Category: Civil Rights

Wal-Mart to Pay $75,000 to Settle EEOC Disability Lawsuit

EEOC Wal-mart disability discriminationCHICAGO – Wal-Mart Stores Inc. will pay a former employee $75,000 to settle a disability discrimination lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced yesterday.

EEOC’s lawsuit charged Wal-Mart with violating federal discrimination law when the giant retailer failed to accommodate Nancy Stack, a cancer survivor with physical limitations, and subjected her to harassment based on her disability. Stack worked at a Walmart store in Hodgkins, Ill.

As a workplace accommodation, Stack needed a chair and a modified schedule. EEOC alleged that while the store provided Stack with a modified schedule for a period of time, it revoked the accommodation for no stated reason. Further, according to EEOC, the store did not ensure that a chair was in Stack’s work area, telling her that she had to haul a chair from the furniture department to her work area, a task that was difficult, given her disability. Making matters even worse, EEOC alleged that a co-worker harassed Stack by calling her “cripple” and “chemo brain.”

Wal-Mart’s alleged conduct violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, which can include denying reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities and subjecting them to a hostile work environment. EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Civil Action No. 15-cv-5796.)

Wal-Mart will pay $75,000 in monetary relief to Stack as part of a consent decree settling the suit, signed by U.S. District Judge Sharon Coleman on Dec. 6th. The two-year decree also provides additional, non-monetary relief intended to improve the Hodgkins store’s workplace. Under the decree, the store will train employees on disability discrimination and requests for reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The Walmart store will also monitor requests for accommodation and complaints of disability discrimination and report those to EEOC.

“Wal-Mart refused to provide simple, effective and inexpensive accommodations in the form of a chair and modified schedule and failed to protect Stack from mocking because she had cancer,” said John Hendrickson, regional attorney of EEOC’s Chicago District Office. “Both the failure to provide accommodations and to stop the harassment violated federal law, and we are pleased with today’s settlement. Ms. Stack will receive monetary recompense from Wal-Mart, and the company will be required to educate its workforce on employees’ rights and on its own obligations under the law.”

You can review this press release in its entirety on the EEOC website here.

EEOC’s Chicago District Office is responsible for processing charges of employment discrimination, administrative enforcement, and the conduct of agency litigation in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and North and South Dakota, with Area Offices in Milwaukee and Minneapolis.

ARTICLE BY U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
© Copyright U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EEOC Issues Guidance on National Origin Discrimination that Applies to Foreign National Employees

EEOC, National Origin DiscriminationThis week the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released guidance regarding national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).  The guidance replaces Section 13 of the EEOC’s compliance manual, with a view toward further defining “national origin” and helping employers and employees understand their legal rights and responsibilities. The guidance specifically states that Title VII applies to any worker employed in the United States by a covered employer (employer with more than four employees), regardless of immigration status, as well as any foreign national outside the United States when they apply for U.S.-based employment.

The new guidance defines “national origin” as an individual’s, or his or her ancestors’, place of origin, which can be a country (including the United States), a former country, or a geographic region.  In addition, “national origin” refers to an individual’s national origin group or ethnic group, which it defines as “a group of people sharing a common language, culture, ancestry, race, and/or other social characteristics.”  Discrimination based on national origin group includes discrimination because of a person’s ethnicity (e.g., Hispanic) or physical, linguistic, or cultural traits (e.g., accent or style of dress).  Discrimination based on place of origin or national origin group includes discrimination involving a mere perception of where a person is from (e.g., Middle Eastern or Arab), association with someone of a particular national origin, or citizenship status.  Title VII discrimination can take the form of unfavorable employment decisions based on national origin or harassment so pervasive or severe that it creates a hostile work environment.

In addition to clarifying the meaning of “national origin,” the guidance provides examples based on how actual courts have applied Title VII to specific facts.  For example, the guidance gives as an example of “intersectional” discrimination a Mexican-American woman who, without explanation, was denied a promotion at a company where she successfully worked for 10 years, despite two non-Mexican women and a Mexican man being selected for the same position.  The guidance also provides examples where national origin discrimination overlaps with other protected bases, such as discriminating against people with origins in the Middle East due to a perception that they follow certain religious practices.  Further, the guidance gives examples of real cases where employment decisions and harassment constituted Title VII national origin violations, as well as cases where Title VII violations were not found.  Finally, the guidance applies Title VII national origin principles to trafficking cases, where employers use force, fraud, or coercion to compel labor or exploit workers, and such conduct is directed at an individual or a group of individuals based on national origin.

