Administrative & Regulatory Archives - Page 32 of 106

Constitutionality of FTC’s Structure and Procedures Under SCOTUS Review

Both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) have authority to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act by investigating and challenging mergers where the effect of such transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”

However, the enforcement paths of these two federal agencies differ markedly. DOJ pursues all aspects of its enforcement actions in the federal court system. The FTC, on the other hand, only uses the federal district courts to seek injunctive relief, but otherwise follows its own internal administrative process that combines the investigatory, prosecutorial, adjudicative, and appellate functions within a single agency.

Whether a transaction is subjected to DOJ or FTC review is determined by a “clearance” process with no public visibility. To many, including entities in the health care industry—and, in particular, parties to hospital mergers that are now routinely “cleared” to the FTC (exemplified by two recently filed enforcement actions against hospitals in New Jersey and Utah)—this process appears to be arbitrary. It is also particularly daunting because the FTC has not lost an administrative action in over a quarter-century. Because of the one-sided nature and duration of these administrative proceedings, most enforcement actions brought against merging hospitals rise or fall at the injunctive relief stage. This process also appears to embolden the FTC into taking unprecedented actions, including the pursuit of enforcement remedies against parties to abandoned transactions.

However, this may soon change. The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear a case that raises a forceful constitutional challenge to the FTC’s structure and procedures. The Supreme Court recently agreed to combine the briefing schedule of this case with a similar case that successfully challenged the constitutionality of the administrative process of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The outcome of these cases may fundamentally alter the FTC’s enforcement process.

Article By E. John Steren and Patricia M. Wagner of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more antitrust and trade regulation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

L.A. Jury Delivers Mother of All Verdicts – $464 Million to Two Employees!

As we have previously reported, jury verdicts in employment cases have continued to skyrocket in recent months, and there is no sign they are leveling off. Late last week, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury awarded a total of over $464 million ($440 million of which was in punitive damages) in a two-plaintiff retaliation case. This verdict is more than double any previous amount ever awarded and clearly qualifies as the largest verdict of its kind since the Fall of the Roman Empire.

The plaintiffs alleged they were retaliated against for making complaints about sexual and racial harassment in the workplace, directed at them and other coworkers, leading to their being pushed out of the company.

One plaintiff brought complaints to management about the alleged sexual harassment of two female employees and claimed he was constructively discharged after being subjected to retaliatory complaints and investigations from other supervisors. The other plaintiff made anonymous complaints to the internal ethics hotline about the racial and sexual harassment of both himself and other coworkers.

After a two-month trial, the jury awarded one plaintiff $22.4 million in compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive damages and awarded the other plaintiff $2 million in compensatory damages and $40 million in punitive damages.

This latest verdict comes on the heels of a judge reducing another huge December 2021 verdict from a Los Angeles Superior Court jury (which we wrote about here) that awarded $5.4 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages to a fired insurance company executive who alleged discrimination and retaliation. The judge ordered a reduction in the verdict to $18.95 million in punitive damages (or, in the alternative, a new damages trial) on the grounds that the prior verdict involved an impermissible double recovery ($75 million each from two Farmers Insurance entities) and a presumably unconstitutional ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages (a ratio exceeding 9 or 10-to-1 is presumed to be excessive and unconstitutional, and the ratio, in that case, was 28-to-1).

Only time will tell if this $464 million verdict stands. In the meantime, our advice to employers worried about these gargantuan verdicts remains the same: ARBITRATE!

Article By Anthony J Oncidi and Morgan J. Peterson of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.¹ Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole. Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence. The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”²

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission. There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct. Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders. Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003. Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast. SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.³ Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”⁴ The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”⁵ including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.⁶ To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.⁷

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.⁸ Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.⁹ Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.¹⁰ The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.¹¹ Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.¹²

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission. Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”¹³ and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”¹⁴

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.¹⁵ The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws. When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.¹⁶ If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”¹⁷ Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.¹⁸ To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission. Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,¹⁹ a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole. The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”²⁰ Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence. Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.²¹ Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public. Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system. Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable. This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice. According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions. Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance. Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters. Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.²² Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307. Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants. She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel. Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy. Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.” As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”²³ Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”²⁴

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority. Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards. The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy. Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003. Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.²⁵ But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted. Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”²⁶ Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”²⁷ a standard that has been left undefined to date.²⁸ In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”²⁹ At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.³⁰ Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner. In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement. The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.³¹ The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”³² As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course. If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties. First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel. As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”³³ Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege. Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice. In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.³⁴ The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances. Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.³⁵ That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.³⁶ In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries. The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices. Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed. Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets. Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession. It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021). In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions. The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct. Id. at *51. Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right. Id. Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion. Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures. The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X. See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e). The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100. The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper. At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission. To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2 (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more Securities & SEC, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Is Coming… Are You Ready? CBP Issues Hints at the Wave of Enforcement To Come

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.

