Tag: California

California Announces Initial Draft Priority Products Under California Safer Consumer Products Regulations

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On March 13, 2014, the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) announced the first set of draft priority products that, if finalized, will be subject to the requirements of the California Safer Consumer Products (“SCP”) Regulations.

Notably, while DTSC had legal authority to identify up to five products, it chose to identify only three draft priority products at this time. The three products are:

  1. Children’s Foam Padded Sleeping Products containing the flame-retardant chemical, Tris (1,3-dichloro-2-propyl phosphate) or (“TDCCP”). Such products include nap mats and cots, travel beds, bassinet foam, portable crib mattresses, play pens, and other children’s sleeping products. In its press release announcing the draft priority products, DTSC asserted that TDCCP is a known carcinogen, is released from products into air and dust where it can be absorbed, inhaled, or transferred from hand to mouth, and has been found in California waters and sediments. DTSC also noted that there is no legal requirement applicable to these products that would require them to be made with flame retardants. For more information on DTSC’s selection of this draft priority product, click here.
  2. Spray Polyurethane Foam (“SPF”) Products containing Unreacted Diisocyanates. SPF products are used for home and building insulation, weatherizing and sealing, and roofing. DTSC asserted in its press release that exposure to wet or “uncured” SPF materials can contribute to occupational asthma and noted that unreacted diisocyanates are a “suspected” carcinogen. DTSC expressed its concern for populations using these products that are not protected by Occupational Safety & Health Administration regulations, such as independent contractors and people performing their own home repairs. In its press release, DTSC noted that currently there are no alternatives to unreacted diisocyanates for spray-foam applications. For additional information from DTSC on this draft priority product, click here.
  3. Paint and Varnish Strippers containing Methylene Chloride. Methylene chloride is a well-known and widely used solvent in paint strippers. According to DTSC, when metabolized, methylene chloride converts to carbon monoxide, which is acutely toxic to the brain and nervous system. DTSC claimed that alternative products without methylene chloride are readily available. For more information on this draft listing, click here.

In announcing the “draft list” of proposed priority products, DTSC emphasized that the naming of these products does not constitute a ban on the products, but rather the initiation of process to examine whether the chemicals of concern used in these products are “necessary” or may be replaced with safer alternatives. To put the draft priority products announcement in context, this announcement begins the second of four steps established by California’s SCP Regulations for identifying, prioritizing, and evaluating the use of chemicals and their alternatives in consumer products. The four steps include:

  1. Identification of Candidate Chemicals. The final SCP Regulations promulgated by DTSC include an initial list of candidate chemicals (~1,200), which DTSC later pared down to an informational “initial” list of fewer than 200 candidate chemicals that exhibit a hazard trait and/or environmental or toxicological endpoint.
  2. Identification of Priority Products. The SCP Regulations require DTSC to evaluate and prioritize product/candidate chemical combinations and to develop a list of priority products for which alternatives analyses must be conducted. Once a candidate chemical is the basis for a priority product listing, it is considered a chemical of concern. March 13’s announcement identifies the first product/candidate chemical combinations that DTSC is proposing to subject to the procedural process outlined in the SCP Regulations.
  3. Alternatives Analysis. Responsible entities of a product listed as a priority product must perform an alternatives analysis to determine how best to limit exposures to, or the level of adverse public health and environmental impacts posed by, the chemicals of concern in the product.
  4. DTSC Regulatory Response. The SCP Regulations provide a range of potential regulatory responses that DTSC may require after review of the alternatives analysis. These include provision of information for consumers (such as safe handling or instructions to limit exposure), restrictions on the use of chemicals of concern in the products, sales prohibition, engineered safety measures, and end-of-life management requirements. DTSC may require regulatory responses for a priority product (if the responsible entity decides to continue producing and distributing the priority product to the California market), or for an alternative product selected to replace the priority product.

