Category: Arbitration

Your Employee As Your Arbitrator? Maybe!

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) has, by its order dated August 24, 2009, in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (“Appellants”) Vs. M/s. Raja Transport (P) Ltd. (“Respondent”)1, once again upheld that the Court must give full effect and meaning to the appointment procedure set by the parties in the arbitration agreement before appointing arbitrator of their choice.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Appellant and Respondent entered into an agreement dated February 28, 2005 (“Agreement”), where under, the Respondent was appointed as the dealer of the Appellant for the retail sale of petroleum products. Clause 692 of the Agreement provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration where the Director, Marketing of the Appellant, or a person appointed by him, was to act as the sole arbitrator.

On August 06, 2005, the Appellant terminated the dealership. The Respondent filed suit in the Civil Court, Dehradun, seeking (1) a declaration that the order of termination of dealership was illegal and void and (2) for a permanent injunction restraining the Appellant from stopping the supply of petroleum products to the retail outlet of the Appellant. In this same suit, the Appellant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), praying that the suit be rejected and the matter be referred to arbitration in terms of Section 69 of the Agreement. The Ld. Judge allowed the Appellant’s application and directed the parties to refer the matter to arbitration within two months and also directed the Appellant not to stop supplies to the Respondent for a period of two months.

Both parties challenged the said order before the District Court, Dehradun. The Respondent also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act seeking an interim injunction against the Appellant. Both appeals and the Section 9 application were disposed off by a common order dated January 20, 2006, whereby, both appeals were dismissed and the Section 9 application was allowed, retraining the Appellant from interrupting the supply of petroleum products to the Respondent for two months as well as directing the parties to refer the matter to arbitration as per the agreement, within the said period of two months.

While the appeals were pending, the Respondent issued letter dated January 04, 2006, through their counsel, wherein, the Respondent, referring to the Appellant’s insistence that only its Director, Marketing could be appointed as the Arbitrator, inter alia alleged that it (the Respondent) did not expect fair treatment or justice if the Director, Marketing or any other employee of the Appellant was appointed as the Arbitrator and called upon the Respondent to have a joint meeting so as to enable the parties to mutually agree on an independent arbitrator. This request was not accepted by the Appellant.

Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application before the Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of an independent arbitrator to decide the dispute. This application7 was allowed and a retired High Court Judge was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to decide the dispute. The Ld. Chief Justice inter alia assigned the following two reasons to appoint a retired Judge as an Arbitrator instead of the persons as named in the arbitration agreement.

  1. The Director (Marketing) of the Appellant, being its employee, should be presumed not to act independently or impartially.
    1. The Respondent had taken steps in accordance with the agreed appointment procedure contained in the arbitration agreement and directions of the civil court by issuing notice dated January 04, 2006, calling upon the Appellant to appoint an arbitrator. After receipt of the said notice, the Appellant had to refer the matter to its Director, Marketing, which it did not do, nor did it take any steps for the appointment of an Arbitrator. The Appellant had, thus, failed to act as required under the agreed procedure.

    Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant preferred an appeal before the Court.

    JUDGMENT:

    The facts and circumstances of this case raised three issues for the Court to consider:

    1. Whether the Ld. Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court was justified in assuming that when an employee of one of the parties to the dispute is appointed as an arbitrator, he will not act independently or impartially.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • Arbitration is a binding and voluntary dispute resolution process by a private forum so chosen by the parties.
    • Where a party, with open eyes and full knowledge and comprehension of the said provision enters into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise, where such arbitration agreements providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, were common, such party cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act.
    • It was settled law that arbitration agreements in government contracts providing that an employee of the department (usually a high official unconnected with the work or the contract) will be the arbitrator are neither void, nor unenforceable.
    • Whilst the provisions relating to independence, impartiality and freedom from bias are implicit under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the same are made explicit in the Act.
    • This position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement. In such cases, there may be a valid and reasonable apprehension of bias in view of his position and interest. In such cases, the court has the discretion not to appoint such a person.
    1. In what circumstances the Chief Justice or his designate can ignore the appointment procedure or the named arbitrator in the arbitration agreement to appoint an arbitrator of his choice.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • The court must first ensure that the terms of the agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted.
    • It is not mandatory to appoint the named arbitrator but at the same time, due regard has to be given to the qualifications required by the agreement and other considerations. Referring the disputes to the named arbitrator shall be the rule. Ignoring the named arbitrator and nominating an independent arbitrator shall be the exception to the rule, which is to be resorted to for valid reasons.

    Interestingly, the Court also proceeded to expound on the scope of Section 11 of the Act, which contains the scheme of appointment of arbitrators.

    1. Whether the Respondent had taken the necessary steps for the appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement, and the Appellant had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure, by not referring the dispute to its Director, Marketing for arbitration.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • In view of the order dated January 20, 2006, the Respondent ought to have referred the dispute to the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant within two months from January 2006. The Respondent had not done so and in light thereof, it was the Respondent that had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure and not the Appellant.
    • As the Arbitrator was already identified, there was no need for the Respondent to ask the Appellant to act in accordance with the agreed procedure.

    The Court proceeded to hold that the Chief Justice had erred in having proceeded on the basis that the Respondent had performed its duty under the agreement and that there was justification for appointment of an independent arbitrator.

    The Court then proceeded to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and appointed the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties.

    ANALYSIS:

    By this decision, the Court has once again upheld that when a person enter into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise having an arbitration agreement providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, such person cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act. However, this position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement.