Employers of foreign national workers should note that individuals with Title VII claims may also have claims under other Federal statutes, including the anti-discrimination provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Form I-9 and the E-Verify program are two areas where discrimination claims could arise under both the INA and Title VII.

ARTICLE BY Kristin Aquino-Pham of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

©2016 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination

sexual orientation discriminationIn the midst of a legal, political and cultural landscape expanding the rights of LGBT individuals, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has held to prior precedent in reaffirming that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, __ S.Ct. __, No. 15-720 (July 28, 2016).  According to the court, though “the writing is on the wall” that sexual orientation discrimination should not be tolerated, because the writing is not in a Supreme Court opinion or Title VII, the court’s hands are tied.

In two 2000 opinions, Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.and Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit had previously held that Title VII offers no protection from sexual orientation discrimination. The court revisited the issue now in order to provide a more detailed analysis in light of recent trends and decisions advancing LGBT rights.

The court recognized the merits of many of Ms. Hively’s arguments, and acknowledged that in light of the recognition of other rights of LGBT individuals the current legal landscape does not make sense. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as unlawful (U.S. v. Windsor) and legalized gay marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). In 2015, the EEOC held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Baldwin v. Foxx (July 16, 2015). Many judicial decisions at the district court level have repeatedly recognized that sexual orientation discrimination cannot be tolerated. Yet, Congress has repeatedly rejected new legislation that would extend Title VII to cover sexual orientation discrimination, and it has not amended the language of Title VII to include sexual orientation.

This creates “a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.” The court observed, “From an employee’s perspective, the right to marriage might not feel like a real right if she can be fired for exercising it.”

Nonetheless, the court stated that Congress’ failure to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation cannot be due to its unawareness of the issue. Thus, Congress must have intended a very narrow reading of the term “sex” when it passed Title VII.

In excluding sexual orientation discrimination from the coverage of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit conveyed its apparent reluctance in doing so:

“Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that  our  society  can  continue  to  condone  a  legal  structure  in  which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled  out  for  undesirable  tasks,  paid  lower  wages,  demoted,  passed  over  for  promotions,  and  otherwise  discriminated  against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, … many of the federal  courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not  condone it …; and this court undoubtedly  does not condone it… . But writing  on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the  form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we  must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent[.]”

The Seventh Circuit went on to offer its further observations:

“Many citizens would be surprised to learn that under federal law any private employer can summon an employee into his office and state, “You are a hard‐working employee and have added much value to my company, but I am firing you because you are gay.” And the employee would have no recourse whatsoever—unless she happens to live in a state or locality with an anti‐discrimination statute that includes sexual orientation.”

Those states are currently California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Other states apply the prohibition to public employment only: Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio; Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Some local city and county ordinances contain similar anti-discrimination provisions.

The bottom line for both employers and LGBT individuals, in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, is that the employment protections afforded to individuals based on sexual orientation remains determined, for now, at the state and local level.

ARTICLE BY Julie Furer Stahr of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

Update Company Policies for Transgendered Employees

Although no federal statute explicitly prohibits employment discrimination based on gender identity, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has actively sought out opportunities to ensure coverage for transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions under its Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2016. After the EEOC issued its groundbreaking administrative ruling in Macy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, EEOC Appeal No. 012012081 (April 23, 2012), where it held that transgendered employees may state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, some courts have trended to support Title VII coverage for transgendered employees.

To address potential challenges and lawsuits that may arise, employers should consider updating codes of conduct as well as non-discrimination and harassment policies. While policies may differ based on an employer’s business, there are some key features to consider:

  • Include “gender identity” or “gender expression” in non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. Gender identity refers to the gender a person identifies with internally whereas gender expression refers to how an employee expresses their gender—i.e. how an employee dresses. The way an employee expresses their gender may not line up with how they identify their gender.

  • Establish gender transition guidelines and plans. A document should be established and available to all members of human resources and/or managers to eliminate mismanaging an employee who is transitioning. The guidelines may identify a specific contact for employees, the general procedure for updating personnel records, as well as restroom and/or locker room use.

