eDiscovery for Pharma, Biotech & Medical Device Industries

The National Law Review is pleased to inform you of IQPC’s e-Discovery for Pharma, Biotech & Medial Device Industries Conference in Philadelphia on October 24-25, 2011.  We’ve provided some information on the conference for your convenience:

Mastering eDiscovery and Information management strategies and best practices fit for life sciences industries

Why attend eDiscovery for Pharma?

  • Learn from industry leaders who have successfully implemented technology solutions that have reduced cost and errors in eDiscovery production. Network with government and industry leaders who are influencing the practice and procedure of eDiscovery in the Pharmaceutical, Biotech and Medical Device Industries.
  • Prepare your organization with defensible information management techniques specifically geared toward global pharmaceutical data.
  • Join peer discussions on industry hot topics such as predictive coding, cloud computing and legal holds.
  • Avoid mistakes and costly sanctions for eDiscovery misconduct and Federal Corrupt Practices Act investigations.
  • Benchmark your internal processes and evaluate their effectiveness in practical scenarios.

Hear Perspectives from:

  • Edward Gramling, Senior Corporate Counsel at Pfizer
  • John O’Tuel, Assistant General Counsel at GlaxoSmithKline
  • Chris Garber, eDiscovery Manager atAllergan, Inc
  • HB Gordon, eDiscovery Analyst, Legal Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA
  • David Kessler, Partner at Fulbright & Jaworski
  • Phil Yannella, Partner at Ballard & Spahr

View Full Speaker List

IRS Defends Discretion to Withhold Section 1256 Exchange Designation for ISOs

Recently posted at the National Law Review by William R. Pomierski of  McDermott Will & Emery an article about the IRS defending its decision not to designate independent system operators as qualified board or exchange:

The IRS defended its decision not to designate independent system operators asqualified board or exchange (QBE) principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3 of Section 1256 Contracts.

In Sesco Enterprises, LLC (Civ. No. 10-1470, D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2010), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defended its discretion to refrain from extending qualified board or exchange status under Code Section 1256 to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-regulated independent system operators.  The district court dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to classify electricity derivatives that traded on independent system operators as “Section 1256 Contracts.

Section 1256 Contracts in General

For federal income tax purposes, a limited number of derivative contracts are classified as Section 1256 Contracts.   Absent an exception, Section 1256 Contracts are subject to mark-to-market tax accounting and the 60/40 rule.  The 60/40 rule characterizes 60 percent of the net gain or loss from a Section 1256 Contract as long-term and 40 percent as short-term capital gain or loss.  Corporate taxpayers often view Section 1256 Contracts as tax disadvantageous, relative to economically similar derivatives that are not taxed as Section 1256 Contracts, such as swaps, unless the business hedging or some other exception is available.

Section 1256 Contract classification is limited to regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options and dealer securities futures contracts, as each is defined in the Internal Revenue Code.   Unless a derivative falls within one of these categories, it is not a Section 1256 Contract, regardless of its economic similarity to a Section 1256 Contract.

Except for foreign currency contracts, Section 1256 Contracts are limited to derivative positions that trade on or are subject to the rules of a qualified board or exchange (or QBE).  QBE status is extended only to national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (a Category 1 Exchange); domestic boards of trade designated as contract markets by the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (a Category 2 Exchange); orany other exchange, board of trade or other market that the Secretary of the Treasury Department determines has rules adequate to carry out the purposes of Code Section 1256 (a Category 3 Exchange).

Category 1 and Category 2 Exchange status is automatic.   Category 3 Exchange status, however, requires a determination by the IRS.  In recent years, Category 3 Exchange designation has been extended to four non-U.S. futures exchanges offering products in the United States: ICE Futures (UK), Dubai Mercantile Exchange, ICE Futures (Canada) and LIFFE (UK).

Sesco Challenges IRS Discretion to Withhold Category 3 Exchange Designation

According to its website, the taxpayer in Sesco (Taxpayer) is an electricity and natural gas trading company. The facts of the case indicate that it traded electricity derivatives (presumably INCs, DECs, Virtuals and/or FTRs) on various independent system operators or regional transmission organizations regulated by the FERC (collectively, ISOs).  Because ISOs are not regulated by the SEC or the CFTC, they cannot be considered Category 1 or Category 2 Exchanges for purposes of Code Section 1256.  To date, no ISO has been designated as a Category 3 Exchange by the IRS.

According to the facts in Sesco, the Taxpayer took the position on its return that derivatives trading on ISOs were Section 1256 Contracts eligible for 60/40 capital treatment.  The IRS denied Section 1256 Contract status on audit.  Somewhat surprisingly, a footnote in Sesco suggests, without any further discussion, that the IRS agreed with the Taxpayer’s position that these electricity derivatives qualified as “regulated futures contracts” under Code Section 1256 except for satisfying the QBE requirement.

