Supreme Court Ruling on Affirmative Action and Impact on Companies’ DEI Programs

In June 2023, the US Supreme Court voted 6-3 in a decision that significantly changed the way colleges and universities used affirmative action in their admissions. The targets of the lawsuit were Harvard University and University of North Carolina for alleged racial discrimination in admissions.

The Ruling 

The Court ruled that race conscious college admission policies aimed at maintaining racially diverse student bodies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court, though ruling out admissions solely based on race, did state, “Nothing in the opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life.” It should be noted that court did not impose the same ruling on military academies because of their “distinct interest” in the benefits of a diverse officer corp. Though the ruling has caused an uproar in both academic and business communities, we need to remember the ruling does not significantly impact effect corporate America, yet.

Race Based Employment 

The affirmative action ruling only applies to colleges and universities admissions processes. Employers are subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is a federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on certain factors which include race, color, religion sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity) and national origin. Further, Title VII applies to all aspects of employment, including, but not limited to recruiting, hiring, promoting training and discharge. Several states, like Massachusetts, have their own version of Title VII to protect both employers and employees. Despite these protections, employers are still cautious with implementing and maintaining diversity equity and inclusion (DEI) programs. This is probably true because most companies do not see the difference between the two. Though they are similar, Title VII protects the employer and employee, while DEI programs aim to enhance the workplace experience and to some extent maximize profits. Plus, most DEI programs go beyond race based concerns and tend to embrace various other aspects of people’s lives that may be subject to bias.

Attack on DEI 

Since the ruling by the Supreme Court, several state attorney generals sent letters to Fortune 500 companies stating that race-based preferences “whether under the label of diversity, equity and inclusion or otherwise” may violate federal and state antidiscrimination laws. In addition, corporations like Amazon and Comcast have had their DEI practices challenged. Several states like Florida have proposed and passed anti-DEI legislation banning certain DEI practices in state agencies. All this fervor has created the concern that the “right case” can outright destroy DEI practices and programs. Most recently, which seems like an act out of an abundance of caution, the well-known longstanding Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM) changed their focus from Inclusion, Equity and Diversity (IE&D) to Inclusion and Diversity (I&D). The concern relating to the future of DEI is palatable.

Safety Net for DEI Programs 

The DEI movement is far from defeated, we must remember DEI and Affirmative Action are not the same. DEI programs, though want to ensure that various races feel accepted in the workplace, should focus on anti-bias, inclusion of all employees from various backgrounds, allyship and the appreciation of everyone’s professional and personal life experiences. You can call your program whatever you want, but it is really the approach used by employers that will survive future legal scrutiny.

Michigan Employers Take Note: New Ruling Impacts Paid Leave and Minimum Wage

Today, July 31, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court released a highly anticipated opinion in the case of Mothering Justice v. Nessel. This case assessed the constitutionality of the Michigan Legislature’s 2018 “adopt-and-amend” strategy under which the Legislature adopted, and then immediately changed, two ballot proposals that would otherwise have been included on the November 2018 ballot for decision by Michigan voters. The ballot proposals pertained to Michigan minimum wage and paid sick leave requirements, and were originally entitled the Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA) and Improved Workforce Opportunity and Wage Act (IWOWA). The Legislature’s “adopt-and-amend” action had narrowed the original ballot proposal language, and resulted instead in the enactment of the Michigan Paid Medical Leave Act (PMLA) and current minimum wage provisions in effect since early 2019.

After years of legal challenge, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a 2023 decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, and ruled that the “adopt-and-amend” approach utilized by the Michigan Legislature violated the Michigan Constitution. The Court determined both of the ballot initiatives as originally adopted by the Legislature should be reinstated in lieu of current, amended versions. In the interests of justice and equity, the Court ordered the reinstatement to occur, but only after a time period the same as that which employers would have been provided to prepare for the new laws absent their improper amendment.

