Tag: California

Cannabis and District Courts: Are Those Courthouse Doors Closed Too?

We have written many times over the past few years about how the bankruptcy courts are off-limits to state-legalized cannabis businesses.  This past year brought no new relief to the cannabis industry, and the doors to the bankruptcy courts remain shut.  Are the other federal courts off-limits as well?  A recent district court decision from the Southern District of California sheds some light on this issue, and indicates that the district courts are at least partially open to participants in legal cannabis businesses.

Factual Background

The facts of Indian Hills Holdings, LLC v. Frye are relatively straightforward.  Plaintiff Indian Hills Holdings (“IHH”), Construction & Design Professional Corp. (“CDP”) and its principal Christopher Frye (“Frye” and, together with CDP, the “Defendants”) entered into a contract whereby IHH paid Defendants to purchase Cultivation “Adult” Extreme Cubes (the “Cubes”).  Defendants in turn contracted with ICT Centurion Investments, LLC (“ICT”) to purchase the Cubes.   The Cubes were marketed as a “fully integrated growing container system” used in indoor cannabis cultivation.  When ICT sold the Cubes to another party, Defendants were unable to deliver the Cubes to IHH.  Defendants refused to return the money, and IHH sued, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment and fraud claims.

A default judgment was entered against CDP for failing to respond to IHH’s complaint.  Frye, however, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part that IHH did not have standing to bring its claims.  Noting that Frye only “cursorily” raised the standing issue and that the “issue is a complex one”, the court reframed Frye’s argument as follows:

  • The contract is illegal under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq.(the “CSA”);
  • Federal district courts will not enforce contracts that violate federal law;
  • Because federal district courts will not enforce contracts that violate federal law, IHH lacks an “actionable injury”; and
  • Because IHH lacks an actionable injury, the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Legal Analysis

The court began its analysis by considering whether the parties’ contract violated the CSA.  Section 863(a) of the CSA makes it unlawful to sell or offer for sale “drug paraphernalia,” which is defined to include “any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing … a controlled substance.”  Because the Cubes are used to grow cannabis, and because cannabis is a controlled substance, the sale of the Cubes would seemingly violate section 863(a) of the CSA.  However, the CSA contains an exemption, whereby section 863 does not apply to any person authorized by state law to manufacture, possess or distribute drug paraphernalia.  California allows the manufacturing of drug paraphernalia, which would include the Cubes.  As a result, the court wrote that the contract “may fall within the CSA exemption.” Additionally, the court noted that the U.S. Department of Justice has declined to enforce the CSA’s prohibition on the sale of marijuana when the marijuana is bought or sold in accordance with state law.  For these reasons, the court concluded that enforcing the parties’ contract would likely neither violate the CSA nor public policy.

While the contract may be legal, the court still had to consider whether assuming jurisdiction over the dispute would result in a violation of federal law.  After all, federal courts will not assume jurisdiction over a dispute where the court will be required to order a legal violation.  The question therefore became whether a plausible remedy existed for IHH that would not require the court to order such a legal violation.   The court held that it could fashion a remedy without violating the law by simply awarding IHH monetary damages.  A judgment for money damages, unlike an award of specific performance, would not result in IHH obtaining the Cubes and growing cannabis.  Instead, the result would be a return of the monies paid by IHH to Defendants for the Cubes.  The court’s ruling was consistent with prior cases involving state-legalized cannabis business, where the courts found ways to provide relief without violating the CSA.  E.g., Polk v. Gontmakher, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53569 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2021) (noting that “recent case law involving cannabis-related business contracts does not espouse an absolute bar to the enforcement of such contracts”); Mann v. Gullickson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152125 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (court may consider breach of contract claim arising from sale of cannabis business when “it is possible for the court to enforce [the] contract in a way that does not require illegal conduct”).

Takeaways

As the legalized cannabis industry continues to grow and develop, market participants will undoubtedly need access to courts.  The bankruptcy courts remain off-limit, thus requiring distressed cannabis businesses and their creditors to turn to state-law insolvency proceedings (e.g., assignments for the benefit of creditors; receiverships).  To those in the industry, it may be a welcome relief to know that at least some federal district courts have made themselves available to these parties and that these courts thus far have shown a willingness to adjudicate disputes arising from the cannabis industry.  However, any party seeking their day in federal court needs to ensure that they are not asking the court to grant relief that would violate federal law, including the CSA.  This means that while money damages should be available, specific performance of the contract is likely off the table.

Article By Mark A. Salzberg of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

California Supreme Court Cases Employers Should Be Watching in 2022

The California Supreme Court has been busy in 2021 deciding cases that affect employers from how to pay meal and rest period penalties to when the statute of limitations for a failure to promote runs.

While the state’s high court answered some big questions in this last year, they still have several cases pertaining to employment law awaiting their attention.

Here are the cases employers should be watching in the new year and why.

People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s Inc.