During the examination process, the Taxpayer apparently requested a private letter ruling from the IRS that the relevant ISOs were Category 3 Exchanges.   According to the district court, “The IRS refused, asserting that the request for a QBE determination must be made by the exchange itself.”  The Taxpayer then asked one of the ISOs to request Category 3 Exchange status, but the ISO declined to do so.  Taxpayer then filed suit challenging the IRS’s adjustments and asserted that the IRS “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion when it refused to make a QBE determination except upon request from the ISO.”  In essence, the Taxpayer was attempting to force the IRS to designate the ISOs at issue as QBEs.

The IRS defended its decision not to designate the ISOs as QBEs principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3.   After briefly considering the wording of Code Section 1256 and the relevant legislative history, the court agreed with the IRS position and dismissed the case on procedural grounds (lack of jurisdiction).

Observations

Although the District Court’s decision in Sesco may be of little or no precedential value due to the procedural aspects of the case, the decision nevertheless is important in that it reflects what has long been understood to be the IRS’ position regarding Category 3 Exchange status, which is that Category 3 Exchange status is not automatic and requires a formal determination by the IRS.  Sesco also confirms that the IRS believes QBE classification can only be requested by the exchange at issue, not by exchange participants.

Unfortunately, Sesco does not address the separate question of whether the IRS could have unilaterally designated the ISOs at issue as QBEs without the participation of the exchanges.  Sesco also raises, but does not address, the issue of whether derivatives traded on exchanges that are not “futures” exchange can be considered “regulated futures contracts” for purposes of Code Section 1256.  These are critical questions that will become more relevant in the near future as the exchange-trading and exchange-clearing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank derivatives reform legislation begin to take effect.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation – Blog Series: Complaints and Answers

Recently posted at the  National Law Review  by John C. Scheller of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP an entrepreneur’s guide to the litigation process.

A.  The Complaint

Litigation begins with a Complaint. “Complaint” is capitalized because it is a specific legal document, rather than a garden-variety complaint about something. The Complaint lays out the plaintiff’s specific legal claims against the defendant. It needs to contain enough facts that, if everything stated is true and there are no extenuating circumstances, a judge and jury could find in favor of the plaintiff.

As an example, Paul Plaintiff is suing Diana Defendant for violating a contract. Paul files a Complaint with a court claiming several facts: 1) Diana signed a contract to buy widgets; 2) Paul delivered the widgets; and 3) Diana did not pay the agreed-upon amount. If the court finds that these facts are true, then, unless there were extenuating circumstances, Diana probably breached a contract with Paul and should pay damages.

Paul’s Complaint also needs to allege facts showing that he has a right to be in that court. For example, if Paul wants to sue Diana inTexas, he has to show that the case and the parties have some connection toTexas. If he wants to sue her in a federal court, he has to meet a number of other criteria. (Federal court is generally only available if the parties are based in different states and the damages are relatively substantial or if the legal question is one of federal law.)

B.  Response to a Complaint

Once the defendant officially learns of the Complaint, she has a certain limited time to file some sort of response with the court. The time to respond, however, does not run from when the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, but generally when he officially delivered notice of the Complaint to the defendant. (There is a timeline that starts ticking when the defendant becomes aware of a state court lawsuit she wants to “remove” to federal court.) The amount of time for the defendant to respond varies by what court the case is in, but is generally a short period of time.

After receiving the complaint, the defendant has three options: 1) Ignore the Complaint and have the court grant judgment in favor of the plaintiff; 2) Tell the court that the Complaint is defective and ask for dismissal; or 3) Answer the Complaint. Option one is usually not a good plan; courts do not look favorably on defendants who ignore the legal process, and this option prevents a defendant from fighting the plaintiff’s claims.

Option two does not deal with the merits of the plaintiff’s issue. It is simply telling the court that the Complaint is defective for a variety of reasons including, for instance, how it was served, who the parties are (or are not), which court the case is in, or simply that, even if everything is true, the plaintiff cannot win. For example, if Paul sues Diana, but never tells Diana about the suit, Diana can then ask the court to dismiss the case. Also, if Diana works for DefendCo and Paul’s contract was actually with DefendCo and not with Diana, personally, she may be able to have the case dismissed because Paul sued the wrong party. If Paul sued Diana in a federal court inTexaswhen both parties are residents ofCaliforniaand neither has ever been to or done business in Texas, then Diana may be able to get the case dismissed, at least from theTexascourt.

Finally, there is the “So, what?” defense. If the Complaint doesn’t actually allege a cause of action, the defendant can ask the court to dismiss it. This usually happens because the plaintiff simply assumes a fact, but does not include it in the Complaint. If, for example, Paul alleges only that Diana failed to pay him a certain amount of money, but does not allege that a contract existed between them, then Diana can essentially say “So, what?” and ask the court to dismiss the case. She would ask the court to dismiss the case because, even if true (she really did not pay him any money), he did not plead any facts showing that she was supposed to pay him money. The defendant is not admitting the truth of the allegation; she is just saying that even if true, the plaintiff cannot win.