Therefore, significant new legal requirements will become effective February 21, 2025. These include:

  1. The paid leave ballot proposal as initially adopted by the Legislature in 2018, in the form of the ESTA, is reinstated effective February 21, 2025, in place of the PMLA. All covered employers must amend existing paid leave policies or implement new leave policies as applicable that comply with the ESTA by February 21, 2025. Key elements of the ESTA include:
    • All Michigan employers, except for the U.S. government, are covered.
    • All employees of a covered employer, rather than only certain categories of employees as provided under the PMLA, are covered.
    • Covered employers must accrue sick time for covered employees, at a rate of at least one hour of earned sick time for every 30 hours worked.
    • Employers with 10 or more employees, as defined by the ESTA, must allow employees to use up to 72 hours of paid earned sick time per year.
    • Employers with fewer than 10 employees, as defined by the ESTA, must provide up to 40 hours of earned paid sick time, and are permitted to provide remaining earned sick leave up to the required 72 hours per year on an unpaid basis, rather than paid.
    • Employers may not prohibit the carryover or cap the accrual of unused earned sick time.
    • Employers may limit the use of earned sick time in any year to 72 hours.
  2. The minimum wage ballot proposal as originally adopted by the Legislature in 2018, in the form of the IWOWA, is also effective February 21, 2025, subject to a phase in of certain requirements that remains to be determined at this time. The IWOWA will replace the narrower amendments that previously were enacted and took effect in 2019. Key provisions effective February 21, 2025, include:
    • The state minimum wage rate will be $10.00 plus the state treasurer’s inflation adjustment, which has yet to be calculated and released.
    • Future increases will be calculated annually based on inflation as specified in the IWOWA.
    • The existing “tip credit” provisions employers of tipped employees currently utilize to calculate whether they have been paid minimum wage will be phased out over a period of years and eliminated entirely by February 21, 2029.
    • Employees will have expanded rights as to how they are compensated for overtime work, including “comp time” as an alternative to customary payment of overtime wages.

The above will be applicable absent further judicial, legislative, or voter-driven constitutional action that prescribes a different course. As to judicial action, opportunities for appeal or rehearing of a state Supreme Court decision are limited and discretionary. As to voter-driven constitutional action, such as a referendum, the timing of the Court’s decision may well not permit for such action to be included on the 2024 ballot, even if sufficient support for such action were shown.

In terms of any legislative action to amend, such action could only occur in a future legislative session, meaning January 2025 or later. As to the level of support required, because the ballot proposals were adopted by the Legislature rather than approved by a majority of Michigan voters in an election process, the normal requirements will apply. Had the ballot proposals been approved by a majority of Michigan voters in the election, a 75% supermajority of both houses of the Legislature would have been required for any amendment passage.

by: Luis E. AvilaMaureen Rouse-AyoubStephanie R. SetteringtonElizabeth Wells SkaggsHannah A. Cone, and Ashleigh E. Draft of Varnum LLP

For more news on Michigan Employment Laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment law section.

In Trio of Decisions, Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Splits on Arbitration

Three recent Supreme Court DecisionsCoinbase v. SuskiSmith v. Spizzirri, and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries—based on consumer and employment disputes have resolved significant circuit splits over arbitration. These cases were all decided by a unanimous Court, with Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Roberts authoring the three opinions.

Supreme Court Considers Arbitrability Based on Conflicting Contracts

In Coinbase v. Suski (May 23, 2024), the Supreme Court held that where there is a conflict between one or more contracts between same parties regarding the arbitrability of a dispute, a court alone (and not the arbitrator) must decide which contract governs. The appeal arose from a sweepstakes dispute wherein the official rules of the sweepstakes conflicted with the defendant’s user agreement.

After the plaintiff consumers brought a class action in California federal court, the defendant sought a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration provision in the user agreement. The district court denied the defendant’s motion based on the forum selection clause in a contract detailing the sweepstakes’ rules. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the forum selection clause, which gave sole jurisdiction over sweepstakes-related disputes to California courts, superseded the arbitration provision in the user agreement.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that courts, not arbitrators, must decide the threshold question of whether a subsequent agreement supersedes an arbitration provision, dismissing concerns that the holding would invite challenges to delegation clauses that empower arbitrators to decide disputes concerning arbitrability.

Prior to the decision in Suski, there was no precedent in the First Circuit addressing the question of who resolves conflicting dispute resolution clauses. However, the Court’s decision accords with the approach of the First Circuit to related questions.

