Category: Criminal Law

Standing and In Pari Delicto Issues Arising in Bankruptcy Cases

Congrats to Rui Li of the The University of Iowa College of Law -one of  winners of the Spring 2011 National Law Review Student Legal Writing Competition:   Rui’s topic addresses whether a bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.  

1.  Introduction

Corporate and managerial fraud is pervasive in today’s economic climate. When fraud leaves a company insolvent and forced to seek protection under the Bankruptcy Code, oftentimes bankruptcy trustees commence legal actions against attorneys to generate recoveries for the benefit of the debtor’s estate. A common scenario goes something like this: A company is in dire financial straits before the fraud or is created as a vehicle for the fraud. The defendant is the corporation’s attorney, who assists the corporation in the fraud. The attorney is hired to ensure the company’s compliance with existing law. The attorney does the bidding of the company’s management in pursuance of their fraud. After the company’s collapse, the bankruptcy trustee sues the attorney for fraud, aiding and abetting fraud and legal malpractice.

Drawing upon the equitable defense that bars recovery by a plaintiff bearing fault with the defendant for the alleged harm, common law principles of agency imputation, and the Constitutional requirement that a plaintiff has standing to sue, a defendant may move to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to sue.

This Note provides an analysis of the issue whether the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.

2.  The In Pari Delicto Doctrine

a) Background

In pari delicto means “at equal fault.” It is a broadly recognized equitable principle and common law defense that prevents a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing from recovering damages resulting from the wrongdoing.[1] The policy behind this doctrine is to prevent one joint wrongdoer from suing another for damages that resulted from their shared wrongdoing.[2] Therefore, if a bankruptcy trustee brings a claim against an attorney on behalf of the corporation, and if the corporation is involved in the corporation’s wrongful conduct which serves as the basis for the claim, the in pari delicto may bar the claim.

The use of the doctrine against bankruptcy trustees emerged in the wave of corporate frauds in the last few decades. This novel application required the introduction of an important new element: agency law. Under agency principles, if the principal acted wrongfully through an agent in the scope of that agency relationship, then the wrongdoing of the agent is attributed to the principal.  Because the acts of corporate managers in the course of their employment are imputed to the corporation, and because a bankruptcy trustee “stands in the shoes” of a debtor corporation, the fraudulent acts of the debtor’s former managers will be imputed to the trustee—unless the trustee can show that management was acting entirely on its own interests and “totally abandoned” those of the corporation to break the chain of imputation.[3]

An analysis of the equitable defense in pari delicto at issue is separable from a standing analysis.[4] “Whether a party has standing to bring claims and whether a party’s claims are barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions, to be addressed on their own terms.”[5]

b)  The Second Circuit’s Approach

In Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit adopted the controversial approach of treating in pari delicto as a question of standing rather than an affirmative defense. Specifically, the standing analysis in the Second Circuit begins with the issue of whether the trustee can demonstrate that the third party professional injured the debtor in a manner distinct from injuries suffered by the debtor’s creditors.[6] In many jurisdictions, the question of the trustee’s standing ends here.[7] In Wagoner, the Second Circuit went further and added a second inquiry that incorporates the equitable defense ofin pari delicto.[8] By combining these two issues, the Wagoner rule blends the in pari delicto question into a rule of standing.

In Wagoner, the sole stockholder, director, and president of a corporation had used the proceeds of notes to finance fraudulent stock trading.[9] After the corporation became insolvent, the trustee brought claims against the defendant, an investment bank, for breach of fiduciary duty in allowing the company’s president to engage in inappropriate transactions.[10] The court held that because the president participated in the alleged misconduct, his misconduct must be imputed to the corporation and the bankruptcy trustee. This rationale derives from the agency principle that underlies the application of in pari delicto to corporate litigants: the misconduct of managers within the scope of their employment will normally be imputed to the corporation.[11] The court ruled that the trustee lacked standing to sue the investment bank for aiding and abetting the president’s alleged unlawful activity.[12] By adopting the Wagoner rule, the Second Circuit upped the ante by making an equitable defense a threshold question of standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, rather than an affirmative defense better resolved on summary judgment or at trial.