  • Announcements. After management is informed, and with the employee’s permission, management should disseminate the employee’s new name to coworkers and everyone should begin using the correct name and pronoun of the employee. Misuse of a name or pronouns may create an unwelcome environment which could lead to a lawsuit.

  • Training and compliance. Employers should review harassment and diversity training programs and modules to ensure coverage of LGBTQ issues. All employees should be trained regarding appropriate workplace behavior and consequences for failing to comply with an organization’s rules.

In addition to the potential liability under federal law, some state laws provide a right of action for transgendered employees who are discriminated against at work; therefore, employers should review the laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate to ensure compliance.

ARTICLE BY Latrice Nicole Lee of Polsinelli PC

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Key Implications of Fourth Circuit’s Denial of En Banc Review of Pro-Transgender Ruling

On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied en banc review of an April decision permitting transgender students to use sex-segregated facilities that are consistent with their gender identity.  The Fourth Circuit encompasses North Carolina; thus, the case G.G. v. Gloucester County Public School Board (“Gloucester County”), although it arose in Virginia, creates a conflict between federal law and North Carolina’s House Bill 2 (“HB2”), which requires transgender individuals to use public bathrooms that match the gender listed on their birth certificates.  Although Gloucester County applies on its face to students and public schools, the decision impacts retailers who provide bathroom facilities to employees and customers and who must navigate conflicting laws regarding transgender protections.  Of additional importance, plaintiffs in sex discrimination lawsuits will likely use the decision as support for the view that a person’s “sex” includes “gender identity.”North Carolina Transgender students

In Gloucester County, a sixteen-year-old transgender high school student who was born a biological female filed suit to use the boys’ restroom at school.  G.G. and his mother contended that the school’s policy of providing separate restrooms and locker rooms based upon a student’s biological sex constituted sex discrimination under Title IX—the federal law that prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally funded educational programs and activities.  On April 19, G.G. prevailed in a two-to-one decision of a three member panel of the Fourth Circuit, which deferred to the U.S. Department of Education’s interpretation that the reference to “sex” in Title IX includes “gender identity.”

Following the panel’s ruling, the school board asked the Fourth Circuit to rehear the case with the full panel of 15 active judges.  On May 31, the en banc panel denied the school board’s request.  Circuit Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, widely considered the most conservative member of the Fourth Circuit, filed the lone dissent, stating the issue “deserves an open road to the Supreme Court to seek the Court’s controlling construction of Title IX for national application.”

Regardless whether the case proceeds to the Supreme Court, the decision signifies the first time a federal appeals court has found that federal law protects the rights of transgender persons to use sex-segregated facilities that are consistent with their gender identity.  Although decided under Title IX with regard to student rights, the decision may have ramifications in the area of employment law, inasmuch as Title VII, like Title IX, prohibits discrimination based on “sex.”  Retailers and other employers should be alert to the issue and may expect that future litigants will seek to expand the Gloucester County ruling to Title VII and other sex discrimination claims.

Given the political and legal climate surrounding HB2 and related laws that affect the rights of transgender persons, we recommend that retailers proactively accommodate the needs of transgender workers rather than reactively respond to potential claims of discrimination.  Retailers, particularly those operating in states with anti-discrimination laws that cover sexual orientation and gender identity, should implement a policy designed to foster workplace inclusion.  In particular, retailers are encouraged to provide transgender employees access to bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity and, where possible, provide employees with additional options, including single-occupancy gender-neutral (unisex) facilities and use of multiple-occupant, gender-neutral restroom facilities with lockable single occupant stalls.  Furthermore, retailers in the clothing industry with dressing/fitting rooms should accommodate their employees and patrons alike by permitting them to use the dressing/fitting room that corresponds to their gender identity.  These recommendations apply equally to those retailers in North Carolina because, although HB2 remains in effect in that state, the law applies only to places of public accommodation, and, in any event, the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision signals that the controversial law may not withstand judicial scrutiny.  In general, retailers should beware that engaging in discriminatory practices may have negative business as well as legal ramifications.

ARTICLE BY Nathaniel M. Glasser & Jonathan L. Shapiro of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Termination For Conduct Caused By Side Effects of Prescription Medication Was Not Disability Discrimination

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Disability Discrimination

A federal court in Florida has upheld an employee’s termination due to her “inebriated” conduct that was caused by her use of prescription medications, holding that her discharge did not constitute disability discrimination. Caporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 8-14-cv-2131-T-36EAJ (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2016).

