Category: Labor & Employment

To Stalk or Not to Stalk . . . That Is the Question – Using Social Media for Applicant Review

Now more than ever, employers are using social media to screen job applicants. According to a 2018 survey, 70 percent of employers use social media to research candidates. Using social media to research job applicants can provide you with useful information, but it can also get you into trouble.

When you review an applicant’s social media account, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc., you may learn information regarding the applicant’s race, sex, religion, national origin, or age, among other characteristics.

As our readers are aware, a variety of state and federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit employers from choosing not to hire a candidate based on a number of legally protected classes. Just as it would be unlawful to ask an applicant if he or she has a disability during an interview and fail to hire that applicant based on his or her disability, it would also be illegal not to hire an applicant because you observed a Facebook post in which she expressed her hope to be pregnant within the next six months.

Consider the following best practice tips for using social media to screen applicants:

  1. Develop a Policy and Be Consistent – Implement a policy detailing which social media websites you will review, the purpose of the review and type of information sought, at what stage the review will be conducted, and how much time you will spend on the search. Applying these policies consistently will help to combat claims of discriminatory hiring practices should they arise.
  2. Document Your Findings – Save what you find, whether it is a picture or a screenshot of a comment the applicant made. What you find on social media can disappear as easily as you found it. Protect your decision by documenting what you find. In case the matter is litigated, it can be produced later.
  3. Wait Until After the Initial Interview – Avoid performing a social media screening until after the initial interview. It is much easier to defend a decision not to interview or hire an applicant if you do not have certain information early on.
  4. Follow FCRA Requirements – If you decide to use a third party to perform social media screening services, remember that these screenings are likely subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements because the screening results constitute a consumer report. This means the employer will be required to: 1) inform the applicant of the results that are relevant to its decision not to hire; 2) provide the applicant with the relevant social media document; 3) provide the applicant notice of his or her rights under the FCRA and; 4) allow the applicant to rebut the information before making a final decision.
  5. Do Not Ask for Their Password – Many states have enacted laws that prohibit an employer from requesting or requiring applicants to provide their login credentials for their social media and other internet accounts. Although some states still allow this, the best practice is not to ask for it. Further, while it is not illegal to friend request a job applicant, proceed with caution. Friend requesting a job applicant (and assuming the applicant accepts the request) may provide you with greater access to the applicant’s personal life. Many people categorize portions of their profiles as private, thereby protecting specific information from the public’s view. If you receive access to this information you may gain more knowledge regarding the applicant’s protected characteristics. If you are going to friend request applicants, you should include this in your written policy and apply this practice across the board.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

More information for employers considering job applicants on the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Bite Your Tongue: NLRB Rules that Produce Company’s Media, Confidentiality Policies are Lawful

The NLRB under the current administration continues to issue decisions that factor in legitimate business considerations of employers when evaluating rules that are alleged to restrict employee protections under the NLRA.  One such recently issued decision, LA Specialty Produce Company, 368 NLRB No. 93 (October 10, 2019), may have particular significance because it addresses an important issue — restrictions on communications responsive to inquiries from the media.

The restriction at issue in the LA Specialty case provided as follows:

“Employees approached for interview and/or comments by the news media, cannot provide them with any information. Our President, Michael Glick, is the only person authorized and designated to comment on Company policies or any event that may affect our organization.”

The Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging that the rule in its entirety violated the NLRA because it purportedly chilled employees from exercising their section 7 rights under the NLRA, including the right to discuss work issues publicly when asked to comment by the press.  The administrative law judge found the rule to be overly broad, and therefore unlawful, because on its face it could be construed to cover NLRA-protected activities; however, the Board disagreed with this reading of the rule.  While the Board recognized that the first sentence of the rule, standing alone, might suggest that employees may never speak to the news media when approached for comment, it concluded that an objectively reasonable employee would understand that the second sentence qualified the first sentence by explaining that only the company president was authorized and designated to comment on company matters. Thus, read as a whole, a reasonable employee would understand that he or she is only precluded from speaking on behalf of the employer when approached for comment.

