Author: National Law Forum

A group of in-house attorneys developed the National Law Review on-line edition to create an easy to use resource to capture legal trends and news as they first start to emerge. We were looking for a better way to organize, vet and easily retrieve all the updates that were being sent to us on a daily basis.In the process, we’ve become one of the highest volume business law websites in the U.S. Today, the National Law Review’s seasoned editors screen and classify breaking news and analysis authored by recognized legal professionals and our own journalists. There is no log in to access the database and new articles are added hourly. The National Law Review revolutionized legal publication in 1888 and this cutting-edge tradition continues today.

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees with HHS Payment Methodology for Disproportionate Share Hospitals

The fight about how Medicare compensates disproportionate share hospitals (“DSH”) is one of the longest-running reimbursement disputes of recent years, and it has generated copious work for judges around the country. In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court settled one piece of the conflict: the counting of “Medicare-entitled” patients in the Medicare fraction of the “disproportionate-patient percentage.” Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 597 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op.). The Supreme Court concluded that the proper calculation, under the statute, counts “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits[,]’ . . . regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments” for certain services. Id. (slip op., at 18) (emphasis added).

DSH payments are made to hospitals with a large low-income patient mix. “The mark-up reflects that low-income individuals are often more expensive to treat than higher income ones, even for the same medical conditions.” Id. (slip op., at 3). The federal government thus gives hospitals a financial boost for treating a “disproportionate share” of the indigent population.

The DHS payment depends on a hospital’s “disproportionate-patient percentage,” which is basically the sum of two fractions: the Medicare fraction, which reflects what portion of the Medicare patients were low-income; and the Medicaid fraction, which reflects what portion of the non-Medicare patients were on Medicaid. Historically, HHS calculated the Medicare fraction by including only patients actually receiving certain Medicare benefits for their care. In 2004, however, HHS changed course and issued a new rule. It counted, in the Medicare fraction, all patients who were eligible for Medicare benefits generally (essentially, over 65 or disabled), even if particular benefits were not actually being paid. For most providers, that change resulted in a pay cut.

The new rule sparked several lawsuits. Hospitals challenged HHS’s policy based on the authorizing statutory language. These hospitals essentially argued in favor of the old methodology. Appeals led to a circuit split, with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits agreeing with HHS, and the Ninth Circuit ruling that HHS had misread the statute.

The Supreme Court has now resolved the issue. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, sided with HHS. The majority concluded that, based on the statutory language, “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits’ are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.” Id. (slip op., at 18). The majority also explained that if “entitlement to benefits” bore the meaning suggested by the hospital, “Medicare beneficiaries would lose important rights and protections . . . [and a] patient could lose his ability to enroll in other Medicare programs whenever he lacked a right to [certain] payments for hospital care.” Id. (slip op., at 11).

Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Alito. The dissent argued that those lacking certain Medicare coverage should be excluded from HHS’s formula, based on “the most fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: Read the statute.” Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2). According to the dissent, the majority’s ruling will also restrict hospitals’ ability to provide care to underprivileged communities. “HHS’s misreading of the statute has significant real-world effects: It financially harms hospitals that serve low-income patients, thereby hamstringing those hospitals’ ability to provide needed care to low-income communities.” Id. (slip op., at 4).

There was one point of agreement among the majority and dissenting justices: the complexity of the statutory language for DSH payments. Echoing the thoughts often held by healthcare advisors, Justice Kagan found the statutory formula to be “a mouthful” and “a lot to digest.” Id. (majority opinion) (slip op., at 4). And in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh called the statute “mind-numbingly complex,” and resorted to an interpretation that he found “straightforward and commonsensical”: that patients cannot be “simultaneously entitled and disentitled” to Medicare benefits. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 3).

Article By Jeffrey DeBeer and Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more Supreme Court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Federal District Court Says Pre-Shift COVID Screening Time Not Compensable

In the first reported decision we’ve seen addressing the issue head on, a federal district court in California dismissed a putative collective action claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking payment for time spent in pre-shift COVID screening.

Prior to clocking in each day, the plaintiff—a non-exempt truck driver whose job duties included loading and transporting automobile parts from a central distribution center to stores throughout southern California—was required to submit to COVID-related health screening conducted on his employer’s premises. During the screening process, a company employee asked the plaintiff a series of questions and took the plaintiff’s temperature. The total time spent in the screening process often exceeded five minutes, which included waiting time.

The plaintiff filed a collective action claim, contending that the time spent by him and other employees participating in the daily screening was compensable under the FLSA.

Starting with the premise that time spent in pre-shift activities is only compensable under the FLSA if it is “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s “principal activities or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform,” the district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the FLSA claims, noting:

A pre-shift COVID screening is not the “principal activity or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). O’Reilly did not hire the employees to undergo health screenings, but instead to load and transport products to stores…. [T]he pre-shift COVID screenings were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ duties because the screening was not an intrinsic element of the loading and transporting of products to the stores. The screenings were not indispensable to the employees’ duties because O’Reilly could eliminate them completely without hindering the employees’ ability to perform their duties…. A pre-shift COVID temperature check and short questions regarding exposure do not share the required nexus with Plaintiff’s duties of retrieving automotive parts and delivering them to auto part stores to make the screening a compensable activity that is integral and indispensable to those activities.

