Category: Arbitration

Court to Consider Whether California Ride Share Drivers Who Make Airport Runs Are Exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act

On November 26, 2019, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Richard B. Ulmer ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) might not apply to Uber drivers who are engaged in interstate commerce while driving passengers to or from international airports.

In his claims before the Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (“DLSE”), driver Sangam Patel (“Patel”) seeks recovery of unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay, meal and rest break premiums, and unpaid business expenses allegedly owed by Uber. Uber petitioned to compel arbitration of Patel’s (“Patel”) claims under the FAA.

The Labor Code provides a right to bring an action to collect wages notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement. Cal. Lab. Code § 229. If the FAA applies, a written arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that contains an arbitration provision. Id. The FAA does not apply, however, to “contracts of…workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id., at § 1.

Notably, there is a distinction between the term “involving” for purposes of section 2 and the term “engaged in” for purposes of section 1.

As the California Court of Appeal explained earlier this year in Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056, 1062, “the [United States] Supreme Court reasoned the plain meaning of ‘engaged in’ interstate commerce in section 1 is narrower in scope than the open-ended phrase ‘involving’ commerce in section 2. Unlike section 2’s reference to ‘involving commerce,’ which ‘indicates Congress’ intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause’ and thus is afforded an ‘expansive reading,’ section 1’s reference to ‘engaged in commerce’ is ‘narrower,’ and therefore ‘understood to have a more limited reach,’ requiring ‘a narrow construction’ and a ‘precise reading.’” (Internal citations omitted.)

Uber argued that the FAA applies to its arbitration provision because it involves commerce as the Uber app is available to riders and transportation providers in over 175 cities across the United States. Relying on precedent that stands for the proposition that workers need only engage in activities that affect interstate commerce to be considered “engaged in interstate commerce,” the Labor Commissioner argued that Uber drivers such as Patel engage in interstate commerce when they transport passengers to and from international airports, thus rendering the FAA inapplicable.

The argument is similar to that raised Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc. earlier this year, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected Uber’s argument that a group of New Jersey drivers suing for unpaid overtime wages were required to arbitrate their claims. The Singh Court found that transportation workers who transport passengers may be exempt from the FAA if they are engaged in interstate commerce. Singh claimed that he frequently transported passengers on the highway across state lines, between New York and New Jersey. In light of the factual dispute as to whether Uber drivers engaged in interstate commerce, the Third Circuit sent the case back to the district court to decide, after discovery on the issue, whether Singh and the proposed class of Uber drivers engaged in interstate commerce. If they did, the FAA would not apply.

Consistent with the Third Circuit in Singh, Judge Ulmer granted the Commissioner’s request for limited discovery on the issue of whether Uber drivers engage in interstate commerce. Following that discovery, Uber may then re-calendar its petition for hearing.

The case bears watching as it may provide employees in some industries with arguments to try to circumvent the otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements that they signed with their employers. Ultimately, if Uber drivers are found to be engaged in interstate commerce such that the FAA is inapplicable, the FAA would not preempt their right to file suit under Labor Code section 229 notwithstanding any private agreement to arbitrate. But section 229 only applies to actions to collect due and unpaid wages. Any other claims – such as claims for missed meal or rest periods, failure to reimburse business expenses, or failure to provide accurate wage statements – would not be covered and, thus, should still be subject to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. It will be interesting to see if and how that issue is addressed.

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

More on the Federal Arbitration Act can be found on the National Law Review ADR, Arbitration and Mediation law page.

Court Finds Medical Bill Reimbursement Claim Subject to “Biblically-Based Mediation and Arbitration”

A Mississippi federal court granted a motion to compel arbitration of a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses from the defendant, a company that provides health care sharing plan alternatives to those of Christian faith. The plaintiff had signed a membership agreement stating that he would abide by the defendant’s guidelines, under which members, such as the plaintiff, were required to exhaust an “appeals” process for challenging bill-sharing decisions before resorting to any sort of legal procedures against the defendant. If the appeals process did not resolve the dispute, a “biblically-based mediation and arbitration” clause in the guidelines stated that any and all disputes arising out of the membership agreement shall be settled by “biblically-based mediation.” If that mediation fails, the member may submit the dispute to an independent and objective arbitrator for binding arbitration but otherwise waives his or her right to file a lawsuit.