    Referring to its decision taken earlier in the matter of Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi Vs. Patel Engineering Company Ltd. (please refer to our earlier hotline dated August 26, 2008) Court reiterated that it is important to first ensure that the terms of the arbitration agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted, before they intervene in any manner.

    However, If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.

    FOOTNOTES

    1 Civil Appeal No. 5760 of 2009 arising out of SLP (C) No. 26906 of 2008.

    2 “69. Any dispute or a difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this Agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director, Marketing of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director Marketing. The dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the contract related or that in the course of his duties or differences. ………………..It shall also be a term of this contract that no other person other than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such Director, marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder…………………….”

    Nishith Desai Associates 2022. All rights reserved.

Article By Sahil Kanuga and Vyapak Desai with Nishith Desai Associates.

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Look at Me, Not Through Me: Supreme Court Limits Federal Jurisdiction for Post-arbitration Award Petitions

On 31 March 2022, the United States Supreme Court in Badgerow v. Walters limited federal subject matter jurisdiction over post-arbitration award petitions under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §§ 9 and 10. After years of widening disagreement between circuit courts regarding when a federal court may exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award, the Supreme Court weighed in and held that federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award if the face of the application supports diversity or federal-question jurisdiction. One of the implications of this ruling is that many more post-arbitration proceedings to confirm or vacate an arbitration award may be channeled into state courts.

BACKDROP: FAA SECTIONS AT ISSUE

Section 4 states that a party seeking to compel arbitration can file suit in any court that, “save for” the arbitration agreement, would have federal jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.1

Section 9 provides that parties may apply to confirm an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.2

Section 10 provides that parties may apply to vacate an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.3

PRELUDE: VADEN

In its 2009 decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Supreme Court found that federal-question jurisdiction could exist under a “look-through” approach in a § 4 petition to compel arbitration.4 In that case, two questions were presented: (1) whether a district court, when asked to compel arbitration, should “look through” the petition and compel arbitration if the court originally would have had federal jurisdiction; and (2) if so, may the court exercise jurisdiction over the § 4 petition when the original complaint rests on state law but the counterclaim rests on federal law?

The Supreme Court answered the first question affirmatively. In doing so, it emphasized that a “federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule.”5 However, the Court found that the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the petition presented in that case, because the complaint was “entirely state-based” and “federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim.”6

Since Vaden, circuit courts have been divided over whether the “look-through” approach also applies to applications to confirm or vacate awards under FAA §§ 9 and 10. For example, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split in Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., noting that the Third and Seventh Circuits decline to apply the look-through approach for confirmation, vacatur, or modification of arbitration awards, but the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits permit the look-through approach.7

Ultimately, a divided Fifth-Circuit panel in Quezada agreed with the majority and held that the Vaden look-through approach applies to applications to confirm or vacate arbitration awards.

OPENING ACTS: BADGEROW V. WALTERS IN THE LOWER COURTS

Badgerow v. Walters followed, implicating the Supreme Court’s Vaden decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Quezada decision on the issue of whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the underlying dispute presents a federal question.

The plaintiff in Badgerow initiated arbitration against her former employer’s principals, alleging violation of federal employment law. The arbitration panel dismissed all of her claims, so she filed an action in state court to vacate the arbitration award. The defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and filed a motion to confirm the award. Plaintiff moved for remand to state court, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the award; however, the district court denied remand and granted defendant’s motion to confirm the award.8

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that it was bound by its precedent in Quezada and applied the look-through approach.9 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on 17 May 2021.10

FEATURE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

In an 8-1 decision,11 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that FAA §§ 9 and 10 lack § 4’s “distinctive language directing a look-through” approach. Thus, without statutory language directing otherwise, “a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction.”12 Noting that Congress could have replicated § 4’s look-through language in §§ 9 and 10 but chose not to, the Court held that a federal court only has jurisdiction over an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the face of the application demonstrates diversity or federal-question jurisdiction.

Applying the new rule to the facts of plaintiff’s appeal, the Court explained that the parties were not contesting the federal employment dispute at this stage; rather, the parties were contesting enforcement of the arbitration award. Therefore, the Court held that federal jurisdiction was not appropriate because enforcement of the award, which was “no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute,” did not amount to federal-question jurisdiction and the parties were not diverse.

SOUVENIR: THE KEY TAKEAWAYS

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration awards, counsel and parties seeking to confirm or vacate arbitration awards must analyze whether their application, on its face, supports an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction if they wish to bring their application in federal court. Without the “look-through” approach for §§ 9 and 10 petitions, and in particular where the parties to arbitration provisions are citizens of the same state (and thus lack diversity jurisdiction), state courts will more likely be the primary venue for post-award petitions.

FOOTNOTES

1 9 U.S.C. § 4.

2 9 U.S.C. § 9.

3 9 U.S.C. § 10.

4 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1268 (2009) (“A federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition and order arbitration if,” notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, “the court would have jurisdiction over ‘the [substantive] controversy between the parties.’” (citations omitted)).

5 Id. at 1273.

6 Id. at 1269.

7 Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2020) (“After Vaden, a circuit split developed regarding whether the same look-through approach also applies to applications to confirm an arbitration award under section 9, to vacate under section 10, or to modify under section 11.”).