Notably, the court referenced—and then distinguished—the U.S. Department of Labor’s COVID-19 and the Fair Labor Standards Act Questions and Answers, which were issued during the height of the pandemic and which many employers felt were ambiguous on the issue of which COVID-related activities were and weren’t considered “hours worked” under the FLSA:

Unlike the nurse in the DOL example whose principal job duty is to keep patients healthy and has direct patient contact, Plaintiff’s principal activities consisted of manual labor and transportation of auto parts to stores.

We examined those agency Q&As—and the broader issues around compensability of time spent in vaccination, testing, and screening activities—in an earlier blog.

The decision is Pipich v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022).

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Medical Marijuana, Workers’ Compensation, and the CSA: Hazy Outlook for Employers As States Wrestle With Cannabis Reimbursement as a Reasonable Medical Expense

While each state has its own unique workers’ compensation program, workers’ compensation generally requires employers to reimburse the reasonable medical expenses of employees who are injured at work. Depending on the injury, these expenses can include hospital visits, follow-up appointments, physical therapy, surgeries, and medication, among other medical care. In recent years, medical cannabis has become increasingly common to treat a myriad of ailments—as of February 2022, 37 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories now allow the use of medical cannabis.

While that is good news for patients seeking treatment for issues like chronic pain, medical cannabis laws can cause a major headache for employers. The federal law known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies cannabis as a Schedule I substance, meaning that under federal law, it is not currently authorized for medical treatment anywhere in the United States and is not considered safe for use even under medical supervision. So, what happens when an employee is injured at work, is eligible for workers’ compensation, and is prescribed medical cannabis to treat their work-related injury in a state that authorizes medical cannabis?

Employers are faced with a tricky dilemma: They can reimburse the employee’s medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense and risk violating the federal prohibition against aiding and abetting the possession of cannabis. Or, they can refuse to reimburse the otherwise reasonable medical expense and risk violating the state’s workers’ compensation law.

Usually, where it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal law, federal law wins—a legal concept called conflict preemption. Unfortunately for employers, however, clarity on this issue will have to wait—the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined two requests to review state supreme court cases on this issue and definitively decide whether the CSA preempts state workers’ compensation laws that require reimbursement of medical cannabis. In the absence of federal guidance, national employers with workers in different states must follow the decisions of the handful of state courts that have taken up the question. The state courts who have decided the issue have come to inconsistent conclusions—thus, whether an employer should reimburse medical cannabis will vary depending on the state where the employee is injured.

For example, in Maine and Minnesota, both states’ highest courts have concluded that employers are not required to pay for their injured employees’ medical cannabis. These courts reasoned that employers would face liability under the CSA for aiding and abetting the purchase of a controlled substance. The employer, if reimbursing employees for using medical cannabis, would knowingly subsidize the employee’s purchase of marijuana in direct violation of federal law. However, in such a case, the employer would also violate state law for refusing to reimburse the employee’s reasonable medical expenses. Deeming it impossible for the employer to comply with both laws, these states’ courts concluded that the federal prohibition on cannabis preempts the state workers’ compensation laws.

States such as New Jersey have gone the other way, requiring employers to reimburse employee’s medical cannabis. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict between the prohibitions of the CSA and the demands of the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. Thus, the federal law did not preempt New Jersey’s state law, and employers were required to comply by reimbursing medical cannabis as a reasonable reimbursement.

Meanwhile, Massachusetts followed Maine and Minnesota’s approach, but did so based on its own medical marijuana statute, not the CSA. The Massachusetts law explicitly exempts health insurance providers or any government agency or authority from the reimbursement requirement because doing so violates federal law.

Given this patchwork of state decisions, employers should be cautious in determining whether to approve or deny medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense under state workers’ compensation laws. While the answer is relatively clear (for now) in the states discussed above, there are still over 30 states with medical cannabis programs that have not addressed this issue. It is important to note that many state medical cannabis laws include provisions like Massachusetts that exempt employers from reimbursing employees for cannabis—a clear indicator that these laws were designed with federal prohibitions in mind. But these provisions are not necessarily determinative—New Jersey’s medical cannabis law has a similar provision, yet New Jersey employers are still required to reimburse for medical cannabis.

The bottom line is that federal CSA violations can be hefty, including a mandatory $1,000 fine, possible incarceration of up to one year, and possibly more if “aggravating factors” are found, such as prior convictions. Employers should therefore pay careful attention to their respective state medical cannabis laws, workers’ compensation laws, as well as the CSA and consult with counsel to determine the best approach in their particular jurisdiction. It is likely that more of these cases will be brought in the future, so be sure to check back for further developments in this evolving area of law.

Article By Amanda C. Hibbler of Foley & Lardner LLP. This article was prepared with the assistance of 2022 summer associate Zack Sikora.

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Nonbinary Pronoun Usage in the Workplace: What Employers Are Doing to Promote Inclusivity

Using the correct pronouns and honorifics in the workplace has become an increasingly important part of maintaining an inclusive workplace. At the same time, the sensitive nature of this trend and the many variations of pronouns and honorifics in use may leave employers confused as to how to accomplish that goal. Moreover, employers may be concerned with how to comply with employees’ requests in an ever-evolving space and with the increasing use of nonbinary pronouns.

Nonbinary Pronouns and Honorifics

Individuals have traditionally identified with binary sets of pronouns based on male and female gender expressions (i.e. he/him/his and she/her/hers). Increasingly, many individuals are expressing that they do not identify as either a “man” or “woman.” An estimated 11 percent of individuals who identity as LGBTQ in the United States (i.e., approximately 1.2 million people), identity as nonbinary, according to a recent study. The vast majority (76 percent) are between the ages of 18 and 29, the study found.