Finally, a defendant can file an Answer. Again, “Answer” is capitalized because it is a specific legal document. In an Answer, the defendant responds, paragraph by paragraph, to each of the plaintiff’s allegations. The defendant must admit, deny, or say that she does not know the answer to each specific allegation. Saying “I don’t know” functions as a denial.

For example, Paul’s Complaint probably alleges that Diana lives at a certain address. Assuming Diana actually lives there, she has to admit that fact. Paul may allege that he delivered the correct number of working widgets to Diana. If the widgets were not what she actually ordered or did not work, Diana would deny that allegation. Finally, Paul may claim that those widgets cost him a certain amount of money. Diana likely has no way to know how much Paul paid for the widgets, so she would say she does not know – thus leaving Paul to prove that allegation.

Also in the Answer, the defendant can claim affirmative defenses. Those tell the court that there were extenuating circumstances so that, even if everything the plaintiff says is true, the court should not find in favor of the plaintiff.

For example, if Paul told Diana not to worry about paying him for the widgets for six months but then turned around and immediately sued her, she would claim that as an affirmative defense.

Finally, the Answer may contain counterclaims. These claims are the defendant counter-suing the plaintiff for something. The counterclaims may be related to the original suit or not. Usually they are related, but they do not have to be. This section follows the same rules as if the defendant were filing a complaint.

For example, Diana may counterclaim against Paul because he sent her the wrong widgets and, perhaps, add a claim that when Paul delivered the widgets to her warehouse, he backed his truck into her building and caused damage. She would then counterclaim for breach of contract and property damage. The court would then sort out the whole mess to decide who owed whom how much.

Click Here: to view the previous post in the Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation – Blog Series: Introduction

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Department of State Releases August 2011 Visa Bulletin

Recently posted at the National Law Review  by Eleanor PeltaA. James Vázquez-Azpiri and Lance Director Nagel of  Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP details regarding The U.S. Department of State’s August 2011 Visa Bulletin.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its August 2011 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications.  Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their status to that of permanent resident, or to obtain approval of an immigrant visa application at an American embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the August 2011 Bulletin Say?

EB-1: All EB-1 categories remain current.

EB-2: Priority dates remain current for foreign nationals in the EB-2 category from all countries except China and India.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for Indian and Chinese nationals are as follows:

ChinaApril 15, 2007 (forward movement of five weeks)

IndiaApril 15, 2007 (forward movement of five weeks)

EB-3: There is continued backlog in the EB-3 category.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: July 8, 2004 (forward movement of one week)

IndiaJune 1, 2002 (forward movement of one month)

MexicoNovember 1, 2005 (forward movement of four months)

PhilippinesNovember 1, 2005 (forward movement of three weeks)

Rest of the World: November 1, 2005 (forward movement of three weeks)

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward, or remain static and unchanged. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning, and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the August 2011 Visa Bulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website at http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5518.html.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

NAWL's Annual Meeting and Awards Luncheon New York City July 21st

The National Law Review wants to remind you that the National Association of Women Lawyers 2011 Annual Meeting and Awards Luncheon is taking place Wednesday July 20th and Thrusday July 21st in New York City at the Waldorf Astoria. 

For a Detailed Schedule Click Here

For a complete list of the 2011 Annual Awardees Click Here

Welcome Networking Night of Giving  Click Here

Table Sponsorships and Reservations Click Here 

Individual Ticket Pricing & Registration Click Here 

Morning Session Ticket Pricing & Registration Click Here

 Afternoon Session Ticket Pricing & Registration Click Here

CLE Credit: 
Application for accreditation of this program is currently pending in AL, AR, CA, FL, GA, IL, MN, NJ, NY, PA, SC, TX. Speaker attendance is subject to change.

Hotel Information:
Attendees can register for guest rooms at the Waldorf=Astoria. A limited number of rooms are available for the rate of $319 per night . To reserve call 1-800-925-3673 and ask for the Women Lawyers’ Room Block.

FTC And DOJ Issue Proposed Statement Of Antitrust Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Seeking To Participate In The Medicare Shared Savings Program

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Scott B. Murray of  Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.  information about the  Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (“DOJ”)  joint Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations:    

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) recently issued a joint Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (the “Policy Statement”). The Policy Statement details how the federal antitrust agencies will apply the nation’s antitrust laws to accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) created pursuant to the health care reform act, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Act”). Public comments were to be submitted by May 31, 2011.