What to Know

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.
The new guidance imposes tighter timelines and a higher burden of evidence on importers to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor. If CBP does not make a decision within specific timeframes, goods will automatically be deemed excluded.
CBP is expected to issue additional technical guidance at the end of May or early June. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also expected to issue guidance closer to June 21, 2022.
CBP is scheduled to host informational webinars detailing their UFLPA guidance in the coming weeks.

What’s New: Tighter Timelines

While US importers were eagerly anticipating the issuance of technical guidance regarding implementation of the UFLPA from CBP last week, which is now expected this week, CBP did post a new guidance document summarizing the UFLPA and forced labor Withhold Release Orders (WRO) enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, CBP’s authority to detain merchandise under the UFLPA will be pursuant to 19 CFR § 151.16, which provides for a much different timeline for the detention of merchandise than the WRO process. Under this process, if Customs does not make a timely decision regarding admissibility, goods are automatically excluded.

UFLPA Timeline Enforcement under 19 CFR § 151.16

Number of Days	Actions
5 Days from Presentation for Examination	CBP must decide whether to release or detail merchandise If the merchandise is not released, it is detained
5 Days after Decision to Release or Detain	CBP will issue a notice to importer advising them of: The initiation of detention Date merchandise examined Reason for detention Anticipated length of detention Nature of tests and inquiries to be conducted Information to accelerate disposition
	Upon written request, CBP must provide importer with testing procedures, methodologies used, and testing results
Within 30 Days of Examination	CBP will make a final determination as to the admissibility of merchandise If CBP does not make a determination within the 30-day period, the merchandise will be deemed excluded This means any submission to rebut the presumption should be made before this 30 day period
Within 180 Days of CBP Determination/Exclusion	Importers may protest CBP’s final determination
Within 30 Days After Protest Submitted	The protest is deemed denied if CBP does not grant or deny the protest within 30 days
Within 180 Days after the Date the Protest is Denied	The importer may commence a court action contesting the denied protest (28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)) In a court action, CBP must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an admissibility decision has been reached for good cause Customs can decide to grant the protest after the deemed denial but before a court case is filed

This is a much shorter timeline than the WRO process. Importantly, a company contesting CBP’s detention of merchandise pursuant to the UFLPA would be required to submit documentation to rebut the presumption within the 30-day period that CBP is assessing admissibility, whereas the WRO process permits 90 days. Like the WRO process, the importer may also file a protest 180 days after CBP makes its final determination regarding the exclusion.

CBP Listening Session: A Higher Burden of Evidence

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022, CBP provided information regarding the publication of guidance and enforcement of the UFLPA:

CBP Publication of Guidance. CBP’s guidance regarding its enforcement of the rebuttable presumption and the UFLPA is scheduled to be published the week of May 30.
DHS Publication of Guidance. DHS guidance will be published on or about June 21, 2022, which will include information relating to supply chain due diligence, importer guidance, and the entity lists.
Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Rebut the Presumption that Merchandise was Produced with Forced Labor. It was confirmed that the UFLPA will have a much higher burden of evidence required to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor than that of a WRO. Any exception to the rebuttable presumption must be reported to Congress, and thus the level of evidence that will be required to overcome the rebuttable presumption is very high. As a practical matter, it appears that very few detained entries will be released. Importers are advised to start conducting due diligence on supply chains in order to ensure that they will be able to obtain documentation should merchandise be detained once the rebuttable presumption goes into effect. Importantly, products that are subject to an existing WRO from Xinjiang will now be enforced under the UFLPA process instead of the WRO process.
Evidence Required if Merchandise is Detained. The forthcoming guidance will set forth information regarding how an importer may meet the exception to the rebuttable presumption and to demonstrate that merchandise was not produced with forced labor, by meeting the following three criteria:
- Demonstrate compliance with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force/DHS strategy;
- Demonstrate compliance with CBP’s guidance and any inquiries that CBP raises; and
- Provide clear and convincing evidence that the supply chain in question is free of forced labor.
Binding Rulings. Importers may apply for a binding ruling to confirm or request an exception to the rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA. Although CBP is still finalizing the process for importers to apply for a binding ruling, importers would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that merchandise is not produced with forced labor. If the ruling is granted, it applies to future shipments for the specific supply chain in question.
Known Importer Letters and Detention Notices. Going forward, CBP will not issue Known Importer letters, and CBP will notify importers that merchandise is subject to the UFLPA through the issuance of detention notices.
Detention of Merchandise. If goods are detained by CBP because they are suspected of having a nexus to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), importers may either provide clear and convincing evidence that merchandise was not produced with forced labor or export the products. If detained products that fall under the UFLPA are comingled with other products that are not subject to the UFLPA, importers may request the segregation of the merchandise that is not subject to the UFLPA.
Chain of CBP Review for Importer Submissions Relating to Detained Merchandise. Chain of CBP review for the request of an exception to the rebuttable presumption has not been finalized yet. However, importers will be required to submit evidence that rebuts the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor to the applicable CBP Port Director. For the moment, the CBP Commissioner is the final individual who can ultimately make an exception to the rebuttable presumption, but CBP is deciding if it will delegate this responsibility to any additional persons.

Upcoming CBP Informational Webinars

CBP will be holding three webinar sessions, all covering the same material, to discuss and review its guidance relating to the UFLPA. The dates of the webinars and the registration links are listed below.

Article By Angela M. Santos, Christine E. Hintze, and Jodi Tai of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

USCIS to Implement Premium Processing for Certain Previously Filed Form I-140 Petitions

On May 24, 2022, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that it would begin implementing premium processing for certain petitioners who have a pending Form I-140 under the EB-1 and EB-2 classifications.

As explained in our previous alert, USCIS had announced that it will expand its premium processing service to include additional immigration benefit case types, pursuant to a final rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rule is intended to implement the Emergency Stopgap USCIS Stabilization Act passed by Congress and is part of USCIS’s efforts to reduce existing backlogs and provide needed relief to Employment Authorization Document (EAD) cardholders.

While the rule will become effective on May 31, 2022, it will be implemented in a phased approach over a three-year period. USCIS has now begun implementing these changes to premium processing, starting with certain Form I-140 classifications: EB-1C (classification as a multinational executive or manager) and EB-2 (classification as a member of professions with advanced degrees or exceptional ability seeking a national interest waiver (NIW)).

This expansion will occur in the following phases:

Beginning June 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before January 1, 2021.
Beginning July 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-2 NIW petitions received on or before June 1, 2021, and EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before March 1, 2021.

USCIS will only accept premium processing requests for currently pending cases based on their date of filing, as noted above. USCIS is not accepting new Form I-140 petitions in these categories with a premium processing request at this time. We anticipate that USCIS will expand premium processing requests for more recently filed EB-1 and EB-2 petitions in the future.

Article By Shannon N. Parker of Mintz

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Don’t Build the Kitchen: Construction Company Settles Allegations of Small Business Subcontracting Fraud for $2.8 Million

For knowingly hiring a company that was not a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business to fulfill a set aside contract, a construction contractor settled allegations of small business subcontracting fraud for $2.8 million. A corporate whistleblower, Fox Unlimited Enterprises, brought this misconduct to light. We previously reported on the record-setting small business fraud settlement with TriMark USA LLC, to which this settlement is related. For reporting government contracts fraud, the whistleblower will receive $630,925 of the settlement.

According to the allegations, the general contractor and construction company Hensel Phelps was awarded a General Services Administration (GSA) contract to build the Armed Forces Retirement Home’s New Commons/Health Care Building in Washington, D.C. Part of the contract entailed sharing the work with small businesses, including service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB). The construction contractor negotiated all aspects of the contract with an unidentified subcontractor and then hired an SDVOSB, which, according to the settlement agreement, Hensel Phelps knew was “merely a passthrough” for the larger subcontractor, thus creating the appearance of an SDVOSB performing the work on the contract to meet the set-aside requirements. The supposedly SDVOSB subcontractor was hired to provide food service equipment for the Armed Forces Retirement Home building.