It is increasingly common for these individuals to go by gender-neutral, nonbinary pronouns, including they/them/theirs. Many others go by other nonbinary pronouns, such as ze (or zie)/zir/zirs; ne/nir/nirs; xe/xem/xir; and ve/ver/vis, or a growing set of nonbinary pronouns that are resurfacing or newly appearing within the U.S. vernacular. Similarly, honorifics, such as Mr., Miss, Mrs., Ms., Sir, and Madame reflect a binary gender view leading some individuals to go by “Mx.,” “Fren,” or another gender-neutral honorific.

The issue has particular significance for employers since the June 2020 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which found that discrimination against gay and transgender individuals is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The high court reasoned that an adverse action against an individual because the individual is gay or transgender is a form of discrimination based on sex “because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” However, the Court left open several questions on how the ruling applies to sex-segregated restrooms, dress codes, grooming standards, and pronouns.

Following the decision, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued new guidance on June 15, 2021, taking the position that “intentionally and repeatedly using the wrong name and pronouns to refer to a transgender employee could contribute to an unlawful hostile work environment” in violation of Title VII. This suggests there could be potential liability for employers who refuse to use a nonbinary employee’s correct pronouns. Further, while Title VII does not cover every employee in the United States, many state and local laws, such as California’s Fair Employment and Housing Council’s regulations and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), provide similar or greater protection from gender identity discrimination.

Best Practices

It is increasingly becoming a commonplace practice for companies to permit employees to include their pronouns in their email signatures or on their social media profiles. This trend might just be the start. In light of the evolving movements in these areas, some employers may be struggling with how to support nonbinary individuals in their workplaces.

Safe Spaces

Some employers will take the stance that it is important to provide safe spaces for employees to identify their pronouns without pressure or the worry of retaliation in order to maintain an inclusive environment. Employers may further want to consider additional training for supervisors and other employees on how to handle everyday interactions regarding pronoun use. For example, employers may want to encourage employees to be comfortable with apologizing and correcting themselves if the wrong pronoun is used. This may be an especially important subject if an employee had started at the company using one set of pronouns and later realizes a different gender identity during the course of employment. A diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) committee or diversity liaisons can guide employers in facilitating these conversations.

Privacy Concerns

At the same time, employers are faced with the tension of ensuring respect for each individual’s privacy. In this regard, employers may want to be conscious that individuals generally will not want to be into a situation in which they must choose between using a nonbinary pronoun or facing inappropriate questions about their choice from management or co-workers. It may be necessary to keep pronoun sharing optional and to encourage employees to default to gender-neutral language where possible.

Gender-Neutral Corporate Communications and Record-Keeping

The Biden Administration, in March 2022, announced a series of federal government policy changes to allow U.S. citizens to identify as nonbinary, including allowing U.S. citizens to select an “X” gender marker on their U.S. passport applications. In accordance, the EEOC also announced that it would provide the option to use a nonbinary gender marker in the filing of a charge of discrimination. Several states have further allowed the use of a gender-neutral marker on state identity documents, including drivers’ licenses. Given these developments, employers may also want to consider using gender-neutral language in communications and updating their human resources demographic record-keeping procedures to allow for employees to be identified as nonbinary or with a gender-neutral marker.

Key Takeaways

The Bostock decisions and the proliferation of state and local anti-discrimination laws may require that employers make efforts to allow employees to share and be addressed by nonbinary pronouns. This could be critical in employer recruiting and retention with younger generations entering the workplace that are increasingly comfortable with expressing their nonbinary gender. Also, it is clear that accurate or appropriate pronouns and honorifics will continue to change. Employers may want to remain ready to adjust in this rapidly evolving space in order to provide inclusive environments and keep workplaces free of harassment and discrimination.

Companies seeking to create more inclusive workplaces for nonbinary individuals can find further information and guidance from a number of organizations that provide educational resources and technical assistance.

Article By Kelly S. Hughes, Alan J. Brozovich, and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Are You Being Served? Court Authorizes Service of Process Via Airdrop

In what may be the first of its kind, a New York state court has authorized service via token airdrop in a case regarding allegedly stolen cryptocurrency assets. This form of alternative service is novel but could become a more routine practice in an industry where the identities of potential parties to litigation may be difficult to ascertain using blockchain data alone.

Background on the Dispute

According to the Complaint in the case, the plaintiff LCX AG (“LCX”) is a Liechtenstein based virtual currency exchange. As alleged in the Complaint, on or about January 8, 2022, the unknown defendants (named in the Complaint as John Does 1-25) illegitimately gained access to LCX’s cryptocurrency wallet and transferred $7.94 million worth of digital assets out of LCX’s control. Cryptocurrency wallets are similar in many ways to bank accounts, in that they can be used to hold and transfer assets. In the same way a thief can transfer funds from a bank account if they gain access to that account, thieves can also transfer cryptocurrency assets if they gain access to the keys to the wallet holding digital assets.

Following the alleged theft, LCX and its third-party consulting firm determined that the suspected thieves used “Tornado Cash,” which is a “mixing” service designed to hide transactions on an otherwise publicly available blockchain ledger by using complicated transfers between unrelated wallets. While Tornado Cash and other mixing services have legal purposes such as preserving the anonymity of parties to legitimate transactions, they are also utilized by criminals to launder digital funds in an illicit manner.