Lisa Caporicci worked for Chipotle as a crew member and had a long history of depression and bi-polar disorder. In April 2013 she informed her manager that she took medication for bi-polar disorder but did not mention any side effects or behavioral issues that might arise from taking the medication.

In May 2013, Caporicci began taking new medication because she was experiencing panic attacks. At that time, she requested a few days off and her request was granted.  She did not work for five days and returned on June 4, 2013.  Four days later, she reported for work in what appeared to be an inebriated state.  She was “very slow, messed up orders and was incoherent.”  Caporicci’s supervisor took her off the serving line and sent her home.  She was fired later that day, for violating Chipotle’s Drug and Alcohol Policy, which prohibits employees from reporting for work or being at work under the influence of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances, or with any detectable amount of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances in his or her system.  The policy further provides that if an employee takes prescription medication that may adversely affect the ability to perform the job, he/she must notify his/her manager prior to starting work.

Caporicci asserted disability discrimination claims under federal and state law, as well as FMLA interference and retaliation claims. Her FMLA claims were dismissed because she had been employed less than 12 months.  As to her disability discrimination claims, Caporicci argued that firing her for medication side effects was tantamount to firing her for her disability.

The Court noted that courts are split on the question of whether a termination based on conduct related to, or caused by, a disability constitutes unlawful discrimination. The majority position, which includes courts in the Eleventh Circuit, holds that an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for workplace misconduct even when the misconduct is a result of the disability.  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court discounted the minority position in Raytheon Company v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 n.6 (2003), stating:  “To the extent that [the Ninth Circuit] suggested that, because respondent’s workplace misconduct is related to his disability, petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent on account of that workplace misconduct violated the ADA, we point out that we have rejected a similar argument in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.”

For these reasons, the Court followed the majority position and held that Caporicci’s termination was not discrimination based on her disability, but rather, it was the result of her employer’s application of a neutral policy which prohibited employees from reporting to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Article By Kathryn J. Russo of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act: New Pregnancy Provision Taking Effect in August

Colorado Anti-discriminationOn August 10, 2016, a new pregnancy provision of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) will take effect. While the CADA had previously been interpreted as prohibiting pregnancy discrimination and requiring accommodations for pregnancy, the new provision strengthens and clarifies those protections. Indeed, the amendment will require more of employers and will make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail than federal anti-discrimination law. This greater pregnancy protection, combined with the fact that the CADA was amended in 2013 to allow successful plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive damages (remedies previously unavailable under the CADA), make it more likely that employers will face lawsuits under the CADA. Accordingly, employers need to be especially careful to comply with the new amendment.

Accommodation

The bill requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee for health conditions related to pregnancy or the physical recovery from childbirth under the following conditions: (1) an accommodation is necessary to perform the essential functions of the job, (2) the employee has requested an accommodation, and (3) the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer. As in the disability context, once an employee requests an accommodation, the employee and employer are required to engage in an interactive process. Importantly, an employer may also require a note from a licensed healthcare provider before providing an accommodation.

While accommodations are to be tailored to the employee, the bill does give examples of reasonable accommodations, including, more frequent or longer break periods, more frequent restroom and refreshment breaks, limitations on lifting, light duty, and modified work schedule. An employer is not required to create a new position or hire additional employees to provide a requested pregnancy accommodation. However, if an employer provides or is required to provide a particular accommodation to another group of employees, the bill creates a rebuttable presumption that the same accommodations for a pregnant employee would not impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Employers should also note that to preserve a pregnant employee’s ability to work, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to accept an accommodation that has not been requested or is not necessary. Similarly, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take leave if the employer can provide another reasonable accommodation.

Adverse Action

The bill also prohibits taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a pregnancy accommodation. Significantly, the bill prohibits more employment practices than other sections of the CADA. Other sections of the CADA specifically make it improper to “refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to harass during the course of employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ” For pregnancy, adverse action is defined as “an action where a reasonable employee would have found the action materially adverse, such that it might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Accordingly, the bill likely covers a broader range of conduct than the other sections of the CADA.