“Set aside” contracts are government contracts intended to provide opportunities to SDVOSB, women-owned small businesses, and other economically disadvantaged companies to do work they might not otherwise access. Large businesses performing work on government contracts are often required to subcontract part of their work to these types of small businesses. “Taking advantage of contracts intended for companies owned and operated by service-disabled veterans demonstrates a shocking disregard for fair competition and integrity in government contracting,” said the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington, as well as a shocking disregard for proper stewardship of taxpayer funds.

Whistleblowers can help fight fraud and protect taxpayers by reporting government contracts fraud. A whistleblower can report government contracts fraud under the False Claims Act and become a relator in a qui tam lawsuit, from which they may be entitled to a share of the funds the government recovers from fraudsters.

Article By Eva Gunasekera and Renée Brooker at Tycko & Zavareei LLP

For more whistleblower legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

DOJ Limits Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Providing Clarity for Ethical Hackers and Employees Paying Bills at Work Alike

On May 19, 2022, the Department of Justice announced it would not charge good-faith hackers who expose weaknesses in computer systems with violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Congress enacted the CFAA in 1986 to promote computer privacy and cybersecurity and amended the Act several times, most recently in 2008. However, the evolving cybersecurity landscape has left courts and commentators troubled by potential applications of the CFAA to circumstances unrelated to the CFAA’s original purpose, including prosecution of so-called “white hat” hackers. The new charging policy, which became effective immediately, seeks to advance the CFAA’s original purpose by clarifying when and how federal prosecutors are authorized to bring charges under the Act.

DOJ to Decline Prosecution of Good-Faith Security Research

The new policy exempts activity of white-hat hackers and states that “the government should decline prosecution if available evidence shows the defendant’s conduct consisted of, and the defendant intended, good-faith security research.” The policy defines “good-faith security research” as “accessing a computer solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in a manner designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices, machines, or online services to which the accessed computer belongs, or those who use such devices, machines, or online services.”

In practice, this policy appears to provide, for example, protection from federal charges for the type of ethical hacking a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter performed in 2021. The reporter uncovered security flaws in a Missouri state website that exposed the Social Security numbers of over 100,000 teachers and other school employees. The Missouri governor’s office initiated an investigation into the reporter’s conduct for unauthorized computer access. While the DOJ’s policy would not affect prosecutions under state law, it would preclude federal prosecution for the conduct if determined to be good-faith security research.

The new policy also promises protection from prosecution for certain arguably common but contractually prohibited online conduct, including “[e]mbellishing an online dating profile contrary to the terms of service of the dating website; creating fictional accounts on hiring, housing, or rental websites; using a pseudonym on a social networking site that prohibits them; checking sports scores at work; paying bills at work; or violating an access restriction contained in a term of service.” Such activities resemble the facts of Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783, which the Supreme Court decided in June 2021. In Van Buren, the 6-3 majority rejected the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA’s prohibition on “unauthorized access” and held that a police officer who looked up license plate information on a law-enforcement database for personal use—in violation of his employer’s policy but without circumventing any access controls—did not violate the CFAA. The DOJ did not cite Van Buren as the basis for the new policy. Nor did the DOJ identify any another impetus for the change.

To Achieve More Consistent Application of Policy, All Federal Prosecutors Must Consult with Main Justice Before Bringing CFAA Charges

In addition to exempting good-faith security research from prosecution, the new policy specifies the steps for charging violations of the CFAA. To help distinguish between actual good-faith security research and pretextual claims of such research that mask a hacker’s malintent, federal prosecutors must consult with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) before bringing any charges. If CCIPS recommends declining charges, prosecutors must inform the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and may need to obtain approval from the DAG before initiating charges.

Article By Kyle R. Freeny, Linda Ricci, Jena M. Valdetero, and Brittany M. Fisher of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more data privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Biden Revisions to the NEPA Regulations Now in Effect

The Biden Administration is amending the federal regulations for implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to reverse certain changes made by the Trump Administration. The first set of amendments took effect last Friday on May 20, 2022.

As background, the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ) first issued the NEPA implementing regulations in 1978. They remained unchanged for more than 40 years until the Trump Administration published its 2020 rule updating the regulations to facilitate “more efficient, effective, timely NEPA reviews.” Developers, construction companies, and other businesses generally supported these changes with the hope they would streamline a lengthy process that often significantly delays projects. However, environmentalists opposed the changes, fearing they would weaken important protections, including those aimed at reducing climate change impacts and protecting natural resources. Upon taking office, the Biden Administration immediately began an effort to reverse parts of the 2020 rule.

The Biden amendments will be issued in two phases. The “Phase One” rule was published on April 20, 2022, and is in effect as of May 20, 2022. The “Phase Two” rule, which is expected to include more comprehensive revisions, will be issued “over the coming months”.

The Phase One rule reinstates the following three key provisions of the NEPA regulations:

1. Statement of Purpose and Need, and Scope of Reasonable Alternatives (40 CFR 1502.13)

Under NEPA, an agency’s statement of purpose and need informs the range of alternative actions analyzed in an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). The NEPA regulations historically required agencies to consider “reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency.” The 2020 rule updates, however, instructed agencies to limit the statement of purpose and need, and therefore the range of alternatives, to only those that are consistent with the applicant’s goals and the agency’s statutory authority.

The Phase One rule removes these limitations to re-establish federal agencies’ discretion to consider a variety of factors, including a range of reasonable alternatives that are not entirely consistent with the goals of the project applicant. Accordingly, federal agencies may again coordinate with communities and project proponents to evaluate alternatives that could minimize environmental and public health costs, but extend beyond the scope of the agency’s authority or do not serve the applicant’s goals.

2. Agency Implementing Regulations (40 CFR 1507.3)

The Phase One rule also removes language that could limit agencies’ standards and procedures for implementing NEPA rules that extend beyond CEQ regulatory requirements. This update reestablishes CEQ regulations as the “floor” for NEPA environmental review, and restores the agency’s discretion and flexibility to tailor NEPA procedures to align with specific agency and public needs. In contrast, the 2020 rule would have made the CEQ regulations a “ceiling” for NEPA requirements, effectively restricting agencies’ discretion to develop and implement procedures beyond requisite CEQ regulations.

3. Scope of Effects (40 CFR 1508.1(g))

Finally, the Phase One rule restores the definition of “effects” that requires agencies to consider the historic categories of “reasonably foreseeable” direct, indirect, and cumulative effects. The 2020 rule, in contrast, limited the scope of this analysis to effects with a “reasonably close causal relationship,” and included language indicating that agencies were only required to consider direct effects, had discretion to consider indirect effects, and should not consider cumulative effects in NEPA review. The Phase One rule change thus ensures that agencies’ NEPA documents will evaluate all relevant environmental impacts resulting from the agency decision.

Here, the Phase One rule reversal is particularly impactful in terms of an agency’s consideration of climate change, where cumulative effects tend to be substantially greater than the effects of the individual project. The Phase One update confirms CEQ’s view that climate change impacts are adequately considered in evaluating direct, indirect and cumulative effects.

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Except for reinstating these three key provisions, the Phase One rule does not affect other changes made by the 2020 rule. The Biden Administration plans to introduce more comprehensive changes as part of the forthcoming Phase Two rule. These changes, which are anticipated to be more controversial and draw additional public attention, are expected to address environmental justice, public participation, and streamlining provisions, including the use of plain language, deadlines, page limits, and inter-agency coordination.

Article By Alexander L. Merritt and Kathryn C. Kafka of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Beware OFAC in a Time of Sanctions

On Monday, April 25, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) announced a settlement with Toll Holdings Limited (“Toll”), an Australian freight forwarding and logistics company, with respect to Toll’s originations and/or receipt “of payments through the U.S. financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons.” Toll, which is not an American entity, and is neither owned by Americans nor located in the U.S. or any of its territories, was involved in almost 3000 transactions where payments were made in connection with sea, air, and rail shipments to, from, or through North Korea, Iran, or Syria, AND/OR involving the property of a person on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. OFAC did not have direct jurisdiction over Toll, BUT because the payments for Toll’s freight forwarding and logistics services flowed through U.S. financial institutions, Toll “caused the U.S. financial institutions to be engaged in prohibited activities with … sanctioned persons or jurisdictions.”