Even the use of these mixing services, however, can often also be unwound. This is especially true in transactions of large amounts of cryptocurrency, similar to how transactions utilizing complex money laundering schemes in the international banking system can be unwound. According to the blockchain data platform Chainalysis, although Illicit crypto transactions reached an all-time high of $14 billion in 2021, these suspected nefarious transactions accounted for 0.15% of crypto volume last year, down from 0.62% in 2020.

While the Complaint alleges the suspected thieves used Tornado Cash, LCX believes its hired consultants were able to unwind those mixing services to identify a wallet which is alleged to still hold $1.274 million of the allegedly stolen assets.

Unlike bank accounts which have associated identifying information, there are often no registered addresses or other identifying information connected to digital wallets. This makes it difficult to provide the actual proof of service required to institute an action or obtain a judgement against an individual where the only known information is their digital wallet addresses. Service via token airdrop into those wallet addresses solves that issue.

Service Via Airdrop

Service of lawsuits is traditionally made on the defendant personally at a home or business address via special process servers. In cases where service on the individual is not possible for some reason, many states authorize alternative means of service if the plaintiff can show that the alternative means of service likely to provide actual notice of the litigation to the defendant. For example, courts have historically allowed notice via newspaper publication as an alternative means of service where the defendant cannot be serviced personally.

Here, the Court permitted service via “airdrop” in which a digital token is placed in a specific cryptocurrency wallet, similar to how a direct deposit can place funds in a traditional bank account. This particular token contained a hyperlink to the associated court filings in the case, and a mechanism which allowed the data of any individual who clicked on the hyperlink to be tracked. While this is a novel way to serve notice of a lawsuit, similar airdrops have been used to communicate with the owners of otherwise anonymous cryptocurrency wallet owners. Such was the case recently when actor Seth Green had his Bored Ape non-fungible token (“NFT”) stolen and the unknowing buyer of the stolen NFT was otherwise difficult to locate.

While this type of digital service is new, it could be implemented in many disputes in the future regarding digital assets. Similar to the authorization of service that was seen recently in the Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Act litigation (where notice was served on potential class members via email and directly on the Facebook platform), service via airdrop may be the most efficient way to inform potential lawsuit participants of the pending dispute and how they can protect their rights in that dispute.

This type of airdropped service is not without issues, though. First, transactions on the blockchain are largely publicly available, meaning any individual with the wallet address would also be able to see service of the lawsuit notice. Additionally, many users are hesitant to click on unknown links (such as the one in the airdropped LCX) due to legitimate cybersecurity concerns.

While service via airdropped token is unlikely to replace traditional methods of service, it may be a useful means of serving process on unknown persons where there is a digital wallet linked to the acts which the applicable lawsuit relates.

Article By Bryan M. Westhoff, Daniel L. McAvoy, and Jonathan E. Schmalfeld of Polsinelli PC

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification Order Because Liability Issues, Not Merely Damages, Were Individualized

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed an issue that tends to arise frequently in class certification motion practice: how trial courts should apply the predominance requirement where appellate decisions have said that the need to calculate individualized damages generally is not sufficient on its own to defeat class certification, but some putative class members likely have no damages. On these types of issues, plaintiffs often try to characterize defendants’ arguments in opposition to class certification as raising mere “damages issues” that can be addressed individually at the end of a class case, and defendants often respond that the issues they raise go to liability, not merely damages, and in any event the damages trials would be too complicated and impractical. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that if determining liability requires highly individualized inquiries, a class should not be certified, and any individualized damages trials would have to be feasible.

In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., Nos. 18-16303, 18-17275, — F.4th –, 2022 WL 2433971 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022), the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to perform preservation services on properties being foreclosed on. They claimed that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors under California law, and therefore should have been paid overtime and reimbursed for business expenses. The district court certified a class, decided certain issues on partial summary judgment in favor of the class, and left for a later damages trial whether a class member worked overtime (and to what extent) and whether the class member was entitled to reimbursement for business expenses (and the amount thereof).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the class certification order. It explained that “We need not decide whether common evidence can prove that [defendant] has a uniform policy of misclassifying its vendors” because “[defendant’s] liability to any class member for failing to pay them overtime wages or to reimburse their business expenses would require highly individualized inquiries on whether that particular class member ever worked overtime or ever incurred any ‘necessary’ business expenses.” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs had “mischaracterize[d] an issue of individualized liability as an issue of individualized damages.” (Emphasis in original.) The Ninth Circuit explained that if the question involves the existence of damages, that is a liability issue, not a damages issue.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, under its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that damages were “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” because they could not “show that the whole class suffered damages traceable to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors,” even if the amounts of those damages would need to be proven individually. In addition, determining damages would require “excessive difficulty” because there was little documentary evidence, and “using the individual testimony of self-interested class members to calculate the overtime hours they worked and the business expenses they incurred isn’t easy.” In a bellwether trial conducted by the district court, eight trial days had been required to determine damages for a sample of only eleven class members.

This decision helpfully clarifies the perennial debate between what constitutes a “damages” issue versus a “liability” issue. As I’ve often written on this blog, it can be helpful to think about the class certification analysis by analyzing how the named plaintiffs’ or putative class members’ claims would be tried in an ordinary individual case, and what evidence the defendant would be entitled to introduce. Here, the bellwether trial helped the Ninth Circuit determine that this case could not be litigated on a class basis.