The Board also designated this rule as a “category 1” rule under the principles announced by the Board in Boeing Co., a Board decision that was issued in December of 2017. “Category 1” rules include rules the Board designates as lawful, either because (i) the rule, when reasonably interpreted, does not prohibit or interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights; or (ii) the potential adverse impact on protected rights is outweighed by justifications associated with the rule.  See our client alert here.  Since there is no Section 7 right to speak to the media on behalf of the employer, the Board concluded that the employer’s media contact restriction, when reasonably interpreted, would not potentially interfere with the exercise of Section 7 rights.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

For more NLRB decisions, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Can an Employee be Fired for Being Gay or Transgender?

HR Professionals will soon know the answer to this question.

The United States Supreme Court is preparing to settle a contentious debate on employee protections under federal employment discrimination laws.  On October 7th, the Court returned from its summer break to start the new term.  The Court did not have to wait long before it tackled a complex case because on October 8th, the Court heard two major oral arguments with potentially far-reaching implications for both employers and employees.  Both cases focus on the prohibitions in employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).  Under Title VII, Congress made it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”  The question that the Court will address is whether employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited employment discrimination “because of sex.”

The first case the Court heard was a consolidated matter involving cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia), both of which involve men who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.

Second Circuit: “Sex” is Necessarily a Factor in Sexual Orientation

The plaintiff in Zarda, Donald Zarda, was a skydiving instructor, who died in 2014.  Prior to his death, a female client complained that Zarda inappropriately touched her during a jump.  At some point, Zarda communicated to the client that he was a homosexual and “had an ex-husband,” a practice that Zarda stated he often did with female clients to put them at ease.  Altitude Express terminated Zarda in connection with the complaint; however, Zarda insisted he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

A federal district court granted summary judgment against Zarda, reasoning that his claim was not cognizable under Title VII.  However, the Second Circuit reversed, with a majority of the court believing that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated by sex and, therefore, a “subset of sex discrimination.”  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that federal law prohibits the firing of an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.  Notably, the court reached this conclusion by taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of the text “because of sex.”  Specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII must protect sexual orientation “because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”

Eleventh Circuit: Discharge for Homosexuality Not Prohibited by Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.  The plaintiff in Bostock, Gerald Bostock, was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator in Clayton County for over ten years.  Although Bostock had received good performance reviews for his work, an internal audit was conducted on his program’s funds.  Bostock, who is gay, claimed the audit was a “pretext for discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation.”  During an advisory meeting, where Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one person criticized Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in a gay softball league.

After his complaint was dismissed at the district court level, Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Referring back to a 1979 decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that it had already held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”  While hinting that this earlier ruling may have been wrong, the court held that it had no choice but to follow precedent and affirm the dismissal of Bostock’s claim.

Sixth Circuit: Discrimination on the Basis of Transgender and Transitioning Status is Necessarily Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The second case, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, presents a similar question to Zarda and Bostock.  That is, whether employees can be fired based on their status as transgender.

The case involves Aimee Stephens, who was a funeral director and embalmer for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes.  While working in this position for six years, Stephens dressed and presented herself as a man without issue.  However, once Stephens communicated that she wanted to live and work as a woman before having sex-reassignment surgery, she was terminated.  The owner of the funeral home, a devout Christian, admitted that Stephens was fired because she “was no longer going to represent himself as a man.  He wanted to dress as a woman.”  The owner believed this change would violate “God’s commands.”

After Stephens filed a discrimination charge, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursued a complaint on her behalf against the funeral home.  In ruling in favor of the employer, the district court reasoned that transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII in this instance as doing so would substantially burden the employer’s religious exercise.  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.”  The court further ruled that the RFRA did not apply to protect the funeral home’s actions because the funeral home was not a “religious institution,” and Stephens was not a “ministerial employee” excluded from Title VII’s protections.

Stakeholders: States, Federal Government, Employers, and Employees

The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, which is expected in the spring or summer of 2020, has the potential to be monumental because of the many stakeholders involved.  Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have barred sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by statute or regulation, as have a number of counties and municipalities.  While a few other states provide protection from this type of discrimination either by agency interpretation or court ruling, the remaining states in the country offer no protection under their state laws.  This means that LGBTQ individuals who live in states such as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and even North Carolina (at least with respect to private employers) may have no remedy to this type of employment discrimination outside of Title VII.