Addressing the defendant’s motion, the court first held that the provision above constituted a valid arbitration agreement and that the subject dispute fell within the scope thereof. The court noted that the plaintiff had indeed agreed that he “will bring no suit, legal claim or demand of any sort … in the civil court system, with the sole exception of enforcing any favorable arbitration award or mediated agreement.” As such, the court explained that arbitration was required unless a federal statute or policy rendered the plaintiff’s claim non-arbitrable. Because the plaintiff failed to identify any such statute or policy, the court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Pettey v. Medi Share, No. 2:19-cv-00059 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 1, 2019).

©2011-2019 Carlton Fields, P.A.

ARTICLE BY Alex B. Silverman of Carlton Fields.

Second Circuit Confirms Arbitration Awards That Are (Literally) Out of This World

Arbitration over whether a South Korean company or a Bermuda company headquartered in Hong Kong owns a geostationary satellite in light of an order from a South Korean regulatory agency can be complicated. The Second Circuit recently affirmed a decision confirming an arbitration award adjudicating ownership of the satellite in question and awarding damages related to a party’s failure to obtain regulatory approvals necessary to complete the sale over claims that the arbitration panel exceeded its power, disregarded the law, and violated public policy.

KT Corp., a Korean company, agreed to sell a satellite to ABS Holdings Ltd., a Bermuda company headquartered in Hong Kong. The companies signed a purchase agreement to convey the title to the satellite and an operations agreement under which KT agreed to operate the satellite on behalf of ABS. Both agreements contained New York choice-of-law provisions and mandatory arbitration clauses. The purchase agreement required KT to obtain and maintain all necessary licenses and authorizations for the sale and the continued operation of the satellite.

The sale was completed and title to the satellite was transferred.

Nearly two years later, a South Korean regulatory agency issued an order declaring the purchase agreement null and void because KT had failed to obtain a required export permit. The agency canceled KT’s permission to use certain frequencies to operate the satellite.

KT and ABS arbitrated who held title to the satellite and whether KT had violated the purchase agreement before a panel of the International Chamber of Commerce. In two awards, the panel concluded that ABS held title to the satellite because title had lawfully passed when the conditions precedent to the purchase agreement were completed when there was no requirement that KT obtain an export permit. And even if that was not the case, the panel concluded, the regulatory order had no effect because it was issued retroactively without notice to the parties in violation of New York law, and KT breached its obligations by failing to obtain all the approvals necessary for the continued operation of the satellite (even though an export permit may not have been required for the sale of the satellite, one was necessary to maintain the satellite’s operations).

KT petitioned the Southern District of New York to vacate the award, and ABS petitioned the court to confirm it. The district court granted ABS’ petition and confirmed the panel’s award.

The Second Circuit affirmed. KT argued that the panel had exceeded its authority and that the award disregarded the law and violated public policy. KT claimed that the panel’s conclusion that the regulatory order was without effect violated due process principles. The court disagreed, noting that KT had not challenged the order, its counsel had questioned its validity, and the panel did not rest on the validity of the order; the panel referenced the propriety of the order as an alternate basis for its primary conclusion that title to the satellite properly changed hands. The court also rejected KT’s argument that the panel had disregarded New York contract law. Regarding public policy, although the court recognized that it is the public policy of the United States to enforce foreign judgments that are not repugnant to U.S. policy, it was unclear whether that public policy extended to foreign regulatory orders, and it was not even clear that the regulatory order in this case was enforceable under South Korean law according to KT’s expert.

KT Corp. v. ABS Holdings, Ltd., No. 18-2300 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2019).

©2011-2019 Carlton Fields, P.A.

ARTICLE BY Brendan N. Gooley of Carlton Fields.
For more arbitration decisions, see the National Law Review ADR / Arbitration / Mediation page.

California Arbitration Roundup: Employers Are 3-1 For Favorable Arbitration Rulings

California employers received mostly good news this past month on the arbitration front, with a trio of pro-employer arbitration-related rulings.  The California Supreme Court’s recent ruling invalidating an employer’s arbitration agreement (discussed below) is a notable exception.

California Supreme Court Invalidates Employer’s Arbitration Agreement As Unconscionable.

In OTO LLC v. Ken Kho, the California Supreme Court ruled that an Oakland Toyota dealership’s arbitration agreement with a former employee was unenforceable and was so unfair and one-sided that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  “Arbitration is premised on the parties’ mutual consent, not coercion, and the manner of the agreement’s imposition here raises serious concerns on that score,” the majority opinion said.