Article By Wystan M. Ackerman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

District Court Rules Most Plaintiffs in Case Do Not Have Standing to Block Florida Stop W.O.K.E. Act

There are two key cases pending before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on Florida’s “Stop W.O.K.E. Act”: the Falls, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00166) and the Honeyfund.com, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00227). The Northern District of Florida has issued its first order on the Act, which went into effect on July 1, 2022.

In an Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, in Part, in the Falls matter, the court concluded that the K-12 teachers, the soon-to-be kindergartner, and the diversity and inclusion consultant who sued Governor Ron DeSantis and other officials to block the Stop W.O.K.E. Act did not have standing to pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The court reserved ruling pending additional briefing on the question of whether the college professor, who also sued, has standing.

Stop W.O.K.E. Act

The Stop W.O.K.E. Act expands an employer’s civil liability for discriminatory employment practices under the Florida Civil Rights Act if the employer endorses certain concepts in a “nonobjective manner” during training or other required activity that is a condition of employment.

Court Order

In the Falls case, a diverse group of plaintiffs claiming they were regulated by the Stop W.O.K.E. Act filed a lawsuit challenging the Act on the grounds that it violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to free expression, academic freedom, and to access information.

The court, however, did not reach the question of constitutionality. It also did not determine whether the case can move forward, an issue that will be decided when the court rules on the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss.

Instead, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on the threshold question of standing. It found the plaintiffs (other than the college professor) did not show they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to DeSantis or another defendant that can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling.

The court found the consultant is not an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act. Therefore, she could not assert standing on that basis. Instead, she argued she has third-party standing to assert the rights of the employers who would otherwise hire her, and she is harmed by the Act because employers will no longer hire her. The court rejected both theories, finding the consultant-employer relationship is not sufficiently “close” to create standing; employers are not hindered in raising their First Amendment rights on their own; and, based on the evidence presented, the court could not reasonably infer that the consultant has lost or will lose business because of the Act.

Importantly, the court specifically held that it was not ruling on the legality of the Act, whether it was moral, or whether it constituted good policy.

Private Employer

The court highlighted that the sister case pending in the Northern District of Florida (Honeyfund.com) involves a private employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In that case, the plaintiffs allege the Stop W.O.K.E. Act violates their right to free speech by restricting training topics and their due process rights by being unconstitutionally vague. Honeyfund.com, Inc. and its co-plaintiffs request that the court enjoin enforcement of the law. The case has been transferred to District Court Judge Mark Walker. The Honeyfund.com case will likely have the largest effect on Florida employers and questions surrounding the enforceability of the Act as to diversity and inclusion training.

***

Since the Stop W.O.K.E. Act took effect, employers are understandably unclear how to proceed with training. Employers should continue to train their employees, but review their training programs on diversity, inclusion, bias, equal employment opportunity, and harassment prevention through the lens of the new law. Employers should also ensure they train the trainers who are conducting these important programs. Finally, employers should understand potential risks associated with disciplining or discharging employees who refuse to participate in mandatory training programs, even if employers do not consider the programs to violate the new law.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris, Samia M. Kirmani, Amanda Simpson, and Lindsay Dennis Swiger of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

**The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine**

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions?

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

Article By J. Michael Showalter, Samuel A. Rasche, and Rachael A. Bryan of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

EPA’s Spring 2022 Unified Agenda Includes Proposed and Final TSCA and TRI Rules

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) spring 2022 Unified Agenda, published on June 21, 2022, includes the following rulemakings under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) or the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).

Proposed Rule Stage

Tiered Data Reporting to Inform Prioritization, Risk Evaluation, and Risk Management under TSCA (2070-AK62): EPA is developing a rulemaking under TSCA Sections 8(a) and (d) to establish reporting requirements based upon a chemical’s status in the Risk Evaluation/Risk Management (RE/RM) Lifecycle and update the reporting requirements under the 40 C.F.R. Part 711 Chemical Data Reporting (CDR) regulation. Specifically, EPA is seeking occupational, environmental, and consumer exposure information. EPA is developing this rule to obtain information about potential hazards and exposure pathways related to certain chemicals, particularly occupational, environmental, and consumer exposure information. According to the Unified Agenda item, EPA needs this information to inform prioritization, risk evaluation, and risk management of chemical substances under TSCA Section 6. EPA intends to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in May 2023 and a final rule in September 2024. More information on EPA’s July 27, 2021, webinar on development of the proposed rule is available in our July 29, 2021, memorandum.
Revisions to the TSCA Fees Rule (2070-AK64): In January 2021, EPA proposed updates and adjustments to the 2018 TSCA fees rule. EPA proposed modifications to the TSCA fees and fee categories for fiscal years (FY) 2022, 2023, and 2024 and explained the methodology by which the proposed TSCA fees were determined. EPA proposed to add three new fee categories: A Bona Fide Intent to Manufacture or Import Notice, a Notice of Commencement of Manufacture or Import, and an additional fee associated with test orders. In addition, EPA proposed exemptions for entities subject to certain fee-triggering activities, including an exemption for research and development (R&D) activities; an exemption for entities manufacturing less than 2,500 pounds of a chemical subject to an EPA-initiated risk evaluation fee; an exemption for manufacturers of chemical substances produced as a non-isolated intermediate; and exemptions for manufacturers of a chemical substance subject to an EPA-initiated risk evaluation if the chemical substance is imported in an article, produced as a byproduct, or produced or imported as an impurity. EPA updated its cost estimates for administering TSCA, relevant information management activities, and individual fee calculation methodologies. EPA proposed a volume-based fee allocation for EPA-initiated risk evaluation fees in any scenario where a consortium is not formed and is proposing to require export-only manufacturers to pay fees for EPA-initiated risk evaluations. EPA also proposed various changes to the timing of certain activities required throughout the fee payment process. In light of public comments, EPA states that it has decided to issue a supplemental NPRM in October 2022 and seek additional public comment on changes to the January 2021 proposal. More information on the proposed rule is available in our December 30, 2020, memorandum.
New Chemicals Procedural Regulations to Reflect the 2016 Amendments to TSCA (2070-AK65): On June 22, 2016, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (Lautenberg Act) was signed into law, amending TSCA and impacting how EPA reviews and makes determinations on new chemical notices under TSCA Section 5. EPA states that as a result of these increased responsibilities, it has become more challenging to complete reviews within 90 days. This rulemaking seeks to revise the new chemicals procedural regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 720 to improve the efficiency of EPA’s review process and to align its processes and procedures with the new statutory requirements. This rulemaking seeks to increase the quality of information initially submitted in new chemicals notices and improve EPA’s processes to reduce unnecessary rework in the risk assessment and, ultimately, the length of time that new chemicals are under review. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023.
Confidential Business Information (CBI) Claims under TSCA (2070-AK68): EPA is considering proposing new and amended rules concerning the assertion and maintenance of claims of CBI under TSCA. Amendments to TSCA in 2016 included several new provisions concerning the assertion and EPA review and treatment of confidentiality claims. EPA states that it is considering procedures for submitting and supporting such claims in TSCA submissions, including substantiation requirements, exemptions, electronic reporting enhancements, and maintenance or withdrawal of confidentiality claims. EPA is also considering whether the proposed rule should also elaborate on EPA’s procedures for reviewing and communicating with TSCA submitters about confidentiality claims. EPA expects the proposed rule to include new provisions, as well as revisions to existing rules on asserting confidentiality claims to conform to the 2016 amendments to TSCA. As reported in our May 17 and May 18, 2022, memoranda, EPA issued a proposed rule on May 12, 2022. EPA intends to issue a final rule in May 2023.
Chemical-Specific Rulemakings under TSCA Section 6(a): TSCA Section 6 requires EPA to address unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment that the Administrator has determined are presented by a chemical substance under the conditions of use. Following risk evaluations for the following chemicals carried out under the authority of TSCA Section 6, EPA initiated rulemakings to address unreasonable risks of injury to health identified in the final risk evaluations:
- Methylene Chloride (2070-AK70): EPA’s risk evaluation for methylene chloride, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0437, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0742. EPA intends to issue an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for methylene chloride will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
- 1-Bromopropane (2070-AK73): EPA’s risk evaluation for 1-bromopropane, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0235, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0741. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in May 2023 and a final rule in August 2024;
- Carbon Tetrachloride (2070-AK82): EPA’s risk evaluation, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0499, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0733. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in April 2023 and a final rule in August 2024;
- Trichloroethylene (TCE) (2070-AK83): EPA’s risk evaluation for TCE, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0500, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0737. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in March 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for TCE will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
- Perchloroethylene (PCE) (2070-AK84): EPA’s risk evaluation for PCE, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0502, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0732. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for PCE will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
- N-Methylpyrrolidone (NMP) (2070-AK85): EPA’s risk evaluation for NMP, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0236, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0743. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in May 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for NMP will be available in a forthcoming memorandum; and
- Asbestos (Part 1: Chrysotile Asbestos) (2070-AK86): EPA’s risk evaluation for chrysotile asbestos, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0501, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0736. More information on EPA’s proposed rule to prohibit ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos is available in our April 7, 2022, memorandum. EPA intends to publish a final rule in November 2023.
Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation under TSCA (2070-AK90): As required under TSCA Section 6(b)(4), EPA published a final rule on July 20, 2017, that established a process for conducting risk evaluations to determine whether a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, without consideration of costs or other non-risk factors, including an unreasonable risk to a potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulation, under the conditions of use. This process incorporates the science requirements of the amended statute, including best available science and weight of the scientific evidence. The final rule established the steps of a risk evaluation process, including: scope, hazard assessment, exposure assessment, risk characterization, and risk determination. EPA states that it is now considering revisions to that final rule and will solicit public comment through an NPRM. EPA intends to publish the NPRM in September 2022. More information on EPA’s 2017 rule is available in our June 26, 2017, memorandum.
Asbestos; Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements under TSCA (2070-AK99): This rulemaking, under the authority of TSCA Section 8(a), would require certain persons that manufactured (including imported) or processed asbestos and asbestos-containing articles (including as an impurity) to report certain exposure-related information, including quantities of asbestos and asbestos-containing articles manufactured (including imported) or processed, types of asbestos used, and employee data. Reported information would be used by EPA and other federal agencies in considering the regulation of asbestos. EPA notes that this rulemaking is the result of a settlement agreement stemming from litigation pursuant to TSCA Section 21. See Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization v. EPA, No. 19-CV-00871; State of California et al. v. EPA, No. 19-CV-03807. More information on EPA’s proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements is available in our May 6, 2022, memorandum. EPA intends to publish a final rule in November 2022.
Other Chemical Substances Undergoing TSCA Section 6 Risk Evaluation; Significant New Use Rule (SNUR) for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL05): EPA is developing TSCA Section 5(a)(2) SNURs on conditions of use identified as not currently ongoing in the final scope documents for the high-priority substances undergoing TSCA Section 6 risk evaluations. EPA states that it will use the SNURs to require notice to EPA before chemical substances and mixtures are used in new ways that might create concerns. Persons subject to a SNUR who intend to manufacture (including import) or process the chemical substance for the significant new use must notify EPA at least 90 days prior to initiating activities via a significant new use notice (SNUN). EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in May 2024.
The Unified Agenda includes the following chemical-specific SNURs for certain non-ongoing uses:
- Phthalates; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL06): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in November 2022 and a final rule in May 2024;
- Flame Retardants; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL07): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in November 2023; and
- Certain Solvents; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL08): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in May 2024.
Inactive Inventory Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) SNUR (2070-AL10): EPA is developing a SNUR under TSCA Section 5(a)(2) for certain uses of Inactive Inventory PFAS. Persons subject to the Inactive Inventory PFAS SNUR would be required to notify EPA at least 90 days before commencing manufacture or processing for any use that EPA has determined is a significant new use. The required notifications would initiate EPA’s evaluation of the intended use within the applicable review period. Manufacture and processing for the significant new use would be unable to commence until EPA has conducted a review of the notice, made an appropriate determination on the notice, and taken such actions as are required in association with that determination. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in September 2022 and a final rule in June 2023.
TRI; Response to Petition to Add Diisononyl Phthalate (DINP) to the TRI List of Toxic Chemicals (2025-AA17): According to EPA, this action arises from a petition received by EPA to add DINP to the list of toxic chemicals reportable under Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA). In response to the petition, EPA initiated a rulemaking on September 5, 2000, proposing to add DINP to the TRI list. On June 14, 2005, EPA issued a notice of data availability seeking comments on EPA’s revised hazard assessment for DINP in further support of EPA’s proposal to add DINP to the TRI list. EPA states that the addition of DINP to the TRI list would make it subject to all the reporting requirements under the Toxic Chemical Release Reporting Rule. EPA intends to publish a supplemental NPRM in July 2022 and a final rule in May 2023;
Changes to Reporting Requirements for PFAS; Community Right-to-Know Toxic Chemical Release Reporting (2070-AK97): EPA is developing a proposal to add PFAS subject to reporting under EPCRA Section 313 and Section 6607 of the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) to the list of Lower Thresholds for Chemicals of Special Concern (Chemicals of Special Concern). EPA states that the addition of the PFAS to the Chemicals of Special Concern list will eliminate the use of the de minimis exemption, eliminate the option to use Form A, and limit the use of range reporting. In addition, EPA is proposing to eliminate the use of the de minimis exemption under the Supplier Notification Requirements for facilities that manufacture or process all chemicals included on the Chemicals of Special Concern list. According to EPA, Chemicals of Special Concern may be found in products below de minimis levels; this is especially true for PFAS that are used at low concentrations in many products. Because of the widespread use of PFAS and their (or their degradants) persistence in the environment, however, even concentrations below de minimis levels can contribute significantly to environmental loading. The elimination of the de minimis exemption for supplier notification purposes will help facilities to identify potential sources of PFAS and other Chemicals of Special Concern. EPA believes that the elimination of the de minimis exemption under the Supplier Notification Requirements for PFAS and other Chemicals of Special Concern will result in a more complete picture of the releases and waste management quantities for these chemicals. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in September 2022 and a final rule in November 2023.
Addition of Certain PFAS to the TRI (2070-AL03): EPA is developing a rulemaking to add certain PFAS to the list of chemicals reportable under EPCRA Section 313. EPA states that the addition of these PFAS is in direct response to a statutory mandate under Section 7321(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA). Under Section 7321(d), EPA was required to evaluate whether certain specific PFAS meet the EPCRA Section 313 listing criteria by December 2021 and is required to add any PFAS that EPA determines meet the listing criteria by December 2023. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in November 2023.
Community Right-to-Know; Adopting 2022 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Codes for TRI Reporting (2070-AL09): EPA is developing a proposed rule to incorporate the revised 2022 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for TRI reporting purposes. According to EPA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) updates the NAICS codes every five years. OMB approved the 2022 NAICS codes on December 21, 2021 (86 Fed. Reg. 72277), with an effective date of January 1, 2022. EPA currently uses 2017 NAICS codes, and with this proposed rule would implement the 2022 codes for TRI Reporting Year 2022. Facilities reporting to the TRI would be required to use 2022 NAICS codes on reports that are due to EPA by July 1, 2023. This rule also proposed to update the C.F.R. to clarify the scope of facilities required to report to the TRI. According to EPA, the actual data required by a TRI form would not change as a result of this rulemaking, nor would the rule affect the universe of TRI reporting facilities that are required to submit reports to EPA under EPCRA Section 313. EPA intended to publish an NPRM in June 2022 and a final rule in November 2022.