In this case, a complainant filed a timely retaliation complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) claiming immediate termination after complaining about non-payment of wages. Her complaint did not allege any disclosure to a governmental agency, but the retaliatory act of termination upon her direct complaint to her employer. The DLSE undertook an investigation and determined that respondents had violated several Labor Code sections, notably 1102.5 (“Section 1102.5”), California’s whistleblower statute. The DLSE notified the parties involved of its determination on December 22, 2015. Respondents were ordered to do several things, including paying the complainant lost wages and civil penalties of $20,000 each for violations of sections 1102.5 and 98.6. Respondents never complied.

On October 17, 2017, the Labor Commissioner filed an enforcement action against Respondents under the authority of section 98.7, subdivision (c)(1)5, alleging violations of these statutory provisions. Eventually, through a lack of response by the employer-defendant, the Labor Commissioner sought to take a default judgment.

The trial court, however, determined that the Labor Commissioner had not stated a claim under section 1102.5, because the complainant had not approached a governmental agency until after her termination. The trial court found that retaliation under the statute required the complainant to have been terminated as a result of disclosure to a governmental agency, which was not alleged. The trial court also found insufficient evidence for the claimant’s unpaid wages, and that the penalties under Section 98.6 were not appropriate.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of Section 1102.5 claim as it found the after-termination complaint to be defective. It also reversed as to the penalties awarded under Section 98.6 and remanded that portion of the judgment.

The question before the California Supreme Court is limited to whether Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), which protects an employee from retaliation for disclosing unlawful activity, applies when the information is already known to that person or agency.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

Depending on the direction the California Supreme Court takes, its holding will affect the burden on employers defending against whistleblower claims – especially those arising out of allegations that an employee told an employer or agency information that the employer or agency was already aware of.

Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center

FlexCare, LLC (“FlexCare”), a temporary staffing agency, assigned Plaintiff to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (“Eisenhower”). Plaintiff alleged that during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received the required meal and rest periods, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. She then filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Plaintiff’s claims were based solely on her work on assignment to Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class and plaintiff executed a release of claims. The trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement.

A year later, Plaintiff brought a second class action suit against Eisenhower, who had not been named in the previous lawsuit, alleging the same labor law violations. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Plaintiff could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims in the prior class action.

The trial court held a limited trial on the issue of the propriety of the lawsuit and ruled that Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Accordingly, Eisenhower could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case could affect staffing agency employers who may want to utilize broad releases if their “clients” are not also named to avoid duplicative litigation – for which they may have to pay twice – through indemnity clauses.

Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.

This case will explore whether the evidentiary standard set forth in Labor Code section 1102.6 (“Section 1102.6”) replaces the McDonnell Douglas test as the relevant evidentiary standard for retaliation claims brought under section 1102.5.

In this case, Defendant was a manufacturer of paint, stains, caulks, and other products. Plaintiff Lawson (“Lawson”) was a territory manager whose duties included merchandising and claims that he was directed by his supervisor to handle a product in a way that fraudulently removed a slow-selling product from its inventory. Lawson told his supervisor he would not do this, then reported the directive to the company’s ethics hotline on two separate occasions. The second report to the ethics hotline resulted in an investigation. During this time, Lawson received poor ratings for his work, was placed on a performance improvement plan, and eventually, Defendant terminated his employment.

Lawson then filed a complaint against the company in the United States District Court, alleging that he was retaliated against as a whistleblower.

The trial court applied the McDonnell Douglas test, which employs burden-shifting between the plaintiff and the employer. This test originated in the context of Title VII, the federal statute governing workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The trial court concluded that Lawson failed to carry his burden to raise triable issues of fact regarding pretext and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, Lawson argued to the 9th Circuit that the trial court should have applied the evidentiary standard outlined in Section 1102.6. Section 1102.6 states that once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the whistleblower activity was a contributing factor in the retaliation against the employee, the employer’s burden of proof is to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons.

In its question to the California Supreme Court, the 9th Circuit noted that application of the McDonnell Douglas test to whistleblower claims under Labor Code section 1102.5 “seems to ignore [a] critical intervening statutory amendment” by which the California legislature established the evidentiary burdens of the parties participating in a civil action or administrative hearing involving a violation of the statute. Though this statement by the Circuit seems like a decision, the 9th Circuit pointed out three published California appellate court decisions that expressly applied McDonnell Douglas after the amendment.

This contradiction between California’s statute and the court rulings is the root of the 9th Circuit’s question.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

If the California Supreme Court rules that the evidentiary requirement under Section 1102.6 applies, disposing of whistleblower retaliation claims prior to trial will become extremely difficult due to the high clear and convincing evidentiary standard imposed on the employer.

Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.