Additionally, states who have passed laws in this area may face challenges in enforcing those laws if the Supreme Court decides that Title VII does not protect gay and transgender status.  Many of these states lean on the EEOC’s authority to investigate claims of discrimination against companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and the EEOC has been successful in partnering with states to investigate discrimination claims and enforce such actions.  However, states would lose EEOC assistance should the Court decide that Title VII’s scope does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identification.

Although the EEOC traditionally has been on the side of expanding Title VII protections, the federal government in the most recent litigation has aligned itself with the employers.  In particular, United States Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” does not apply to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Accepting this interpretation, Title VII is limited to barring employers from treating women different from men in the same or similar position, and vice-versa.

Equally important to the states’ and federal government’s interest is the interest of employers.  Companies have lined up on both sides of the debate with over 36 briefs filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, and over 24 briefs filed in support of Clayton County and Altitude Express.  For example, one brief filed in support of Bostock and Zarda includes 206 companies representing businesses such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Uber.  These businesses argued that interpreting Title VII to “exclude sexual orientation or gender identity from protections against sex discrimination would have wide-ranging, negative consequences for businesses, their employees, and the U.S. economy.”  In contrast, the C12 group that represents “the largest network of Christian CEOs, business owners, and executives in the United States” filed a separate brief in support of the employers arguing that interpreting “because of sex” in Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity ignores the natural meaning of the law, “thereby bypassing the political process, shutting down debate, preventing any accommodation of divergent views, and precluding any compromise.”

Makeup of the Court: The Deciding Vote

Prior to his retirement, Justice Anthony Kennedy was the deciding vote in several gay rights cases.  However, Justice Kennedy is no longer on the bench, and these cases present the first opportunity for the public to see how his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will vote on these issues.  Also, Justice Neil Gorsuch, successor to Justice Antonin Scalia, may play a key role in deciding these issues.  Similar to Scalia, it is believed that Justice Gorsuch is more inclined to rule that courts should naturally interpret statutes as they were meant when enacted.  Should Justice Gorsuch hold firm to this view, then there is some thought that he may conclude sexual orientation and gender identity were not meant to be included as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.  The perspectives of these new Justices are likely to dictate the Court’s ultimate decision – a decision which may directly impact the employment landscape for years to come.

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on Employment Protections, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment and Civil Rights law pages.

Supreme Court Will not Disturb Ruling that a False Rumor about “Sleeping Your Way to a Promotion” can be a Hostile Work Environment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to review an appellate court decision that held a false rumor about a woman “sleeping” her way to a promotion can give rise to a hostile work environment claim.  This means that the February 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc. will stand.  In Parker, the Fourth Circuit held that, where an employer participates in circulating false rumors that a female employee slept with her male boss to obtain a promotion, this constitutes Title VII gender discrimination.

Parker’s Discrimination Claim

Evangeline Parker started worked for Reema Consulting Services, Inc., (“RCSI”) at its warehouse facility as a low-level clerk.  She was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager.  About two weeks after she was promoted to a manager position, she learned that some male employees were circulating “an unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor about her” that “falsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual relationship” with a higher-ranking manager to obtain her management position.

The rumor originated with another RCSI employee who was jealous of Parker’s achievement, and the highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility participated in spreading the rumor.  Parker’s complaint alleged that as the rumor spread, she “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising.

At an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the door in Parker’s face and excluded her from the meeting.  The following day, the warehouse manager screamed at Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace.” He also stated that “he could no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and that he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  A few days later, the warehouse manager “lost his temper and began screaming” at Parker, and Parker then filed an internal sexual harassment complaint with RCSI Human Resources.  Shortly thereafter, RCSI gave Parker two warnings and terminated her employment.

Lawyer pointingParker brought a discrimination claim, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  The district court dismissed her claim on the grounds that 1) the harassment was not based upon gender and instead based upon false allegations of conduct by her, and 2) the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of Parker’s employment because the rumor was circulated for just a few weeks.  Judge Titus found, “Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her.”  However, he continued “that is not a harassment based upon gender.  It’s based upon false allegations of conduct by her.  And this same type of a rumor could be made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity leading to a promotion.”  Ultimately, Judge Titus held that “the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.

Gender-Based Rumors Can Constitute Sex Harassment

Taking into account all of the allegations of the complaint, including the sex-based nature of the rumor and its effects, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor that Parker had sex with her male superior to obtain a promotion was gender-based in that it implied that she “used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion.”  The court found that the rumor invoked “a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success.”  This double standard precipitated by negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior can cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men.  Thus, the rumor about Parker sleeping her way to a promotion constituted a form of sexual harassment.

The Fourth Circuit also held that Parker sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment:

[T]he harassment was continuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the Sterling facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her final promotion.  The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male workplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees.  Management too contributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor.  The highest-ranking manager asked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker, whether his wife was divorcing him because he was “f–king” Parker.  The same manager called an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker.  In another meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace. And in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he should have fired her when she began “huffing and puffing” about it.

Implications

Parker correctly recognizes that gender-based stereotypes can prevent women from advancing in the workplace and that Title VII bars employers from using negative gender stereotypes to harass employees.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
More on workplace harassment via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Resist the Urge to Access: the Impact of the Stored Communications Act on Employer Self-Help Tactics

As an employer or manager, have you ever collected a resigning employee’s employer-owned laptop or cellphone and discovered that the employee left a personal email account automatically logged in? Did you have the urge to look at what the employee was doing and who the employee was talking to right before resigning? Perhaps to see if he or she was talking to your competitors or customers? If so, you should resist that urge.

The federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., is a criminal statute that makes it an offense to “intentionally access[ ]without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided[ ]and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a[n] . . . electronic communication while it is in electronic storage  . . . .” It also creates a civil cause of action for victims of such offenses, remedied by (i) actual damages of at least $1,000; (ii) attorneys’ fees and court costs; and, potentially, (iii) punitive damages if the access was willful or intentional.

So how does this criminal statute apply in a situation in which an employee uses a personal email account on an employer-owned electronic device—especially if an employment policy confirms there is no expectation of privacy on the employer’s computer systems and networks? The answer is in the technology itself.

Many courts find that the “facility” referenced in the statute is the server on which the email account resides—not the company’s computer or other electronic device. In one 2013 federal case, a former employee left her personal Gmail account automatically logged in when she returned her company-owned smartphone. Her former supervisor allegedly used that smartphone to access over 48,000 emails on the former employee’s personal Gmail account. The former employee later sued her former supervisor and her former employer under the Stored Communications Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, arguing, among other things, that a smartphone was not a “facility” under the statute.

While agreeing with that argument in principle, the court concluded that it was, in fact, Gmail’s server that was the “facility” for purposes of Stored Communications Act claims. The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments (i) that because it was a company-owned smartphone, the employee had in fact authorized the review, and (ii) that the former employee was responsible for any alleged loss of privacy, because she left the door open to the employer reviewing the Gmail account.

Similarly, in a 2017 federal case, a former employee sued her ex-employer for allegedly using her returned cell phone to access her Gmail account on at least 40 occasions. To assist in the prosecution of a restrictive covenant claim against the former employee, the former employer allegedly arranged to forward several of those emails to the employer’s counsel, including certain allegedly privileged emails between the former employee and her lawyer. The court denied the former employer’s motion to dismiss the claim based on those allegations.

Interestingly, some courts, including both in the above-referenced cases, draw a line on liability under the Stored Communication Act based on whether the emails that were accessed were already opened at the time of access. This line of reasoning is premised on a finding that opened-but-undeleted emails are not in “storage for backup purposes” under the Stored Communications Act. But this distinction is not universal.

In another 2013 federal case, for example, an individual sued his business partner under the Stored Communications Act after the defendant logged on to the other’s Yahoo account using his password. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on that claim, and the defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendant argued that she only read emails that had already been opened and that they were therefore not in “electronic storage” for “purposes of backup protection.” The court disagreed, stating that “regardless of the number of times plaintiff or defendant viewed plaintiff’s email (including by downloading it onto a web browser), the Yahoo server continued to store copies of those same emails that previously had been transmitted to plaintiff’s web browser and again to defendant’s web browser.” So again, the court read the Stored Communications Act broadly, stating that “the clear intent of the SCA was to protect a form of communication in which the citizenry clearly has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Based on the broad reading of the Stored Communications Act in which many courts across the country engage, employers and managers are well advised to exercise caution before reviewing an employee’s personal communications that may be accessible on a company electronic device. Even policies informing employees not to expect privacy on company computer systems and networks may not save the employer or manager from liability under the statute. So seek legal counsel if this opportunity presents itself upon an employee’s separation from the company. And resist the urge to access before doing so.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on the Stored Communications Act, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

Happy New Year! – Prepare to Track Time of More Employees or Increase Salaries

The US Department of Labor finally released its highly anticipated changes to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This rule, which goes into effect on January 1, 2020, will make more employees eligible for overtime because it updates the minimum salary thresholds necessary to exempt certain employees from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime pay requirements, as it will:

  • Raise the salary level from the current $455 per week to $684 per week (or $35,568 per year for a full-year worker)
  • Raise the total annual compensation level for highly compensated employees from the current $100,000 per year to $107,432 per year
  • Allow employers to use nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) that are paid at least annually to satisfy up to 10 percent of the salary level
  • Revise the special salary levels for workers in US territories and in the motion picture industry

This means all employees who are paid a salary falling below the new salary threshold will be non-exempt beginning on January 1, 2020. Said another way, these employees will be eligible for overtime for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Remind Me About the Exemptions Affected

The FLSA generally requires employees to be paid at least minimum wage for every hour worked, and overtime (time and a half) for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Certain employees are “exempt” from the FLSA’s minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements. Key here are the “white collar” exemptions, namely the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions, which depend on three things:

  1. The employee must be paid on a “salaried basis,” meaning the employee receives a fixed, guaranteed minimum amount for any workweek in which the employee performs any work. This means there can be no change in salary regardless of the hours worked.
  2. The employee must be paid a minimum salary of, as of January 1, 2020, $684 per week ($35,658 annually).
  3. However, paying a sufficient salary is not enough — the employee must also perform exempt job duties under one of the exemptions to satisfy this test. (Notably, the new rule did not make any changes to the job duties test, despite ambiguity and years of employer confusion.)

Let’s reiterate this important point again: to be exempt under one of these exemptions, all three prongs above must be satisfied.

I’m Busy — Can I Deal with This Later?

We wouldn’t recommend that. It’s time to start preparing because there are many moving parts when making classification decisions, and, as we all know, 2020 will be here sooner than we think. Also, we suspect these won’t be unilateral decisions made by the human resources department but that others will need to be involved; for most companies, that won’t happen overnight, as it may require significant analysis of the budgetary impact of potential salary increases before employee classifications can be finalized.

So what can you do now? We suggest you start by identifying employees who are currently classified as exempt but whose salaries fall below the new $684 weekly salary. Then, try to estimate the number of hours worked by the employee each workweek, which may be more difficult than it sounds, since exempt workers typically don’t track their time. Depending on the employee’s salary and the number of hours worked, you’ll want to consider whether you’re going to raise the employee’s pay to meet the new threshold or reclassify the employee as non-exempt and pay overtime; and, if you’re going to reclassify the employee, you’ll have to determine how and what the employee will be paid. You should go through the same analysis for those employees who are classified as exempt under the highly compensated employee exemption if their annual salary falls below the new $107,432 threshold.

Think you’re done? Wait, there’s more! Once you identify employees who will be reclassified, you’re going to need to craft your message to explain the changes and new expectations. You may need to develop new policies and/or train the newly non-exempt employees (and possibly their supervisors) on the company’s timekeeping policies as well as on the consequences for failing to follow them. Remember that the FLSA provides strict record-keeping requirements for employers to track the working hours of non-exempt employees. And you may be faced with the need to soothe the egos of employees who feel like being paid hourly is beneath them. (We know this sounds silly, but these morale concerns are real.)

Finally, if you have concerns about the classification of any of your other employees, or if it has simply been awhile since your employee classifications were reviewed, this is a prime time to conduct a general audit of your wage and hour practices. With many employees across the country, and likely within your own organization, being reclassified and becoming eligible for overtime come January 1, you’ll be able to make changes to the classification of other employees who may not meet any exemptions while drawing less attention.

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP

For more on the New DOL Overtime Rule, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Job Applicant Pay History Inquiries Now Off-Limits in Illinois

As of September 29, 2019, Illinois employers may not ask job applicants or their prior employers about salary history. The change comes after Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed an amendment to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003.

The New Requirements

The Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003 made it illegal to pay employees differently on the basis of sex or the employee’s status as an African American, subject to exceptions. The impetus behind the law is to address historic pay disparities for the same or substantially similar work. The amendment now takes the law a step further to address the practice of using pay histories of applicants to set wages (including benefits and other compensation). Specifically, the amendment makes the following additions to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003:

  • Employers, including employment agencies, may not screen out applicants on the basis of their current or prior wage history by setting a maximum or minimum wage level that applicants must satisfy.
  • Employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of employment.
  • More specifically, employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of being considered for employment, being interviewed, continuing to be considered for employment, or receiving a job offer.
  • Employers may not seek the wage history of an applicant from any current or prior employer.

If an applicant voluntarily discloses his or her pay history this does not create a violation. However, the employer cannot then use the voluntarily disclosed pay history in consideration of employment, an offer of compensation, or setting future wages, benefits, and other compensation.

What Are Employers Permitted to Do?

While employers cannot look into the wage histories of applicants, they are still permitted to share salary and benefit information about the position the applicant seeks. Employers can also discuss salary expectations with applicants without running afoul of the law.

Employers with Illinois employees should review their recruitment and compensation practices, including paper applications and online forms, to remove any references and requests regarding an applicant’s pay history. Further, human resources employees should be trained on appropriate recruitment procedures for Illinois employees.

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

For more state salary history bans, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Global Employment Contracts: The Modern Tower of Babel

Although multi-jurisdictional compliance is a challenge in relation to every aspect of employment law, the structure of employment contracts and the enforcement of global policies require particularly careful consideration.

The need to coordinate individual country compliance across numerous countries whilst still maintaining a common company culture requires extensive knowledge of national laws and considerable flexibility.

Contracts

US-based businesses will be used to working with at-will offer letters, but these are mostly unheard of elsewhere. In most jurisdictions, detailed employment contracts are not only customary, but are required by law. As you would expect, companies must ensure the legal compliance of their contractual documentation for each country in which they do business. This includes engagement letters, employment offers, employment contracts, bonus schemes, stock option plans, etc.

With employment contracts, the most common approach is to prepare a contract compliant with local law in accordance with best practices in the jurisdiction where the individual is to be employed. Contracts should incorporate crucial terms, such as probationary periods, termination grounds, working time provisions, and post-termination non-compete and/or non-solicitation provisions.

  • Countries have varying rules on the maximum duration of a probationary period. For example, France permits an eight-month probationary period, one renewal included, for executives under an indefinite-term contract (contrat à durée indéterminée); whereas a 90-day probationary period is standard in the United States.
  • Subject to applicable statutory restrictions in each country, termination provisions provide a good starting point to enforce the departure of an employee, for example in case of a violation of company policies, such as a code of conduct.
  • In France, where the legal working time is 35 hours per week, there is the option of entering into flat-rate pay agreements for autonomous executives whose roles and responsibilities do not permit alignment with the collective working time/office schedule. In the United Kingdom, there exist more flexible, zero-hours contracts, under which the employer is not obliged to provide any minimum working hours but, equally, the employee has no obligation to accept the work offered.
  • The rules on post-termination provisions, such as confidentiality, non-compete and non-solicitation restrictions, vary significantly. Some jurisdictions follow a reasonableness approach (Australia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom); others have outright prohibitions (India, Mexico, and Russia); and others mandate compensation for non-compete clauses (China, France, and Germany).

With so many nuances country-by-country, contract drafters often consider choice of law and jurisdiction clauses. Public policy considerations may, however, override such clauses. For an Italian citizen hired in Italy to work in Italy, it will be difficult to apply Australian law merely because the employer is an Australian corporation. The general rule is that the laws of an employee’s physical worksite will likely apply, regardless of such clauses.

The relevant law for all European Union countries is the Rome I Regulation. Under Rome I, foreign employees in Europe benefit from the mandatory laws of the country with which they have the closest connection, which will usually be the country where they normally work. Accordingly, a German employee working in France should receive a French law-governed employment contract, even if the employee works for a UK employing entity.

For highly mobile employees, however, the place of work is often debatable. For instance, English employment courts have decided that an employee working remotely in Australia has the right to bring an unfair dismissal claim in the United Kingdom if the work is done for a UK employer, regardless of the employee’s physical worksite.

Forum-selection provisions that call for a forum other than the place of employment tend to be unenforceable outside the United States. In London, US expatriates working under contracts with such clauses who sue before an English Employment Tribunal are unlikely to see their claim dismissed when their employer invokes the forum-selection clause.