In Biller v. S-H OpCo Greenwich Bay Manor, LLC (2020), the First Circuit held that for parties to agree to have an arbitrator decide gateway questions of arbitrability, they must do by “clear and unmistakable evidence,” safeguarding a court’s jurisdiction to decide questions of arbitrability. Similarly, in McKenzie v. Brennan (2021), the First Circuit held that the court holds the decision-making power to decide whether parties intend to arbitrate a dispute when a new contract between the parties does not contain a broad arbitration clause, but an earlier contract does.

District Courts May Not Dismiss Cases Referred to Arbitration Upon a Request to Stay

In Smith v. Spizzirri (May 16, 2024), the Supreme Court interpreted 9 U.S.C. § 3 to mean that when a district court finds that a contract compels arbitration and a party has requested a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration, the court lacks jurisdiction to dismiss the suit. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that a lower court must stay the proceedings until the dispute is resolved in arbitration or the dispute is brought back before the court.

The decision arose from a California class action alleging delivery drivers had been misclassified as independent contractors and denied required wages and paid leave. While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s discretion to dismiss the action referred to arbitration on a motion by the defendant, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded. Spizzirri may be understood as the complement to an earlier decision also involving Coinbase, Coinbase v. Bielski (June 23, 2023) (see our prior alert here), which held that a district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing.

The First Circuit (as well as the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits) had previously held that a district court has discretion to either dismiss litigation without prejudice or stay the proceedings. Dismissal following a referral to arbitration provided plaintiffs with an opportunity to appeal that final, adverse ruling, with the Supreme Court’s decision now requiring plaintiffs to wait until the arbitration has been completed.

While the First Circuit has not yet passed a decision under following Spizzirri, a recent decision by the Rhode Island District Court may indicate how post-Spizzirri questions will be decided. In De Simone v. Citizens Bank (June 17, 2024) the court directly cited to Spizzirri to conclude that the proceedings in that case must be stayed pending arbitration. At the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit (which previously, like the First Circuit, held that courts have discretion to stay or dismiss) amended its opinion in Herrera v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. (March 11, 2024; amended June, 24, 2024) to reflect the decision in Spizzirri, writing that “Spizzirri made clear that a district court does not have discretion to dismiss the action when granting a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3.”

Supreme Court Holds Workers in Any Industry May Benefit from Arbitration Exemption

In Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St. LLC (May 14, 2024), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for transportation workers at 9 U.S.C. § 1, which protects workers in foreign or interstate transportation from having their employment claims referred to mandatory arbitration, may apply to workers in any industry.

In LePage Bakeries, the defendant companies argued that baked goods delivery drivers were not protected from the exemption because they were not transportation industry employees. The district court and Second Circuit agreed, compelling arbitration of the parties’ dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Second Circuit has created a transportation-industry requirement without any basis in the text of the statute.

The decision resolves a split among the First and Second Circuits in favor of workers seeking to bring class action claims. In two 2023 cases, Canales v. CK Sales Co. and Fraga v. Premium Retail Servs., Inc., the First Circuit explicitly rejected the Second Circuit’s reading of the Federal Arbitration Act that a worker must be employed in the transportation industry to benefit from the exemption to mandatory arbitration. Instead, the First Circuit focused on the worker’s role instead of the employer’s business, a test that the Supreme Court has now embraced. The Court’s decision follows New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) and Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2023) wherein the Court held the exemption applies to independent contractors and airplane cargo loaders.

Recent Decisions Reflect Critical Questions on Jurisdiction Over Arbitration Disputes

The Supreme Court’s trio of unanimous arbitration decisions outline three areas in which district courts retain jurisdiction over arbitration disputes. The rulings reflect the outer limits of a multi-decade trend in which the Supreme Court has consistently issued arbitration-friendly decisions, encouraging the resolution of arbitrable matters without involving the courts.

It is likely that challenges to arbitrability based on conflicting contracts and transportation work will remain flashpoints in federal court litigation for years to come, with federal courts retaining jurisdiction over disputes referred to arbitration, hearing fewer appeals of orders compelling arbitration, and resolving matters that arise during those proceedings. The decisions serve as reminders to businesses that they should work with experienced counsel to draft and regularly review dispute resolution clauses in consumer and employment contracts to ensure that, if disputes do ultimately arise, they will be resolved via the intended procedure.