In 2013, Ken Kho, then an employee of the dealership, One Toyota, was asked to sign several documents, including an arbitration agreement.  Kho signed it, and was later terminated.

The California Supreme Court acknowledged that California and federal laws strongly favor arbitration. However, the Court considered the following factors in determining that One Toyota’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable:

  • The arbitration agreement purported to waive Kho’s right to file a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner and to have a “Berman” hearing before the Labor Commissioner (while not dispositive, the Court noted that this remains a significant factor in considering unconscionability of employee arbitration agreements);

  • The agreement was presented to Kho in his workspace, along with other employment-related documents;

  • Neither its contents nor its significance was explained;

  • Kho was required to sign the agreement to keep the job he had held for three years;

  • Because One Toyota used a piece-rate compensation system, any time Kho spent reviewing the agreement would have reduced his pay;

  • A low-level employee (a porter) presented the agreement to Kho, “creating the impression that no request for an explanation was expected and any such request would be unavailing”;

  • By having the porter wait for the documents, One Toyota conveyed an expectation that Kho sign them immediately, without examination or consultation with counsel;

  • There was no indication that the porter had the knowledge or authority to explain the terms of the agreement;

  • Kho was not given a copy of the agreement he had signed;

  • The agreement was written in an extremely small font in the form of a “single dense paragraph” of 51 lines, and the text was “visually impenetrable” and “challenge[d] the limits of legibility”;

  • The sentences were complex, filled with statutory references and legal jargon;

  • Kho was not offered a version to read in his native language (while the Court noted this factor, it did not consider it because it did not know Kho’s English proficiency);

  • The arbitration agreement did not make clear One Toyota’s obligation to pay arbitration-related costs (and rather cited to statutory provisions and referenced legal precedent; the Court noted “It would have been nearly impossible to understand the contract’s meaning without legal training and access to the many statutes it references. Kho had neither.”);

  • One Toyota’s agreement did not mention how to bring a dispute to arbitration, nor did it suggest where that information might be found (e.g., by citing to a commercial arbitration provider such as JAMS or AAA); and

  • One Toyota’s arbitration process was complicated to navigate and would likely require an attorney, making it cost-prohibitive for Kho.

The Court concluded that “[w]e have not said no arbitration could provide an appropriate forum for resolution of Kho’s wage claim, but only that this particular arbitral process, forced upon Kho under especially oppressive circumstances and erecting new barriers to the vindication of his rights, is unconscionable.”

Employers would thus be well-advised to revisit their employee arbitration agreements to ensure that they do not contain any of the defects discussed by the Supreme Court in the Kho case.

NLRB Upholds Employer Conduct Related to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

In Cordúa Restaurants, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 43 (2019), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) addressed the lawfulness of employer conduct surrounding mandatory arbitration agreements for the first time since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, where the Court held that mandatory arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (see here).  In Cordua Restaurants, the NLRB ruled in part that employers are not prohibited under the NLRA from: (1) informing employees that failing or refusing to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement will result in their discharge; and (2) promulgating mandatory arbitration agreements in response to employees opting in to a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act or state wage-and-hour laws.

The NLRB’s decision in Cordua Restaurants is a natural extension of the Supreme Court’s analysis and ruling in Epic Systems.  There, the Court held that Congress, when passing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, instructed courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written.  Since the passage of the FAA predates the NLRA by ten years, and since the NLRA says nothing about overruling the FAA, the NLRB could not, under the guise of enforcing the NLRA, rule that an arbitration agreement that otherwise is lawful on its face violates the NLRA.  This decision by the NLRB is further evidence of that agency’s retreat from past policies advanced by the NLRB in the prior administration and likely will not be overruled.

California Court of Appeals Compels Employee to Arbitrate Claims Even Though He Filed Suit Before Signing Arbitration Agreement

In Quiroz Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium, the California Court of Appeals compelled an employee to arbitrate his claims against his employer even though the employee filed his lawsuit two days before he signed an arbitration agreement.  The Court held that the arbitration agreement was clear in that it required arbitration of any claims and that it did not contain any restriction based on when a claim was filed.