This case involves a class of security guards who alleged meal break violations and sought premium wages, waiting time penalties, inaccurate pay stub penalties, and attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeal held that unpaid premium wages for meal period violations did not entitle employees to pay stub penalties or waiting time penalties.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case will resolve a long-standing debate on whether waiting time penalties are recoverable for meal and rest period violations. If the California Supreme Court disagrees with the lower courts, it will increase potential penalties for California meal and rest period violations, as violations could be compounded by alleged pay stub penalties and waiting time penalties.

Article By Leonora M. Schloss and Karen Luh of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation and legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021

9th Cir. Upholds Antitrust Jury Verdict Against Chinese Telescope Company [PODCAST]

Court affirms evidentiary rulings on market definition and overcharges. Agrees evidence supported verdict for collusion and attempted monopolization.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this month upheld judgment in favor of Optronic Technologies, Inc., finding there was sufficient evidence that Chinese telescope manufacturer, Ningbo Sunny Electronic (“Sunny”), conspired with a competitor in the U.S. consumer telescope market to allocate customers, fix prices, and monopolize the telescope market in violation of federal antitrust laws (Optronic Technologies, Inc., v. Ningbo Sunny Electronic Co., Ltd., No. 20-15837, 9th Cir. 2021). Ninth Circuit Judge Ronald M. Gould wrote the opinion.

California-based Optronic, known commercially as Orion Telescopes & Binoculars, sued Sunny in November 2014. Orion alleged Sunny violated Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 by conspiring to allocate customers in the telescope market and conspiring to fix prices or credit terms for Optronics in collusion with Suzhou Synta Optical Technology. Orion further alleged Sunny’s 2014 acquisition of independent manufacturer, Meade, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Orion alleged that Sunny engaged in these anticompetitive acts to force Orion out and further monopolize the telescope market.

A California jury found in favor of Orion on all counts and awarded the company $16.8 million in damages, which the district court trebled to $50.4 million. The district court also ordered injunctive relief, directing Sunny to supply Orion and Synta’s Meade on non-discriminatory terms for five years, and not to communicate with Synta about competitively sensitive information.

Rulings on key elements of plaintiff’s economic evidence affirmed.

Sunny appealed on several grounds, including two that challenged key elements of the plaintiff’s expert economic evidence. The jury had found Sunny liable for attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2, which makes it unlawful for any person to monopolize or attempt or conspire to monopolize any relevant market. Sunny argued on appeal that the evidence could not support a Section 2 verdict because Orion’s economist failed to define a relevant market. In particular, Sunny claimed the expert did not examine the cross-elasticity between substitute products in the market or perform a SSNIP test, the standard analysis used to delineate the outer boundaries of a relevant market.

The appeals court found these contentions lacked merit. The plaintiff’s economist had testified that the relevant product market was the market for telescope manufacturing services. The purpose of the SSNIP test is to determine whether the relevant market is drawn too narrowly and should be expanded to include potential substitutes. But because no other manufacturing capacity can substitute for telescope manufacturing services, wholesale purchasers of telescopes cannot turn to other manufacturers to fulfill orders. Without substitutable manufacturers, a SSNIP test boils down to whether new manufacturers would enter the market fast enough to make an increase in price unprofitable for a hypothetical monopolist, which they could not. As a result, the court held that the economist reasonably could forgo performing a SSNIP analysis.

Sunny also challenged the economist’s estimate of anticompetitive overcharges that could not directly be observed. Neither the “benchmark” nor “before-and-after” estimation methods were available. Therefore, to develop a measure of damages, the plaintiff’s expert presented two different methods of estimating the overcharges. In the first method, the expert collected data on cartel overcharges from the economic literature on markets with structures and conditions similar to telescope manufacturing. The average of those overcharges was then used as an estimate of the overcharge resulting from defendants’ collusion. As a check on this estimate, the economist also submitted a theoretical Cournot equilibrium model of market prices based on assumptions drawn from the record in the case. The two methods yielded similar and consistent results. Affirming the admissibility of the expert’s damages estimates, the appellate court found the expert’s report and testimony “were sufficiently tied to the facts of this case such that the district court properly admitted this evidence.”

In rebuttal, the defendant’s economist testified to the high sensitivity of the assumptions used in the plaintiff’s theoretical model. Interestingly, defendants were not permitted to submit their own estimate of damages for the first time on rebuttal, so the defendants’ expert had to limit her testimony to the sensitivity of the model without the ability to show the jury any resulting alternative estimate of the anticompetitive overcharge. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s limitation on the defendants’ rebuttal expert.

Price fixing and a larger scheme.

Sunny also argued that Orion failed to present sufficient evidence to support Orion’s Section 1 claims. Section 1 prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Horizontal price fixing and market allocation are per se unreasonable and support Section 1 liability without regard to any purported justification or defense. The Ninth Circuit noted that Orion offered evidence that Synta executives encouraged Sunny’s purchase of Meade, an acquisition that was part of a larger scheme by Sunny and Synta to jointly control the telescope manufacturing market, even though federal regulators had already prohibited such a combination. The court also declined to upset the jury’s finding that Sunny conspired with a Synta subsidiary to fix prices and credit terms to Orion, a per se violation of Section 1.