c)  Approaches of Other Circuits

Although the Wagoner rule still prevails in the Second Circuit, a majority of other courts have declined to follow it, including the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. These circuits have “declined to conflate the constitutional standing doctrine with the in pari delicto defense.”[13] “Even if an in pari delictodefense appears on the face of the complaint, it does not deprive the trustee of constitutional standing to assert the claim, though the defense may be fatal to the claim.”[14]

The Eighth Circuit held that in pari delicto cannot be used at the dismissal stage.[15] On a motion to dismiss, the court is generally limited to considering the allegations in the complaint, which the court assumes to be true in ruling on the motion.[16] Because in pari delicto is an affirmative defense requiring proof of facts that the defendant asserts, it is usually not an appropriate ground for early dismissal.[17] An in pari delicto defense may be successfully asserted at the pleading stage only where “the facts establishing the defense are: (1) definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other allowable sources of information, and (2) sufficient to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.”[18] Thus, the in pari delicto defense is generally premature at this stage of the litigation, and the court must deny the motion to dismiss.

The existence of a possible defense does not affect the question of standing.[19]Standing is a constitutional question, and all a plaintiff must show is that they have suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and that the requested relief will likely redress the alleged injury.  In this matter, the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach is more convincing. Those courts hold that whether a trustee has standing to bring a claim and whether the claim is barred by the equitable defense of in pari delicto are two separate questions and that the in pari delicto defense is appropriately set forth in responsive pleadings and the subject of motions for summary judgment and trial.

3.  Standing Issues The Trustees Face 

a)  Background

The next question is whether the bankruptcy trustee fulfills the constitutional requirement of standing. Article III specifies three constitutional requirements for standing. First, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury. Second, he must allege that the injury is traceable to the defendant’s conduct. Third, the plaintiff must show that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury.[20]

A critical issue in evaluating whether a trustee or receiver has standing to sue is whether the claim belongs to the corporate debtor entity or to the individual investors of the corporate debtor. The Supreme Court held in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1972), that a bankruptcy trustee has standing to represent only the interests of the debtor corporation and does not have standing to pursue claims for damages against a third party on behalf of one creditor or a group of creditors. Although the line is not always clear between the debtor’s claims, which a trustee has statutory authority to assert, and claims of creditors, which Caplin bars the trustee from pursuing, the focus of the inquiry is on whether the trustee is seeking to redress injuries to the debtor that defendants’ alleged conduct caused.[21]

b)  The Shifting Focus of the Second Circuit

In Wagoner, the Second Circuit held that the corporation and the trustee did not have standing to bring a claim because a “claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation with the cooperation of management accrues to creditors, not to the guilty corporation.”[22] The rationale for this rule is “though a class of creditors has suffered harm, the corporation itself has not.”[23] Without cognizable injury, the trustee representing the debtor corporation failed to meet the constitutional standing requirement.

Commentators have criticized the Wagoner rule that there is no separate injury to the corporation on several grounds. First, the court’s finding that a corporation is not harmed when its assets are squandered effectively ignores the existence of the corporation during the bankruptcy process.[24] Furthermore, the Wagonercourt seems to acknowledge the trustee’s right to sue the guilty managers for damages done to the corporation. Such a construction leads to the absurd result that when management and its accomplices defraud a corporation, management can be sued on behalf of the corporation for the harm caused to the corporation, but the accomplices cannot be sued on behalf of the corporation because the corporation was not harmed.[25] Recognizing the faults of this rule, the Second Circuit recognized that there was “at least a theoretical possibility of some independent financial injury to the debtors” as a result of the defendant’s aid in the fraud.[26] Nevertheless, the court denied the plaintiff’s standing, relying on the observation that any damage suffered by the debtor was passed on to the investors, and “there was likely to be little significant injury that accrues separately to the Debtors.”[27] In other words, most of the alleged injuries in Hirsch were suffered by third parties, not by the debtors themselves. The Second Circuit shifted the focus of the Wagoner rule from lack-of-separate-injury (the first inquiry of theWagoner rule) to the in pari delicto (the second inquiry) in Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, 336 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, the court denied the trustee standing, holding that even if there was damage to the corporation, the trustee lacked standing because of the debtor’s collaboration with the corporate insiders.[28]