Notice

To help educate employees about their rights under the new law, the bill requires employers to give new employees notice of their rights under this section at the start of employment. Further, employers are required to give current employees notice by December 8, 2016. Moreover, employers are required to post a notice in the workplace (along with the other employment law posters).

Although the bill does not provide a remedy for an employer’s failure to provide notice to existing or new employees, employers should comply with those provisions.

Remedies

Before filing a lawsuit, an employee who believes she has suffered an adverse action or improperly denied an accommodation under the new bill must file a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission within six months of the conduct. Once the employee has exhausted the administrative remedies, she may sue for back pay (up to two years reduced by what the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence), front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

Action Plan

In anticipation of the new bill taking effect on August 10, 2016, employers should:

  • Review all job descriptions to ensure that they clearly identify the essential functions of each job.

  • Review handbooks and policies to ensure that they clearly define the procedures for an employee to request a pregnancy-related accommodation.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to current employees on or before December 8, 2016.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to new employees.

  • Update on-boarding policies and procedures to include providing the required notice of rights.

  • Review the accommodations provided to other classes of employees to understand the accommodations that may be presumed reasonable for pregnancy-related accommodations.

  • Train the employee or employees who will respond to pregnancy-related accommodation requests on the requirements of the bill.

  • Train managers on the requirements of the new bill, including the prohibitions on taking adverse actions against employees who request or use accommodations and the prohibitions on requiring employees to accept accommodations that are unwanted or unnecessary.

  • Update employment law postings to include a notice of rights under the bill.

Article By Gillian McKean Bidgood of Polsinelli PC
© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

North Carolina Retailers Navigate Conflicting Laws Regarding Transgender Protections

On March 23, 2016, the North Carolina Legislature passed House Bill 2, the “Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act” (“HB2”), that overturned a Charlotte ordinance extending anti-discrimination protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) individuals and allowing transgender persons to use the bathroom of their choice. Instead, HB2 requires individuals to use public bathrooms that match the gender listed on their birth certificates. A swift public outcry followed, with many celebrities denouncing the law and canceling appearances in North Carolina, companies threatening to boycott, and the American Civil Liberties Union filing a lawsuit challenging HB2 as unconstitutional and for violating federal law.

North Carolina TransgenderNorth Carolina officials have refused to disavow HB2 and, on May 9, filed a lawsuit against the federal government seeking a ruling that HB2 is not discriminatory. The Justice Department has countersued, alleging that HB2 violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII). Regardless of the ultimate outcome of these lawsuits, it is clear that discriminating against LGBT individuals has real consequences, from both a business and legal perspective. What should retailers know and, more importantly, do to survive in this current environment?

At a minimum, retailers should familiarize themselves with their state’s employment nondiscrimination laws (if any) that apply to private employers. Twenty states (including California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York) and the District of Columbia have passed employment non-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination by private employers based on both sexual orientation and gender identity. Two states (New Hampshire and Wisconsin) have such laws covering sexual orientation only. These laws protect LGBT persons from discrimination in hiring and in the workplace.

Retailers also are encouraged to review their municipality’s nondiscrimination laws and regulations, if any. For example, New York City law prohibits gender identity discrimination, and the New York City Commission on Human Rights recently announced guidance (“NYC Guidance”) that makes clear what constitutes gender identity and gender expression discrimination under the NYC Human Rights Law. The NYC Guidance warns employers and business owners that they may violate New York City law if they intentionally fail to use a transgender employee’s preferred name, pronoun, or title, or refuse to allow a transgender employee to use single-sex facilities, such as bathrooms or locker rooms, and participate in single-sex programs consistent with their gender identity.

Retailers also should know that the EEOC has aggressively pursued transgender discrimination claims on theories of sex stereotyping and gender nonconformity under Title VII, which bars employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sex. In cases involving government employees, the EEOC has held that: (i) an employer’s restriction on a transgender woman’s use of a common female restroom facility constituted illegal sex discrimination under Title VII,(ii) an employer’s intentional references to a transgender female as “he” may constitute sex-based discrimination and/or harassment, and (iii) a transgender employee stated a valid Title VII sex discrimination claim based on his allegation that his employer took over a year to correct his name in the company’s computer system.