“If you break it, you buy it.”

Finally, it is notable that the appellate court affirmed the award of damages accruing after September 2016, when the defendant and Synta took their last steps to eliminate Meade, and Synta entered a Settlement and Supply Agreement with Orion. The court held that, even if the conspiratorial acts of Sunny and Synta ended in 2016, Orion could still recover post-2016 damages “because it continued to suffer economic harm from the harm to competition caused by the illegal concerted activity.” Thus, where collusion causes a durable change in market structure or sets the pattern of a continuing collusive practice, it is no defense that the conspirators may have ceased engaging in concerted action.

The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Optronics is clear: “[W]here an antitrust plaintiff suffers continuing antitrust injuries from anticompetitive changes to market structure that arose from a proven antitrust violation, we hold that the violation may be a material cause of that injury, and so recovery of damages is permitted, even after the last proven date of the violative conduct. This rule accords with the common-sense principle that ‘if you break it, you buy it.’”

Welcomed clarity.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion brings welcomed clarity on several points. It demonstrated that plaintiffs need not perform a SSNIP test where market-specific circumstances define a market’s outer boundary. For claimants facing the need to estimate unobservable anticompetitive overcharges, it affirms an ingenious method for arriving at a reasonable and reliable estimate. And, for past conspiracies with continuing anticompetitive effects, the decision announces the common-sense principle that a defendant “remains liable for the continuing injuries suffered by plaintiffs from the structural harm to competition that its unlawful scheme brought about.” Put simply, this is a well-articulated decision by a capable panel that adds precision and certainty to antitrust.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP

© MoginRubin LLP

For more articles on 9th Circuit decisions, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Proposition 13 Overhaul Qualifies for November Ballot

California Secretary of State Alex Padilla announced on Friday, May 29, 2020, that the revised initiative entitled “The California Schools and Local Communities Act of 2020” officially qualified for the November ballot. If passed, the initiative would establish a “split roll” where retail, office, commercial, and industrial real property would be taxed based on their market value, while residential property would continue to be assessed based on its purchase price.

THE CURRENT TAX REGIME: PROPOSITION 13

The current property tax regime under Proposition 13 generally provides that real property is taxed at one percent of its fair market value, which usually is the property’s purchase price. Unless there is a change in ownership of the property such as a sale, this “base value” can only increase by an inflationary rate that cannot exceed two percent per year. When property changes ownership, it is reassessed and the property’s base value is reset to its then current fair market value. Under Proposition 13, a property’s base value can be lower than its current fair market value, which in turn can reduce the amount of property tax that might otherwise be owed.

THE SPLIT ROLL

The ballot initiative creates a “split roll” if voters approve it in November. Under the split roll, commercial and industrial property with a fair market value of more than $3 million would be reassessed at its current fair market value at least every three years. The current tax regime under the Proposition 13 rules described above would continue to apply to all residential property, including both single-family and multi-unit structures and the land on which those structures are constructed or placed. The current rules also would remain in place for real property used for commercial agricultural production.

The process of administering this new tax regime will be determined by the California legislature, which will include, among other things, a process for reassessment appeals. The taxpayer will have the burden of proving that the property was not properly valued. The legislature also will determine a process by which to allocate mixed-use property between its commercial and residential uses for purposes of implementing the split roll.

The new regime will not apply to commercial or industrial property with a fair market value of $3 million or less unless any of the direct or indirect owners of such real property also own interests in other commercial and/or industrial real property. In that case, the new regime will apply if all such real property has an aggregate fair market value in excess of $3 million.

TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX RELIEF

If passed, the ballot initiative would exempt small businesses from property tax on all of its tangible personal property. A small business is a business that: (1) has fewer than 50 annual full time employees, (2) is independently owned and operated such that the ownership interests, management and operation are not subject to control, restriction, modification, or limitation by an outside source, individual or another business, and (3) owns real property located in California.

For all other taxpayers, an amount up to $500,000 of combined tangible personal property and fixtures (other than aircraft and vessels) will be exempt from taxation.

WHEN WOULD THE SPLIT ROLL TAKE EFFECT?

The split roll would become operative beginning January 1, 2022, and the tangible personal property tax relief would become operative on January 1, 2024.

Despite the split roll becoming operative on January 1, 2022, the reassessment of undervalued commercial and industrial property will be implemented through a phase-in over two or more years. An owner of commercial or industrial property would only be obligated to pay taxes based on the new assessed value beginning with the lien date for the fiscal year when the assessor has completed the reassessment. In addition, if 50% or more of the square footage of a commercial or industrial property is occupied by a small business, such property will not be subject to the new regime at least until the 2025-26 fiscal year.

© 2010-2020 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more on real estate taxation, see the National Law Review Tax law section.

Court Rules That Whistleblower Must Face Trial On Former Employer’s Claims

Life is not necessarily all skittles and beer for whistleblowers.  Sometimes, they are sued by the very companies on which they blew the whistle.  Such is the case in the ongoing case of Erhart v. Bofi Holding, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57137.  Judge Cynthia Bashant limns the background facts as follows:

“Charles Erhart was an internal auditor for BofI Federal Bank. After Erhart discovered conduct he believed to be wrongful, he reported it to BofI’s principal regulator. BofI responded by allegedly defaming and terminating him. Erhart then filed this lawsuit for whistleblower retaliation under state and federal law. The next morning, The New York Times published an article summarizing the lawsuit’s allegations—causing BofI’s stock price to plummet. The Bank quickly commenced a countersuit against Erhart claiming he committed fraud, breached his duty of loyalty, and violated state and federal anti-hacking statutes. The Court consolidated BofI’s countersuit with Erhart’s whistleblower-retaliation action.”

In the cited decision, Judge Bashant grants in parts and denies in part Erhart’s and Bofi’s motions for summary adjudication.  The ruling is lengthy and tackles a variety of issues, some of which I hope to address in future posts.  Nonetheless, a key point for whistleblowers is that Judge Bashant is allowing Bofi’s claims against Erhart to proceed to trial, albeit on a limited basis.

When “Whistleblower” First Became Figurative

Recently, I endeavored to identify the first figurative use of the term “whistleblower” in a reported California opinion.  I was surprised that earliest case dates to the presidency of Ronald Reagan.  Interestingly, the Court addresses the very tension at the heart of Erhart:

“There is a great public interest in the truthful revelation of wrongdoing, and in protecting the ‘whistleblower’ from retaliation; there is very little public interest in protecting the source of false accusations of wrongdoing.”

Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 283, 690 P.2d 625, 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1984).  Many cases dating back to the mid 19th Century mention the blowing of whistles, but the references are to actual, not figurative, whistles.

© 2010-2020 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more on whistleblowers, see the National Law Review Litigation & Trial Practice Section.

California Judicial Council Adopts Emergency Rules Affecting Unlawful Detainer Actions and More

The Judicial Council of California adopted 11 temporary emergency rules in response to the COVID-19 pandemic affecting eviction proceedings, judicial foreclosures, and statutes of limitations for civil causes of actions, among other things. The rules, adopted April 6, 2020, are effective immediately and apply to all California state courts.

Rules of particular interest:

  •  Emergency Rule 1: Unlawful Detainers
    • Prohibits courts from issuing a summons on an unlawful detainer complaint until 90 days after the Governor declares the state of emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic is lifted. This rule applies to all new unlawful detainer actions – whether or not the eviction action is related to nonpayment of rent for COVID-19 related issues. The only exception is for an unlawful detainer action necessary to protect public health and safety.
  • Emergency Rule 2: Judicial Foreclosures
    • Stays any action for judicial foreclosure and tolls any statute of limitations for filing such action until 90 days after the state of emergency is lifted.
  • Emergency Rule 9: Tolling of Statutes of Limitations for Civil Causes of Action
    • Tolls statutes of limitations for civil causes of action from April 6, 2020, until 90 days after the Governor declares the state of emergency is lifted.
  • Emergency Rule 10: Extension of 5-Year Rule for Civil Actions
    • Extends the five-year deadline to bring a civil action to trial to five years and six months for all actions filed on or before April 6, 2020.
  • Emergency Rule 11: Depositions through Remote Electronic Means
    • Allows a deponent to not be present with the deposition officer at the time of deposition.

© 2010-2020 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Lyft Sexual Assault Claims Consolidated for Pre-Trial Proceedings

Lyft and other companies have become a part of life and people look to them for a safe ride home at the end of a night out.   However, ridesharing companies, like Lyft and Uber, have been under fire for passenger safety concerns, and the stories of women being sexually assaulted by their drivers are prolific, harrowing and terrifying.  In response to this disturbing trend, a wave of lawsuits in California are addressing the company’s responsibility when a passenger is assaulted.

Lyft Sexual Assault Claims Consolidated in San Francisco Superior Court

Recently,  California Superior Court Judge Hon. Kenneth Freeman granted a petition to consolidate multiple Lyft sexual assault cases in California recommending the Superior Court of California San Francisco County as the appropriate venue for the “complex” coordinated matters to be heard.

The Lyft passenger lawsuits claim the plaintiffs were sexually assaulted by sexual predators driving for Lyft after Lyft had been on actual notice of ongoing, sexual assaults by its drivers. According to the complaints, Lyft failed to respond to the sexual assaults by adopting and implementing adequate driver hiring or monitoring systems and procedures to protect riders. This failure to respond to an identified, systemic issue of sexual assault put more riders at risk.

The Lyft plaintiffs filed a motion to coordinate the cases, as most of the cases included in the ruling had been filed in San Francisco Superior Court.  The court agreed with the Lyft plaintiffs that: Lyft’s corporate headquarters are in San Francisco, as are the majority of corporate witnesses and documents.   The court added, the San Francisco Superior Court uses e-filing, which could potentially save the parties significant costs.  Additionally, only cases that are “complex” as defined by California’s Judicial Council standards may be coordinated.

Need for ESI (Electronically Stored Information)  Orders, Are Lyft Drivers are Independent Contractors or Employees, Additional Plaintiffs Joining Requires Complex Case Management

Co-Counsel for the Lyft Sexual Assault Plaintiffs, Brooks Cutter of Cutter Law argued that there are likely to be thousands of documents, studies, e-mails, and memoranda that are relevant to the claims and defenses in this case and discovery will inevitably require a complex ESI (Electronically Stored Information) order and accordingly a court like San Francisco Superior Court is well-equipped to handle such issues, including staying discovery, staying portions of the case, obtaining stipulations that apply to the entire coordinated case, and selecting bellwether plaintiffs.

Many of the underlying cases in the consolidation action allege vicarious liability or the liability of Lyft for the torts or wrongful actions of their drivers whether or not Lyft classifies them as an employee or independent contractor.  Lyft, Uber, and Doordash are actively fighting California Assembly Bill 5 Pledging over $90 Million To Fund Voter Initiative To Overturn AB-5  which went into effect January 1, 2020.  AB-5 profoundly alters the legal standard applied in evaluating whether a worker is classified as an employee or an independent contractor.   Furthermore,  Uber and Postmates on December 31st  filed a legal challenge in Federal Court alleging AB-5 violates individuals’ constitutional rights, seeking declaratory and injunctive remedies claiming the law unfairly discriminates against technology platforms and those who make a living through them.

Lyft has also been accused of stalling and slowing down discovery. Coordinated proceedings could help plaintiffs’ attorneys combat Lyft’s delays, and it could be beneficial to have one judge see how Lyft has conducted itself in discovery.

Attorney Cutter stated he is aware of five more related sexual assault cases that have been filed in the time since that petition was filed.   According to attorney Cutter, “There are definitely victims who have not yet come forward.”

Lyft Fought Against Sexual Assault Lawsuit Consolidation

Lyft, represent by Williams & Connolly, argued that the consolidation of  Lyft Sexual assault cases “would make in San Francisco Superior Court a national clearinghouse for claims against San Francisco-based companies.”    Furthermore, Lyft contended that:

“all claims against a California based-company —wherever the underlying incidents arise, and however much the disputed facts occurred elsewhere and other states’ laws govern the contested legal issues — could be brought in California courts and coordinated.”

Lyft’s two main objections to consolidation are that “the allegations of misconduct are not the same and that the majority of the cases did not occur in California.”

Judge Freeman, however, disagreed with the company, focusing instead on Lyft’s actions or inactions as an organization to protect rider’s safety. “To the contrary, the predominating legal and factual issues will examine Lyft’s liability for allegedly failing to institute a system to have prevented the assaults in these cases and potential future assaults.” Judge Freeman said. “The court agrees with plaintiffs that this is not a case against the drivers; it is fundamentally a case against Lyft.”

Significance of Lyft Consolidation Ruling

Judge Freeman also found that coordination of the suits would make the most efficient use of court resources and avoid duplicative testimony. In giving his ruling he further noted that there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings if the cases were not coordinated, which would create confusion, and it would hinder the Court of Appeal’s ability to hear challenges to inconsistent rulings, orders, and judgments, which would inevitably cause significant delays.

“This is an important ruling for victims as it means the claims will be heard in a single court in California,” plaintiff’s co-counsel Brooks Cutter said. “Lyft opposed our motion and wanted to force victims to undergo litigation in separate courts across the country. As a California company, it is appropriate for these Lyft claims to be heard in California.”

The Lyft sexual assault and rape claims each allege that the company did not adequately address the issue of sexual misconduct committed by sexual predators who drove for the ride-sharing company. Furthermore, they allege Lyft owed that duty to its riders, who believed it offered a safe form of transportation.  Attorney Cutter says, “The occurrence of sexual assault in the vast majority of these lawsuits is undisputed. The focus of these lawsuits is Lyft’s accountability for the assaults, which plaintiffs contend were enabled by Lyft’s lax background checks and failure to enact reasonable in-app monitoring to help ensure rider safety.”

Alexandra LaManna, a spokeswoman for Lyft, disclosed to the New York Times: in 2019 nearly one in five employees at the company had been dedicated to initiatives strengthening the rideshare platform’s safety, and that in recent months Lyft had introduced more than 15 new safety features.  Lyft announced in September of 2019 some of these safety features: access to 911 through the app and monitoring and offers of support from Lyft personnel to the driver and passenger if a trip is experiencing an unexpected delay.  These are on top of the company’s criminal background checks, steps to prevent fraudulent use of the app and identify driver identity, and harassment prevention programs.

However, despite these steps, more Lyft lawsuits are being filed, alleging the ride-sharing company has not taken adequate steps to protect riders from sexual assault.

Lyft has not Released a Safety Report – Lyft Victims Can Still File Lawsuits

In December 2019, Lyft competitor Uber released a safety report.  Uber reported that in 2017 and 2018 it received reports of 5,981 incidents of sexual abuse.  In 2018, this included 235 rapes and 280 reports of attempted rape, 1,560 reports of groping, 376 reports of unwanted kissing to breast, buttocks or mouth and 594 reports of unwanted kissing to another body part.  Because Uber’s figures are based on the information it received, the actual numbers could in fact be higher than reported.

Lyft has not released its safety report regarding sexual assaults, rapes, and accidents. Attorney Cutter finds the lack of safety report from Lyft to be problematic.  He says, “It is important for Lyft to issue a safety report so the public has a better understanding of the significant risk of sexual assault in rideshare vehicles.”

Victims who suffered sexual assault committed by a Lyft driver are still eligible to file a lawsuit. Consolidation of the current lawsuits does not prevent future lawsuits from being filed, and it is likely there are many more victims who have yet to come forward about their experiences.

Copyright ©2020 National Law Forum, LLC

More on consolidated case litigation in the National Law Review Litigation and Trial Practice section.

Federal Court Preliminary Enjoins Enforcement of New California Arbitration Law AB 51

On Friday, January 31, 2020, Chief District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the federal District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a Preliminary Injunction (PI) against the State of California, enjoining the State from enforcing Assembly Bill 51 (AB 51) with respect to mandatory arbitration agreements in employment to the extent governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1

As discussed in the Vedder Price employment law alert, TRO Halts New Arbitration Law AB 51, the District Court had previously issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on December 30, 2019 temporarily enjoining enforcement of AB 51 pending a preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for January 10, 2020. The Court subsequently continued the January 10 hearing and extended the TRO until January 31 to allow the parties time to submit supplemental briefing. AB 51, the new California law previously slated to take effect on January 1, 2020, purportedly prohibited employers from requiring applicants or employees in California to agree, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit, to arbitrate claims involving violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) or the California Labor Code. AB 51 did not specifically mention “arbitration” but instead broadly applied to the waiver of “any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of [the FEHA or Labor Code], including the right to file and pursue a civil action.”

In issuing the PI, the District Court specifically: (a) enjoined the State from enforcing sections 432.6(a), (b), and (c) of the California Labor Code where the alleged “waiver of any right, forum, or procedure” is the entry into an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA2; and (b) enjoined the State from enforcing Section 12953 of the California Government Code [FEHA] where the alleged violation of “Section 432.6 of the Labor Code” is entering into an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA.

The PI will remain in place pending a final judgment, which would likely occur following a motion for summary judgment rather than a full trial on the merits since there are no material facts in dispute to be tried. However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), an order granting a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable. Accordingly, it is likely that the State of California will file an immediate appeal directly with the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

In the interim, based on this PI, employers should feel comfortable in continuing to require employees in California to sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment without being subjected to criminal prosecution under AB 51, provided that the arbitration agreement is clearly governed by the FAA. Employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to ensure compliance in this regard.

1 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S., et al. v. Xavier Becerra, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-02456-KJM-DB, Dkt. No. 44 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020).

2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16

© 2020 Vedder Price

For more on recent employment law litigation in California and elsewhere, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.

California Law Creates New Risk Factor

Last year, California enacted AB 5 imposing the so-called A-B-C test for employee status under California’s Labor Code.  The legislation basically extended the California Supreme Court’s holding in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018) which imposed the test in the more limited context of claims for wages and benefits arising under wage orders issued by the Industrial Welfare Commission.

Although aimed at the gig economy, AB 5 has impacted a wide range of traditional businesses.  For example, it was widely reported last year that Vox media had laid off hundreds of California free-lance writers in response to AB 5.  Not surprisingly, the American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc., and National Press Photographers Association has filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the new law (A hearing on California’s motion to dismiss is scheduled for March 23).  A ballot initiative measure is currently in circulation to change for “app-based” transportation and delivery drivers.  This month, the California Trucking Association succeeded in obtaining a federal court order enjoining enforcement of AB 5 as to any motor carrier operating in California.

I am music and I write the songs, but am I an employee?

Great uncertainty still abounds about the applicability, application and even constitutionality of AB 5.  Thus, it is not surprising to see issuers identifying AB 5 as a risk factor in their filings with the SEC.  For example, Warner Music Group Corp.  included this risk factor in its Form 10-K concerning independent songwriters and and recording artists:

“Although we believe that the recording artists and songwriters with which we partner are properly characterized as independent contractors, tax or other regulatory authorities may in the future challenge our characterization of these relationships. We are aware of a number of judicial decisions and legislative proposals that could bring about major reforms in worker classification, including the California legislature’s recent passage of California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5″). AB 5 purports to codify a new test for determining worker classification that is widely viewed as expanding the scope of employee relationships and narrowing the scope of independent contractor relationships. Given AB 5’s recent passage, there is no guidance from the regulatory authorities charged with its enforcement, and there is a significant degree of uncertainty regarding its application. In addition, AB 5 has been the subject of widespread national discussion and it is possible that other jurisdictions may enact similar laws. If such regulatory authorities or state, federal or foreign courts were to determine that our recording artists and songwriters are employees, and not independent contractors, we would be required to withhold income taxes, to withhold and pay Social Security, Medicare and similar taxes and to pay unemployment and other related payroll taxes. We would also be liable for unpaid past taxes and subject to penalties. As a result, any determination that our recording artists and songwriters are our employees could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.”

© 2010-2020 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more on California’s AB5 see the National Law Review Labor & Employment Law section.

My Business Is In Arizona, Why Do I Care About California Privacy Laws? How the CCPA Impacts Arizona Businesses

Arizona businesses are not typically concerned about complying with the newest California laws going into effect. However, one California law in particular—the CCPA or California Consumer Privacy Act—has a scope that extends far beyond California’s border with Arizona. Indeed, businesses all over the world that have customers or operations in California must now be mindful of whether the CCPA applies to them and, if so, whether they are in compliance.

What is the CCPA?

The CCPA is a comprehensive data privacy regulation enacted by the California Legislature that became effective on January 1, 2020. It was passed on September 13, 2018 and has undergone a series of substantive amendments over the past year and a few months.

Generally, the CCPA gives California consumers a series of rights with respect to how companies acquire, store, use, and sell their personal data. The CCPA’s combination of mandatory disclosures and notices, rights of access, rights of deletion, statutory fines, and threat of civil lawsuits is a significant move towards empowering consumers to control their personal data.

Many California businesses are scrambling to implement the necessary policies and procedures to comply with the CCPA in 2020. In fact, you may have begun to notice privacy notices on the primary landing page for national businesses. However, Arizona businesses cannot assume that the CCPA stops at the Arizona border.

Does the CCPA apply to my business in Arizona?

The CCPA has specific criteria for whether a company is considered a California business. The CCPA applies to for-profit businesses “doing business in the State of California” that also:

  • Have annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars; or
  • Handle data of more than 50,000 California consumers or devices per year; or
  • Have 50% or more of revenue generated by selling California consumers’ personal information

The CCPA does not include an express definition of what it means to be “doing business” in California. While it will take courts some time to interpret the scope of the CCPA, any business with significant sales, employees, property, or operations in California should consider whether the CCPA might apply to them.

How do I know if I am collecting a consumer’s personal information?

“Personal information” under the CCPA generally includes any information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked” with a specific consumer. As the legalese of this definition implies, “personal information” includes a wide swath of data that your company may already be collecting about consumers.

There is no doubt that personal identifiers like name, address, email addresses, social security numbers, etc. are personal information. But information like biometric data, search and browsing activity, IP addresses, purchase history, and professional or employment-related information are all expressly included under the CCPA’s definition. Moreover, the broad nature of the CCPA means that other categories of data collected—although not expressly identified by the CCPA—may be deemed to be “personal information” in an enforcement action.

What can I do to comply with the CCPA?

If the CCPA might apply to your company, now is the time to take action. Compliance will necessarily be different for each business depending on the nature of its operation and the use(s) of personal information. However, there are some common steps that each company can take.

The first step towards compliance with the CCPA is understanding what data your company collects, how it is stored, whether it is transferred or sold, and whether any vendors or subsidiaries also have access to the data. Next, an organization should prepare a privacy notice that complies with the CCPA to post on its website and include in its app interface.

The most substantial step in complying with the CCPA is to develop and implement policies and procedures that help the company conform to the various provisions of the CCPA. The policies will need to provide up-front disclosures to consumers, allow consumers to opt-out, handle consumer requests to produce or delete personal information, and guard against any perceived discrimination against consumers that exercise rights under the CCPA.

The company will also need to review contracts with third-party service providers and vendors to ensure it can comply with the CCPA. For example, if a third-party cloud service will be storing personal information, the company will want to verify that its contract allows it to assemble and produce that information within statutory deadlines if requested by a consumer.

At least you have some time!

The good news is that the CCPA includes a grace period until July 1, 2020 before the California Attorney General can bring enforcement actions. Thus, Arizona businesses that may have ignored the quirky California privacy law to this point have a window to bring their operations into compliance. However, Arizona companies that may need to comply with the CCPA should consult with counsel as soon as possible to begin the process. The attorneys at Ryley Carlock & Applewhite are ready to help you analyze your risk and comply with the CCPA.

Copyright © 2020 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

Learn more about the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) on the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet Law page.