In the case, Quiroz Franco, the employee, was given an arbitration agreement on March 9, 2018, and a Spanish translation shortly thereafter.  On March 19, 2018, he filed a lawsuit against his employer, alleging harassment, discrimination, and wage and hour claims among others.  On March 21, 2018, Quiroz Franco handed in his signed arbitration form, which the employer used to attempt to compel him to arbitrate. The lower court ruled that the claims in the employee’s suit started to accrue before he signed the arbitration agreement, so arbitration couldn’t be compelled.  The employer appealed and the Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision.

California Court of Appeals Rules that Unfair Competition Law Claims Are Arbitrable

In Clifford v. Quest Software Inc., the California Court of Appeals addressed whether an employee’s claim against his employer for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL) was arbitrable, ruling that it was.  The employee brought various wage and hour claims against his employer, and the employer moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ arbitration agreement.  The trial court granted the motion in part and ordered to arbitration every cause of action except the employee’s UCL claim, which the court concluded was not arbitrable.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the employee’s UCL claim was subject to arbitration along with his other causes of action—more good news for California employers.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

Court Compels Arbitration Based on Text Message Agreement

A district court has granted a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in an agreement sent via text message and agreed to via a reply text.

Lexington Law Firm, a debt collection company, was sued in a putative class action under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act after purportedly deducting funds without consent.

Lexington moved to compel arbitration. It had sent the named plaintiff a text message agreement that contained an arbitration clause requiring him “to arbitrate all disputes and claims between [him] and Lexington on an individual basis only.” The plaintiff responded with a text that said: “Agree.” The plaintiff opposed Lexington’s motion. He claimed, inter alia, that there was no mutual assent and that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion and because it was so broadly worded. The district court disagreed.

The plaintiff had been given the agreement and had agreed to it. The court distinguished, among other things, cases involving “browsewrap” agreements in which a website user “agreed” to terms and conditions merely by using a website. Although the court found the agreement minimally procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion, that did not render the agreement unconscionable as a whole. The agreement was not substantively unconscionable merely because it was broadly worded, at least where, as here, the plaintiff’s claims were related to the agreement he signed. The court therefore dismissed the putative class action.

Starace v. Lexington Law Firm, No. 1:18-cv-01596 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2019).

 

©2011-2019 Carlton Fields, P.A.

How Deflategate May Affect Your Business

In a closely watched case, federal judge Richard M. Berman of the Southern District of New York vacated the four-game suspension handed down to New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady by NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell. Relying on Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, Judge Berman’s decision focuses in large part on the discovery aspects of the arbitration proceeding which originally confirmed Brady’s suspension. In vacating the suspension, Judge Berman strikes a blow to those who view arbitration as a low-cost alternative to the traditional expense and burden of discovery, and provides an arrow in the quiver of parties looking to employ discovery costs as leverage in their disputes.

The suspension was originally imposed after the NFL commissioned an independent investigation into whether the New England Patriots, and Brady, tampered with game-used footballs during last season’s AFC Championship Game. Brady’s appeal was initially heard through the arbitration proceedings provided for under the NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement, and Commissioner Goodell served as the sole arbitrator. During the proceeding, Commissioner Goodell denied Brady’s request for the files gathered and created during the independent investigation, and also denied Brady’s request to compel testimony from Jeff Pash, general counsel for the NFL. Commissioner Goodell ultimately issued an award upholding the suspension and the NFL sought confirmation of that award from Judge Berman.

In a 40- page written opinion vacating the suspension, Judge Berman not only focused on what he deemed “fundamentally unfair” discovery rulings made by Commissioner Goodell, he also relied in part on the contention that Commissioner Goodell did not provide adequate justification for those rulings, particularly with respect to his decision to preclude the testimony of Pash. By digging into the nuts and bolts of the discovery process, Judge Berman deviated from what is often viewed as the “rubber stamp” process of confirming an arbitration award. Further, by pointing to the reasoning (or lack thereof) behind the arbitrator’s individual discovery rulings, Judge Berman arguably expands the burden on arbitrators to incorporate more formality into their decisions and, in essence, second-guessed the judgment of the Commissioner in his role as Arbitrator. Parties looking to protect future arbitration awards may also now feel the need to demand more formality in the discovery process, and from their arbitrators.

At one time, arbitration was seen as a more informal, yet sophisticated, way for businesses to settle disputes and conserve resources. With the increase in filing fees, the self-expansion of powers (and processes) by the organizations who conduct arbitrations, and now rulings like Judge Berman’s, it may be time to re-evaluate that view.

The NFL already has announced its intention to appeal. This case may go into overtime.

Article By Thomas Haskins of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Let the NFL Season Begin: Judge Overturns Arbitration Award Suspending Tom Brady

Tom Brady will begin the 2015 NFL season as the starting quarterback of the New England Patriots for the 14th consecutive season following U.S. District Court Judge Richard Berman’s grant of the National Football League Players Association’s motion to vacate NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s July 28, 2015, arbitration award imposing a four-game suspension on Brady. This forestalled the suspension before it was scheduled to take effect on September 5.

Judge Berman found the NFL failed to show it applied Article 46 of its collective bargaining agreement with the NFLPA fairly and consistently.

This decision is the fourth time a legal authority has challenged the NFL’s application of Article 46, following U.S. District Judge David Doty in the Adrian Peterson case, former Federal Judge Barbara Jones in the Ray Rice arbitration, and former NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue in his opinion regarding the Saints players in Bountygate.

While judges rarely vacate arbitration awards, Judge Berman identified specific problems with the Brady arbitration hearing held by Goodell, including denial of access to key witnesses, which can be grounds to vacate an arbitration award. He found problematic the denial of NFLPA attorneys’ request to question NFL general counsel Jeffrey Pash, who edited the Wells Report before its release.

In addition, Judge Berman criticized Goodell for using the League’s collectively bargained steroid punishment policy to justify the suspension. Recognizing that the policy’s procedures are irrelevant to the allegations made against Brady, Judge Berman wrote that the steroid policy “cannot reasonably be used as a comparator for Brady’s four-game suspension for alleged ball deflation by others.”

Judge Berman also found decisions cited by the NFL to support confirming the arbitration award to be distinguishable. While Article 46 authorizes the League to use Goodell as the arbitrator for player appeals, Judge Berman concluded the “law of the shop,” requiring fairness and consistency, prohibits Goodell from rendering a decision that may have been compromised by bias.

The next phase of this litigation has already begun. The NFL recognizes that a motion seeking a stay of Judge Berman’s decision would require a showing of “irreparable harm,” and its argument would fall short on this score.

The NFL filed a Notice of Appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit within hours of Judge Berman’s decision.

Therefore, the immediate impact of Judge Berman’s decision is that Tom Brady can play in the first four games of the upcoming NFL season. Indeed, because of the Notice of Appeal, Judge Berman’s decision does not yet have precedential authority. However, the long-term effect of Judge Berman’s decision is far-reaching and considerable for the NFL, the NFLPA, and any private arbitral process governed by a collective bargaining agreement.

The NFL’s appeal faces the burden of convincing two appellate judges that Judge Berman misapplied the law.

Each case presents unique issues and facts, appellate courts typically do not reverse district court judges on their orders to vacate or confirm arbitration awards. The NFL likely will rely on strong legal precedent discouraging federal judges from interfering with a private arbitrator’s decision. In his 40-page decision, Judge Berman reasoned that the NFL failed to provide notice to Brady that being aware of deflated footballs and obstructing an investigation were misconduct justifying a four-game suspension. The NFL will undoubtedly argue that the “lack of notice” argument is irrelevant where the collective bargaining agreement gives the Commissioner complete authority to evaluate the definition of “conduct detrimental” to the League and to issue punishments based upon that determination. This is the authority provided by the NFLPA to the Commissioner under the current collective bargaining agreement and the NFL will argue it was not required to provide such “notice.” The NFL likely will also stress that Judge Berman’s decision to vacate Brady’s suspension reflects a complete disregard of judicial precedents confirming arbitration awards.

Clearly, this matter is not about Tom Brady, deflated footballs, or even NFL’s investigation. Rather, the appeal is about the NFL seeking to protect its internal arbitral process. Indeed, 38-year-old Tom Brady may even be retired by the time the appeals are ultimately resolved and a final determination is made.

Should the Second Circuit affirms Judge Berman’s decision, it will create a stronger precedent for the NFLPA to challenge future discipline issued through the NFL’s arbitral process. The Second Circuit’s precedent also will have potential far-reaching implications on all employers who utilize a private arbitration governed by a collective bargaining agreement, especially in light of the broad authority afforded to the Commissioner in the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement.

Article By Gregg E. Clifton & Benjamin A. Tulis of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015