Final Rule Stage

Significant New Uses of Chemical Substances; Updates to the Hazard Communication Program and Regulatory Framework; Minor Amendments to Reporting Requirements for Premanufacture Notices (PMN) (2070-AJ94): In 2016, EPA proposed changes to the existing regulations governing significant new uses of chemical substances under TSCA (40 C.F.R. Part 721, specifically “Protection in the Workplace” (40 C.F.R. Section 721.63) and “Hazard Communication Program” (40 C.F.R. Section 721.72)) to align these regulations with revisions to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Hazard Communications Standard (HCS) (29 C.F.R. Section 1910.1200), which are proposed to be cross referenced, and with changes to the OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) respirator certification requirements pertaining to respiratory protection of workers from exposure to chemicals. EPA also proposed changes to the significant new uses of chemical substance regulations based on issues that have been identified by EPA and issues raised by public commenters for SNURs previously proposed and issued under these regulations. Additionally, EPA proposed a minor change to reporting requirements for PMNs and other TSCA Section 5 notices. EPA states that it expects these changes to have minimal impacts on the costs and burdens of complying, while updating the significant new use reporting requirements to assist in addressing any potential effects to human health and the environment. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is planning to issue a final rule. EPA intends to issue a final rule in October 2022. More information on the proposed rule is available in our July 29, 2016, memorandum.
Reporting and Recordkeeping for PFAS under TSCA Section 8(a)(7) (2070-AK67): EPA published a proposed rule on June 28, 2021, addressing reporting and recordkeeping requirements for PFAS under TSCA Section 8(a)(7). In accordance with obligations under TSCA Section 8(a), as amended by NDAA Section 7351, persons that manufacture (including import) or have manufactured these chemical substances in any year since January 1, 2011, would be subject to the reporting and recordkeeping requirements. In addition to fulfilling statutory obligations under TSCA, EPA states that it expects that the proposed rule would enable it to characterize better the sources and quantities of manufactured PFAS in the United States. EPA intends to publish a final rule in December 2022. More information on EPA’s proposed rule is available in our June 11, 2021, memorandum.
TRI; Response to Petition from the Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) to Add 25 Chemicals (2070-AK26): The Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) submitted a petition under EPCRA Section 313(e)(1) to add 25 chemicals to the EPCRA Section 313 list of toxic chemicals subject to reporting under the TRI. Three of the 25 chemicals were added to the EPCRA Section 313 list through actions unrelated to the petition. EPA states that it evaluated the remaining 22 chemicals to determine if they met the listing criteria of EPCRA Section 313(d)(2). EPA proposed the addition of 12 of the 22 chemicals that were determined to meet the EPCRA Section 313(d)(2) criteria and for which reports were expected to be filed. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is planning to issue a final rule. EPA intends to issue a final rule in November 2022.
Parent Company Definition for TRI Reporting (2070-AK42): In 2021, EPA proposed to codify the definition of “parent company” for purposes of reporting to the TRI. Although the existing regulation requires facilities reporting to the TRI to identify their parent company in annual reporting forms, no codified definition of this data element exists. Among the facilities reporting to the TRI are those with complicated corporate ownership structures. As such, effort is required each year by reporting facilities and EPA to clarify how the parent company data element should be represented on the form. According to EPA, a codified definition of parent company would allow EPA to address various corporate ownership scenarios explicitly and reduce the reporting burden caused by regulatory uncertainty. EPA states that the proposed rule would clarify existing regulations to reporting facilities and add a foreign parent company data element, if applicable, while improving EPA’s data quality. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is determining next steps. EPA intends to publish a final rule in October 2022.
NDAA Mandated Addition of Certain PFAS to the TRI for Reporting Year 2022 (2070-AL04): According to EPA, NDAA Section 7321 provides a framework for PFAS to be added automatically to the TRI list on January 1 of the year following certain EPA actions. In December 2021, EPA announced the statutory addition of the PFAS chemicals covered by the NDAA to the list of chemical substances subject to reporting for the TRI. This regulatory action amends the EPCRA regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 372 to reflect this statutory addition. EPA intended to publish a final rule in June 2022.

Article By Lynn L. Bergeson and Carla N. Hutton of Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

For more environmental law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

EEOC Sanctions Employer for GINA Violations Relating to Collection of Employees’ Family Members’ COVID Test Results

On July 6, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced it has entered into a conciliation agreement with a Florida-based medical practice for violations of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) arising out of the practice’s collection of employees’ family members’ COVID-19 testing results.

In a press release announcing the agreement, the EEOC stated that, following an investigation, it found that the medical practice – Brandon Dermatology – violated GINA by requesting the test results of employees’ family members and that “[s]uch conduct violates the GINA, which prohibits employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information about applicants or employees and their family members, except in very narrow circumstances which do not apply in this matter.” GINA defines “genetic information” to include “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an employee’s family members.”

While the press release includes limited details on the matter, the EEOC noted that “[i]n addition to compensating affected employees through restoration of leave time or back pay, as well as compensatory damages, the conciliation agreement resolving the charge requires Brandon Dermatology to review its COVID-19 policies; conduct training on EEO laws as they pertain to COVID-19; and post a notice.”

In its technical assistance guidance relating to COVID-19, the EEOC states that GINA “prohibits employers from asking employees medical questions about family members” including asking an employee who is physically coming into the workplace whether they have family members who have COVID-19 or symptoms associated with COVID-19. However, the guidance goes on to state that “GINA . . . does not prohibit an employer from asking employees whether they have had contact with anyone diagnosed with COVID-19 or who may have symptoms associated with the disease.” It also notes that “from a public health perspective, only asking about an employee’s contact with family members would unnecessarily limit the information obtained about an employee’s potential exposure to COVID-19.”

Article By Evandro C Gigante and Laura M. Fant of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Author: National Law Forum

Federal District Court Says Pre-Shift COVID Screening Time Not Compensable

Like this:

Medical Marijuana, Workers’ Compensation, and the CSA: Hazy Outlook for Employers As States Wrestle With Cannabis Reimbursement as a Reasonable Medical Expense

Like this: