Exporting U.S. Antitrust Law: Are We Really Ready for NOPEC?

The year is 1979. Inflation and lines at the gas pumps caused by a revolution in Iran have stunned Americans. Driven to action, the International Association of Machinists (IAM) files suit in the Central District of California against OPEC and its 14 member countries for participating in a cartel that controls the worldwide price of oil. None of the defendants made any kind of appearance before the court. Nonetheless, the union lost, and its case was dismissed.

Under the Constitution, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A district court has no power to decide a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. The requirement cannot be waived or avoided; a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction has no legal authority to entertain the matter. A federal statute known as the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA) limits the court’s jurisdiction in cases involving foreign sovereigns and, subject to a few specific exceptions, grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The court in IAM v. OPEC raised the FSIA on its own (there being no defendants present) and, finding the OPEC states immune (OPEC itself could not be served), dismissed the case. Thusly did the IAM lose its antitrust case against defendants who never even showed up in court.

The judiciary has resisted the innumerable attempts since 1979 to hold the OPEC cartel accountable for violating U.S. antitrust laws, even though the court’s IAM decision has proven erroneous. Acts by a sovereign “based upon a commercial activity” in the U.S., or affecting U.S. commerce, do not enjoy immunity under FSIA. Although the district court in IAM didn’t think so, the Ninth Circuit on appeal made clear that pricing of oil on world markets is indeed commercial activity that affects the U.S. economy and, therefore, not entitled to sovereign immunity. But the Appeals Court nonetheless sidestepped the case, taking refuge in the judge-made Act-of-State doctrine. The doctrine is prudential, as opposed to jurisdictional, and amounts to a voluntary renunciation of jurisdiction by a court when its decision could interfere with the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch. Indeed, it is easy to see how a suit against the members of OPEC for price fixing might intrude into a sensitive foreign policy area.

In the four decades since IAM, these considerations have obstructed U.S. courts from holding OPEC accountable for a cartel formed for the purpose of and with the effect of stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce, which is illegal per se. As recently as 2010, the Obama administration urged the Fifth Circuit to dismiss an antitrust suit brought by private plaintiffs on Act-of-State grounds, it being up to the executive branch and not the courts to conduct foreign policy and protect national security interests.

Since 2000, when the first No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Act was introduced in the House, the same legislation has been introduced no less than four times. NOPEC came closest to passage in 2007, when different versions of the bill passed the House and the Senate but were not reconciled. The House and Senate judiciary committees have now both approved the bill, and the latest version is on the Senate’s legislative calendar. Congress could act quickly if there is bipartisan support, otherwise it will take several months and require reintroduction in 2023.

NOPEC consists of three operative parts.

  • First, it would amend the Sherman Antitrust Act by adding a new Section 7(a) that explicitly makes it illegal for any foreign state to act collectively with others to limit production, fix prices, or otherwise restrain trade with respect to oil, natural gas, or other petroleum products. Judicial enforcement and a remedy would be available only to the Department of Justice, so the bill does not create a private right of action.

  • Second, it would amend FSIA to explicitly grant jurisdiction to U.S. court against foreign sovereigns to the extent they are engaged in a violation of the new Section 7(a).

  • Third, the legislation clarifies that the Act-of-State doctrine does not prevent U.S. courts from deciding antitrust cases against sovereigns alleged to have violated the new Section 7(a).

Calls for taking a harder line against OPEC are growing stronger in light of recent actions taken by the cartel. In May, for example, Saudi Arabia and 10 other OPEC members voted to slash oil production – resulting in high gas prices – as the U.S. and other nations imposed embargoes on Russian oil. OPEC’s production cuts provided Russia with a substantial lifeline in its increasingly difficult, costly, and prolonged invasion of Ukraine.

The Senate bill is sponsored by ​​Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Chuck Grassley and cosponsors Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) Mike Lee (R-UT), and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who argue that OPEC’s price-fixing goes directly against the idea of fair and open markets, with current laws leaving the U.S. government “powerless” over OPEC. But are we really ready for NOPEC?

The concern over interference with foreign policy is far from trivial.

The American Petroleum Institute (API) recently sent a letter to Congress opposing the NOPEC bill, stating it would harm U.S. military, diplomatic, and business relations. API President and CEO Mike Sommers warned that while NOPEC is a noble endeavor designed to protect consumers, it would open the U.S. up to reciprocal lawsuits by foreign entities, writing that this could devastate certain political relations and trigger retaliation from OPEC countries. Other NOPEC critics say OPEC countries may limit other business dealings with the U.S., including lucrative arms deals or by pulling in their investments, as Saudi Arabia threatened to do in 2007, when the Deputy Saudi Oil Minister said the country would pull out of a multi-billion Texas oil refinery project unless the DOJ filed a statement of interest urging dismissal of an antitrust case then pending in the U.S. courts. In 2019, Saudi Arabia and OPEC threatened to start selling their oil in currencies other than the dollar, which would weaken the dollar’s position as the global vehicle currency.

For these reasons, it’s not clear what the White House would do if NOPEC passes. The Biden administration’s view of the measure seems to have shifted a bit, but it hasn’t come out strongly one way or the other. This is hardly surprising given the delicate and complex nature of the issue, the ongoing impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the great importance voters place on the price of gas. Then-Press Secretary Jen Psaki said on May 5, 2022, that the “potential implications and unintended consequences of this legislation require further study and deliberation.” More recently, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Brian Deese, President Biden’s Director of the National Economic Council, said that nothing is off of the table – that the administration is assessing the situation and inviting recommendations. On Oct. 5 the Department of Energy said it would release another 10 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In making that announcement, Sullivan and Deese said the administration will consult with Congress on “additional tools and authorities to reduce OPEC’s control over energy prices.” They also reiterated the importance of investing in clean American-made energy to reduce reliance on foreign fossil fuels.

OPEC has such tremendous sway over U.S. gas prices and national security it is no wonder Congress continues to try to do something to free U.S. from OPEC’s whims and hold it accountable for going against the ideals of free markets. But whether NOPEC is the right approach remains an open question.

The antitrust laws represent a national ideological perspective on the most beneficial way to organize an economy. Policy differences between nations are supposed to occur in the diplomatic arena, not in the courts of one country or another. And if OPEC or its members lose an antitrust case in a U.S. court, how will the court enforce its judgment?

© MoginRubin LLP

Five States Put Abortion Questions on the Ballot; Health Care and Other Employers Should Stay Tuned

In the wake of the landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, we have been closely monitoring legal developments across the country. In addition to well publicized “trigger laws” that were effectuated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s order, states have taken up a variety of legislative actions in response to the ruling, which placed authority for the regulation of abortion with the states.

On Election Day, five states will have voters consider various proposals in light of Dobbs and its directive that abortion law belongs with the people. Here is a run-down of abortion-related ballot initiatives that will be put to a popular vote on November 8, 2022.

A Constitutional Amendment for California

On the ballot in California is Proposition 1: Constitutional Right to Reproductive Freedom, which would amend the state Constitution at Article I, Section 1.1, to provide that the state cannot “deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives.” Any amendment to the California Constitution requires a simple majority of voters. If the amendment is passed, changes take effect the fifth day after the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election.

Should Proposition 1 pass, it would add express protection for reproductive freedom, including decisions about abortion and contraception, to the state constitution, under its existing guaranteed right to privacy. If the proposition does not pass, it will not affect the status quo of reproductive rights in California: while current protections for abortion and other reproductive medical care would not be constitutionally guaranteed, they would remain in place under state law.

California currently has strong protections for the right to abortion, generally only prohibiting abortion at viability. Since the Dobbs decision earlier this year, California has promoted access to abortion, including launching abortion.ca.gov, a website dedicated towards providing information on reproductive health care services to people both inside and outside of California. Recently, in late September, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a package of 12 bills of abortion protections, aimed towards improving access to abortion and protecting patients and clinicians who undergo or provide them.

With the backdrop of an already-strong California legal reproductive health network, consistent polling indicates the ballot measure is expected to pass by a wide margin. Passage of the proposition will likely signal and establish the state as a refuge for individuals from more restrictive states seeking abortions.

Michigan May Modify its Constitution, Too

Michigan will also turn to its voters to decide whether its state constitution should be amended to include protections for abortion. The Michigan proposal, referred to as “Proposal 3 of 2022 – ‘Reproductive Freedom for All’ Petition,” seeks to protect the right to an abortion with a constitutional amendment that declares a right to reproductive freedom. The petition sets forth proposed language for a new section of the Michigan Constitution, stating, in part, that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care.”

Proposal 3 would take effect 45 days following the ballot initiative if approved by the majority of voters. It would (1) establish new individual rights to reproductive freedom, to broadly include the right to make and carry out all decisions relating to pregnancy; (2) permit state regulation of abortion in limited circumstances; (3) forbid discrimination in enforcement of reproductive rights; (4) prohibit adverse action by the state with respect to “potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes;” and (5) invalidate state laws that conflict with the Constitution as amended by Proposal 3.

If Proposal 3 is not passed and the state constitution remains as is, the future of the right to an abortion in Michigan will be unclear. Michigan has a pre-Roe ban that, if enforced, would prohibit abortion in nearly all situations and make abortions in non-life saving circumstances potentially prosecuted as manslaughter. However, a Michigan Court of Claims judge granted a permanent injunction in Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s suit to block local prosecutors from enforcing the ban. The ban is subject to an ongoing lawsuit.

Given the uncertainty of the ballot initiative’s outcome, Michigan employers should closely monitor the results of the November 8, 2022 vote.

Vermont’s Vote

In Vermont, abortion remains legal after Dobbs under state law. However, on November 8, 2022, voters will have the opportunity to further protect abortion rights through a ballot initiative. This initiative, referred to as Proposal 5, asks registered Vermont voters whether they are in favor of amending the state’s constitution to add the following language: “That an individual’s right to personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Passage would guarantee the right to access and obtain an abortion as well as other reproductive care, and prohibit government infringement of reproductive rights absent a compelling state interest, which would need to be achieved through the least restrictive means.

Should Proposal 5 pass, the resulting constitutional amendment is not expected to significantly alter the legal landscape of abortion in Vermont, which currently has strong protection for the right to abortion. If approved, the amendment will become part of Vermont’s constitution on November 22, 2022.

In Contrast, Kentucky Seeks to Constitutionally Exclude Abortion Rights

Kentuckians will cast their votes deciding whether to amend the state’s constitution to explicitly provide that the state constitution offers no protection for a right to abortion. The proposal further clarifies that there is no constitutional right to use public funds for abortion. “Constitutional Amendment 2” poses the following question to voters: “Are you in favor of amending the Constitution of Kentucky by creating a new Section of the Constitution to be numbered Section 26A to state as follows: ‘To protect human life, nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion?’”

If the majority of votes are affirmative, a new section will be added to Kentucky’s constitution. This does not constitute an outright abortion ban, but rather prohibits courts from finding an implicit right to an abortion within the state’s constitution. Kentucky laws restricting abortion, including those triggered by Dobbs, are among the most restrictive in the nation. Approval of Constitutional Amendment 2 would not alter these laws or their existing narrow exceptions, which permit the procedure only when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.

An advisory from the Kentucky Attorney General provides further color on the ramifications of the amendment, noting that Amendment 2 does not ban abortion, but rather ensures that elected officials of Kentucky’s General Assembly, and not courts, would regulate abortion. The Advisory also explains that implementation of Amendment 2 would not amend other provisions in the state’s constitution.

Montana’s Ballot – NOT a Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Abortion is currently legal in Montana, as a 1999 Supreme Court ruling held that the state constitution protects abortion under its right-of-privacy provision. However, in 2021, a number of restrictive abortion laws were enacted, including a law that prohibits abortions after 20 weeks. These laws are under legal challenge by abortion providers and are temporarily enjoined pending litigation.

Meanwhile, on the ballot for November 8 is a referendum on LR-131, also known as the Born Alive Infant Protection Act. The Act proposes a new statute that would classify any infant born alive as “a legal person” and require the provision of “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to such person. This would include all infants born alive from an induced labor, C-section, or attempted abortion. The Act also includes a provision mandating providers, employees, and volunteers to report a failure to comply to law enforcement, and sets forth criminal penalties. Violation of this law would be a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison or a fine of up to $50,000. The proposed law is aimed at health care workers, and does not impose liability on parents or other parties.

Health care providers have raised concerns that the broad language of the bill could lead to unintended consequences, particularly for OB/GYN practitioners. Health care providers would be required to take “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to keep any infant alive, but these terms are not defined in the bill. Health care workers that could be held liable include doctors, nurses, and “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service of procedure.”

If approved by the Montana electorate, the law would take effect on January 1, 2023. Hospitals and other health care providers would need to reexamine their operating procedures to comply with the bill, should it pass, including compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

Keeping Up With The Changes

We continue to track litigation, legislative developments, and the entirety of the post-Dobbs legal landscape as it continues to shift. Our 50-state survey and other resources provide employers, health care providers, life sciences stakeholders, and others impacted by these rapidly changing circumstances with in-depth analysis and monthly updates. Election Day results will be another element of this evolving story.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Five New Employment Laws that Every California Employer Should Know

A new year brings new employment laws for California employers.  California employers will want to begin revising employee policies and handbooks now, so that they are prepared to comply with these new laws when the majority of them go into effect on January 1, 2023.  Here are five new employment laws that every California employer should know:

AB 1041 (Expanded Definition of “Family Member” for Medical and Sick Leave)

Through AB 1041, the California legislature amended Government Code section 12945.2 and Labor Code section 245.5 to expand the definition of “designated person” for purposes of employee medical leave.  Section 12945.2 provides qualifying employees with up to 12 workweeks in any 12-month period for unpaid family care and medical leave.  Section 245.5 relates to California paid sick leave.  Both sections permit an employee to take protected leave to care for a “family member,” which is currently defined as a child, parent, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, spouse, or domestic partner.  With the passage of AB 1041, the Legislature added a “designated person” to this list of “family members” for whom an employee may take protected leave.  A “designated person” is defined as “any individual related by blood or whose association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship.”  In light of this broad definition, employers should be prepared to provide employees with leave to care for a wider range of persons.  An employee may identify his or her designated person at the time of requesting protected leave.  However, an employer may limit an employee to one designated person per 12-month period.

AB 1949 (Bereavement Leave)

AB 1949 adds section 12945.7 to the Government Code, in order to provide employees with protected leave for bereavement.  Under this new law, eligible employees may request up to five days of bereavement leave upon the death of a qualifying family member.  Family member is defined as a spouse, child, parent, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, domestic partner, or parent in law.  Although the employee must complete bereavement leave within three months of the family member’s death, the employer may not require that the five days be used consecutively.  Statutory bereavement leave is unpaid, but the employer must allow the employee to use any accrued and unused paid vacation, personal leave, sick leave, or other paid time off for this purpose.  Section 12945.7 prohibits discrimination, interference or retaliation against an employee for taking bereavement leave; also, the employer must maintain confidentiality when an employee takes bereavement leave. Finally, section 12945.7 does not apply to certain union employees, with an existing agreement regarding bereavement leave.

SB 1162 (Posting Pay Ranges and EEO Reporting Requirements)

SB 1162 modifies Government Code section 12999 and Labor Code section 432.3 to require employers to provide candidates with salary ranges on job postings, report employee compensation and demographic information to the California Civil Rights Department (formerly the DFEH) on an annual basis, and retain relevant records.  For job postings (including those posted by third parties), employers with 15 or more employees will be required to include a pay range, which is defined as the salary or hourly wage range that the employer reasonably expects to pay for the position.  In addition to the current requirement that, upon request, the employer must provide a candidate a pay range, the employer must now also provide existing employees with a pay range, when requested.  Failure to comply with the pay range disclosure or record retention requirements can result in penalties of up to $10,000 per violation.

The new reporting requirement concerns annual employer pay data reports.  Employers must now report the median and mean hourly rate by each combination of race, ethnicity, and sex, within each job category, with the first report due on May 10, 2023, based on 2022 pay data.  Employers with 100 or more employees hired through labor contractors must now produce data on pay, hours worked, race/ethnicity, and gender information in a separate report.  Employers who fail to timely file these required reports face civil penalties of up to $200 per employee.

Finally, employers must retain records of job titles and wage rate histories for each employee for the duration of the employee’s employment and three years after termination.  Failure to comply with these retention requirements can result in penalties of up to $10,000 per violation.

AB 2188 (Off the Job Cannabis Use Protection)

Effective January 1, 2024, AB 2188 adds section 12954 to the Government Code, which prohibits employers from discriminating against a person because of cannabis use while off the job, with some exceptions.  Employers may take action against a person who fails a pre-employment drug test, or other employer-required drug test, that does “not screen for non-psychoactive cannabis metabolites.”  This is because, according to the California Legislature, cannabis “matabolites do not indicate impairment, only that the individual has consumed cannabis in the last few weeks.”  The employer may administer a performance-based impairment test, and terminate any employee who is found to be impaired in the workplace.  This new law does not apply to employees in the building or construction industry, or in positions requiring a federal background investigation or clearance, and does not preempt state or federal laws that require employees to be tested for controlled substances.

AB 152 (COVID-19 Supplemental Paid Sick Leave Extension)

AB 152 modified Labor Code section 248.6 and 248.7 in order to extend COVID-19 Supplemental Paid Sick Leave (SPSL), previously blogged about here, which was expected to expire on September 30, 2022.  This new modification allows California employees to use any remaining SPSL through December 31, 2022.  It does not provide employees with new or additional SPSL.  In a departure from the original version of the law, when an employer requires an employee to take a COVID-19 test five days or later after a positive test result, the employer is now permitted to require the employee to submit to a second diagnostic test within no less than 24 hours.  If the employee refuses, the employer may decline to provide additional SPSL.  The employer obligation to cover the cost of any employee COVID-19 tests remains in effect.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

California PFAS Legislation Will Dramatically Impact Businesses

We previously reported on three significant pieces of California PFAS legislation that were before California’s Governor Newsom for ratification. Two of the bills were passed, which means that several categories of products will have applicable PFAS bans. The third bill was not signed by the Governor, which would have required companies to report certain data to the state for goods  sold in or otherwise brought into California that contain PFAS.

With increasing attention being given to PFAS in consumer goods in the media, scientific community, and in state legislatures, the California PFAS bills underscore the importance of companies anywhere in the manufacturing or supply chain for consumer goods to immediately assess the impact of the proposed PFAS legislation on corporate practices, and make decisions regarding continued use of PFAS in products, as opposed to substituting for other substances.  At the same time, companies impacted by the PFAS legislation must be aware that the new laws pose risks to the companies involvement in PFAS litigation in both the short and long term.

California PFAS Bills

One of our prior reports was on the first significant PFAS bill that Governor Newsom was expected to sign into law – AB 2771 – and which was indeed passed into law. The bill prohibits the manufacture, sale, delivery, hold, or offer for sale any cosmetics product that contains any intentionally added PFAS. The law would go into effect on January 1, 2025. The bill defines a cosmetics products as “an article for retail sale or professional use intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance.”

The second bill signed into law by the Governor is AB 1817, which bans the use of PFAS in textiles manufactured and sold in California. More specifically, the bill prohibits, beginning January 1, 2025, any person from “manufacturing, distributing, selling, or offering for sale in the state any new, not previously owned, textile articles that contain regulated PFAS” and requires a manufacturer to use the least toxic alternative when removing PFAS in textile articles to comply with these provisions. The bill requires a manufacturer of a textile article to provide persons that offer the product for sale or distribution in the state with a certificate of compliance stating that the textile article is in compliance with these provisions and does not contain any regulated PFAS. The bill specifically regulates three categories of textiles:

(1) “Textile articles” means textile goods of a type customarily and ordinarily used in households and businesses, and include, but are not limited to, apparel, accessories, handbags, backpacks, draperies, shower curtains, furnishings, upholstery, beddings, towels, napkins, and tablecloths;

(2) “Outdoor apparel” means clothing items intended primarily for outdoor activities, including, but not limited to, hiking, camping, skiing, climbing, bicycling, and fishing; and

(3) “Apparel”, defined as “clothing items intended for regular wear or formal occasions, including, but not limited to, undergarments, shirts, pants, skirts, dresses, overalls, bodysuits, costumes, vests, dancewear, suits, saris, scarves, tops, leggings, school uniforms, leisurewear, athletic wear, sports uniforms, everyday swimwear, formal wear, onesies, bibs, diapers, footwear, and everyday uniforms for workwear…outdoor apparel and outdoor apparel for severe wet conditions.

The bill that California’s Governor vetoed was AB 2247, which would have established reporting requirements for companies that utilize products or substances that contain PFAS and which are used in California in the stream of commerce. “The bill would [have] require[d], on or before July 1, 2026, and annually thereafter, a manufacturer, as defined, of PFAS or a product or a product component containing intentionally added PFAS that, during the prior calendar year, is sold, offered for sale, distributed, or offered for promotional purposes in, or imported into, the state to register the PFAS or the product or product component containing intentionally added PFAS, and specified other information, on the publicly accessible data collection interface.”

Impact of California PFAS Legislation On Businesses

California PFAS legislation places some of the most significant and widely used consumer products in the crosshairs with respect to PFAS. While other states have banned or otherwise regulated PFAS in certain specific consumer goods, California’s bills are noteworthy given the economic impact that it will have, considering that California is the fifth largest economy in the world.

It is of the utmost importance for businesses along the whole cosmetics supply chain to evaluate their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate these compounds. One major point of contention among members of various industries is whether to regulate PFAS as a class or as individual compounds.  While each PFAS compound has a unique chemical makeup and impacts the environment and the human body in different ways, some groups argue PFAS should be regulated together as a class because they interact with each other in the body, thereby resulting in a collective impact. Other groups argue that the individual compounds are too diverse and that regulating them as a class would be over restrictive for some chemicals and not restrictive enough for others.

Companies should remain informed so they do not get caught off guard. States are increasingly passing PFAS product bills that differ in scope. For any manufacturers, especially those who sell goods interstate, it is important to understand how those various standards will impact them, whether PFAS is regulated as individual compounds or as a class. Conducting regular self-audits for possible exposure to PFAS risk and potential regulatory violations can result in long term savings for companies and should be commonplace in their own risk assessment.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

California Law Prohibits Cooperation with Out-of-State Entities Regarding Lawful Abortion

In response to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, California Governor Gavin Newsom recently signed AB 1242 into law, which “prohibits law enforcement and California corporations from cooperating with out-of-state entities regarding a lawful abortion in California.”

In particular, AB 1242 prohibits California companies that provide electronic communication services from complying with out-of-state requests from law enforcement regarding an investigation into, or enforcement of, laws restricting abortion.

Sponsored by California Assembly member Rebecca Bauer-Kahan and California Attorney General Rob Bonta, AB 1242:

takes an innovative legal approach to protect user data. The bill prohibits California law enforcement agencies from assisting or cooperating with the investigation or enforcement of a violation related to abortion that is lawful in California. This law thereby blocks out-of-state law enforcement officers from executing search warrants on California corporations in furtherance of enforcing or investigating an anti-abortion crime. For example, if another state wants to track the movement of a woman traveling to California seeking reproductive health care, the state would be blocked from accessing cell phone site tower location data of the woman by serving a warrant to the tech company in California. In addition, if another state wants Google search history from a particular IP address, it could not serve an out-of-state search warrant at Google headquarters in CA without an attestation that the evidence is not related to investigation into abortion services. Although the first state to enact such a law, as California often is when it comes to privacy rights, we anticipate that other states will follow suit and that these laws will be hotly contested in litigation.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court’s Decision In Famous Hale & Norcross Mining Case

Having read Professor Stephen Bainbridge‘s post about the origins of the judicial doctrine that directors must act on an informed basis, I passed along a reference to the California Supreme Court’s in Fox v. Hale & Norcross Silver Mining Co.,  108 Cal. 369, 41 P. 308 (1895).   The Hale and Norcross mine was a famous silver and gold mine in Nevada’s Comstock mining district.  Samuel Clemens (aka Mark Twain), who had worked in Virginia City, Nevada, even bought shares in the mine on margin, as he related in Chapter 15 of his autobiography:

“One day I got a tip from Mr. Camp, a bold man who was always making big fortunes in ingenious speculations and losing them again in the course of six months by other speculative ingenuities. Camp told me to buy some shares in the Hale and Norcross. I bought fifty shares at three hundred dollars a share. I bought on a margin, and put up twenty per cent. It exhausted my funds. I wrote Orion [his brother and the first and only Secretary of the Nevada Territory] and offered him half, and asked him to send his share of the money. I waited and waited. He wrote and said he was going to attend to it. The stock went along up pretty briskly. It went higher and higher. It reached a thousand dollars a share. It climbed to two thousand, then to three thousand; then to twice that figure. The money did not come, but I was not disturbed. By and by that stock took a turn and began to gallop down. Then I wrote urgently. Orion answered that he had sent the money long ago–said he had sent it to the Occidental Hotel. I inquired for it. They said it was not there. To cut a long story short, that stock went on down until it fell below the price I had paid for it. Then it began to eat up the margin, and when at last I got out I was very badly crippled.”

Samuel Clemens disappointing investment predated by a number of years the litigation that resulted in the California Supreme Court’s opinion.

The Hale and Norcross mine was located in Nevada, but the corporation that owned it was incorporated in California.  That is why the shareholders sued the directors in the Golden, rather than the Silver, state.  The Supreme Court’s decision was big news.  The day after the decision was issued, The San Francisco Call published this lengthy article that not only described the case, but also published the decision itself and a drawing of the plaintiff, M.W. Fox.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Why More Than One Commodity May Not Be Commodities

A plural form of a noun usually implies a set having more than one member of the same type.  For example, a reference to “dogs” is understood to refer to more than one dog.  No one understands a reference to “dogs” to mean a dog, a cat and a mouse.  That is not necessarily the case, however, under the California Corporations Code.

Section 29005 of the Corporations Code defines “commodities” to mean “anything movable that is bought or sold”.  Section 29504 assigns a much broader definition to the singular term “commodity”:

“Commodity” means, except as otherwise specified by the commissioner by rule or order, any agricultural, grain, or livestock product or byproduct, any metal or mineral (including a precious metal set forth in Section 29515), any gem or gemstone (whether characterized as precious, semiprecious, or otherwise), any fuel (whether liquid, gaseous, or otherwise), any foreign currency, and all other goods, articles, products, or items of any kind.  However, the term “commodity” shall not include (a) a numismatic coin whose fair market value is at least 15 percent higher than the value of the metal it contains, or (b) any work of art offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction, or through a private sale by the owner of the work of art.

Putting these two definitions together, it is possible for a multiple items to be “commodities” even though a single item is not a “commodity”.  For example, a numismatic coin of the requisite value would not be a “commodity” even more than one such coin would meet the definition of “commodities”.   The explanation for these seemingly inconsistent definitions is that they are found in two different laws.  “Commodities” is defined in California’s Bucket Shop Law while “commodity” is defined in the California Commodity Law of 1990.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification Order Because Liability Issues, Not Merely Damages, Were Individualized

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed an issue that tends to arise frequently in class certification motion practice: how trial courts should apply the predominance requirement where appellate decisions have said that the need to calculate individualized damages generally is not sufficient on its own to defeat class certification, but some putative class members likely have no damages. On these types of issues, plaintiffs often try to characterize defendants’ arguments in opposition to class certification as raising mere “damages issues” that can be addressed individually at the end of a class case, and defendants often respond that the issues they raise go to liability, not merely damages, and in any event the damages trials would be too complicated and impractical. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that if determining liability requires highly individualized inquiries, a class should not be certified, and any individualized damages trials would have to be feasible.

In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., Nos. 18-16303, 18-17275, — F.4th –, 2022 WL 2433971 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022), the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to perform preservation services on properties being foreclosed on. They claimed that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors under California law, and therefore should have been paid overtime and reimbursed for business expenses. The district court certified a class, decided certain issues on partial summary judgment in favor of the class, and left for a later damages trial whether a class member worked overtime (and to what extent) and whether the class member was entitled to reimbursement for business expenses (and the amount thereof).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the class certification order. It explained that “We need not decide whether common evidence can prove that [defendant] has a uniform policy of misclassifying its vendors” because “[defendant’s] liability to any class member for failing to pay them overtime wages or to reimburse their business expenses would require highly individualized inquiries on whether that particular class member ever worked overtime or ever incurred any ‘necessary’ business expenses.” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs had “mischaracterize[d] an issue of individualized liability as an issue of individualized damages.” (Emphasis in original.) The Ninth Circuit explained that if the question involves the existence of damages, that is a liability issue, not a damages issue.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, under its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that damages were “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” because they could not “show that the whole class suffered damages traceable to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors,” even if the amounts of those damages would need to be proven individually. In addition, determining damages would require “excessive difficulty” because there was little documentary evidence, and “using the individual testimony of self-interested class members to calculate the overtime hours they worked and the business expenses they incurred isn’t easy.” In a bellwether trial conducted by the district court, eight trial days had been required to determine damages for a sample of only eleven class members.

This decision helpfully clarifies the perennial debate between what constitutes a “damages” issue versus a “liability” issue. As I’ve often written on this blog, it can be helpful to think about the class certification analysis by analyzing how the named plaintiffs’ or putative class members’ claims would be tried in an ordinary individual case, and what evidence the defendant would be entitled to introduce. Here, the bellwether trial helped the Ninth Circuit determine that this case could not be litigated on a class basis.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

For A Limited Time Only – California Is Giving Away Corporations, LLCs And More!

As a result of the recent enactment of California’s 2022-2023 Budget Bill, the California Secretary of State’s office has announced a temporary waiver of many business entity filing fees.   This waiver will last until June 30, 2023, the end of the state’s current fiscal year.

Here is the Secretary of State’s list of filings for which no filing fee is currently being imposed:

  • Articles of Organization – CA LLC

  • Registration – Out-of-State LLC

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Close

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Stock

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Insurer

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Professional

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Social Purpose

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Accountancy or Law (Professional)

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Insurer

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Stock

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Common Interest Development

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Credit Union

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit – Common Interest Development

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Religious

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Nonprofit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Agricultural Cooperative Association

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Cannabis Cooperative Association

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Cooperative

  • Certificate of Limited Partnership – CA LP

  • Registration – Out-of-State LP

Note that the Secretary of State will continue to impose other fees not listed above.

It is unlikely that this temporary suspension of fees will have any significant impact on the number of business entities being formed under California law.  Historically, these fees have been relatively modest.  For example, the fee for filing articles of incorporation is $100.  Cal. Gov’t Code § 12186(c).  The real costs are the ongoing costs associated with the crushing tax and regulatory burdens placed on businesses by the state.  According to the Tax Foundation, California ranks 48th in business tax climate (just ahead of New York and New Jersey).

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Even in the 9th Circuit, merely conveying contaminated groundwater isn’t “transportation” of a “solid waste”

Just before the July 4th holiday, two Judges on a Ninth Circuit panel reversed their earlier conclusion that conveying contaminated groundwater can give rise to RCRA liability for the “transportation” of a “solid waste”.  The panel now agrees that the City of Vacaville’s mere conveyance of drinking water contaminated by someone else is not something Congress intended to criminalize (or make subject to civil penalties) in RCRA.

The two Judges reiterated their view that the contaminated groundwater does fall within RCRA’s definition of “solid waste”.

This case first caught my attention in January after the panel’s first bite at this apple. (See https://insights.mintz.com/post/102hg8l/overturning-the-9th-circuit-vaca…).

I guess it is progress that the panel has corrected one of its two mistakes.  But to suggest that conveying groundwater containing parts per billion of anything is the transportation of a solid waste is completely unfaithful to the language of RCRA as the panel has now recognized with respect to the definition of “transportation” but not the definition of “solid waste”.

It bears repeating that the water the City is providing to the residents of Vacaville reportedly meets all applicable federal and state standards, including those established under the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, and the State of California has stringent standards of its own.  It is those laws, and not the federal law having to do with the transportation and disposal of solid waste, that should apply.

As I wrote in January, if we think those laws, or any of our other federal and state environmental laws, need improving, we should lobby our elected officials to improve them.  But stoking the fears of an already cynical citizenry that our federal, state and local governments aren’t doing their job isn’t worth whatever citizen suit plaintiffs might stand to gain from misusing the laws that we do have.

“RCRA’s context makes clear that mere conveyance of hazardous waste cannot constitute ‘transportation’ under the endangerment provision,” writes Judge Patrick J. Bumatay in the new ruling, joined by District Judge Douglas L. Rayes, sitting on the 9th Circuit by designation.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.