The agencies identify the potential advantages and disadvantages of ACOs that they will examine under the antitrust laws. The agencies “recognize that ACOs may generate opportunities for health care providers to innovate in both the Medicare and commercial markets and achieve for many consumers the benefits Congress intended for Medicare beneficiaries through the Shared Savings Program.” Policy Statement, at p. 2. However, the agencies also understand that “not all such ACOs are likely to benefit consumers, and under certain conditions ACOs could reduce competition and harm consumers through higher prices or lower quality services.” Id.

ACOs Covered By Policy Statement

The Policy Statement applies to “collaborations among otherwise independent providers and provider groups, formed after March 23, 2010, that seek to participate, or have otherwise been approved to participate, in the Shared Savings Program.” Id. “[C]ollaboration” is defined to mean an agreement or set of agreements, other than merger agreements, thus, the Policy Statement does not apply to mergers among health care providers, which will still be analyzed under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Id.

The Rule of Reason Will Be Applied To ACOs

The agencies have previously stated that joint price agreements among competing health care providers are evaluated under the Rule of Reason, if the providers are financially or clinically integrated and the agreement is reasonably necessary to accomplish the pro-competitive benefits of the integration. The Rule of Reason “evaluates whether the collaboration is likely to have substantial anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the collaboration’s potential pro-competitive efficiencies are likely to outweigh those effects.” Id., at p. 4. Thus, “the greater the likely anticompetitive effects, the greater the likely efficiencies must be to pass muster under the antitrust laws.” Id.

In prior pronouncements regarding health care provider collaborations, the agencies have stated that sufficient financial integration exists if the collaboration’s participants have agreed to share substantial financial risk, because such risk-sharing generally establishes both an overall efficiency goal for the venture and the incentives for the participants to meet that goal. The agencies have previously provided a number of examples of satisfactory financial risk-sharing arrangements, while noting that the examples did not represent an exhaustive list.

Regarding clinical integration, while not previously providing specific examples, the agencies have noted that such integration must be “sufficient to ensure that the venture is likely to produce significant efficiencies.” Id., at p. 4. The Act authorizes CMS to approve ACOs meeting certain eligibility criteria, and the Policy Statement indicates that “CMS’s proposed eligibility criteria are broadly consistent with the indicia of clinical integration that the Agencies previously set forth [and that] organizations meeting the CMS criteria for approval as an ACO are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to improve quality, and reduce the costs, of providing medical and other health care services through their participants’ joint efforts.” Id., at p. 5. Because many health care providers will want to use the ACO structure in both the commercial market and the Medicare context, “if a CMS-approved ACO provides the same or essentially the same services in the commercial market the Agencies will provide rule of reason treatment to an ACO if, in the commercial market, the ACO uses the same governance and leadership structure and the same clinical and administrative processes as it uses to qualify for and participate in the Shared Savings Program.” Id., at p. 5. The Rule of Reason analysis applies to ACOs for the length of their participation in the Shared Savings Program.

Streamlined Approach For The Rule Of Reason Analysis Of ACOs

The Policy Statement provides a streamlined approach to determining market shares for the common services provided by an ACO’s participants. The first step is to list the common services provided by two or more of the ACOs’ participants. The list of services for the various types of health care providers ( i.e., physicians, inpatient facilities, and outpatient facilities) will be made available by CMS. The second step is to determine the Primary Service Area (“PSA”) for each common service of the ACO participants. “The PSA is defined as the lowest number of contiguous postal zip codes from which the participant draws at least 75 percent of its patients for that service.” Id., at pp. 7 & 12.

If the ACO participants do not provide any common services in any of the same PSAs, then the ACO needs to determine if any ACO participant is a “Dominant Provider,” meaning a participant with greater than 50 percent market share for a service in a PSA. If the ACO does include a Dominant Provider, such participant must be non-exclusive to ACO, and the ACO cannot require commercial payers to be exclusive to ACO or otherwise restricted in dealing with other ACOs or providers.

Safety Zone Applies If ACO Has Less Than 30 Percent Combined Market Share For All Common Services In All PSAs

If there are common services provided by two or more ACO participants in the same PSA, then the ACO must calculate its combined market share for each such common service in each PSA. CMS will make available Medicare fee-for-service data sufficient for physicians and outpatient facilities to calculate their market shares. For inpatient facilities, market shares should be calculated based on “inpatient discharges, using state-level all-payer hospital discharge data where available, for the most recent calendar year for which data are available.” Id., at p. 13. Where such data is not available, Medicare fee-for-service payment data should be used, or other available data if such Medicare data is insufficient.

If the combined market share for each common service in each PSA is less than 30 percent, then the ACO falls within the “safety zone,” meaning that there will be no agency challenge of the ACO absent extraordinary circumstances. If the combined share for even one common service is greater than 30 percent in a PSA, the safety zone does not apply.