The EEOC has taken further action against private companies. For example, it recently entered into a consent decree with a Minnesota financial services company for allegedly refusing to let a transgender employee use the women’s restroom and subjecting her to a hostile work environment. In another action, a Florida eye clinic paid $150,000 to settle an EEOC lawsuit that sought relief for an employee who was allegedly discriminated against when transitioning from male to female.

In light of this climate, retailers are encouraged to accommodate the needs of transgender workers proactively rather than reactively responding to potential claims of discrimination. Retailers, particularly those operating in states with anti-discrimination laws that cover sexual orientation and/or gender identity, should implement a policy designed to foster workplace inclusion. Retailers can avoid significant business and legal risk if they follow these two directives:

  • Call transgender employees by their preferred names, pronouns, and titles, and promptly update internal databases (pay accounts, training records, benefits documents, etc.) with this information upon an employee’s request. The NYC Guidance, for example, advises employers to use the employee’s preferred name regardless of whether the employee has legally changed his or her name “except in very limited circumstances where certain federal, state, or local laws require otherwise (e.g., for purposes of employment eligibility verification with the federal government).” This is a sound policy that retailers beyond New York City should consider following. In addition, employers may choose to offer new business cards and email aliases for their employees.

  • Provide transgender employees access to bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity. On May 3, the EEOC issued a “Fact Sheet” stating that the denial of equal access to a bathroom corresponding to an employee’s gender identity qualifies as sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII and that contrary state law is no defense. The Fact Sheet encourages employers to refer to the more comprehensive “Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers,” which was issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and offers model practices for restroom access for transgender employees. Like the EEOC, OSHA advises that “all employees should be permitted to use the facilities that correspond with their gender identity.” Where possible, employers should provide employees with additional options, including single-occupancy gender-neutral (unisex) facilities and use of multiple-occupant, gender-neutral restroom facilities with lockable single occupant stalls.

While the North Carolina Legislature has rolled back protections for the LGBT community, the media attention surrounding HB2 has been largely negative and has affected the businesses of companies operating in the state. Given the number of other states that have enacted laws expressly prohibiting sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination, the federal government’s enforcement position, and changing public opinion on the issue, retailers are on notice that such discrimination may have negative business or legal ramifications.

Article By Nathaniel M. Glasser & Jonathan L. Shapiro of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Oxford, Alabama, City Council Repeals Bathroom Ordinance Targeting Transgender Individuals

The Oxford, Alabama, City Council has repealed on May 4, 2016, an ordinance it passed a week previously that barred transgender people from using a bathroom that corresponds with their gender identity. (See our article, Oxford, Alabama, City Council Adopts Ordinance Restricting Access to Bathroom Facilities Based on Biological Sex.)

The ordinance made it unlawful for a person to use a bathroom or changing facility within the jurisdiction of the City that did not correspond to the sex indicated on the individual’s birth certificate. Persons deemed to have violated the ordinance could have faced a misdemeanor charge, punishable by a fine of up to $500 or up to six months’ incarceration.

 The ordinance quickly garnered national attention and civil rights groups, including the Human Rights Campaign and the Southern Poverty Law Center, publicly condemned the ordinance. In a letter issued to the Oxford City Council prior to the repeal, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the ACLU of Alabama stated that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by singling out transgender people for different and unequal treatment. The groups also argued that the ordinance violated the due process clause, “because of its broad reach and lack of enforcement mechanisms,” which, according to the groups, left it unclear “whether people risk arrest simply for failing to carry their birth certificates to the restroom at all times.”

The letter also stated that the ordinance violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in public schools. The letter noted a recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056, 2016 LEXIS 7026 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2016), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, accorded deference to the Department of Education’s interpretation of regulations governing toilets, locker rooms and shower facilities. The Department of Education opined that a school must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.

In a special meeting, the Council voted 3-2 to repeal the ordinance. Because the mayor was ill and had not yet signed it, the Council could vote to recall the ordinance. In repealing the ordinance, some Council members expressed concerns regarding whether the ordinance violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

In addition to the repeal of the Oxford ordinance, the U.S. Department of Justice took a similar position in a letter dated May 4, 2016, to North Carolina Governor McCrory. The DOJ stated that North Carolina’s law restricting bathroom access to restrooms based on an individual’s biological sex and not based on an individual’s consistent gender identity violates both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. (See our article, Department of Justice Warns Governor that North Carolina LGBT Law is Unlawful.)

