentions franchising or the inconsequential fact that the parties in cited cases were franchises.  The Dynamex court could not be fairly understood to have abandoned its stalwart embrace of the franchise business model in its 2014 Patterson decision, without ever bothering to mention the case or to make any reference to franchising.  Yet the Vazquez court concluded that a passing citation to cases that happened to involve franchise companies in the Dynamex opinion—to make a procedural point that was unrelated to franchising in any way—was an occult signal from the California Supreme Court that the “Patterson gloss” had been abandoned by implication five years after its creation.

Nor was it valid for the Vazquez court to confine the “Patterson gloss” to vicarious liability cases.  As Witkin points out, California law on vicarious liability and employment developed together, so that most “of the rules relating to duties, authority, liability, etc. are applicable to employees as well as other agents.”  Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed., Agency & Employment, § 4).  The core obligation to control a trademark licensee—hard-wired by the Lanham Act into every franchise relationship—must be respected in both vicarious liability and employment cases if the franchise business model is to be preserved.

The Vazquez court had it right when it withdrew and de-published its original decision on July 22, 2019.  When the court certified the retroactivity issue to the California Supreme Court that day, it could have also certified the franchise issue back to the court that created the Patterson gloss, but it did not do so.  Franchisors are now left to wonder how they are to maintain existing long-term commercial relationships and to continue to sell franchises after the Vazquez opinion has taken from them the fundamental right to license trademarks without incurring the unintended liabilities of employers.

© 2019 Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

Read more on the topic on the National Law Review Franchising Law page.

EEOC Provides Guidance on Reporting Non-Binary Gender Employees

Over the last few years, many employers have implemented diversity and inclusion programs, whether official or unofficial, emphasizing a work force that includes a wide variety of individuals based on, among other categories, race, gender, and sexual orientation.

Internally, companies have updated employment policies, expanded the scope of anti-harassment trainings, created avenues for diverse mentorship, and implemented changes to create workplaces that include and support a diverse office culture.

Externally, a number of states too have begun to update government documents to accommodate diverse individuals, including those who identify their gender as non-binary. For example, California recently enacted legislation permitting individuals to identify as female (F), male (M), or non-binary (X) on their drivers’ licenses.

Yet many employers with non-binary employees have been concerned as to how to appropriately report all of their employees on the federal EEO-1 reports and still comply with the law. As we previously reported, in 2017, the EEOC made it clear that the protections offered by Title VII include an “individual’s transgender status or the individual’s intent to transition,” “gender identity,” and “sexual orientation.”

The EEOC guidance also went further, stating that “using a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s gender identity in a persistent or offensive manner” is sex-based harassment.  It is clear, therefore, that non-binary individuals must be afforded protections regarding their gender identity.  However, the EEO-1 report, which requires employers with over 100 employees to submit data specific to their employees’ gender and race/ethnicity, limits the gender categories to either male or female.  Employers with non-binary employees therefore have had no category to indicate the correct gender identity of these individuals, and several questioned whether it was appropriate (or even legally compliant) to request that non-binary employees choose a marker for which they do not identify.

Last month, the EEOC offered guidance by updating its Frequently Asked Questions to address this issue.  In the FAQ, the EEOC advises that employers “may report employee counts and labor hours for non-binary gender employees by job category and pay band and racial group in the comment box on the Certification Page,” and further provides examples as to how employers may comply with submitting the EEOC-required data in the future for those employees who identify as non-binary.

While describing these details in a comment box as opposed to checking a pre-marked gender identity box is not as streamlined or efficient as some employers would have hoped, it is at least a step toward ensuring that employers have a means to comply with reporting requirements and support their employees by acknowledging the gender identity of their choice.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

For more on diversity in the workplace, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Finally, the Final Part 541 Rule: $35,568 Is the New Salary Threshold for Exempt Employees

In its final part 541 overtime rule, the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) set the salary level or amount test at $684 per week/$35,568 per year for exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees of section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The total annual compensation test for a highly compensated employee is $107,432. The standard salary level test of $684 is comparable to the amount proposed earlier this year since the WHD used the same methodology as it applied in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). The total annual compensation level for highly compensated employees of $107,432 is lower than that proposed earlier this year in its NPRM because it is based on the 80th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried employees nationally.

According to the DOL, which released the final rule on September 24, 2019, this final part 541 overtime rule “has been submitted to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication, and is currently pending placement on public inspection at the OFR and publication in the Federal Register.” These new thresholds for exemption from both the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA go into effect on January 1, 2020.

This final rule is the culmination of a long-term effort to increase these salary and total annual compensation requirements—set forth in part 541 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations—which were last increased in 2004. These regulations define and delimit the exemptions for bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees. As we wrote previously, the DOL/WHD published a notice of proposed rulemaking in March 2019, with a 60-day comment period that expired on May 21, 2019. After its review of the comments, the DOL submitted its draft final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget on August 12, 2019. OIRA completed its review of the final overtime rule and returned it to the DOL on September 13, 2019.

In addition to finalizing the salary amount test for exempt employees and the total annual compensation requirement for highly compensated employees, the final rule also permits employers to apply non-discretionary bonus and other incentive payments to satisfy up to 10 percent of the standard salary level, provided such non-discretionary payments are paid at least annually or more frequently. Also in keeping with its proposed rule, the final overtime rule does not include a provision that automatically would increase the salary level test or total annual compensation amount on some regular or periodic basis. Most significantly, the final overtime (part 541) rule does not make any changes to any of the duties tests for these exemptions.

As you may recall in 2016, employer-aligned interests brought suit to challenge the final overtime rule issued during the final year of the Obama administration. The litigation was successful, and the 2016 final rule was enjoined by a federal district court in Texas and has never gone into effect. The 2019 final part 541 rule formally rescinds the 2016 final rule. At this juncture, it is difficult to predict whether employee advocates will mount a similar legal challenge to this rulemaking. While several have expressed interest in doing so, almost all of these advocates argue that the salary level test in the 2019 final rule is insufficient. Instead, they support a salary level requirement along the lines of that published in the 2016 rulemaking that set the salary level test at $913 per week/$47,476 per year for exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees..

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more DOL regulation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment Law page.