Applicability

The SCP regulatory requirements apply to businesses (“responsible entities”) that manufacture, import, distribute, sell or assemble consumer products[1] identified by DTSC as priority products that are placed into the stream of commerce in California. Responsible entities are defined to include manufacturers, importers, retailers and assemblers. The SCP Regulations assign the principal duty to comply with the requirements to manufacturers. If a manufacturer does not comply with its obligations with regard to a priority product, DTSC may notify an importer, retailer or assembler of its duty to meet the requirements with respect to the priority product. Even if not called on to conduct an alternatives analysis, importers, assemblers and/or retailers of priority products may be impacted by regulatory responses selected by DTSC after the manufacturer’s completion of the alternatives analysis (e.g., if DTSC imposes a sales prohibition or requires additional information to be provided to the consumer at the point of sale) .

Requirements for Responsible Entities

Once the draft priority products are formally proposed and finalized through a public rulemaking process (which may take up to one year), responsible entities will be required to:

  • Within 60 days after finalization of the final priority products list, notify DTSC that the responsible entity makes or sells a priority product (DTSC will post information obtained from notifications, including the names of the responsible entities as well as the product names, on its web site);
  • Within 180 days after finalization of the final priority products list, prepare a Preliminary Alternatives Analysis[2] to determine how best to limit exposures to, or the level of adverse public health and environmental impacts posed by, the chemicals of concern in the product; and
  • Within one year after DTSC issues a Notice of Compliance for the Preliminary Alternatives Analysis, prepare a Final Alternatives Analysis.

Next Steps

Those that manufacture, sell, use, or otherwise have an interest in the draft priority products may wish to submit comments to DTSC as part of the priority product listing process. DTSC will follow a formal rulemaking process to finalize the draft priority products, which will take up to a year after the products are formally proposed. DTSC plans to hold several workshops in May and June of 2014 before publishing the notice of proposed rulemaking and opening the public comment period. Stakeholders will then have the opportunity to weigh in on whether, and how, the proposed priority products will be regulated by DTSC.

If your products were not among the three proposed priority products,stay tuned: By October 1, 2014, DTSC is required to issue a Priority Product Work Plan that identifies and describes the product categories that DTSC will evaluate to select priority products for the three years following the issuance of the Work Plan (roughly from 2015 to 2017). DTSC intends the Work Plan to serve as a signal to consumers and the regulated community as to the categories of products it will examine next.

Once DTSC finalizes the initial priority product listings (anticipated late summer or early fall of 2015), responsible entities will be required to meet a series of deadlines for notification and submission of alternatives analysis reports outlined above. Manufacturers of draft priority products should engage their supply chain partners to evaluate options prior to finalization of the priority product listings. Note that manufacturers that choose to reformulate products prior to finalization of the priority product listing will not be subject to the DTSC notification or alternatives analysis requirements.

[1] “Consumer product” is defined for purposes of the California Safer Consumer Products regulations to mean “a product or part of the product that is used, brought, or leased for use by a person for any purposes.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25251(e). Certain limited products, such as dental restorative material or its packaging, prescription drugs or devices and their packaging, medical devices and their packaging, food, and federally registered pesticides, and mercury containing lights are excluded from the definition of consumer product.

[2] DTSC is currently developing an alternatives analysis guidance document to assist responsible entities in carrying out their obligations under the SCP Regulations. As of March 13, 2014, the guidance is still in development. DTSC anticipates that it will be released sometime before the first set of priority products is finalized.

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California District Court Holds that Providing Cellphone Number for an Online Purchase Constitutes “Prior Express Consent” Under TCPA – Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).

In Baird, the plaintiff booked flights through the Hawaiian Airlines website. In order to complete her purchase, the plaintiff provided her cellphone number. Several weeks later she received a text message from the airline’s vendor, Sabre, Inc., inviting the plaintiff to receive flight notification services by replying “yes.” The plaintiff did not respond and no further messages were sent. The plaintiff sued the vendor claiming that it violated the TCPA by sending the single text message.

The central issue in Baird was whether, by providing her cellphone number to the airline, the plaintiff gave “prior express consent” to receive autodialed calls from the vendor under the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC promulgated TCPA implementing rules, including a ruling that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”). In support of this ruling, the FCC cited to a House Report stating that when a person provides their phone number to a business, “the called party has in essence requested the contact by providing the caller with their telephone number for use in normal business communications.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102–317, at 13 (1991)).