8 Badgerow v. Walters, — S. Ct. —-, 2022 WL 959675, at *3 (2022).

9 Badgerow v. Walters, 975 F.3d 469, 472–74 (5th Cir. 2020).

10 Badgerow v. Walters, 141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021).

11 Justice Breyer in dissent wrote that although the Court’s decision “may be consistent with the statute’s text,” practical application would create curious consequences, artificial distinctions, and results that are “overly complex and impractical.” Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

12 Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *3.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates
For more articles about Supreme Court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA

On March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No 20-1143, addressing when federal courts have jurisdiction to rule on motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 decision, the Court narrowed the circumstances in which federal courts have such jurisdiction. Under the Court’s new decision, employers (and employees) will now more often be required to file their motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards in state rather than federal court.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s decision addresses a number of arcane questions of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction that could make for a nightmarish law school exam.

The decision starts from the well-accepted premise that the FAA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction. The FAA does, however, give parties to arbitration agreements certain rights, including the right to move a court to compel arbitration and the right to move a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award. So the question that follows is: When can parties file these FAA motions in federal court and when must they file them in state court?

Under Badgerow, we now know that the answer is not the same for motions to compel arbitration and motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards.

Under the Court’s prior case law, Vaden v. Discover Bank (2009), an employer can file a motion to compel arbitration in federal court so long as the underlying dispute to be arbitrated involves a question under federal law. For example, if an employee is alleging claims under a federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any of the myriad other federal employment laws, a federal court would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to compel arbitration of those claims. In addition to this “federal question” jurisdiction, the federal court might also have jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties. Under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties that are citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

In Badgerow, the Court held that a different analysis applies to motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards, which are governed by different sections of the FAA. Unlike motions to compel arbitration, federal courts are not permitted to “look through” a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm to see whether there is a federal question involved in the underlying arbitration matter. Instead, a federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction based on the motion itself.

Asking a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award will usually raise questions about contract interpretation and enforcement. Contract law is usually state law. Thus, a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will generally present questions of state law rather than federal law.

Since motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will rarely present federal questions on their face, federal courts will rarely have “federal question” jurisdiction over such motions. Federal courts may still have diversity jurisdiction if the parties on opposite sides of the motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. It is also theoretically possible that a federal court could still have federal question jurisdiction on some other grounds, but the Badgerow decision did not delve into that subject.

Key Takeaways

Under the Supreme Court’s new decision, employers will more often need to turn to state courts for motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the FAA.

State courts historically have been more hostile to arbitration than federal courts. In losing the option of going to federal court to confirm some arbitration awards, arbitration may become marginally less reliable. However, this new decision should not affect the overall benefits that many employers conclude they receive from using employment arbitration.

In addition, the new decision will likely affect employers’ strategies in moving to compel arbitration, because the scope of federal jurisdiction is broader for such motions. In seeking to compel arbitration, employers may now more frequently ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the arbitration so that the parties may return to that federal court to address any subsequent motion to vacate, modify, or confirm the resulting arbitration award.

Finally, by forcing employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) more frequently to go to state court to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards, the Badgerow decision will likely bring to the fore another question that has been looming on the horizon: do the FAA’s provisions permitting motions to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards even apply in state court? Several courts around the country have suggested that they do not, meaning that employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) will need to rely on state arbitration statutes for such motions in some jurisdictions. But that is another topic for another day.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
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WEBSITE LAYOUT PASSES MUSTER: Court Enforces Cruise Line’s TCPA and Arbitration Disclosures Over Objection

Those of you who attended Lead Generation World heard me discuss the big trend from back in 2020 in which Courts were refusing to enforce online disclosures owing to perceived problems with website layout.

Things like “below the button” disclosures and distracting visual elements were often described as defeating a manifestation of assent to disclosure terms in that unfortunate line of cases.

Well, 2022 has brought a couple of cases that have determined website disclosures to be just fine. Yesterday I reported on a big win by Efinancial, and today we have a nice victory by a cruise ship company.

In Barney v. Grand Caribbean Cruises, Inc., CASE NO. 21-CV-61560-RAR, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263 (S.D. Fl. January 17, 2022) the Defendant moved to enforce an arbitration provision on its website arguing that the Plaintiff had agreed to the terms and conditions by submitting a sweepstakes entry form.

Predictably, the Plaintiff argued that the disclosures were not enforceable because the website layout was insufficient–specifically that the font was too small and the terms excessively lengthy.

The Court was not impressed.

Noting that the disclosure was plainly readable and above the button–and it required a check box–the Court simply refused to heed the Plaintiff’s argument that he didn’t know he was agreeing to consent and arbitration. Here’s the analysis:

First, in terms of placement, the Website does not tuck away its statement regarding the Terms & Conditions in an obscure corner of the page where a user is unlikely to encounter it. Rather, the statement is located directly between the contact information fields and the “Submit Entry” button. The user is required to check the box indicating assent to the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted. Id. ¶ 14. Thus, it is impossible that a user would miss seeing the statement regarding the Terms & Conditions or—at the very least—the checkbox indicating assent to them. Second, rather than merely informing the user that the Terms & Conditions exist, the statement directs the user to the precise location where the Terms & Conditions can be accessed—namely, at the “bottom of the page.” Finally, and most significantly, the user is required to check an acknowledgement box to accept the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted through the Website—an affirmative act indicating [*14] assent. The checkbox accompanies the statement, which specifically includes language indicating that the user “agree[s] to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions.” Thus, there is an explicit textual notice that checking the box will act as a manifestation of an intent to be bound. A reasonable user confronting a statement that “I consent to receive e-mail, SMS/Text messages, and calls about offers and deals from an automatic dialing system and/or pre-recorded voice technology” and “confirm that I am over age 25 [and] agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions that are hyperlinked at the bottom of the page” would understand that he or she is assenting to the linked terms, including those pertaining to mandatory arbitration. And the record shows that Plaintiff indeed checked the box before clicking “Submit Entry.” Connolly Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s objections to the design of the Website hold no water. Plaintiff assails the statement regarding the Website’s Terms & Conditions as “lengthy” with “extremely small font that blends into the background.” Resp. at 9. But as seen in the screenshot of the Website on the day of Plaintiff’s visit, the statement’s text is clearly legible [*15] and not overly long. Indeed, it is roughly the same size and color as the text indicating the fields for “First Name,” “Last Name,” “Email,” and “Phone Number.” Plaintiff also objects to the placement of the link to the Terms & Conditions at the bottom of the page. Id. at 10. But, as discussed supra, that is precisely where the statement directed the user to view them.

As you can see the Court found the layout to be perfectly appropriate and was particularly moved by the presence of the opt in check box. Although many cases have recently enforced disclosures WITHOUT checkboxes, they do remain favored by the Courts.

I think Barney represents a case of a pretty clearly enforceable provision. The above-the-button text coupled with the radial button and the clear articulation of the terms being accepted made this an easy case for the court.

I will note that the TCPA consent is connected to the terms and conditions lingo–I don’t love that since the TCPA disclosure should be “separately signed”. But the agreement by the consumer that they are over 25 is a nice touch–helps to protect against claims that minors are supplying consent illegally.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
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Supreme Court to Address Role of “Prejudice” in Evaluating Waiver of Arbitrability

One of the best ways for companies facing media and privacy risk to protect themselves from expensive class action litigation is by including an arbitration provision in the applicable terms and conditions. While it’s not always clear at the outset of litigation whether the plaintiff agreed to the terms, companies often have to invoke arbitration quickly out of fear that they will be found to have waived arbitration. But in its coming term, the U.S. Supreme Court is now poised to address the critical point of whether prejudice to the plaintiff is a necessary element for a finding of waiver.

The Court agreed to decide whether prejudice is a required element in determining whether the right to arbitrate has been waived when it granted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Robyn Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (No. 21-328). The case reached the Supreme Court after the Eighth Circuit found that Sundance, Inc., a company that owns over 150 Taco Bell franchises nationwide, did not waive its right to arbitrate the plaintiff’s claims, despite waiting almost eight months after the filing of her Complaint to move to compel arbitration.

There is, at a present, a circuit split on the question of whether prejudice plays a role in the waiver analysis. Nine out of the twelve federal circuit courts—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—have explicitly found that prejudice is a required element to establish a waiver of the right to arbitrate. But the remaining three circuit courts—the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits—have held that prejudice is not a required element.

In this case, the plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a proposed putative class, filed suit against Sundance on September 25, 2018 in the U.S. Southern District of Iowa, alleging that it had failed to pay employees for overtime hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Because an action containing nearly identical allegations had been pending in the Eastern District of Michigan for nearly two years, Sundance first filed a motion to dismiss or stay the claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), which the District Court ultimately denied.

Thereafter, Sundance, plaintiff, and the plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Michigan action voluntarily attended mediation in an attempt to achieve a global resolution of the claims asserted against Sundance. Plaintiff’s claims were not resolved at the mediation, and three weeks later (nearly eight months after the case had been filed), Sundance moved to compel arbitration.

The motion to compel arbitration was filed before the parties attended an initial scheduling conference with the District Court and before the parties had engaged in any discovery. Nonetheless, the District Court denied the motion, finding that Sundance had waived its right to arbitration because it acted inconsistently with its right by invoking the “litigation machinery,” which prejudiced plaintiff.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that—in light of the totality of the circumstances—plaintiff had not been prejudiced by Sundance’s eight-month delay because, during that time, the parties were briefing the quasi-jurisdictional issue raised in the motion to dismiss or stay and then waiting on the District Court’s ruling on same, rather than litigating the merits of the claim.

Plaintiff sought review by the Supreme Court, asking it to answer the following question: “Does the arbitration specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court’s instruction [in , 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)] that lower courts must ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?’”

In response, Sundance argued that despite the apparent split, the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits nonetheless consider prejudice in determining if the right to arbitrate has been waived. Per Sundance, “[a]t bottom, all of the Circuits are looking at the totality of the circumstances, as they should, in assessing waiver, and all are considering the existence of prejudice, whether as a mandatory or non-mandatory factor, as part of the assessment, based upon highly overlapping facts.”

Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court agrees, but we will continue to track and report on this case.

© 2022 Vedder Price

Article By Bryan Clark and Julia L. Koechley of  Vedder Price

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Supreme Court to Consider Whether the FAA Mandates Arbitration of PAGA Actions

On Dec. 15, 2021, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, and likely will decide by summer 2022 whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California public policy and requires enforcement of arbitration agreements that purport to waive an employee’s ability to pursue representative actions under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Employers have been waiting for the Supreme Court to take up this issue and are watching the case with interest.

Currently, per the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s right to pursue PAGA representative actions are considered void and unenforceable. In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held the FAA does not preempt California state law prohibiting prospective PAGA waivers because PAGA actions are between the employer and the state, not the employee. Thus, the state of California is the real party in interest, not the employee bringing suit, and although the employee may have executed a binding arbitration agreement, the state of California did not. Thus, arbitration agreements that purport to waive the right, expressly or otherwise, to bring a PAGA representative action are not enforceable.

In Viking River, the employee filed a PAGA representative action seeking civil penalties for various alleged violations of the California Labor Code, despite signing an arbitration agreement with her employer agreeing to resolve all future employment-related disputes with the employer via individual arbitration. Relying on the agreement, the employer moved to compel the action to arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial citing California state law as articulated in Iskanian. The California Supreme Court subsequently denied the employer’s petition for review.

Viking River then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. These decisions held that courts may not disregard bilateral arbitration agreements or reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating class-wide arbitration procedures without all parties’ consent. Viking River argued the Supreme Court needed to review the case to reaffirm the FAA and national policy in favor of arbitration. Viking River further argued review was necessary to ensure that Concepcion and Epic promote bilateral arbitration, rather than simply result in “representational litigation” under PAGA by those who agreed to arbitrate individually. In granting review, the Supreme Court will decide “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.”

This will be a closely watched decision for both sides of the bar and will likely have a groundbreaking effect on California employment litigation. Should the Supreme Court decide in Viking River’s favor, PAGA-only actions, which have become the preference of California plaintiffs’ attorneys in the face of arbitration agreements containing class action waiver provisions, will largely become a thing of the past for those employers who mandate individual arbitration for employees. Although it is by no means certain how the Supreme Court will decide this issue, employers should certainly be ready to revisit any arbitration agreements with California employees and consider what if any changes the ultimate ruling may warrant.

Article By Ashley M. Farrell Pickett and Radha D.S. Kulkarni of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

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Ninth Circuit Rejects Ex-Tinder Employee’s Attempt to Avoid Arbitration

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an ex-Tinder employee must arbitrate her claims against her former employer and cannot pursue her claims in court, even though her claims arose before she executed an arbitration agreement. In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit not only enforced the broad language of the parties’ arbitration agreement, but also held that a unilateral modification clause (granting the employer the right to make changes to the agreement) does not, in and of itself, render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. Elizabeth Sanfilippo v. Match Group LLC et al., Case No. 20-55819, 2021 U.S. App. Lexis 29263 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2021).

In this case, the chronology of events is important to understanding how this lawsuit arose.  In September 2016, Tinder hired the plaintiff as a brand manager.  According to the plaintiff, in mid-2017 and January 2018, she complained to human resources about sexual harassment by her coworkers and supervisors. During that same time period, in July 2017, Tinder was acquired by Match Group, Inc. After acquiring Tinder, Match Group sent its employees a mandatory arbitration agreement. The plaintiff signed the agreement and continued to work for Match Group until Match Group discharged her in March 2018. The plaintiff sued in California state court for sexual harassment and retaliation.  The case was removed to federal court at which point Match Group successfully moved to compel arbitration. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the arbitration agreement (1) is unenforceable, and (2) does not cover her claims, which predated the agreement.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the arbitration agreement was enforceable and applicable to the plaintiff’s sexual harassment allegations, even though the plaintiff did not sign the agreement until after her claims arose. In ruling for Match Group, the court highlighted the broad nature of the arbitration agreement’s language that required arbitration for “all claims and controversies arising from or in connection with [the plaintiff’s] application with, employment with, or termination from the Company.” In enforcing the agreement, the court noted that the agreement’s reference to “all claims and controversies” arising out of the plaintiff’s employment necessarily included her claims that predated the arbitration agreement.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was not swayed by the fact that the arbitration agreement included a provision that allowed Match Group to modify the terms of the agreement unilaterally. While the court recognized that such a provision could be substantively unconscionable, it explicitly discussed how Match Group had not actually modified the agreement but was rather seeking to enforce the agreement as written. But the court went even further in enforcing the agreement. In addition to upholding the agreement, the Ninth Circuit determined that even if it assumed that a provision permitting unilateral modifications by the employer is substantively unconscionable, such a provision alone does not render the entire agreement unenforceable. Therefore, even taking the plaintiff’s argument as true, the agreement, as a whole, was still enforceable.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is encouraging for employers seeking to enforce their arbitration agreements for a few reasons. First, the court made clear that a unilateral modification clause will not, in of itself, render the agreement unenforceable. Second, the court  enforced the broad language in the employer’s arbitration agreement and compelled arbitration of claims that pre-date the execution of the agreement.

Co-authored by Spencer Ladd.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021

Lessons From Above: SCOTUS Declines to Review a Class Arbitrability Case (the Issue Had Been Delegated to an Arbitrator)

In its restraint, SCOTUS has shown us the mischief that arbitrators may do if parties are lax in setting boundaries in their agreement to arbitrate.  By declining to grant certiorari regarding the Second Circuit’s most recent decision in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2019), cert. den., No. 19-1382, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 4133 (Oct. 5, 2020), SCOTUS reminds us of the significance of the doctrine of judicial deference to the authorized decisions of an arbitrator.

In Jock, the ultimate issue was formidable — class arbitrability.  And the subsidiary issues were and are daunting. For example,

(1) parties to an arbitration agreement can delegate the class arbitrability issue (is class arbitration permitted?) to an arbitrator in the first instance, but would that delegation bind non-appearing putative class members, who are of course not parties to the operative arbitration agreement?

(2) who decides that delegation issue?

(3) would an arbitrator’s determination that class arbitration is permitted bind (a) non-appearing putative class members or (b) an unwilling respondent vis-à-vis those non-appearing putative class members?

The Second Circuit held that an arbitrator had acted within her authority in “purporting to bind the absent class members to class procedures,” 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 at *14, and that that determination therefore would stand “regardless of whether [it] is, as the District Court believes, ‘wrong as a matter of law.’”  Id.  Indeed, the Second Circuit had framed its inquiry as “whether the arbitrator had the power, based on the parties’ submissions or the arbitration agreement, to reach a certain issue” and “not whether the arbitrator correctly decided that issue.”  Id. at *8-*9, citing Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 (2013).

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not review the merits of the arbitrator’s Class Determination Award (“CDA”), but rather defended it from scrutiny on the merits.  Instead, the Second Circuit focused on the delegation question — did the parties clearly and unmistakably delegate the class arbitrability issue to the arbitrator for determination in the first instance?

The first lesson:  if the issue of class arbitrability is delegated to an arbitrator for determination in the first instance, the resulting award becomes a hardened target with respect to its legal merits.  It may be challenged on the narrow grounds for vacatur set out in Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), and it then benefits from the deference accorded to all arbitral awards.  Consequently, a decision concerning class arbitrability that might be reversed on de novo review if issued by a court will likely be left undisturbed if issued by an arbitrator.

That lesson alone is important to any company that uses a form arbitration clause in many substantially similar contracts – e.g, employment, consumer, financial, or insurance agreements.  It highlights the urgency of getting one’s form(s) of arbitration agreement in order, including the advisability (i) to state clearly whether arbitrability issues – and class and/or collective arbitrability issues in particular – are to be determined by a court or an arbitrator in the first instance, and (ii) to expressly prohibit class and collective arbitration if bilateral arbitration is the sole desired structure for dispute resolution.

To illustrate the point, consider that SCOTUS decided in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2943 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2019), that when a court is deciding the matter under the FAA in the first instance, neither silence nor ambiguity in an arbitration agreement regarding the permissibility of class arbitration is a sufficient basis to find that the parties agreed to permit class arbitration.  And SCOTUS implied that incorporation by reference of institutional rules such as those of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), including its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, is not a sufficient basis to infer an agreement to permit class arbitration.  (The AAA’s Supplementary Rules are expressly consistent with that. See R-3.)

But, as the Second Circuit pointed out, the parties in Lamps Plus had agreed that a court, not an arbitrator, should resolve the class arbitrability question, and so the District Court’s decision in Lamps Plus was subject to de novo review on appeal, rather than the deferential review that applies concerning a motion to vacate an arbitrator’s award.  See, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 at *18.

In the Jock case, on the other hand, the class arbitrability issue had been delegated to an arbitrator for determination in the first instance:  (1) the appearing arbitrating parties had “squarely presented to the arbitrator” the issue of whether the controlling arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, id. at *6, in effect resolving the delegation issue via an ad hoc agreement; (2) the operative arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrator shall decide questions of arbitrability and procedural questions, see id. at *12-*13; and (3) the operative arbitration agreement incorporated the AAA’s arbitration rules, including the delegation provision (see R-3) of its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, which “evinces agreement to have the arbitrator decide the question of class arbitrability,” id. at *12, citing Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 396 (2d Cir. 2018).  The Second Circuit justifiably took these manifestations to be “clear and unmistakable evidence” of an intent by the appearing parties to delegate the class arbitrability issue to an arbitrator.

The wild card question, however, was whether the non-appearing putative class members should be deemed bound by that delegation.

It is worth recalling that the Jock case has a lengthy history in the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, having bounced back and forth between those courts several times already.  In an earlier go-round, after an arbitrator had “certified” a class of 44,000 employee claimants (including 250 active claimants),1 the District Court denied respondent Sterling’s motion to vacate that CDA, but the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that it had not previously squarely determined “whether the arbitrator had the power to bind absent class members to class arbitration given that they…never consented to the arbitrator determining whether class arbitration was permissible under the agreement in the first place.”  2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 at *6.  On remand, the District Court then vacated the arbitrator’s CDA.  But the Second Circuit reversed again, this time based principally on the appellate court’s determination that the arbitrator had been authorized to adjudicate class arbitrability in the first instance, and so the District Court’s review of that award was therefore limited by (a) the narrow grounds for vacatur set out in FAA § 10(a)(4) and (b) the requisite deferential standard of review of such awards.

In that decision, which SCOTUS eventually let stand, the Second Circuit arguably could have addressed a number of issues:

(1) did the parties to the operative arbitration agreement delegate the class arbitrability issue to an arbitrator?

(2) did the non-appearing members of a putative class too delegate the class arbitrability issue to the particular arbitrator in the pending arbitral proceeding?

(3) are the non-appearing putative class members, who were not parties to the operative arbitration agreement, bound by that arbitrator’s decision regarding class arbitrability?

(4) should the District Court have vacated the arbitrator’s CDA?

The Second Circuit first determined that the class arbitrability issue had been delegated to an arbitrator.  It also decided that the District Court should not have vacated the CDA because the arbitrator had the authority, based on the delegation, to resolve the class arbitrability issue in the first instance, and the merits of that determination therefore were not up for review even if the District Court believed that it had been wrongly decided as a matter of law.

Finally, the Second Circuit decided– and this was novel– that the arbitrator had the authority to reach the class arbitrability issue even with respect to the non-appearing putative class members.  2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 at *15.  Thus, the appellate court decided that, in the circumstances, the non-signatory “absent class members” (a) were deemed to have delegated the class arbitrability issue to the particular arbitrator in the proceeding in question, and (b) were bound by her determination that class arbitration was permitted.

The court’s rationale was:  (1) each of the non-appearing putative class members respectively had made an arbitration agreement with respondent Sterling Jewelers that was substantially identical to the agreement upon which the appearing arbitration participants relied; (2) they thereby consented to, and indeed “bargained for,” an arbitrator’s authority to decide the class arbitrability issue, see id. at *11, *14; (3) that constituted an express contractual consent to delegation by the non-appearing putative class members, see id. at *17; and (4) even if the non-appearing class members had not expressly agreed to “this particular arbitrator’s authority,” id. at *15, that did not matter because judicial class actions routinely bind absent members of mandatory or opt-out classes, id. at *15-*16.  (But of course, arbitration is not litigation, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 does not apply in arbitrations.)

Notably, this rationale appears to be inconsistent with the skepticism in this regard expressed by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion in the Oxford Health case.  Justice Alito had opined that an arbitrator’s interpretation of an arbitration agreement generally “cannot bind someone who has not authorized the arbitrator to make that determination,” and that “it is difficult to see how an arbitrator’s decision to conduct class proceedings could bind absent class members who have not authorized the arbitrator to decide on a class-wide basis when arbitration procedures are to be used.”  Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. at 2072 (Alito, J., concurring).  Thus too, “an arbitrator’s ‘erroneous interpretation’ of a contract that does not authorize class procedures cannot bind absent class members who have ‘not authorized the arbitrator to make that determination.’”  2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34205 at *10-*11, citing Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 574 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).

Nevertheless, SCOTUS let the Jock decision, with all it entails, stand.  And we are left to puzzle out what further lessons SCOTUS intended to convey in this regard.

1 The arbitrator “certified” an arbitration class solely for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief, and it was an opt-out class (which is usually certified for class action litigations seeking money damages) rather than an opt-in class (which might have lent more justification to the CDA) or a mandatory class.

©1994-2020 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
ARTICLE BY Gilbert A. Samberg  of Mintz
For more articles on litigation, visit the National Law Review ADR / Arbitration / Mediation section.

Feuding Business Partners in Private Companies: Considering Arbitration to Resolve Partnership Disputes

It is common for private company co-owners to have disagreements while they operate their business, but they typically work through these disputes themselves.  In those rare instances where conflicts escalate and legal action is required, business partners have two options—filing a lawsuit or participating in an arbitration proceeding.  Arbitration is available, however, only if the parties agreed in advance to arbitrate their disputes.  Therefore, before business partners enter into a buy-sell contact or join other agreements with their co-owners, they will want to consider both the pros and the cons of arbitration.  This post offers input for private company owners and investors to help them decide whether litigation or arbitration provides them with the best forum in which to resolve future disputes with their business partners.

Arbitration is often touted as a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation with the additional benefit of resulting in a final award that is not subject to appeal.  These attributes may not be realized in arbitration, however, and there are other important factors involved, which also merit consideration.  At the outset, it is important to emphasize that arbitrations are created by contract, and parties can therefore custom design the arbitration to be conducted in a manner that meets their specific needs.  The critical factors to be considered are: (i) speed—how important is a quick resolution to the dispute, (ii) confidentiality—how desirable is privacy in resolving the claims, (iii) scope—how broad are the claims to be resolved, (iv) expense—how important is it to limit costs, and (v) finality—is securing a final result more desirable than preserving the right to appeal an adverse decision.

Speed—Prompt Resolution of Dispute

Arbitrations generally resolve claims more promptly than litigation, but that is not always the case as arbitration proceedings can drag on if the arbitration is not subject to any restriction on when the final hearing must take place.  One way to ensure that an arbitration will promptly resolve the dispute, however, is to require an end date in the arbitration agreement.  Specifically, the parties can state in their arbitration provision that the final arbitration hearing must take place within a set period of time, perhaps 60 or 90 days of the date the arbitration panel holds its first scheduling conference.  The arbitrators will then set a date for the final hearing that meets this contractual requirement.  Similarly, in the arbitration provision, the parties can also specify the length for the hearing (no more than 2-3 days), and they can also impose limits on the extent of discovery, including by restricting the number of depositions than can be taken.

If securing a prompt resolution of a dispute with a business partner is important, this result can be assured by requiring that all claims are arbitrated, particularly if the parties specify in the arbitration provision that the final hearing must take place on a fast track basis.

Confidentiality—Arbitration Conducted Privately

Litigation takes place in a public forum and, as a result, all pleadings the parties file, and with only rare exceptions, all testimony and other evidence presented at any hearings and at trial will be available to the public.  Therefore if a business partner wants to avoid having future partnership disputes subject to public scrutiny, arbitration provides this protection. But looking at this from another perspective, a minority investor may want to decline to arbitrate future claims against the majority owner if the owner is sensitive to adverse publicity.  The threat of claims being litigated in a public lawsuit may provide the investor with leverage in the negotiation and settlement of any future claims the investor has against the majority owner.

Scope of Dispute—How Much Discovery Required

Determining the scope of a future dispute with a business partner is difficult to do at the time that business partners enter into their contract when any future claims are unknown.  The downside arises in the arbitration context, because one of the parties may desire broad discovery of the type that is permitted in litigation, which may be necessary to defend against certain types of contentions, such as claims for fraud, personal injury and other types of business torts.  In an arbitration proceeding, discovery is typically more restricted, and it may further be limited by the arbitration provision, which caps the number of depositions and narrows the scope of document discovery.  Under these circumstances, the defending party (the respondent) may be hamstrung by these discovery limitations in defending against the claimant’s allegations in arbitration.

To avoid prejudice to the respondent from restrictions on discovery in arbitration, the parties may decide to agree that not all claims between them would be subject to arbitration.  For example, the parties could agree that all claims related in any way to the value and purchase of a departing partner’s interest in the business would be subject to arbitration, but that other claims of a personal nature (e.g., claims for discrimination, wrongful termination) would be litigated in court rather than arbitrated.  This splitting of claims in this manner may not be practical, but is something to be discussed by the parties when they enter into their agreement at the outset.

Expense of Dispute Resolution

As discussed above, business partners can limit the expense of resolving future claims between them by requiring a fast track arbitration hearing and also by limiting the scope and the extent of allowed discovery.  For example, if the parties require a final arbitration hearing to take place in 90 days after the initial scheduling conference, limit the hearing to two days and permit no more than three fact witness depositions per side.  They will have likely achieved a significant reduction of the cost of resolving their dispute.

The issue of cost requires additional analysis, however, because if the parties are not of equal bargaining power, the partner with more capital may not agree that arbitration is the best forum to resolve disputes with a less solvent partner.  The wealthier partner may believe that he or she would prevail over the less well-capitalized partner in a “war of attrition.” This factor may be so significant that it causes the wealthier partner to reject the arbitration of future disputes in favor of resolving of all future claims by or against the other partner through litigation.

Finality of Arbitration Awards

There is no right of an appeal in arbitration and the grounds for attacking an arbitration award in a court proceeding after the arbitration concludes are narrow and rarely successful.  This finality element may thus be an important factor in selecting arbitration as the forum for resolving partnership disputes with the goal of ending the dispute without having it linger on.

There is another concern here, however, that also bears considering.   The conventional wisdom among trial lawyers is that arbitrators are prone to “split the baby” by not providing a strict construction of the written contract or the controlling statute at issue.  Instead, the belief is that arbitrators are inclined to include something for both sides in the final award in an attempt to be as fair as possible, which results in mixed bag outcome.   That has not been my personal experience, but it is true that if the arbitration award is not fully consistent with the contract or a governing statute, there is no right to appeal the decision.  The bottom line is that, at the end of the arbitration, the parties will have to live with the result, and there is no available path to challenge an unfavorable/undesired outcome.

Conclusion

The takeaway is that arbitration is not a panacea.  It can be structured to take place faster and more cost-effectively than a lawsuit, and it will also be held in private and not be subject to public scrutiny.  But, business partners also need to consider other factors in arbitration, such as specific limits on discovery that may be problematic and the finality of the arbitrators’ decision, which may not be viewed as fully consistent with the partners’ contract or in strict accordance with the applicable law.   To the extent that business partners do opt for arbitration, they should craft the arbitration provision to make sure its terms closely align with their business goals.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

ARTICLE BY Ladd Hirsch at Winstead.
For more on business conflict resolution, see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations law section.

Federal Court Preliminary Enjoins Enforcement of New California Arbitration Law AB 51

On Friday, January 31, 2020, Chief District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the federal District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a Preliminary Injunction (PI) against the State of California, enjoining the State from enforcing Assembly Bill 51 (AB 51) with respect to mandatory arbitration agreements in employment to the extent governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1

As discussed in the Vedder Price employment law alert, TRO Halts New Arbitration Law AB 51, the District Court had previously issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on December 30, 2019 temporarily enjoining enforcement of AB 51 pending a preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for January 10, 2020. The Court subsequently continued the January 10 hearing and extended the TRO until January 31 to allow the parties time to submit supplemental briefing. AB 51, the new California law previously slated to take effect on January 1, 2020, purportedly prohibited employers from requiring applicants or employees in California to agree, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit, to arbitrate claims involving violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) or the California Labor Code. AB 51 did not specifically mention “arbitration” but instead broadly applied to the waiver of “any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of [the FEHA or Labor Code], including the right to file and pursue a civil action.”

In issuing the PI, the District Court specifically: (a) enjoined the State from enforcing sections 432.6(a), (b), and (c) of the California Labor Code where the alleged “waiver of any right, forum, or procedure” is the entry into an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA2; and (b) enjoined the State from enforcing Section 12953 of the California Government Code [FEHA] where the alleged violation of “Section 432.6 of the Labor Code” is entering into an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA.

The PI will remain in place pending a final judgment, which would likely occur following a motion for summary judgment rather than a full trial on the merits since there are no material facts in dispute to be tried. However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), an order granting a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable. Accordingly, it is likely that the State of California will file an immediate appeal directly with the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

In the interim, based on this PI, employers should feel comfortable in continuing to require employees in California to sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment without being subjected to criminal prosecution under AB 51, provided that the arbitration agreement is clearly governed by the FAA. Employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to ensure compliance in this regard.

1 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S., et al. v. Xavier Becerra, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-02456-KJM-DB, Dkt. No. 44 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020).

2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16

© 2020 Vedder Price

For more on recent employment law litigation in California and elsewhere, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.