c)  Approaches of Other Circuits

In Lafferty, the creditors’ committee brought an action against the debtor’s officers, directors and outside professionals, alleging that through participation in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, the defendants wrongfully prolonged the debtor’s life and incurred debt beyond the debtor’s ability to pay, ultimately forcing the debtor into bankruptcy.[29] The Lafferty court articulated different kinds of harms to the corporation: (1) fraudulent or wrongful prolongation of an insolvent corporation’s life, (2) prolongation that causes the corporation to incur more debt and become more insolvent, and (3) diminution of corporate value had prolongation not occurred.[30] Recognizing that conduct driving a corporation deeper into debt injures not only the corporate creditors, but the corporation itself, the Third Circuit held the committee had standing to sue the outsiders on behalf of the debtor.[31]The court also noted that although the Tenth and Sixth Circuits had applied the in pari delicto doctrine to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee, those courts assumed that the bankruptcy trustee at least has standing to bring the claim.[32]

The Eighth Circuit held that a trustee who had alleged sufficient injury traceable to the actions of the defendants had standing to sue.[33] The court held that the defendant law firm and attorneys participated in stripping the corporation’s assets and that the injury was traceable to the activities of the lawyers who engineered the transaction to the detriment of their client.[34] In addition, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Third Circuit in Lafferty and the Ninth Circuit (in Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP 421 F.3d at 1004) rejected the argument that a cause of action for harm to an insolvent corporation belongs to the creditors rather than the corporation. The Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of Lafferty that simply because the creditors may be the beneficiary of recovery does not transform an action into a suit by the creditors.[35]

The Ninth Circuit found that the trustee had standing to pursue breach of contracts and duties against attorneys, auditors and investment bankers where, if defendants had not concealed the financial condition of debtor, the debtor might have filed for bankruptcy sooner and additional assets might not have been spent on a failing business.[36] “This allegedly wrongful expenditure of corporate assets qualifies as an injury to the firm which is sufficient to confer standing upon the Trustee.”[37] The court stated that “We rely only on the dissipation of assets in reaching the conclusion that the debtor was harmed.”[38] “A receiver has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against third parties who allegedly helped that corporation’s management harm the corporation.”[39]

To sum up, when a director or officer enlists the help of attorneys to misstate the financial health of a company, it causes significant harm to a corporation. Harms include: (1) the fraudulent and concealed accrual of debt which can lessen the value of corporate property, (2) legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy, (3) operational limitations on profitability, (4) the undermining of business relationships, and (4) failed corporate confidence.

If court were to afford standing to trustee, third parties would be deterred from negligent, reckless, or other wrongful behavior. It will provide a means for increasing attorneys’ liability for the wrongs they commit. While limitless liability for attorneys is not the solution, increasing liability will require attorneys to answer in court when they fail to detect fraud or manipulation on the part of directors and officers that a reasonable attorney would discover.

4.  Conclusion

Attorneys are equipped with the tools to prevent fraud. An attorney may always report fraud to the appropriate authority or refuse to participate in the fraud. However, attorneys may not want to jeopardize important client relationships unless the consequence of inaction makes reporting more beneficial. Given the turmoil of the financial markets since 2008, increased liability for attorneys could help alleviate corporate fraud and bolster consumer confidence in this distressed market.

For the above reasons, the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.

 

[1] Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir.1997).

[2] In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

[3] Wight v. Bank American Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).

[4] See generally Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: the In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What is Section 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 Emory Bankr.Dev. J. 519 (2005); Gerald L. Baldwin, In Pari Delicto Should Not Bar a Trustee’s Recovery, 23-8 Am. Bankr.Inst. J. 8 (2004); Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in The Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 Am. Bank. L.J. 305 (2003); Robert T. Kugler, The Role of Imputation and In Pari Delicto in Barring Claims Against Third Parties, 1 No. 14 Andrews Bankr.Litig. Rep. 13 (2004);Making Sense of the In Pari Delicto Defense: “Who’s Zoomin’ Who?” 23 No. 11 Bankr. Law Letter 1 (Nov.2003).

[5] Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,267 F.3d 340, 346-47 (3d Cir.2001).

[6] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118.

[7] R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d at 340.

[8] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118.

[9] Id. at 116.

[10] Id. at 116-17.

[11] Wight, 219 F.3d at 86.

[12] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120.

[13] In re Senior Cottages of America LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).

[14] Id. at 1004.

[15] Id. at 1002.

[16] Wilchombe v. Tee Vee Toons. Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009).

[17] Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts Financial Group, Inc., 348 F.3d 230, 237 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2003).

[18] Gray v. Evercore Restructuring, LLC, 544 F.3d 320, 325 (1st Cir. 2008).

[19] Novartis Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 190 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1999).

[20] Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-58 (1984).

[21] Smith v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005).

[22] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120.

[23] Id.

[24] Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 519, 525 (2005).

[25] Id. at 527.

[26] Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1995).

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 100.

[29] Lafferty Co., 267 F.3d at 348-49.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 354.

[32] Id. at 358.

[33] In re Senior Cottages Of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 1001.

[36] Smith v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 421 F.3d at 1003 (9th Cir. 2005).

[37] Id.

[38] Id. at 1004.

[39] Id.

© Copyright 2011 Rui Li

 

Anti-Money Laundering Strategies and Compliance Conference May 9-11 New York, NY

Anti-money laundering officers, professionals, and in-house counsel should attend this conference to better understand the changing environment of the financial industry, learn how companies are adapting to these changes, and to identify new measures in which criminals are laundering money through the United States financial system. With technological advancements and the introduction of money laundering into new financial entities, it is important that anti-money laundering professionals and in-house counsel who oversee anti-money laundering compliance to stay abreast of current AML issues and best practices for preventing money laundering and suspicious activities from occurring in their organizations.

The Anti-Money Laundering conference is a highly intensive, content-driven event that includes case studies, presentations, and panel discussions over two full days. This conference targets industry leaders in AML, and Financial Compliance roles in order to provide an intimate atmosphere for both delegates and speakers.

key conference topics include:

Explore the Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions Program and updates to the Iranian Sanctions

  • Evaluate the increasing correlation between fraud and money laundering
  • Discuss potential risks that emerging technological products pose to the financial industry
  • Investigate the increase in money laundering through the US from Narcotics Trade and Human Trafficking

 Registration, Location & Details…..

  • May 9-11 Doubletree Metropolitan, New York City, NY, USA
  • To Register and for More information – please click here:

Highlights of the UK Bribery Act Guidance: What It May Mean For Your Company

Recently posted by Bracewell & Giuliani LLP – a great overview of the recently passed UK Bribery Act:  

On March 30, 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice issued its highly anticipated guidance (Guidance) for the UK Bribery Act (the Act), a criminal anti-corruption statute that will become effective July 1, 2011.1 The Act covers both commercial and official bribery, within and sometimes outside the UK, and a company may be criminally liable for failing to prevent bribes from being offered or paid by its employees, agents or subsidiaries.

Following a brief overview of the new Guidance, in this Update we review:

  • The jurisdictional reach of the Act
  • The impact of extended liability for business organizations
  • Six fundamental principles that can form a full defense for companies
  • Facilitation payments, which are considered illegal bribes under the Act
  • The treatment of hospitality and promotional expenses

Overview

The newly-released Guidance offers some assistance to commercial companies doing business in the UK seeking to implement “adequate procedures” – both to prevent violations and serve as an affirmative defense against liability under the Act. For United States companies doing business in the UK, both the Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) form essential components of a comprehensive global anti-corruption compliance program.

The Guidance sets out six fundamental principles (see below), but one overarching theme is clear:  Companies would be wise to fully evaluate and understand their entire business operations – how and where they do business — assess the differing risks they face and tailor common sense programs to address those specific risks. In pursuing a risk-based approach, companies may be afforded reasonable flexibility (depending on the size, structure, and complexity and the sophistication of their operations) to implement appropriate, and varying, programs.

Jurisdictional Reach Over US and Other Companies

The Act’s jurisdictional reach extends to business organizations that are incorporated or formed in the UK, and also to those that conduct business in the UK (wherever they are incorporated or formed). Whether a business is deemed to “carry on” business, or even part of its business, for the purposes of the Act – and be rendered a “relevant commercial organisation” — will be a fact-sensitive determination, which the Guidance submits will be based on a common-sense approach. Ultimately, the courts will make the final determination based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The Guidance provides two examples which in and of themselves will not confer jurisdiction on the company: (1) where the company’s securities are listed and may be traded on the London Stock Exchange; and (2) where it merely has a UK subsidiary (which “may act independently of its parent or other group companies”).

Extended Liability for Business Organizations

A “relevant commercial organization” risks prosecution if the government determines there is sufficient evidence to establish that an “associated person” bribed someone else with the intent to obtain or retain business or an advantage for that business entity. The associated person — someone who merely needs to “perform[] services” for or on behalf of the company — is not required to be prosecuted as a predicate for the company’s prosecution. Nor is the associated person required to have a close connection with the UK. Moreover, the determination of who performs such services is to be based on a broad interpretation. Employees are presumed to perform services, agents and subsidiaries qualify, and contractors and suppliers may also qualify depending on the circumstances. Titles and position are not determinative; far more important are the underlying conduct and the practical realities.

In addition to liability for failing to prevent bribery from occurring, the business organization may also be prosecuted if the government can prove that the bribe giving or receiving (or offering, encouraging or assisting) took place by someone “representing the corporate ‘directing mind.'” JPG.

An Adequate Compliance Program Is A Full Defense: Six Fundamental Principles

The Act creates a full defense for companies that can demonstrate they have implemented “adequate procedures” to prevent associated persons from engaging in bribery (even if a case of bribery has been proved). The affirmative defense is required to be proved by “the balance of probabilities.” In deciding whether to proceed with its case, the government will also consider the adequacy of compliance procedures, which can turn on the case-by-case facts and circumstances, including the level of control exercised over the conduct of the relevant associated persons and the degree of risk for which mitigation is required.

Six core principles have been set out in the Guidance and accompanying commentary to help advise companies in devising and implementing adequate procedures to prevent bribery:

  1. Proportionality of response to the bribery risks that the organization faces and to the nature, scale and complexity of the organization’s activities
  2. Commitment of top-level management to prevent bribery by associated persons (e.g., effectively communicating no tolerance policy from top to bottom)
  3. Risk Assessment (to promote periodic, informed and documented assessment proportionate to the company’s size and structure and to the nature, scale and location of its operations)
  4. Due Diligence: Demanding that companies investigate and are aware of who is acting on their behalf in order to mitigate bribery risks
  5. Communication (and training): Ensure that policies and programs are “embedded and understood” throughout the company through internal and external communication.
  6. Monitoring and Review: Undertake systematic review to assess changed circumstances and new risks and implement improved procedures where deemed appropriate

Facilitation Payments Constitute Illegal Bribes Under the Act

Unlike the FCPA, the Act prohibits facilitation payments – small grease payments to low-level government officials to perform or expedite routine, non-discretionary services (e.g., processing immigrations or customs forms, turning on the electricity, etc.)… Nonetheless, the Guidance makes clear that the UK government appreciates that given the realities in certain global regions and in certain sectors, overnight elimination is not feasible. Moreover, “eradication” of facilitation payments is recognized as a “long-term objective.” However, the JPG identifies factors tending in favor of and against prosecution:

Factors in favor of prosecution: (i) large or repeated payments; (ii) planned or accepted payments that may reflect standard operating procedure; (iii) payments reflective of an official’s corruption; and (iv) the failure to follow the organization’s facilitation payment policies and procedures

Factors against prosecution: (i) a single small payment; (ii) payment identified as part of genuinely proactive approach involving self-reporting and remedial action; (iii) adherence to the organization’s clear and appropriate procedures for facilitation payment requests; and (iv) the particular circumstances placed the payer in a vulnerable position

Hospitality and Promotional Expenses Are Not Prohibited by the Act

Like the promotional expense exception under the FCPA, the Act does not criminalize bona fide hospitality and promotional expenses, as long as there is no improper intent. Specifically, the guidance makes clear that providing tickets to sporting events or taking clients to dinner to promote and continue good relations, or paying for reasonable travel expenses in order to demonstrate your company’s goods or services, if reasonable and proportionate, will not run afoul of the Act. However, where hospitality expenses are made to mask an intent to bribe or improperly induce advantageous business conduct, the authorities can be expected to view the expense payment as an illegal bribe under the Act. The extent of the hospitality and promotional expenses offered, the way in which they were provided and the level of influence the client exercised or could exercise in the business decision will all be examined.

Current Considerations

The next three months, until July 1, when the Act goes into effect, will provide a special opportunity for U.S. and other companies doing business in the UK to re-evaluate their operations and take a fresh look at the effectiveness, or “adequacy,” of their anti-corruption policies and procedures. Conducting a measured, proportionate and risk-based assessment makes eminent good sense in light of the UK Bribery Act, the FCPA and an evolving global propensity for strict anti-corruption enforcement.

The Ministry of Justice Guidance can be found here.

_______________________

1Also issued that same day is the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (JPG), which provides some insight into the Directors’ views as to “prosecutorial decision-making” regarding violations of the Act.

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

China Adopts Amendment to the Criminal Law to Outlaw Bribery of Foreign Officials

Recent guest bloggers at the National Law Review from Squire Sanders & Dempsey (US) LLP.…Nicholas Chan, Zijie (Lesley) Li, Amy L. Sommers, and  Laura Wang outline some of the recent changes in Chinese law related to bribery of foreign officials: 

On February 25, 2011 the PRC adopted Amendment No. 8 of the PRC Criminal Law, criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials and “international public organizations” to secure illegitimate business benefits. This amendment goes into effect on May 1, 2011.

The PRC did not have any law addressing cross-border bribery before and this law will be the first law to condemn bribery of foreign officials. This amendment is the PRC’s effort to comply with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption to which the PRC is a signatory.

The amendment was made to Article 164 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibiting entities or individuals from offering bribes to employees of companies and enterprises who are not government officials. With the amendment, it is a criminal act to bribe foreign government officials or international public organizations.

According to this Article 164, if the payor is an individual, depending on the value of the bribes, he or she is subject to imprisonment up to 10 years; if the payor is an entity, criminal penalties will be imposed against the violating entity and the supervisor chiefly responsible and other directly responsible personnel may also face imprisonment of up to 10 years. Penalties may be reduced or waived if the violating individual or entity discloses the crime before being charged. According to the PRC Supreme Procuratorate issued in 2001, individuals offering bribes of more than RMB10,000 and entities offering bribes of more than RMB 200,000 may be prosecuted under Article 164.

Unlike other bribery-related crimes in the PRC, which focus on the receipt by the briber of ”illegitimate benefits,” bribery of foreign officials or international organizations prohibits securing illegitimate business benefits. In advance of the release of judicial interpretation of what may be “illegitimate business benefits,” the current legal understanding of what is “to secure illegitimate benefits” means in other bribery-related crimes may provide a reasonable basis for understanding this amendment.

The law refers to “officials of foreign countries and international public organizations,” but does not define these terms. For example, it is not clear whether international public organization includes foreign non-governmental organizations.

As of this Alert, no judicial interpretation or administrative regulations regarding the implementation of this provision has been promulgated. It is not clear whether foreign companies may also be subject to jurisdiction under the PRC Criminal Law with respect to this new amendment. We will continue to closely monitor future development related to this amendment.

©Squire, Sanders & Dempsey All Rights Reserved 2011

ABA – The Fifth Annual National Institute on Securities Fraud Oct 7 & 8th New Orleans

Looking for a good excuse to head to New Orleans?  The National Law Review would like to remind you that the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section, Criminal Justice Section, Section of Litigation, and the Center for Continuing Legal Education are sponsoring the 5th Annual National Institute on Securities Fraud: 

The aftermath of the global financial crisis continues to cause uncertainty in the areas of securities regulation and enforcement. SEC and DOJ collaboration has increased, with both agencies pursuing aggressive legal theories.  Congress has passed the most sweeping changes to the federal securities laws since they were enacted in the 1930s. And state attorney generals continue to assert a significant role in enforcing state securities laws.

This unprecedented confluence of events raises significant questions for industry participants and publicly traded companies that require a forward-looking and flexible approach to avoiding missteps.

The 2010 program will squarely address the issues and trends that are shaping the direction of securities regulation and enforcement for decades to come, including the status and potential impact of financial reform legislation,  the enforcement trends suggested by recent cases, and the priorities of top enforcers.  The program will provide valuable strategic and tactical insights to navigate this ever-changing terrain, from the perspective of thought leaders of every persuasion, including judges, prosecutors, regulators, compliance officers, and defense counsel.

The Securities Fraud National Institute Planning Committee, in cooperation with the Criminal Justice Section White Collar Crime Committee and the Business Law Section, will provide an educational and professional forum to discuss the legal and ethical issues that arise in securities fraud matters. For More Information – Click Here:

Public Defenders as Effective as Private Attorneys

This week’s featured blogger at the National Law Review is Tom Jacobs of Miller-McCune – who discusses a recent study done comparing the relative effectiveness of public defenders and private attorneys in the Cook County criminal court system. The research team led by Richard Hartley of the University of Texas at San Antonio came up with some interesting and somewhat startling results.  Read on:

Perhaps it’s time for someone to come to the defense of public defenders. A newly published look at Chicago-area courts finds that, when you consider the actual outcomes of judicial hearings, these underpaid and underappreciated attorneys do just as well as their private-sector counterparts.

“This study suggests that there is little difference in the quality of legal defense provided to defendants by private attorneys and public defenders,” a research team led by Richard Hartley of the University of Texas at San Antonio writes in the Journal of Criminal Justice. “The type of attorney representing the defendant was not influential on any of the four decision-making points examined here.”

The researchers examined a random sample of 2,850 offenders convicted of felonies in Cook County Circuit Court, “a large Midwestern jurisdiction which is similar to other large, urban jurisdictions in the country.” They compared cases where the defendant was represented by a private attorney or public defender, focusing on four stages of the judicial process:

  • The decision to grant bail. The researchers looked at whether bail was set rather than whether it was made, since the latter is more a function of ability to pay rather than quality of legal representation.
  • Plea-bargaining decisions. This served as a measure of whether an attorney was successful in getting the initial charge reduced.
  • Whether the defendant, once convicted, served jail time.
  • The length of sentence imposed on those convicts who were incarcerated.

“The overall results of this study generally support the idea that there is no difference between private attorneys and public defenders regarding case outcomes,” the researchers conclude. “The type of attorney representing the defendant was not influential on any of the four decision-making points examined here.”

Two important caveats. The researchers did not look at convictions vs. acquittals. And they found that retaining a private attorney is apparently beneficial “for certain offenders and at certain stages” of the process. Specifically, they noted some interestingly varied outcomes when looking at a defendant’s race.

“White defendants are the only defendants who benefit from having a private attorney at the release decision,” they write. Specifically, they found whites with private attorneys are 2.7 times more likely than whites with public defenders to have bail granted.

For people of color, private attorneys may not help in getting bail, but they do facilitate plea bargains. “Black defendants who retain a private attorney are almost two times more likely to have the primary charge reduced than black defendants who are represented by a public defender,” the researchers write.

Why are public defenders so effective at representing their clients? One theory, according to Hartley, involves the “courtroom workgroup” model of justice, where the public defender, prosecutor and judge work together to dispose of cases.  He notes that when the system functions in this way, “public defenders are in better positions than private attorneys to negotiate favorable plea bargains and to mitigate punishment.”

These findings are not likely to put any law firms out of business. But given the negative media coverage of public defenders offices, they do offer some reassurance that the system is reasonably fair, even for those who can’t afford an attorney.

“This study provides evidence that contradicts the idea that you get what you pay for, at least in Cook County,” Hartley and his colleagues conclude. In Chicago courtrooms, “Public defenders are as effective as private attorneys.”

Miller-McCune © 2010 

About the Author:

Tom Jacobs is a veteran journalist with more than 20 years experience at daily newspapers. He has served as a staff writer for The Los Angeles Daily News and the Santa Barbara News-Press. His work has also appeared in The Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune and Ventura County Star.

TheEditor@miller-mccune.com / www.miller-mccune.com / 805-899-8620