In choice-of-forum situations, Europeans invoke the provisions of the “Recast Brussels Regulation.” These codify the general rule that employees rarely have to litigate employment disputes outside their host country place of employment, even if a choice-of-foreign-forum clause purports to require otherwise.

Communicating Global Policies

Every organisation has bespoke policies, employee handbooks, and a code of conduct. In addition, every organisation has its own HR practices, such as evaluation processes and training programmes, all dictated by the corporate culture and even corporate vocabulary. It can be challenging to extend those across borders and the legal systems of different countries.

In France, policies related to safety, disciplinary procedures, harassment, whistleblowing, etc., particularly if the policy provides sanctions, must be incorporated within internal rules (règlement intérieur), which must be filed with the employment court and inspectorate. If a company fails to file its policies correctly, it may not be able to discipline employees for violating the rules.

Country by country, companies must consider the interrelationship between the contract and the applicable policies. In some jurisdictions, it is advisable to incorporate relevant handbook policies into the contract. In the United Kingdom, for example, it is compulsory to mention disciplinary and grievances procedures in the contract.

Language Barriers

Where the policies are written is, however, merely the beginning. How they are written is much more complicated. Communicating clearly in multiple languages is now a core HR function for global entities. Many jurisdictions, such as Belgium, France, and Poland, require contracts to be in the local language, even for an employee fluent in the primary language used by the employer. If the contract is not in the local language, its provisions, the policies, and other elements, will be unenforceable, at least for the employer.

A typical example is a global bonus plan, where a failure by the employer to translate the target objectives can allow the employee to claim a bonus without needing to comply with the terms of the plan (i.e., without achieving the stated goals or objectives). This has been confirmed by French case law.

In some countries, such as Turkey, the local language will always prevail, regardless of what is provided for in the contract. In those cases, ensuring translation accuracy can avoid inadvertently granting employees more generous terms under a local translation than the company intended.

Local language translations are also required for other purposes. For instance, in Spain the employment contract needs to be filed with the government, in Spanish. In other countries, such as China, works councils and unions will need to be consulted on the implementation of policies, and submissions for those consultations will need to be in the local language.

As a result, businesses now often consider whether to create employment documents in the local language only, or in two languages. If a document is used that has two columns showing the corporate language and the local language, it is crucial to state which language prevails.

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery

For more on employment law, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

Legal Alert: Not So Fast: National Labor Relations Board Rejects Boeing S.C. Micro Unit

On September 9, 2019, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) clarified its test for unionizing “micro units” of employees within larger workforces, and prevented the International Association of Machinists from representing a small group of Boeing Co. technicians at a plant in South Carolina. The Boeing Company, 368 NLRB No. 67 (2019). In a three-to-one vote, the Board said a proposed bargaining unit consisting of about 175 flight-readiness technicians at Boeing’s Charleston Final Assembly operation does not meet federal standards for appropriate units, because the workers are not distinct from the site’s larger workforce of approximately 2,700 maintenance and production workers.

The International Association of Machinists won an election in May of 2018 to become the bargaining representative of this smaller unit of employees. This election followed an earlier election where a large unit of production and maintenance workers rejected the Union in a 2,087 – 731 vote. After the May 2018 election, the Company appealed the certification of the smaller unit of Boeing employees, arguing that the NLRB Regional Director had improperly approved the small unit of flight-readiness technicians.

In Boeing, the Board indicated that the standard it set forth for unionizing smaller bargaining units of employees in the PCC Structurals decision from December of 2017 was being misapplied. The standard for unionizing micro units of employees, as set forth in Boeing, requires a three-step legal analysis to determine the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. First, the proposed unit must share an internal community of interest. Second, the interests of those within the proposed unit and the shared and distinct interests of those excluded from that unit must be comparatively analyzed and weighed. Third, consideration must be given to the Board’s decisions on appropriate units in the particular industry involved.

Moving forward, unions will have to demonstrate a sufficiently distinct community of interest among the proposed bargaining unit as compared to excluded employees. And, excluded employees’ distinct interests will have to outweigh the similarity of interests that excluded employees share with members of the proposed bargaining unit. This decision strikes a strong blow against unions’ efforts to organize and represent smaller bargaining units.

Copyright © 2019 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

For more NLRB decision-making, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.