In addition, for the safety zone to apply, any hospital or ambulatory surgery center participating in the ACO must be non-exclusive – i.e., allowed to contract or affiliate with other ACOs or commercial payers – regardless of its PSA market shares. If the ACO falls within the safety zone, but includes a Dominant Provider, then the same Dominant Provider requirements described above must be met.

An ACO may include one physician per specialty from each “rural county” (as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau), and a Rural Hospital, on a non-exclusive basis and still qualify for the safety zone even if the inclusion of the rural provider or Rural Hospital makes the ACO’s combined market share for a common service greater than 30 percent in a PSA.

Mandatory Review By The Agencies Applies If ACO Has Greater Than A 50 Percent Combined Market Share For Any Common Service In A PSA

If an ACO’s combined market share for any common service in any PSA is greater than 50 percent, the ACO must make a submission to the agencies for a mandatory initial review of the ACO’s potential competitive effects. Thus, if the combined share for even one of the ACO’s common services is greater than 50 percent in a PSA, review by the antitrust agencies is mandatory. The mandatory review requirement does not mean that the ACO is presumed to be anticompetitive, but only that an initial review is necessary.

The ACO must submit to the agencies a copy of its application and all supporting documents that the ACO plans to submit, or has submitted, to CMS or that CMS requires the ACO to retain as part of the Shared Savings Program application process. In addition, the ACO must submit other documents that will allow the agencies to analyze the ACO’s potential competitive effects. If the agencies receive all such documentation in a timely fashion, they have committed to completing the review in an expedited, 90-day time period. The additional documents that must be submitted include documents relating to the ability of the ACO’s participants to compete with the ACO, the ACO’s business strategies, competitive plans, and likely impact on prices, cost, or quality of any service the ACO provides, any other ACOs created by or affiliated with the proposed ACO or its participants, the ACO’s market share calculations, the identity of the ACO’s five largest payer customers, and the identity of any competing ACOs. Id., at pp. 9-10.

After receiving this documentation, the reviewing agency will advise the ACO within 90 days of whether it has no intent to challenge the ACO or is likely to challenge it. CMS will not approve an ACO that has received a letter of likely challenge.

No Man’s Land If > 30 Percent, But << 50 Percent Combined Share

Given the safety zone and mandatory review thresholds, there is a no man’s land for ACOs with market shares for common services that fall between these two thresholds – i.e., if the ACO has a combined market share for any common service in any PSA greater than 30 percent, but no combined market share greater than 50 percent in any PSA. While there is no presumption that ACOs falling in this no man’s land will have anticompetitive effects, the agencies have identified certain conduct that such ACOs should avoid to reduce the risk of challenge by the antitrust agencies:

1. Steering or incentivizing commercial payers away from providers outside the ACO.

2. Tying sales of the ACO’s services to the purchase of non-ACO services (and vice versa).

3. Contracting with ACO participants on an exclusive basis (except for primary care physicians, who can be exclusive to an ACO).

4. Prohibiting commercial payers from providing health plan participants with the ACO’s cost, quality or other performance information.

5. Sharing price or other competitive information among the ACO’s participants that can be used to collude regarding non-ACO services.

ACOs with market shares requiring mandatory review should also avoid such conduct to reduce the risk of antitrust challenge.

If an ACO falling within the no man’s land desires to obtain further certainty regarding whether it will face an antitrust challenge, it can request expedited antitrust review by the agencies similar to the mandatory review process.

Likely Concerns Regarding The Proposed Policy Statement

Potential public comments to the Policy Statement include:

1. Whether non-exclusivity should be required for a hospital or ambulatory surgery center if the ACO still falls within the safety zone for all common services and does not include a Dominant Provider for any service.

2. Whether the 30 percent and 50 percent market share thresholds are appropriate.

3. Are PSAs an appropriate proxy for the relevant antitrust geographic market?

4. Will the Medicare and other publicly available data allow for accurate market share calculations?

5. Will the mandatory review process represent an unreasonable time and cost burden to be incurred by proposed ACOs?

6. Should the Policy Statement include additional examples of market share calculations for hypothetical ACOs?

The Policy Statement represents a substantial and welcome effort on the part of the agencies to provide guidance to the health care industry regarding the antitrust analysis to be applied to ACOs seeking to participate in the Shared Savings Program; however, it is likely that some procedural and substantive modifications will be necessary to help health care providers fully achieve the goals of the Act through the formation of ACOs.  

This article appeared in the June 2011 issue of The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.  

Copyright © 2011 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. All rights reserved.

 

 

Federal Authorities Warn of Terrorism: Three Steps Toward Comprehensive Risk Management for the Hotel Industry

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Richard J. Fildes of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. – news about a recent federal government terror alert involving hotels and resort properties: 

Quality service, prime amenities, ideal locations and excellent accommodations are the repertoire of successful hotels. In light of a recent warning issued by federal authorities to the U.S. hotel industry, that checklist may need to expand, according to the American Hotel & Lodging Educational Institute. Though Mumbai-style attacks have thankfully not come to fruition on American soil in recent years, the need for vigilance is ever-present. Based on intelligence reports gathered by the U.S. government, terror plots on the hotel industry are a looming threat;however, a panic-free plan for potentially devastating crises can easily be developed.

Attacks of terrorism and natural disasters can often share the same elements of surprise, chaos, structural destruction and health-related concerns. Just as hotels should plan for before, during, and after a storm (more details), there should be a similarly structured program for staff and guests when dealing with terrorist attacks. Combining the consideration of both events can streamline the process of training employees and increasing familiarity with risk management in the aftermath of such events. Some considerations are as follows:

 Lobbies tend to be the most dangerous part of hotels because they are typically unsecured open areas where guests congregate. If finances permit, have plain clothed security personnel in the lobby. The presence of uniformed security guards can create a perception of safety; however, non-uniformed guards can be more attuned as the eyes and ears of hotel security.

• Staff should be trained to spot potentially dangerous activities. All employees who may have contact with guests, including housekeeping, maintenance, front desk, guest services, food and beverage, transportation, and parking should be given detailed instructions on what types of activity should be reported to hotel security.

 Staff should also have equally detailed instructions on panic control and ways to manage the turmoil of natural disasters.

 Record keeping is also vital, especially with health related issues. Knowing which employees have medical ailments or potential concerns will help reduce health risks stemming from natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Though some guests may not want to disclose such information, consider asking guests whether they have any heart conditions, diabetes or other issues that would be necessary for the staff to know in case of an emergency. Such inquiries should be phrased “as non-intrusive” inquiries geared toward providing the best possible customer care and service in the rare chance that something may happen.

• Keeping both paper and electronic copies of records, including which guests are checked into the hotel at any given time, is also key to minimizing confusion and chaos when responding to an emergency.

• Develop specific evacuation plans. The standard “in-case-of-a-fire” evacuation route may not be helpful during a chemical weapon attack, bombing or hurricane.

• Have designated evacuation areas equipped (or readily able to be equipped) with vital supplies. Back up energy sources, medical supplies and non-perishable foods, and bottled waters are all necessary to keep guests safe and calm.

• Make the evacuation routes easy to follow, and ensure that the staff knows exactly where guests should be located during the different emergencies.

Being vigilant, heightening security efforts, and ensuring staff preparedness will help reduce the stress, commotion and devastating aftermath of natural disasters and terrorist related incidents.

* Tara L. Tedrow is co-author of this article. She is a rising third year law student and has not been admitted to the Florida Bar.

To read the press release issued by the American Hotel & Lodging Association, please click on the following : AHLEI PR_TerrorWarningReinforcesNeedVigilanceTraining.pdf

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA, 2011. All rights reserved.

New York’s Highest Court Reinstates $5 Billion Lawsuit By Big Banks Against MBIA

Posted recently at the National Law Review by Michael C. Hefter and Seth M. Cohen of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP news about New York’s highest court reinstating a $5 billion lawsuit brought by a group of banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, against MBIA. 

New York’s highest court yesterday reinstated a $5 billion lawsuit brought by a group of banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, against insurance giant MBIA. ABN AMRO Banket al. v. MBIA Inc., et al.— N.E. 2d –, 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. (June 28, 2011). The Plaintiffs-banks sought to annul MBIA’s 2009 restructuring, which separated the insurer’s municipal bond business from its troubled structured finance unit, on the grounds that the transactions left the insurer incapable of paying insurance claims in violation of New York’s Debtor and Creditor Law. The Superintendent of Insurance in New York approved the transactions that effectuated the split of MBIA’s business in 2009. 

The Court of Appeals’ decision represents a victory for Wall Street banks in one of the many battles being fought in connection with the collapse of the financial markets. Those banks saw their fraudulent transfer claims against MBIA dismissed earlier this year by the Appellate Division, First Department. The intermediate appellate court determined that the banks’ fraudulent transfer claims were a “collateral attack” on the Superintendent’s authorization of the restructuring and that an Article 78 proceeding challenging that authorization was the sole remedy available to the Plaintiffs. The banks’ remedies under Article 78 – a procedure entitling aggrieved parties to challenge agency decisions – would be limited compared to those remedies available in state or federal court under a fraudulent transfer theory. 

At issue for the Court of Appeals was whether the Plaintiffs-banks had the right to challenge the restructuring plan in light of the Superintendent’s approval. Plaintiffs argued that the restructuring was a fraudulent conveyance because MBIA Insurance siphoned approximately $5 billion in cash and securities to a subsidiary for no consideration, thereby leaving the insurer undercapitalized, insolvent and incapable of meeting its obligations under the terms of the respective insurance policies. MBIA countered that, as held by the First Department, Plaintiffs’ claims were impermissible “collateral attacks” on the Superintendant’s approval of the restructuring. 

In a 5-2 decision, the Court of Appeals modified the First Department’s decision and reinstated the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, common law, and creditor claims. In an opinion authored by Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, the Court held that NY Insurance Law does not vest the Superintendent with “broad preemptive power” to block the banks’ claims. MBIA Inc., 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. at 16.

“If the Legislature actually intended the Superintendent to extinguish the historic rights of policyholders to attack fraudulent transactions under the Debtor and Creditor Law or the common law, we would expect to see evidence of such intent within the statute. Here, we find no such intent in the statute.” Id.

Critical to the Court’s holding was that Plaintiffs had no notice or input into the Insurance Department’s decision to approve MBIA’s restructuring. “That the Superintendent complied with lawful administrative procedure, in that the Insurance Law did not impose a requirement that he provide plaintiffs notice before issuing his determination, does not alter our analysis,” Judge Ciparick wrote. “To hold otherwise would infringe upon plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process.” MBIA Inc., 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. at 21. Moreover, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be properly raised and adjudicated in an Article 78 proceeding. Id.

The Court’s decision re-opens claims by multiple financial institutions that MBIA instituted the restructuring in order to leave policyholders without financial recourse. 

The case is ABN AMRO BANK NV. et al., v. MBIA Inc., et al, 601475-2009 (N.Y. State Supreme Court, New York County.)

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Interview with C. David Morris, Senior Counsel International at Northrop Grumman Corporation

Recently postd at the National Law Review by Michele Westergaard of marcus evans an interview with a Senior in house Counsel of Northrop Grumman about FCPA compliance issues: 

With the steady increase in enforcement, organizations need to now move beyond FCPA compliance and embrace a global anti-corruption compliance program. Global companies should assess their existing anti-corruption compliance programs and adjust them to meet potentially more stringent requirements.

C. David Morris, Senior Counsel International at Northrop Grumman Corporation is a speaker at the 6th FCPA & Anti-Corruption Compliance Conference taking place on June 22-24, 2011 in Washington, DC.

Mr. Morris is Senior Counsel in the Northrop Grumman Corporation International Law Department located in Linthicum, MD. His practice focuses on international regulatory compliance and cross-border transactions involving the corporation’s domestic and international businesses and joint ventures. David answered a series of questions on how to enhance FCPA and anti-bribery initiatives to adapt to heightened global anti-corruption enforcement.

What is the importance for companies to conduct regular compliance training for FCPA and foreign anti corruption laws?

DM:  From a legal perspective, the U.S. Government has made it clear through many Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission settlement agreements and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that regular training is an essential component of a corporate compliance program for companies that conduct business with foreign government entities. As such, a company’s history of conducting anti-corruption training can be viewed as either a mitigating or aggravating factor should a company find itself in litigation on a FCPA matter. Likewise, the Guidance to the UK Bribery Act also identifies training as a key component to the corporate defense of having adequate compliance procedures. In this regard, the failure to provide training could be detrimental to the statutory defense. From a business perspective, anti-corruption training is a wise investment as part of a preventative law program.  Regular anti-corruption training helps to reinforce and shape a corporation’s ethical culture and standards of business conduct. When clear policies and expectations are communicated, a culture for ethical behavior becomes engrained throughout the enterprise.    

How can companies not only meet the minimal expectationsforFCPA compliancebut also exceed them?

DM: Two features of a robust compliance program that companies can undertake to achieve top tier status are to conduct benchmarking activities relative to their industry peer companies and to regularly conduct comprehensive internal risk assessments on a periodic basis. Collaboration with outside experts on these activities can be particularly helpful because they can bring an independent perspective to aid in the decision making process. In addition, there are numerous webinars, conferences, and bar association committees that provide useful practice tips and networking opportunities to stay abreast of best practices. Finally, the OECD published guidance in this area last year with their Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance, which is often cited by enforcement authorities as a model for companies to embrace.

What are the effects of non-compliance on share price, organizational reputation etc?

DM:  The effects of a corruption related enforcement action can be devastating on all of a company’s constituencies. For shareholders, it is fairly common to see a company’s market capitalization decline following the announcement of a government investigation or a financial reserve set aside to cover potential fines and penalties. In 2010 alone, there were five settlements with the DOJ and SEC in excess of $100M.  For customers and trading partners, uncertainties about the reliability of a company undergoing an enforcement action can be problematic because of the possibility of suspension, debarment, and/or revocation of export privileges in some cases. For employees, morale can take a hit when they observe their leaders prosecuted for criminal activity. Lastly, the enterprise as a whole can suffer because the lifecycle of a typical enforcement action (investigation, litigation, consent decree, and compliance monitor) can consume management focus for many years.

How can existing anti corruption programs be strengthened to take account of emerging global anti-corruption trends?

DM:  Given the extra-territorial reach of the FCPA, the jurisdictional reach of the UK Bribery Act, and the level of inter-country prosecutorial cooperation, companies need to review their policies, procedures, and internal controls to ensure their anti-corruption compliance program is in lock-step with their corporate footprint. As with any business activity, capital, human, and technological resources need to be deployed where they will be most effective and adjusted as the business evolves. An internal risk assessment and procedural gap review are two features of a healthy continuous improvement program. Lastly, I would add that partnering with Internal Auditors, Country Managers, Ethics Officers, Finance personnel and others with an anti-corruption focus can be a beneficial way to leverage and extend the reach of existing resources.

How best can red flags of possible FCPA violations be identified?

DM:  The FCPA’s accounting and internal controls provisions require companies to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in accordance with management’s authorization and are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets. In addition, there are Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for management to provide a statement of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. As such, procedures and controls should be established for entering into third party commitments, making payments, and cash disbursements to detect red flags which may require additional due diligence. In addition to periodic internal risk assessments and related interviews of key personnel, it is a good practice to provide awareness training on red flags and to require those involved with international transactions to certify if they are aware of red flags or adverse information at milestones throughout a business transaction. The establishment of an anonymous hot line to report ethical concerns is also often cited as a best practice to detect red flags. In terms of identifying red flags of external trading partners, periodic media searches can reveal a wealth of information.  The commercial attaché of the US Embassy of the country in question can also be a valuable red flag identification resource, as well as in-country employees and outside counsel.

© Copyright 2011 marcus evans

 

 

 

Texas Supreme Court Makes Enforcement of Noncompete Agreements Easier for Employers

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP  a good recap of the Texas Supreme Court decision which clarifies the standards for enforcing noncompete agreements: 

On June 24, the Texas Supreme Court issued a long-awaited decision clarifying the standards for enforcement of noncompete agreements under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. In Marsh USA Inc. and Marsh & McLennan Cos. v. Rex Cook, the court considered whether an employee’s receipt of stock options could sustain an agreement that prohibited the employee from soliciting or accepting business from certain customers of Marsh McLennan (Marsh).

Noncompete agreements, which include prohibitions on working for a competitor and limitations on an employee’s ability to solicit customers, are governed in Texas by the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Under that statute, such agreements may be enforced only if they contain reasonable limitations with respect to geography, time, and scope of activity to be prohibited and only if they are “ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement.” Texas courts, as well as practitioners and employers, have struggled with this latter requirement. The Cook case represents a significant change in Texas law and a departure from the Texas Supreme Court’s previous analysis of noncompete agreements.

Under previous court decisions, the analytical focus was on the type of consideration provided by the employer in exchange for the employee’s promise to refrain from competing. Specifically, a Texas employer seeking to enforce a noncompete agreement must have been able to show that the consideration it provided to the employee “gave rise to an interest” in restraining competition. For example, an employer’s promise of trade secrets or confidential information was deemed sufficient consideration to support a noncompete agreement whereas simple cash consideration was not.

In Cook, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether an employer’s grant of stock options satisfied the “ancillary” prong of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Cook joined Marsh in 1983 and signed an agreement under which he could exercise certain stock options in exchange for signing an agreement limiting his ability to solicit or accept business from clients of Marsh with whom he had business dealings during his employment. Cook thus signed the noncompete agreement not when he was provided the original grant of stock options, but rather when he chose to exercise the options.

After his separation from employment with Marsh, Cook went to work for a competitor. He thereafter was sued by Marsh for breach of his contract and for breach of fiduciary duty. Cook filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court on the grounds that the agreement was unenforceable under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. The trial court granted Cook’s motion and an appellate court affirmed that ruling.

The Texas Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, disagreed with the lower courts and reversed the grant of summary judgment. Significantly, the court overruled previous authority that focused on the type of consideration provided by the employer and the assessment of whether or not that consideration “gives rise” to an interest in restraining competition. Rather, the court construed the Texas Business and Commerce Code as requiring simply that there be a nexus between the noncompete agreement and the employer’s interests, holding that the noncompete agreement “must be reasonably related to the [employer’s] interest worthy of protection.” The court emphasized Cook’s high-level executive position with the company and found that, by providing an ownership interest in the company, the stock options provided to Cook were “reasonably related to the company’s interest in protecting its goodwill, a business interest the [Texas Business and Commerce Code] recognizes as worthy of protection.” The noncompete was thus enforceable on that basis.

As a practical matter, Cook should make enforcement of noncompete agreements easier in Texas. The decision represents a shift from the previous, more technical focus on the type of consideration provided in the noncompete agreement to a more generalized assessment of the employer’s interests in restraining competition. Cook follows a trend of other recent Texas Supreme Court cases that have found that the enforcement of noncompete agreements should be decided in the context of the overall purpose of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which is to provide for reasonable restrictions that protect legitimate business interests.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.