* * *

Thank you to firm summer associate Jonathan Tucker for his contribution to this post.

Opposing Decisions – Does the FTC Have the Authority to Ban Non-Compete Clauses?

In April, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated a new rule banning non-competes (the Rule); the FTC adopted the Rule to prohibit employers from entering into or enforcing non-compete clauses with workers and senior executives. Several lawsuits were quickly filed challenging the rules. Separate parties filed in Texas (in which cases were consolidated), and ATS Tree Services, LLC, filed an action in Pennsylvania.

On July 23, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a ruling denying ATS Tree Services’ motion for a stay and a preliminary injunction against the Rule. ATS Tree Services, LLC v FTC, No: 2:24-cv-01743-KBH, at p.18 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2024). The Court held that ATS had not demonstrated the irreparable harm necessary to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction and also held that ATS failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its action.

The ruling is diametrically opposed to the July 3, 2024, ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which preliminarily enjoined the Rule and postponed its effective date in Ryan, LLC v. U.S., No. 3:24-CV-00986-E, 2024 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2024). However, the district court declined to issue a universal injunction, making its ruling applicable only to the Ryan plaintiffs.

The Decisions

In ATS Tree Services, the court first held that nonrecoverable costs of compliance do not rise to the level of irreparable harm, in that “monetary loss and business expenses alone are insufficient bases for injunctive relief.” ATS Tree Services at p.18. Additionally, the court held that the claimed loss of contractual benefits was too speculative. Id. 20-21.

Even though the court found that ATS failed to establish irreparable harm, it added an analysis of ATS’s likelihood of success on the merits, spending the majority of its decision assessing (just as the Ryan Court had) whether “[s]ection 6(g) empowers the FTC with the authority to make substantive rules related to unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, or whether the rulemaking authority therein is limited to procedural rules relating to adjudications of unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.” ATS Tree Services, at p.8. Notably, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024) to “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Id. at 25. In doing so, the Court harmonized sections 5 and 6 of the FTC Act, concluding:

When taken in the context of the goal of the Act and the FTC’s purpose, the Court finds it clear that the FTC is empowered to make both procedural and substantive rules as is necessary to prevent unfair methods of competition. Thus, the Court rejects ATS’s argument that it should read the word “procedural” but not the word “substantive” into the statutory text defining the FTC’s rulemaking authority. This argument is inherently inconsistent and therefore untenable. Id. at 26.

This was directly contrary to the Ryan decision where the court found under section 6(g) that the FTC lacks the authority to create substantive rules because the Act is only a “housekeeping statute” that allows the FTC to promulgate general “rules of agency organization procedure or practice,” not “substantive rules.” Ryan at *15 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310 (1979)).

The court in ATS Tree Services went on to address the FTC’s mandate to “prevent prohibited ‘unfair methods of competition’” under section 5, thereby acknowledging Congress’s terms were “intended to act prophylactically to stop ‘incipient’ threats of unfair methods of competition, not solely responsively through adjudications, as courts interpreting the statute have confirmed.” ATS Tree Services, at p. 28. In addition, the court found that the FTC’s rulemaking authority had been confirmed by other circuit courts. Finally, in the rest of the decision, the Court disposed of the other alternative challenges made by ATS. This was contrary to the Ryan decision, where the Texas court had held that the FTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, because the Rule was “unreasonably broad without a reasonable explanation” and did not sufficiently address alternatives to issuing the Rule.

Key Takeaways

The two courts have issued opinions with conflicting analyses. While Texas has issued a preliminary injunction specific to the Ryan plaintiffs, the court did indicate it intends to make a final determination on the merits by August 30, 2024, prior to the Rule’s effective date. The Ryan Court will have the opportunity to vacate the Rule in its entirety as unlawful and issue a permanent injunction, with the scope of the relief ordered yet to be decided. This new ruling sets up the potential for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and possibly seek direct relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

*This post was co-authored by Lily Denslow, legal intern at Robinson+Cole. Lily is not admitted to practice law.

The Gig Continues: California Supreme Court Upholds Proposition 22

On July 25, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited ruling in Castellanos et al., v. State of California and Protect App-Based Drivers and Services, et al., upholding the 2020 voter initiative known as Proposition 22 the allows certain gig economy companies to classify drivers as independent contractors.

In 2019, California Assembly Bill 5, also known as AB5, expanded the landmark California Supreme Court decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, and made the “ABC” test law.

Pursuant to the ABC test, in order to maintain independent contractor status, the hiring entity must establish each of the following three factors:

  1. that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and
  2. that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and
  3. that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.

As a result, AB5 is widely perceived as the most draconian independent contractor test in the country.

The impact of AB5 has been pronounced and widespread, perhaps most noticeably for California’s gig economy.

In November 2020, following significant investment by affected companies such as Uber and Lyft, Proposition 22 hit the ballot. It asked voters whether “App-Based Transportation and Delivery Companies” should be exempted from providing employee rights and benefits to their drivers. In other words, whether gig drivers could be classified independent contractors. The initiative passed by 59% of the vote, and was codified as Business and Professions Code section 7451.

Shortly thereafter, drivers’ groups and unions challenged Proposition 22, arguing that section 7451 was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the power granted to the legislature to regulate workers’ compensation. After winning that argument in the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the dispute.

The state’s highest court rejected the challenge in a unanimous decision, holding that the state constitution does not preclude the “electorate from exercising its initiative power to legislate on matters affecting workers’ compensation.” The decision was careful to examine only the question presented, i.e., whether section 7451 was unconstitutional. The Court specifically declined further exploration of the underlying workers’ compensation issue, stating: “We reserve these issues until we are presented with an actual challenge to an act of the Legislature providing workers’ compensation to app-based drivers.”

As a result of this decision, covered gig workers may maintain independent contractor status, with additional rights such as guaranteed earnings above minimum wage, health care stipends, and insurance — but without the protections of California’s employment laws — while maintaining the flexibility often attractive to those who choose this work.

In addition to drivers for app-based companies covered by Proposition 22, there are other limited exceptions to AB5, such as businesses that work through referral agencies, real estate professionals, and workers providing professional services. Each of the applicable tests is involved and often complicated.

At this stage, before classifying anyone as an independent contractor in California, companies would be wise to review the issues closely with their counsel.

It’s a Cruel Summer (for Employers Still Facing Uncertainty of Looming Federal Trade Commission Noncompete Rule)

Relying on Noncompete Clauses May Not Be the Best Defense of Proprietary Data When Employees Depart

Much of the value of many companies often is wrapped up with and measured by their intellectual property (IP) portfolios. Some forms of IP, such as patents, are known by the public. Others derive their value from being hidden from the public. Many companies, for example, have gigabytes of data or “know-how” that may be worth millions, but only to the extent that they remain secret. This article discusses some ways to keep business information confidential when an employee who has had access to that information leaves the company.

Many companies traditionally turned to employment agreements, specifically noncompete clauses, to protect proprietary competitive information. The legality of noncompetes is in question following the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) ban on them, which is being challenged in court by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, causing confusion and concerns about protecting information via noncompete agreements. As covered in Wilson Elser’s prior articles* on this subject, the timeline of the FTC rule in question was as follows:

  • The FTC promulgated new rules to take effect in September 2024 banning all noncompete agreements.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 40-year-old method of reviewing agency rules (Chevron Deference), throwing all agency rules, including the FTC’s rule on noncompetes, into question.
  • The District Court for the Northern District of Texas preliminarily enjoined the FTC from enforcing its new rule banning noncompetes.

After this flurry of activity, noncompetes are, for now, not banned. But do they offer an effective solution for businesses seeking to protect their proprietary information?

Noncompete Clauses Are Not Always Effective
Vortexa, Inc. v. Cacioppo, a June 2024 case from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, illustrates the limitations of noncompete clauses in employment agreements. That case presents the familiar fact pattern of an employee leaving and going to work for a competitor. With some evidence of the employee’s access to proprietary competitive information in hand (but no evidence of actual misappropriation), the former employer sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the employee from working for the competitor for one year, the term stated in the noncompete clause in the employee’s contract with the former employer. The contract also included common non-disclosure and confidentiality clauses.