Article By Thomas A. Davis, Michelle E. Phillips & Kimberley R. Ward of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Fourth Circuit Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Transgender Student

Schools across the country have found themselves at the forefront of the societal debate on the appropriate manner in which to address issues surrounding accommodation of transgendered persons. Conflicting regulatory rulings, contemplated state legislation, and in the case of North Carolina, state prohibitions on accommodation have led to a patchwork of inconsistencies and doubt in relation to a school district’s legal duties.

On Tuesday, April 19, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of a transgender student, Gavin, who was born female and wished to use the boys’ restroom at his rural Virginia high school. The ruling, G.G. v Gloucester County Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir., Apr. 19, 2016), is significant, as it marks the first time that a federal appellate court has ruled that Title IX extends to protect the rights of transgender students to use the bathroom that corresponds with the student’s gender identity.

Gavin had previously been granted approval by administration to use the boys’ restroom and did so for a short period of time until the school board adopted a policy prohibiting him from using the bathroom of the gender with which he identifies. Instead, according to board policy, Gavin was required to use the restroom of his biological gender or a separate, unisex restroom. Gavin filed a lawsuit claiming that the school board impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.

In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the Department of Education (“DOE”) regulations implementing Title IX. Those regulations permit schools to provide “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” so long as the facilities are comparable. The question the Court faced in light of this regulatory guidance was how to apply the “separate but equal” mandate to transgender individuals.

The DOE argued that the regulation should be interpreted to mean that schools generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity; the Gloucester school board argued for an interpretation that defined students consistent with their biological sex. The Court recognized that the plain language of the regulation clearly permits schools to provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities for its male and female students. By implication, the regulation also permits schools to exclude males from the female facilities, and vice versa. Although the regulation is silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms, the Court concluded it is susceptible to two interpretations – determining maleness or femaleness is either a matter exclusively of biology, or it is a matter of gender identity.

The Court agreed that public restrooms, locker rooms, and showers historically have been separate on the basis of sex, and that individuals have a legitimate and important interest in bodily privacy. Nonetheless, the Court stated that these safety concerns or privacy interests should be addressed by the DOE or Congress, and not the Court. Thus, the Court held that it was required to afford deference to the DOE’s interpretation. In so doing, the Court held that an individual’s sex should be determined by reference to the student’s gender identity, i.e., consistent with DOE interpretation.

The Fourth Circuit only addressed the student’s claims with respect to Title IX and whether Title IX extends to gender identity. The case has been remanded back to the district court to decide whether the school board violated Title IX and the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. However, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling only has precedential value in that circuit (encompassing Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina), which means those states are now required to follow the DOE’s interpretation of Title IX – that schools generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.

What Does This Mean for Your District?

Although not binding in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Wisconsin, the Fourth Circuit’s decision is instructive as to how Wisconsin school districts should address restroom, locker room, and shower concerns under Title IX. Additionally, the DOE has been aggressive in its efforts to ensure that transgender students can use bathrooms in public schools that correspond with their gender identities. In November 2015, the DOE Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued a letter of findings to a Chicago-area school district demanding that the school district give unfettered locker room access to a transgender student for the facilities of the gender in which the student identified. The OCR gave the school district only 30 days to resolve the matter or risk forfeiting Title IX funding. The school district reached a settlement with OCR prior to having its federal funding rescinded.

School districts should begin the process (if they have not done so already) of developing policies to set the parameters and processes the district will follow when a transgender student seeks guidance and clarity. A district should further ensure that its non-discrimination policy is comprehensive in scope as to all protected classes of students. District policies should address how the district will ascertain the student’s gender identity; what proof, if any, a district will require; the manner in which a student should be addressed and allowed to change his/her name; student dress codes; student records; physical education class; school-sponsored and WIAA-sanctioned sports; and of course, restroom, locker room, and shower facilities.

If your district has a prior policy in place regarding transgender students and gender identity, your district should consider revising the policy to ensure it does not run afoul of Title IX. Ultimately, school districts should be prepared to respond to a request from a student seeking direction as to school processes and procedures. Now is the time to prepare for the inevitable and ensure the district has laid the framework to quickly and fairly respond.

Article By Christine V. Hamiel of von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

©2016 von Briesen & Roper, s.c