The court found that, while the 1992 FCC Order “is not a model of clarity,” it shows that the “FCC intended to provide a definition of the term ‘prior express consent.’” Id. at *5. Under that definition, the court held that the plaintiff consented to being contacted on her cellphone by an automated dialing machine when she provided the number to Hawaiian Airlines during the online reservation process. Id. at *6. Under the existing TCPA jurisprudence, a text message is a “call.” Id. at *1. Furthermore, although the plaintiff only provided her cellphone number to the airline (and not to Sabre, Inc., the vendor), the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.” Id. at *6. The Judge was likewise unmoved by the fact that the plaintiff was required to provide a phone number (though not necessarily a cellphone number) to complete the online ticket purchase. Indeed, the court observed that the affirmative act of providing her cellphone number was an inherently “voluntary” act and that, had the plaintiff objected, she could simply have chosen not to fly Hawaiian Airlines. Id.

Baird does not address the October 2013 TCPA regulatory amendments that require “prior express written consent” for certain types of calls made to cellular phones and residential lines (a topic that previously has been covered on this blog). See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2), (3) (emphasis added). “Prior express written consent” is defined as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorized such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8). Whether the Baird rationale would help in a “prior express written consent” case likely would depend on the underlying facts such as whether the consumer/plaintiff agreed when making a purchase to be contacted by the merchant at the phone number provided, and whether the consumer/plaintiff provided an electronic signature. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii).

Nonetheless, Baird is a significant win for the TCPA defense bar and significantly reduces TCPA risk for the defendants making non-telemarketing calls (or texts) to cellphones using an automated dialer (for which “prior express consent” is the principal affirmative defense). If that cellphone number is given by the consumer voluntarily (and, given the expansive logic of Baird, we wonder when it could be considered “coerced”), the defendant has obtained express consent. Baird leaves open a number of questions worth watching, including how far removed the third-party contractor can be from the company to whom a cellphone number was voluntarily provided. Judge Wilson seemed to think it was obvious to the consumer that a third-party might be utilized by an airline to provide flight status information, but how far does that go? We’ll be watching.

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Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

California Continues to Shape Privacy Standards: Song-Beverly Act Extended to Email Addresses

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Executive Summary: California retailer restricted from requiring a customer email address as part of a credit card transaction. We knew that asking for zip codes is intrusive personal questioning, and now asking for email has been added to the list.

California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act (Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1747 et seq.) (“Song-Beverly Act” or “Act”) restricts businesses from requesting, or requiring, as a condition to accepting credit card payments that the card holder provide “personal identification information” that is written or recorded on the credit card transaction form or otherwise. “Personal identification information” means “information concerning the cardholder,other than information set forth on the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the card holder’s address and telephone number.” The California Supreme Court has previously ruled that zip codes are also “personal identification information” under the Song-Beverly Act. See Pineda (Jessica) v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 2011 Cal. LEXIS 1502 (Cal. Feb. 10, 2011).

Recently, a United States federal district court in California expanded “personal identification information” to include email addresses in a decision denying retailer Nordstrom’s motion to dismiss claims it violated the Song-Beverly Act. The plaintiff sued Nordstrom for collecting his email address as part of a credit card transaction at one of its California stores in order to email him a receipt, then subsequently using his email address to send him frequent, unsolicited marketing emails. See Capp v. Nordstrom, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151867, 2013 WL 5739102 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013).

Raising a case of first impression under California law, Nordstrom claimed that email addresses are not “personal identification information” under the Song-Beverly Act, so the Act did not apply. The court disagreed with Nordstrom and found the opposite based on the California Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Pineda. Nordstrom’s argument that email addresses can readily be changed, unlike zip codes, and consumers can have multiple email addresses was not persuasive. The court held that an email address regards a card holder in a more personal and specific way than a zip code. Unlike a zip code that refers to the general area where a card holder works or lives, email permits direct contact with the consumer and implicates their privacy interests. The court concluded that the collection of email addresses is contrary to the Song-Beverly Act’s purpose to guard against misuse of personal information for marketing purposes. In particular, the plaintiff’s allegation that his email address was collected to send him a receipt and then used to send him promotional emails directly implicates the protective purposes of the Act as interpreted in Pineda.

Pineda held that zip codes are personal information for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act, and therefore a brick and mortar retailer violated the Act when it requested and recorded such data. In the Pineda decision, the California Supreme Court found that zip codes, like the card holder’s address expressly called out as “personal identification information” under the Act, were unnecessary to completing the credit card transaction and inconsistent with the protective purpose of the Act. This is especially true when a zip code is collected to be used with the card holder’s name in order to locate the card holder’s address, permitting a retailer to locate indirectly what it is prohibited from obtaining directly under the Act.

Nordstrom also argued that the plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act were preempted by the federal “Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act” (better known as the CAN-SPAM Act), but the court disagreed. While the CAN-SPAM Act contains a preemption provision, it only preempts state laws that regulate the manner in which email messages are sent and their content, both of which are not regulated under the Song-Beverly Act.

Retailer tip: The federal court issuing this most recent decision recommends waiting to request an email address (or a zip code) until after the consumer has the receipt from their credit card transaction in hand, and then sending the consumer emails only in conformance with the CAN-SPAM Act.

In the wake of Pineda, retailers faced class action lawsuits for requesting consumer zip codes at check out. This new decision could have a similar effect.

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Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

2014 Update for California Employers

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While 2013 was marked by some novel and interesting judicial and administrative decisions, including Quicken Loans (in which the National Labor Relations Board invalidated certain common employee handbook policies), Vance v. Ball State University (in which the U.S. Supreme Court established the parameters of who could be deemed a “supervisor” for employment discrimination purposes), Nelson v. Knight (in which the Iowa Supreme Court opined that an attractive female employee could be terminated because she was “too distracting” to the small business owner), and Purton v. Marriott (in which the California Court of Appeal addressed an employer’s liability for accidents caused by alcohol consumption at its holiday party), the California Legislature also enacted a number of new bills that become effective in 2014.

Among the most significant of these are the following:

Minimum Wage Increase and Resulting Salary Increase to Maintain Exempt-Employee Status (AB 10)

The California minimum wage will increase to $9.00 per hour, effective July 1, 2014, and to $10.00 per hour effective January 1, 2016. A less-advertised consequence of this increase, however, is the impact it will have on the salary test for preserving an employee’s exempt status. Under California law, a supervisor classified as exempt must be paid a monthly salary that is no less than two times the wages paid to a full-time minimum wage employee. After July 1, 2014, the minimum monthly salary to preserve exempt status under California Labor Code section 515, will rise to $3,120 per month, annualized to $37,440. As this change is scheduled to occur mid-year, employers are advised to make their adjustments early, if needed, to avoid this potential pitfall. In addition, under AB 442 the penalties available for minimum wage violations will now include “liquidated damages.”

Wage Rate Increases for Computer Software Employees and Physicians

Labor Code sections 515.5 and 515.6 provide exemptions for overtime for certain computer software employees and licensed physicians who earn a set minimum wage that is adjusted annually by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. Effective January 1, 2014, the minimum hourly rate increased to $40.38 (from $39.90) for computer professionals and to $73.57 (from $72.70) for physicians, reflecting a 1.2 percent increase in the California Consumer Price Index. Affected employers should adjust their rates accordingly.

Meal Periods, Rest Breaks, And Now “Recovery Periods” (SB 435)

For several years, the California Code of Regulations has required employers of outdoor-working employees to allow their outdoor workers the opportunity to “take a cool-down rest in the shade for a period of no less than five minutes when they feel the need to do so to protect themselves from overheating.” (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 8, § 3395, subd. (d)(3).) Previously, an employer who failed to provide these cool-down recovery periods was subject to a citation issued by the California Division of Safety and Health. But now, effective January 1, 2014, SB 435 provides employees with a right, under California Labor Code § 226.7, to seek recovery of statutory damages each workday that an employer fails to provide an employee with these cool-down recovery periods. Employers with outdoor-working employees should review their current policies and practices to ensure that meal periods, rest breaks, and recovery periods are addressed and afforded. 

Making It Harder For Prevailing Employers To Obtain Attorney’s Fees And Costs In Wage Cases (SB 462)

California Labor Code Section 218.5 allows the “prevailing party” to recover attorney’s fees and costs in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages (e.g., minimum or overtime wages), fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund contributions. SB 462 amends Labor Code Section 218.5 to make it more difficult for employers to obtain attorney’s fees and costs under this section. Indeed, effective January 1, 2014, to obtain attorney’s fees and costs under Labor Code Section 218.5, an employer must not only be the “prevailing party” in such an action, but the court must also find that the “employee brought the court action in bad faith.” On the other hand, due to the enactment of AB 1386, which amends Section 98.2 of the Labor Code, a final order of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement can create a lien on the employer’s real property to secure amounts due to a prevailing employee-claimant. Unless the lien is satisfied or released, it will continue for 10 years after the date of its creation.

The IRS To Begin Enforcing Its Rule That Automatic Gratuities Are Wages, Not Tips

Restaurants often add automatic gratuities on the bill of large parties (for example, a 20% automatic gratuity for parties of eight or more). Previously, for IRS purposes, these automatic gratuities were considered part of an employee’s “tips,” and thus the employee could pocket their share of automatic gratuities, and it was up to the employee to report them to their employer and on their tax return. Starting in 2014, however, the IRS will treat an employee’s portion of automatic gratuities as the employee’s regular wages and, as such, they will be subject to tax withholdings by the employer. Thus, employees will now receive their portion of automatic gratuities as part of their normal paychecks, and employers will be tasked with the responsibility of actively monitoring these wages, performing the necessary tax withholdings, and correctly reporting these wages to the IRS. Notably, because automatic gratuities will now be considered part of an employee’s regular wages for IRS purposes, employers should analyze whether they are required to account for these automatic gratuities when computing an employee’s overtime rate.

Wage Withholdings (SB 390)

Under Labor Code Section 227, it is unlawful for an employer to willfully, or with the intent to defraud, fail to make agreed-upon payments to health and welfare funds, pension funds or vacation plans, or other various benefit plans. SB 390 amends this provision so that it is now also unlawful for an employer to fail to remit withholdings from an employee’s wages that were made pursuant to state, local, or federal law, such as taxes. SB 390 further provides that in criminal proceedings under this section, any withholdings that are recovered from an employer shall be forwarded to the appropriate fund or plan and, if restitution is imposed, the court shall direct to which agency, entity, or person it shall be paid. 

Criminal History Inquiries (SB 530)

On October 10, 2013, Governor Jerry Brown approved SB 530, which amends California Labor Code Section 432.7 to include additional prohibitions for employers related to pre-employment inquiries into an individual’s prior criminal history. California law already prohibits employers from asking applicants to disclose, or from using, arrest records. Effective January 1, 2014, employers are prohibited from asking job applicants to disclose, or from utilizing as a factor in determining any condition of employment, information concerning a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed. SB 530 exempts employers from the above requirements in the following circumstances: (1) the employer is required by law to obtain such information; (2) the applicant would be required to possess or use a firearm during the course of the employment; (3) an individual who has been convicted of a crime is prohibited from holding the position sought by the applicant, regardless of whether that conviction has been expunged, judicially ordered se
aled, statutorily eradicated, or judicially dismissed following probation; and (4) the employer is prohibited by law from hiring an applicant who has been convicted of a crime.

As with the existing version of Section 432.7, SB 530 allows an applicant to recover from an employer the greater of actual damages or two hundred dollars ($200), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, for a violation of the statute and the greater of treble actual damages or five hundred dollars ($500), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, for an intentional violation of the statute. An intentional violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).

This expanded protection for applicants with criminal conviction records supplements the federal government’s recent efforts on this topic. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has published an Enforcement Guidance on the consideration of conviction records in employment decisions. In order to avoid claims of disparate treatment or impact, the EEOC recommends that employers develop narrow policies that determine the specific criminal offenses that may demonstrate unfitness for particular jobs. The EEOC recommends individualized assessments as opposed to blanket policies. Employers should carefully review their job application form to ensure compliance with these new requirements.

Domestic Worker Bill of Rights (AB 241)

Another wage-and-hour change comes from the Domestic Worker Bill of Rights, which took effect January 1, 2014. The new legislation establishes, among other things, overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay to caregivers who work more than nine hours a day or more than 45 hours a week. Covered caregivers include those who provide one-on-one care for 80 percent or more of their duties, such as nannies and in-home caregivers of the elderly or disabled. It does not cover babysitters, family members who provide babysitting services, or caregivers of low-income individuals through California’s In Home Supportive Service. Caregivers who work at facilities that provide lodging or boarding are also excluded.

Victims’ Rights to Time Off From Work (SB 288)

Employers may not retaliate or discriminate against employees who are victims of certain felony crimes, domestic violence or sexual assault for taking time off from work to appear in court or to obtain prescribed relief. A new addition to California Labor Code — Section 230.5 — now will also prohibit an employer from terminating or discriminating against an employee who is a victim of certain additional specified criminal offenses from taking time off to appear in court. These specified offenses include vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, felony child abuse, felony stalking and many other “serious felonies.” The employee-victim may take such time off from work to appear in court to be heard at any proceeding involving a postarrest release decision, plea, sentencing, postconviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue. Employers should include a policy addressing this leave of absence right in their employee handbooks.

Victims of Stalking (SB 400)

Sections 230 and 230.1 of the California Labor Code set forth various protections for victims of domestic violence or sexual assault. SB 400 expands these protections to victims of stalking and also requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to such victims. The bill defines reasonable accommodations to include a transfer, reassignment, modified schedule, changed work telephone, changed work station, installed lock, an implemented safety procedure, or another adjustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement in response to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or referral to a victim assistance organization. As with reasonable accommodations for disabilities, employers must engage in a timely, good faith, and “interactive process” with the affected employee to determine effective reasonable accommodations. Again, language should be added to an employee handbook to address this new right.

Family Temporary Disability Insurance Program (SB 770)

Beginning on July 1, 2014, the scope of the family temporary disability program will be expanded to include time off to care for a seriously ill grandparent, grandchild, sibling or parent-in-law. The employee’s certification required to qualify to take such leave to care for a family member must include a number of items, including a statement that the serious health condition warrants the participation of the employee to care for the family member. “Warrants the participation of the employee” includes providing psychological comfort as well as arranging third party care for the family member.

Sexual Harassment Definition Clarified (SB 292)

SB 292 amends the definition of harassment under California law to clarify that sexually harassing conduct does not need to be motivated by sexual desire. This law is intended to overturn the decision in Kelley v. Conoco Companies which had affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff in a same-sex harassment case on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the alleged harasser harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff. This legislation may signal an interest by Sacramento in passing broader “anti-bullying” protections for California employees.

Expansion of Employee Whistleblower Protections (SB 496)

On October 12, 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law SB 496, which amends Section 1102.5 of the California Labor Code to provide greater whistleblower protections to employees who disclose information related to their employer’s alleged violations of or failure to comply with the law. Specifically, SB 496 now provides that an employee’s disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency regarding their employer’s violation of local rules or regulations is a legally protected disclosure. Formerly, employees were only protected if they disclosed information regarding their employer’s noncompliance with state and federal laws. Employees now enjoy complete whistleblower protection for disclosing information if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information shows a violation of a state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation. Also, disclosures made to a supervisor of another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover and correct the alleged legal violation is a significant expansion of the protection under SB 496. Interestingly, the statute’s expansion now also includes the circumstance where the employer merely “believes the employee disclosed or may disclose information.” Employers are subject to steep civil penalties, up to $10,000 per violation, if they prevent or retaliate against an employee for an employee’s disclosure of information related to their employer’s violation of the law or refusal to participate in any activity which would result in a violation of local, state, or federal law.

Unfair Immigration-Related Practices (AB 263, SB 666)

AB 263 amends several sections of the California Labor Code, all with the goal of providing greater employee protections for making complaints regarding unsafe, unfair and illegal work practices. First, AB 263 amends Section 98.6 of the Labor Code to include an employee’s written or oral complaint of unpaid wages as a legally protected activity. Employers may not discharge or in any manner discriminate, retaliate or take any adverse action against an employee for making such a complaint regarding unpaid wages owed to them. Under AB 263, employers are now at risk of facing a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per employee for each violation for failing to comply with Section 98.6.

AB 263 further amends the Labor Code by adding protections for immigrant
employees. Under the new Unfair Immigration-Related Practices section of the Labor Code (sections 1019 et seq.), employers may not engage in any unfair immigration-related practice, as defined under the statute, against any employee for the purpose or intent of retaliating against employees for the exercise of any right afforded to them under the law. The term “unfair immigration-related practice” is defined to include: (i) requesting more or different documents than are required under federal immigration law, (ii) refusing to honor immigration-related documents that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine; (iii) using the federal E-Verify system to check the employment authorization status of a person at a time or in a manner not required by federal law, (iv) threatening to file or the filing of a false police report, and (v) threatening to contact immigration authorities. Now, without the threat of reprise from their employer regarding their immigration status, employees are allowed to (1) make a good-faith complaint or disclosure of an employer’s violation of or noncompliance with any federal, state or local law; (2) seek information regarding their employer’s compliance with federal, state or local laws; or (3) inform and assist other employees of their rights or remedies under the law. Employers are subject to heavy sanctions for any unlawful threat, attempt, or actual use of an employee’s immigration status to retaliate against an employee for engaging in legally protected workplace activities. Sanctions may include, but are not limited to, up to a 90-day suspension of the employer’s business licenses and a host of other civil damages.

Another legislative enactment, SB 666, provides that businesses licensed under the Business and Professions Code (including lawyers, accountants, engineers, and contractors) are subject to suspension, revocation, or disbarment if they are determined to have reported or threatened to report an employee’s, former employee’s, or prospective employee’s citizenship or immigration status, or the citizenship or immigration status of a family member of the same, to a federal, state, or local agency because the employee, former employee, or prospective employee exercises a right under the provisions of the Labor Code, the Government Code, or the Civil Code. In addition to any other remedies available, the bill provides for a civil penalty, not to exceed $10,000 per employee for each violation, to be imposed against a corporate or limited liability company employer. The bill contains an important exception, stating that an employer is not subject to suspension or revocation for requiring a prospective or current employee to submit, within three business days of the first day of work for pay, an I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification form. (Beginning not later than January 1, 2015, the DMV will be required to issue driver’s licenses to certain non U.S. citizens, although this particular form of driver’s license may not be used to verify employment eligibility for purposes of a Form I-9.)

Finally, certain unfair immigration-related practices are also a crime. For example, Penal Code section 518 defines “extortion” as the obtaining of property from another, with his/her consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear. Extortion is punishable as a felony by up to four years in jail. AB 524, which amends the Penal Code, provides that “wrongful use of force or fear” now includes the threat to report an individual or their family’s immigration status or suspected immigration status.

Expansion of Leaves of Absence for Emergency Duty (AB 11)

Existing California law requires employers to provide temporary leaves of absence for volunteer firefighters so that they could attend required fire or law enforcement trainings. AB 11 expands the protected leave rights for volunteer firefighters, reserve peace officers, and emergency rescue personnel, and allows for leave for emergency rescue training in addition to fire or law enforcement training. The law applies only to employers with 50 or more employees. Under the law, employees that are fired, threatened with being fired, demoted, suspended, or otherwise discriminated against because they took time off for qualifying training are entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits. Employee handbooks should be revised to comply with this expanded law.

Military and Veteran Status Is Now a Protected Category Under the FEHA (AB 556)

AB 556 broadens the scope of “protected categories” under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act to include “military and veteran status.” Under the law, an employee with “military and veteran status” is defined as a member or veteran of the United States Armed Forces, United States Armed Forces Reserve, the United States National Guard, and the California National Guard. The law provides an exemption in circumstances where an employer makes an inquiry into an employee’s military status to afford the employee preferential treatment in hiring. All equal employment opportunity policies should now include this additional protected category.

Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance

San Francisco’s Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance (“FFWO”) became effective on January 1, 2014. As currently written, the ordinance applies to employers with 20 or more employees, although an amendment is expected to pass early in the year which will clarify that the ordinance applies regardless of where the 20 employees are based. The ordinance provides employees who are employed within San Francisco, who have been employed for six months or more, and who work at least eight hours per week with the right to request flexible work arrangements to assist with caregiving responsibilities. Such requests may include but are not limited to modified work schedule, changes in start and/or end times for work, part-time employment, job sharing arrangements, working from home, telecommuting, reduction or change in work duties, and predictability in the work schedule. The employee may request the flexible or predictable working arrangement to assist with care for a child or children under the age of eighteen, a person or persons with a serious health condition in a family relationship with the employee, or a parent (age 65 or older) of the employee. Within 21 days of an employee’s request for a flexible or predictable working arrangement, an employer must meet with the employee regarding the request. The employer must respond to an employee’s request within 21 days of that meeting. An employer who denies a request must explain the denial in a written response that sets out a bona fide business reason for the denial and provides the employee with notice of the right to request reconsideration. The ordinance also has posting and recordkeeping obligations and prohibits retaliation for exercising rights protected by the ordinance. Employers with any San Francisco based employees (whether they telecommute or otherwise) should consider revisions to employee handbooks, comply with posting obligations (in English, Spanish, Chinese and any language spoken by at least 5% of the employees the workplace or job site), and establish a procedure to timely handle written requests for flexible work arrangements under the FFWO.