Absent evidence of actual misappropriation, the plaintiff employer relied on the “Inevitable Disclosure” doctrine, which assumes that a departing employee will inevitably disclose confidential information when they go work for a competitor. The court refused to apply this doctrine, explaining that inevitable disclosure may substitute for actual evidence of misappropriation only when the information is a trade secret. Here, none of the information about which the former employer was concerned was a trade secret.

The proprietary information that the former employee had was pricing data, marketing strategies and “intricacies of the business.” These types of information do not, in and of themselves, constitute trade secrets. In addition, the information was not afforded trade secret treatment because (1) some of it was ascertainable by the competitor without reference to the first employer’s information; (2) the companies sell different products; (3) some of the information was developed without the expenditure of a good deal of money and effort; (4) some of the information was provided to clients without a non-disclosure agreement; (5) some of the information was shared on company-wide collaboration channels; and (6) “google drive log records show that [the former employee] opened and viewed these documents, which underlines the lack of security protecting this purportedly confidential information.”

Most of these reasons for the information not being accorded trade secret status cannot be changed by any action of the employer. For example, if information can be generated by means independent of the first employer, that information cannot be protected by trade secret law and nothing the first employer can do will change that after the fact. However, any business seeking to protect its valuable competitive information can change the way that it secures, protects and manages access to its competitive information, and this may be enough to ensure that its information is protected by trade secret law.

What Businesses Should Do to Protect Their Proprietary Competitive Information
Generally, proprietary competitive information can be protected as a trade secret by operation of law or via contract. In many cases, the “boots and suspenders” approach is best – the information should be protected both by contract and by meeting the requirements for protection under trade secret law. As described, a contract alone is sometimes ineffective, so information that derives its value from not being generally known to the public should also be treated in such a manner that the courts would see it as being a trade secret.

Specifically, for something to qualify for trade secret protection under federal and state statues and common law, it must be securely kept and carefully protected from disclosure. Some easy ways to protect information are to (1) restrict access to folders on a company’s internal computer systems, (2) physically lock rooms that contain hard copies and (3) have computers lock automatically when not accessed for set time periods. Protecting information via noncompete, confidentiality and non-disclosure contractual obligations is another way to ensure that information remains secret, such that it is protected under trade secret law. Internal policies on how information may be shared with third parties, such as clients, also are helpful evidence of trade secret treatment. In addition, the business may consider maintaining records on the time, effort and monetary expenditures required to develop proprietary information, which should allow the business to demonstrate that making such information freely available to a competitor is fundamentally unfair.

In some cases, information protected as a trade secret may be the most valuable IP that a company owns. But the value can easily be lost if the company does not properly secure the information. Different scenarios call for different methods of security, and a good rule of thumb to protect information from disclosure by a departing employee is to protect this information both by contract and as a trade secret.

The first step for any business is to think through their overall data protection strategy and consult with experienced intellectual property counsel to put appropriate protections in place.

Pennsylvania Federal Court Declines to Preliminarily Enjoin FTC Rule Banning Non-Competes

Earlier today (July 23, 2024), Judge Hodge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a tree care company’s motion to stay the effective date and preliminarily enjoin the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) proposed final rule (“Final Rule”) banning nearly all non-competes. ATS Tree Services, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 2:24-cv-01743-KBH (E.D. Pa.). The decision comes in the wake of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas’ July 3, 2024 ruling to the contrary in Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 3:24-cv-00986-E, which stayed the Final Rule’s effective date as to the plaintiffs in that case, but had no nationwide effect.

The Pennsylvania Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania court denied Plaintiff ATS Tree Services, LLC’s (“ATS”) request for a preliminary injunction based on its conclusion that the company failed to establish that it (i) would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was not issued; and had a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claims.

ATS argued it would be harmed by incurring “nonrecoverable efforts to comply” with the Rule, and by losing “the contractual benefits from its existing non-compete agreements.” ATS described its nonrecoverable compliance costs as: costs associated with notifying its twelve employees of the change in accordance with the Rule’s notice provision; the costs and efforts to “review and modify [its] business strategy”; and the unquantifiable costs and efforts of altering its specialized training program. But court found these either insufficient or too speculative to support injunctive relief. ATS further argued it would face the risk that its employees would leave and transfer confidential information to direct competitors. The court found these risks too speculative.

ATS also unsuccessfully argued that it would succeed on the merits because, it asserted, the FTC lacks substantive rulemaking authority under its enabling statute, the FTC exceeded its authority, and Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the FTC. The court rejected each argument. The court further found that the “major questions doctrine” did not apply, because the Final Rule falls within the FTC’s core mandate, and the FTC has previously used its Section 6(g) rulemaking power in similar ways to the Final Rule.

Looking Forward

The Pennsylvania court’s decision did not analyze the Ryan decision, which reached contrary conclusions. It is likely that the dispute will ascend to the Third and Fifth Circuits, respectively. Notably, the Ryan court has indicated that it intends to issue a final judgment on the merits by August 30, 2024, which is likely to be appealed, and the Final Rule is scheduled to become effective by September 4, 2024.

Michigan Supreme Court Expands Employer Exposure to Public Policy Retaliation Claims

In Michigan, various state employment laws prohibit employers from retaliating against employees. But can an employee pursue a public policy retaliation claim against the employer in addition to a statutory retaliation claim?

On July 22, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that anti-retaliation provisions in two important workplace safety laws—the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) and Michigan’s Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MIOSHA”)—do not preclude a plaintiff from also asserting a violation of public policy in court. Stegall v. Resource Technology Corp (Case No. 165450, decided July 22, 2024).

Cleveland Stegall, an IT specialist working at FCA through the staffing agency Resource Technology, complained internally about asbestos insulation issues at the assembly plant and threatened to file complaints with the government. He was subsequently terminated. Stegall sued both entities for wrongful discharge under OSHA and MIOSHA’s anti-retaliation provisions, as well as termination in violation of public policy.

At-will employees generally may be terminated for any reason (or no reason at all). But one exception to this rule is that certain terminations violate public policy and therefore create an actionable legal claim. This includes firings for “failure or refusal to violate a law” or exercising a right conferred by the Michigan Legislature.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Stegall’s public policy claim because they concluded that the OSHA and MIOSHA laws already forbid retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the remedies under OSHA and MIOSHA are insufficient, pointing to the truncated 30-day period to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, the discretion granted to the respective investigating agency, and the employee’s lack of control over what occurs after a complaint has been filed. See 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(2) and MCL 408.1065(2).

What does this case mean for employers? The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision provides another avenue for employees to pursue retaliation claims, particularly where the employee raises workplace safety concerns. It is unclear, however, whether courts will extend this ruling and allow employees to pursue public policy wrongful discharge claims if the employee is also seeking relief under another anti-retaliation statute.

Full Steam Ahead: NLRB Top Lawyer Signals Continued Focus On Injunction Actions

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Starbucks v. McKinney clarifying the standards courts must use when evaluating requests by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for injunctive relief under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Many view this as, at least in some jurisdictions, heightening the standard the agency must meet in these cases.

NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memo on July 16 noting this ruling will not affect how her office views Section 10(j) cases. According to the press release, “General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo reaffirmed her commitment to seeking Section 10(j) injunctions after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, which set a uniform four-part test applicable to all Section 10(j) injunction petitions.”

The statement then goes on to note, “General Counsel Abruzzo explained that, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks Corp. provides a uniform standard to be applied in all Section 10(j) injunctions nationwide, adoption of this standard will not have a significant impact on the Agency’s Section 10(j) program as the Agency has ample experience litigating injunctions under that standard and has a high rate of success in obtaining injunctions under the four-part test — a success rate equivalent to or higher than the success rate in circuit courts that applied the two-part test.”

Employers should take note, as the NLRB does indeed have a high success rate when seeking these injunctions against employers. For example, in fiscal year 2020, the agency prevailed in every 10(j) case it brought. These actions can be costly from a time and resources perspective for companies, as they are then forced to defend against alleged labor violations before both the NLRB and in federal court simultaneously.

Accordingly, while the recent Supreme Court ruling did offer a uniform standard and clarity around the legal framework for 10(j) cases, it appears this won’t cause a dip in the amount of such matters the NLRB brings.