Each OFAC violation can be the basis of civil sanctions. Here the 2853 violation would have supported the imposition of civil sanctions totaling over $826 million. Toll was “happy” to settle OFAC’s enforcement action for $6 million. OFAC found that the Toll violations were “non-egregious,” in part due to the rapid growth of Toll after 2007 through acquisitions of smaller freight forwarding companies. OFAC noted that by 2017 Toll had almost 600 invoicing, data, payment, and other systems spread across its various units. OFAC also noted that Toll did not have adequate compliance procedures and procedures in place and did not attend to those issues until an unnamed bank threatened to cease doing business with Toll because Toll was using its U.S. dollar account to transact business with sanctioned jurisdictions and/or persons. OFAC took note of Toll’s voluntary self-disclosure, well-organized internal investigation, and extensive remedial measures.

OFAC traces its origins to the War of 1812, when the then Secretary of the Treasury imposed sanctions on the United Kingdom in retaliation for the impressment of American sailors. The Treasury Department has had a special office dealing with foreign assets since 1940 (and the outbreak of World War II), with statutory authority found in the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 (as World War I raged), and a series of federal laws involving embargoes and economic sanctions. OFAC received its current name as part of a Treasury Department order on October 15, 1962 (contemporaneous with the Cuban missile crisis).

The Toll settlement reflects the growing use by OFAC of public enforcement against foreign businesses for “causing” violations by involving U.S. payment systems. The use of U.S. dollars in any part of a transaction will typically involve the U.S. financial system, directly or indirectly – that subjects the entirety of the transaction to U.S regulatory jurisdiction, including that of OFAC. The Toll settlement evidences OFAC’s increasing willingness to exercise its expansive jurisdiction over foreign businesses, even those involving primarily extraterritorial transactions — for example, the increase in OFAC sanctions of foreign businesses seen as facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Foreign businesses must give serious and continuing attention to having substantial policies and procedures in place to insure compliance with U.S. sanctions and, thereby, to avoid OFAC enforcement actions. Companies can start by reviewing OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments and implementing the recommendations there. In addition, all parties to a transaction should be screened against sanction lists (OFAC’s, and also those of the U.K. and E.U.). Companies should consider adopting preventive measures, not only to deter violations, but also to demonstrate a vigorous compliance program. Similarly, these issues MUST be considered as part of any merger or acquisition (as the Toll experience suggests).Finally, all counterparties, including financial intermediaries, should be evaluated for potential sanction list issues. Otherwise, a foreign business may have to “pay the Toll” for its shortcomings.

Experienced American business lawyers may prove helpful in designing and/or evaluating the compliance programs of non-U.S. companies.

Article By Peter D. Hutcheon of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more financial legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Afghanistan Temporary Protected Status Application Instructions To Be Issued

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) grant for Afghanistan will go into effect on May 20, 2022, with publication of the notice in the Federal Register with instructions on how to apply for TPS and for Employment Authorization.

In March 2022, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas announced that Afghanistan was added to the list of countries eligible for TPS. This would benefit approximately 75,000 individuals and provide temporary employment authorization. The 18-month initial grant and registration period became effective on March 20, 2022, and runs through November 20, 2023.

To be eligible, individuals must demonstrate their continuous residence in the United States since March 15, 2022, and their continuous physical presence in the United States since March 20, 2022. Any nationals or residents of Afghanistan who are not currently residing in the United States or who arrived after March 15, 2022, will not be eligible for this TPS designation.

Eligible individuals must submit Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, during the 18-month initial registration period. They may also submit a request for an Employment Authorization Document using Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization. The applications may be submitted together and may be submitted online.

Afghan nationals who arrived in the United States through the evacuation effort, Operation Allies Welcome, received humanitarian parole and work authorization for a period of two years. Those individuals may also be eligible for TPS.

DHS has also announced that F-1 students from Afghanistan experiencing severe economic hardship due to the situation in Afghanistan will be eligible for work authorization, increased permittable work hours, and a reduction in their course load as an accommodation.

Article By Rashmi K. Shah of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Category: Administrative & Regulatory

Constitutionality of FTC’s Structure and Procedures Under SCOTUS Review

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