Employers throughout California (whether in San Francisco or not) should also be aware of possible discrimination against workers with caregiving responsibilities, as this might constitute employment discrimination based on sex, disability or other protected characteristics. Some of these issues are summarized in the EEOC’s guidance entitled “Employer Best Practices for Workers With Caregiving Responsibilities.” 

Article by:

Of:

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

I Scream, You Scream, We All Scream For…Ascertainability? Re: How Ben & Jerry’s Defeated an “All Natural” Class Certification Motion

Sheppard Mullin 2012

 

On January 7, 2014, the Northern District of California refused to certify a class of Ben & Jerry’s purchasers who allegedly had purchased ice cream that was falsely advertised as “all natural.” Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. C 10-4387 PJH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1640 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014).  This opinion shows the continuing viability of arguments based on ascertainability and the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) to defeat consumer class actions.  Thus, for many defendants, this opinion will get 2014 off to a delicious start.

In Astiana, the plaintiff alleged that certain Ben & Jerry’s ice creams were not “all natural” because they contained “alkalized cocoa processed with a synthetic ingredient.”  Astiana, p. 4.  After asserting claims under the Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, as well as common law fraud and unjust enrichment, the plaintiff sought to certify a class of all California purchasers of “Ben & Jerry’s ice cream products that were labeled ‘All Natural’ but contained alkalized cocoa processed with a synthetic ingredient.”

The court denied class certification.  First, the court held that the class was not ascertainable so that it was “administratively feasible to determine whether a particular person is a class member.” Astiana, p. 5.  The court found that the plaintiff provided no evidence as to how the plaintiff could tell which consumers purchased ice cream with the synthetic ingredients because the synthetic ingredient was not present in every ice cream labeled as “all natural.”  Furthermore, because cocoa could be processed with a “natural” alkali, the ingredient list that only said “processed with alkali” was insufficient to identify the non-natural ice creams.  Even though only one supplier provided Ben & Jerry’s with the alkalized cocoa, the evidence demonstrated that the supplier did not know whether a synthetic ingredient was used in every instance.  Thus, even if every package was labeled “all natural,” it was impossible to tell which products actually contained the synthetic ingredients that would make the advertised claim false under California law.

Second, applying Comcast, the court held that the plaintiff was required to show “that there is a classwide method of awarding relief that is consistent with her theory of deceptive and fraudulent business practices.”  Astiana, p. 21.  The plaintiff offered no expert testimony on calculating damages, contending, instead, that it would be “simple math” to calculate Ben & Jerry’s profits and award “restitutionary disgorgement.”  The court held that this was insufficient: there was no evidence that the price of Ben & Jerry’s “all natural” ice cream was higher than its ice cream without that label, thus there was no evidentiary model tying damages to plaintiff’s theory of the case.  Since Ben & Jerry’s sold its products at wholesale (rather than to the public directly), these calculations would be extremely difficult, thereby debunking the plaintiff’s claim that the damages could be figured out with “simple math” and proving the need for expert testimony.  In light of the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence of “a damages model that is capable of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3),” class certification was denied.

Astiana demonstrates that plaintiffs seeking to certify class actions involving small consumables will continue to run into ascertainability problems.  See e.g. Carrera v. Bayer, Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).  Astiana also represents the application of the strong reading of Comcast, essentially telling plaintiffs “No damages expert, no certification.”  If courts continued to adopt this reading of Comcast, plaintiffs will no longer be able to gloss over these significant (and oftentimes difficult) damages issues by simply asserting that the court can certify now and figure out the damages later.

Article by:

Paul Seeley

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP