Public Urged to Use Encryption for Mobile Phone Messaging and Calls

On December 4, 2024, four of the five members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group (the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) law enforcement and cyber security agencies (Agencies) published a joint guide for network engineers, defenders of communications infrastructure and organizations with on-premises enterprise equipment (the Guide). The Agencies strongly encourage applying the Guide’s best practices to strengthen visibility and strengthen network devices against exploitation by reported hackers, including those hackers affiliated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The fifth group member, the United Kingdom, released a statement supportive of the joint guide but stated it had alternate methods of mitigating cyber risks for its telecom providers.

In November 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint statement to update the public on its investigation into the previously reported PRC-affiliated hacks on multiple telecommunications companies’ networks. The FBI and CISA reported that these hacks appeared to focus on cell phone activity of individuals involved in political or government activity and copies of law enforcement informational requests subject to court orders. However, at the time of the update, these U.S. agencies and members of Congress have underscored the broad and significant nature of this breach. At least one elected official stated that the hacks potentially expose unencrypted cell phone conversations with someone in America to the hackers.

In particular, the Guide recommends adopting actions that quickly identify anomalous behavior, vulnerabilities, and threats and respond to a cyber incident. It also guides telecoms and businesses to reduce existing vulnerabilities, improve secure configuration habits, and limit potential entry points. One of the Guide’s recommended best practices attracting media attention is ensuring that mobile phone messaging and call traffic is fully end-to-end encrypted to the maximum extent possible. Without fully end-to-end encrypted messaging and calls, the content of calls and messages always has the potential to be intercepted. Android to Android messaging and iPhone to iPhone messaging is fully end-to-end encrypted but messaging from an Android to an iPhone is not currently end-to-end encrypted. Google and Apple recommend using a fully encrypted messaging app to better protect the content of messages from hackers.

The FBI and CISA are continuing to investigate the hacks and will update the public as the investigation permits. In the interim, telecom providers and companies are encouraged to adopt the Guide’s best practices and to report any suspicious activity to their local FBI field office or the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center. Cyber incidents may also be reported to CISA.

Common Mistakes When Applying for the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program

The Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, commonly referred to as the green card lottery, was established by the U.S. government to provide individuals from countries with low immigration rates a chance to live and work in the U.S.

Each year, the U.S. Department of State conducts a random lottery drawing to select 55,000 applicants who will be given the opportunity to apply for a Diversity Visa (DV). This selection process is based on a computer-generated random lottery system, ensuring fairness and equal opportunities for all participants.

To qualify, applicants must be a citizen of a country deemed eligible by the U.S. government and have either a high school education or its equivalent or possess two years of work experience in a qualifying occupation.

Applying for the DV Program is an exciting opportunity for those looking to immigrate to the United States. However, even a minor mistake when filling out the entry form can lead to a major complication in the registration process.

By understanding the most common mistakes and learning how to avoid them, applicants can improve their chances of submitting a successful entry to the green card lottery.

The seven “deadly sins” of the Diversity Visa application process

Green card lottery entries are submitted electronically via the Electronic Diversity Visa (E-DV) website during the specified registration period. Although the DV instructions provide detailed guidance for completing the online entry form, there are seven common mistakes — aka “deadly sins” — that could result in delays or even rejection of the application.

1. Submitting multiple entries

The law allows only one entry by or for each person during each registration period. The Department of State uses advanced technology to detect multiple entries. Submissions of more than one entry will be disqualified. Applicants should take the time to review and double-check their information before submitting it.

2. Missing the deadline

No late entries or paper entries are accepted. Applicants must use the E-DV website for submission and must submit their application by the specified deadline.

The online registration period for the 2026 DV Program is open now through Nov. 5, 2024, at 12 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) (GMT-5).

3. Inputting inaccurate personal information

Applicants should ensure their name and surname are entered exactly as they appear on their passport or other identification documents. They should avoid using nicknames or name variations to prevent discrepancies that could raise concerns during the review process. Applicants should also double-check the date of birth and make sure the correct day, month and year are entered. Inaccuracies in this section can lead to delays or even rejection of the entry form.

4. Omitting family members

Applicants should make sure to include all immediate family members in the entry, including a spouse and any unmarried children under the age of 21. Failure to list any eligible family members can result in their exclusion from the program.

5. Using third-party websites for assistance

Be cautious of third-party websites claiming to assist with the entry process. These sites often charge unnecessary fees and may provide inaccurate information. It is recommended to visit the official Department of State website or trusted government portal for the application.

6. Leaving entry fields blank

As we outlined above, to avoid rejection or delays applicants should ensure that all required fields are filled out. Missing information or leaving any mandatory fields blank can result in disqualification. It’s important to take the time to carefully review the form and provide accurate and complete responses.

7. Not meeting mandatory requirements

To qualify, an applicant must either have a high school education or equivalent, defined as the successful completion of a 12-year course of formal elementary and secondary education. Alternatively, an applicant must have at least two years of work experience within the past five years in an occupation that requires a minimum of two years of training or experience.

Avoid leaving it all to luck with BAL

Being aware of these common reasons for disqualification and learning how to avoid them can help ensure the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program entry is filled out correctly, providing applicants the chance of selection in the green card lottery.

While this is one route to a green card, there are more paths that don’t rely on luck. For example, a National Interest Waiver (NIW) is an immigrant visa that creates a path to a green card without a job offer or labor certification. The NIW is an alternative to the traditional PERM process and is available to those whose work is deemed to be in the national interest of the United States.

There are many ways to get a green card in the United States and the process generally involves a petition, an application, a biometrics appointment, interviews with immigration officials and decisions that potentially come with requests for more information and documents. The processing time for a green card can also vary from one to six years, depending on demand.

Top Competition Enforcers in the US, EU, and UK Release Joint Statement on AI Competition – AI: The Washington Report


On July 23, the top competition enforcers at the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ), the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and the European Commission (EC) released a Joint Statement on Competition in Generative AI Foundation Models and AI products. The statement outlines risks in the AI ecosystem and shared principles for protecting and fostering competition.

While the statement does not lay out specific enforcement actions, the statement’s release suggests that the top competition enforcers in all three jurisdictions are focusing on AI’s effects on competition in general and competition within the AI ecosystem—and are likely to take concrete action in the near future.

A Shared Focus on AI

The competition enforcers did not just discover AI. In recent years, the top competition enforcers in the US, UK, and EU have all been examining both the effects AI may have on competition in various sectors as well as competition within the AI ecosystem. In September 2023, the CMA released a report on AI Foundation Models, which described the “significant impact” that AI technologies may have on competition and consumers, followed by an updated April 2024 report on AI. In June 2024, French competition authorities released a report on Generative AI, which focused on competition issues related to AI. At its January 2024 Tech Summit, the FTC examined the “real-world impacts of AI on consumers and competition.”

AI as a Technological Inflection Point

In the new joint statement, the top enforcers described the recent evolution of AI technologies, including foundational models and generative AI, as “a technological inflection point.” As “one of the most significant technological developments of the past couple decades,” AI has the potential to increase innovation and economic growth and benefit the lives of citizens around the world.

But with any technological inflection point, which may create “new means of competing” and catalyze innovation and growth, the enforcers must act “to ensure the public reaps the full benefits” of the AI evolution. The enforcers are concerned that several risks, described below, could undermine competition in the AI ecosystem. According to the enforcers, they are “committed to using our available powers to address any such risks before they become entrenched or irreversible harms.”

Risks to Competition in the AI Ecosystem

The top enforcers highlight three main risks to competition in the AI ecosystem.

  1. Concentrated control of key inputs – Because AI technologies rely on a few specific “critical ingredients,” including specialized chips and technical expertise, a number of firms may be “in a position to exploit existing or emerging bottlenecks across the AI stack and to have outside influence over the future development of these tools.” This concentration may stifle competition, disrupt innovation, or be exploited by certain firms.
  2. Entrenching or extending market power in AI-related markets – The recent advancements in AI technologies come “at a time when large incumbent digital firms already enjoy strong accumulated advantages.” The regulators are concerned that these firms, due to their power, may have “the ability to protect against AI-driven disruption, or harness it to their particular advantage,” potentially to extend or strengthen their positions.
  3. Arrangements involving key players could amplify risks – While arrangements between firms, including investments and partnerships, related to the development of AI may not necessarily harm competition, major firms may use these partnerships and investments to “undermine or coopt competitive threats and steer market outcomes” to their advantage.

Beyond these three main risks, the statement also acknowledges that other competition and consumer risks are also associated with AI. Algorithms may “allow competitors to share competitively sensitive information” and engage in price discrimination and fixing. Consumers may be harmed, too, by AI. As the CMA, DOJ, and the FTC have consumer protection authority, these authorities will “also be vigilant of any consumer protection threats that may derive from the use and application of AI.”

Sovereign Jurisdictions but Shared Concerns

While the enforcers share areas of concern, the joint statement recognizes that the EU, UK, and US’s “legal powers and jurisdictions contexts differ, and ultimately, our decisions will always remain sovereign and independent.” Nonetheless, the competition enforcers assert that “if the risks described [in the statement] materialize, they will likely do so in a way that does not respect international boundaries,” making it necessary for the different jurisdictions to “share an understanding of the issues” and be “committed to using our respective powers where appropriate.”

Three Unifying Principles

With the goal of acting together, the enforcers outline three shared principles that will “serve to enable competition and foster innovation.”

  1. Fair Dealing – Firms that engage in fair dealing will make the AI ecosystem as a whole better off. Exclusionary tactics often “discourage investments and innovation” and undermine competition.
  2. Interoperability – Interoperability, the ability of different systems to communicate and work together seamlessly, will increase competition and innovation around AI. The enforcers note that “any claims that interoperability requires sacrifice to privacy and security will be closely scrutinized.”
  3. Choice – Everyone in the AI ecosystem, from businesses to consumers, will benefit from having “choices among the diverse products and business models resulting from a competitive process.” Regulators may scrutinize three activities in particular: (1) company lock-in mechanisms that could limit choices for companies and individuals, (2) partnerships between incumbents and newcomers that could “sidestep merger enforcement” or provide “incumbents undue influence or control in ways that undermine competition,” and (3) for content creators, “choice among buyers,” which could be used to limit the “free flow of information in the marketplace of ideas.”

Conclusion: Potential Future Activity

While the statement does not address specific enforcement tools and actions the enforcers may take, the statement’s release suggests that the enforcers may all be gearing up to take action related to AI competition in the near future. Interested stakeholders, especially international ones, should closely track potential activity from these enforcers. We will continue to closely monitor and analyze activity by the DOJ and FTC on AI competition issues.

Domestic Visa Processing – Application Slots Now Available

On January 29, 2024, the Department of State’s stateside visa pilot renewal program began accepting DS-160s for qualifying individuals seeking to renew their existing H-1B visas while they are in the United States. As discussed in our previous blog post about this new program, the program allows individuals in the United States who are renewing an H-1B visa issued by US consular sections in Canada between 1/1/2020 and 4/1/2023 or one issued by US consular sections in India from 1/2/2021 and 9/30/2023 to do so online through the Department’s CEAC website rather than having to travel outside the US to obtain the visa.

Under the pilot program, each week for five weeks the Department will release 4000 application slots—2000 for applicants whose most recent H-1B visa were issued in Canada, and 2000 for those whose most recent H-1B visas were issued in India. If all designated slots are filled before the next week’s allotment becomes available, the Department will lock the portal until the next group is released. Applications can be submitted online at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/employment/domestic-renewal.html, where you can also find program FAQs published by the Department of State.

The first group of application slots was released on Monday, January 29. Later groups will be released on February 5, February 12, February 19, and February 26. The program will end when all available slots are filled or on April 1, 2024, whichever happens first.

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2022 Midterm Election Guide

The 2022 midterm elections produced modest, but perhaps still significant, changes to Congress. Democrats outperformed in many parts of the country, significantly stemming the tide of the “red wave” many analysts were expecting.

The results for partisan control of Congress remain in doubt.

The power balance in the U.S. Senate may not be known until next month, but the Democrats are seemingly poised to retain control. The Pennsylvania Senate seat flipped to the Democrats while Nevada could flip Republican with the Democratic incumbent currently behind. Three other Senate contests remain uncalled, with the incumbent party narrowly positioned to win all three. That would leave the Senate tied, waiting for the results of a Georgia run-off in December to determine which party controls the Senate.

The House of Representatives appears likely to shift to Republican control, but by the slimmest of margins. The final outcome and margins in the House will not be known until more votes are counted and several very close races are called. If Republicans win control of the House, as seems likely, it is unclear if their razor-thin majority—which could be between two and twelve seats—will allow their leaders to govern effectively.

To help assess the 2022 midterm election, we have prepared a comprehensive guide that summarizes the results and their impact on the 118th Congress, which convenes in January. The Election Guide lists all new members elected to Congress, updates the congressional delegations for each state, and provides a starting point for analyzing the coming changes to House and Senate committees, including potential new chairs and ranking members.

Our committee analysis assumes that the Democrats retain control in the Senate, but Republicans flip the House and chair committees.

Please click here to download the most up-to-date version of this Election Guide, which will be updated on an ongoing basis as more of the close races are called and committees are finalized.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

On the Rise: Bicycle-Related Deaths and Injuries

In 2020preventable fatalities from bicycle accidents increased by 16%, according to the National Safety Council (NSC). The NSC also noted that over the last decade, there was a total increase of 44% in preventable bicycle-related deaths.

These figures highlight the ongoing safety crisis for cyclists on American roadways.

Bicycle-related deaths and injuries: the statistics

According to the CDC, bicyclists account for 2% of all motor vehicle crashes. Approximately 1,000 people die each year from these accidents, and 130,000 become injured. These numbers will continue to increase unless widespread measures to prioritize road safety become implemented nationwide.

We see this trend reflected in the report from the NSC, which notes an increase in preventable nonfatal injuries of 5% between 2019 and 2020. Additionally, the newest data released by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) shows that bicyclist fatalities increased again in 2021 by 5%.

In the state of New Jersey specifically, there were 30 preventable bicycle-related fatalities between 2019 and 2020. As of 2021, the number of deaths reached its highest single-year total thus far, with 27 individuals lost. Hopefully, these numbers will decrease in the coming years as legislative efforts are implemented to improve cyclist safety.

Legislation addressing the bicycle fatalities crisis

With the continual increase in motor vehicle fatalities and the increase in injuries sustained by these accidents, both state and federal legislatures have implemented new measures to address street safety.

The following legislation seeks to reduce the number of crashes and fatalities involving bicyclists, pedestrians, and others using a method of personal conveyance.

New Jersey’s Safe Passing Law

New Jersey has implemented its Safe Passing Law, laying out new driver requirements. When approaching someone using a method of personal conveyance such as a bicycle, electric scooter, or a pedestrian, drivers must do the following:

  1. Move over one lane to allow for extra space while passing.
  2. If moving over one lane is not possible, drivers must allow for four feet of space while approaching and passing.
  3. If neither moving nor allowing four feet of space is possible without violating traffic laws, drivers must reduce the vehicle’s speed to 25 mph and be prepared to stop.

Drivers who violate New Jersey’s Safe Passing Law will incur a $100 fine if the violation does not result in personal injury. However, they will incur two motor vehicle penalty points, and the fine will be $500 if the offense results in bodily injury to pedestrians, cyclists, or others using a method of personal conveyance.

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law signed by President Biden on November 15th, 2021, authorizes up to $550B of funding between 2022 and 2026 to invest in America’s infrastructure, including support for safety improvements on our roads.

Safe Streets and Roads for All Program

The Safe Streets and Roads for All Program (SS4A) is a new grant program included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that allocates $6B in funding over the next five years. The program seeks to fund local efforts to reduce roadway crashes and fatalities.

Eligible applicants for the SS4A grant include:

  • Metropolitan planning organizations
  • Political subdivisions of a State
  • Members of a federally recognized Tribal government
  • Multi-jurisdictional groups of the entities above

Also, according to the Federal High Administration, the use of SS4A funds must only be used for:

  • Development of a comprehensive safety action plan
  • Planning, designing, and developing activities for initiatives identified in the safety action plans
  • Implementing the projects and strategies identified in the safety action plan.
COPYRIGHT © 2022, STARK & STARK

What’s in the American Data Privacy and Protection Act?

Congress is considering omnibus privacy legislation, and it reportedly has bipartisan support. If passed, this would be a massive shake-up for American consumer privacy, which has been left to the states up to this point. So, how does the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA) stack up against existing privacy legislation such as the California Consumer Privacy Act and the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act?

The ADPPA includes a much broader definition of sensitive data than we’ve seen in state-level laws. Some notable inclusions are income level, voicemails and text messages, calendar information, data relating to a known child under the age of 17, and depictions of an individual’s “undergarment-clad” private area. These enumerated categories go much further than recent state laws, which tend to focus on health and demographic information. One asterisk though – unlike other state laws, the ADPPA only considers sexual orientation information to be sensitive when it is “inconsistent with the individual’s reasonable expectation” of disclosure. It’s unclear at this point, for example, if a member of the LGBTQ+ community who is out to friends would have a “reasonable expectation” not to be outed to their employer.

Like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, the ADPPA includes a duty of data minimization on covered entities (the ADPPA borrows the term “covered entity” from HIPAA). There is a laundry list of exceptions to this rule, including one for using data collected prior to passage “to conduct internal research.” Companies used to kitchen-sink analytics practices may appreciate this savings clause as they adjust to making do with less access to consumer data.

Another innovation is a tiered applicability, in which all commercial entities are “covered entities,” but “large data holders” – those making over $250,000,000 gross revenue and that process either 5,000,000 individuals’ data or 200,000 individuals’ sensitive data – are subject to additional requirements and limitations, while “small businesses” enjoy additional exemptions. Until now, state consumer privacy laws have made applicability an all-or-nothing proposition. All covered entities, though, would be required to comply with browser opt-out signals, following a trend started by the California Privacy Protection Agency’s recent draft regulations. Additionally, individuals have a private right of action against covered entities to seek monetary and injunctive relief.

Finally, and controversially, the ADPPA explicitly preempts all state privacy laws. It makes sense – the globalized nature of the internet means that any less-stringent state law would become the exception that kills the rule. Still, companies that only recently finalized CCPA- and CPRA-compliance programs won’t appreciate being sent back to the drawing board.

Read the bill for yourself here.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

  1. The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
  2. How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
  3. The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
  4. What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
  5. When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

  • In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
  • Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

  • In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
  • Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
  • On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions? 

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

  • Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
  • No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
  • The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Implications of the Use of the Defense Production Act in the U.S. Supply Chain

What owners, operators and investors need to know before accepting funds under the DPA

There has been an expansion of regulations related to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in both the United States and abroad. Current economic and geopolitical tensions are driving further expansion of FDI in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Whether by intent or coincidence, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) regulations that took effect February 13, 2020, included provisions that expanded the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) and FIRRMA based upon the invocation of the Defense Production Act (DPA) – such as with President Biden’s recent Executive Order evoking the DPA to help alleviate the U.S. shortage of baby formula.

As background, the U.S. regulation of foreign investment in the U.S. began in 1975 with the creation of CFIUS. The 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act refined CFIUS and broadened the definition of national security. Historically, CFIUS was limited to technology, industries and infrastructure directly involving national security. It was also a voluntary filing. Foreign investors began structuring investments to avoid national security reviews. As a result, FIRRMA, a CFIUS reform act, was signed into law in August 2018. FIRRMA’s regulations took effect in February 2020.

It is not surprising that there are national security implications to U.S. food production and supply, particularly based upon various shortages in the near past and projections of further shortages in the future. What is surprising is that the 2020 FIRRMA regulations provided for the application of CFIUS to food production (and medical supplies) based upon Executive Orders that bring such under the DPA.

The Impact of Presidential DPA Executive Orders

The 2020 FIRMMA regulations included an exhaustive list of “critical infrastructure” that fall within CFIUS’s jurisdiction. Appendix A to the regulations details “Covered Investment Critical Infrastructure and Functions Related to Covered Investment Critical Infrastructure” and includes the following language:

manufacture any industrial resource other than commercially available off-the-shelf items …. or operate any industrial resource that is a facility, in each case, that has been funded, in whole or in part, by […] (a) Defense Production Act of 1950 Title III program …..”

Title III of the DPA “allows the President to provide economic incentives to secure domestic industrial capabilities essential to meet national defense and homeland security requirements.” This was arguably invoked by President Trump’s COVID-19 related DPA Executive Orders regarding medical supplies (such as PPEs, tests and ventilators, etc.) and now President Biden’s Executive Order related to baby formula (and other food production).

Based on the intent of FIRRMA to close gaps in prior CFIUS coverage, the FIRRMA definition of “covered transactions” includes the following language:

“(d) Any other transaction, transfer, agreement, or arrangement, the structure of which is designed or intended to evade or circumvent the application of section 721.”

Taken together, the foregoing provision potentially gives CFIUS jurisdiction to review non-U.S. investments in U.S. companies covered by DPA Executive Orders that are outside of traditional M&A structures. This means that even non-controlling foreign investments in U.S. companies (such as food or medical producers) who receive DPA funding are subject to CFIUS review. More significantly, such U.S. companies can be subject to CFIUS review for a period of 60 months following the receipt of any DPA funding.

As a result of DPA-related FDI implications, owners, operators, and investors should carefully assess the implications of accepting funding under the DPA and the resulting restrictions on non-U.S. investors in businesses and industries not historically within the jurisdiction of CFIUS.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Best Practices for Commercial Property Owners/ Operators: Phase One of Reopening the Economy

The Federal Coronavirus Task Force issued a three-stage plan last week to reopen the economy, where authorities in each state – not the federal government – will decide when it is safe to reopen shops, schools, restaurants, movie theaters, sporting arenas and other facilities that were closed to minimize community spread of the deadly virus. Once phase one is adopted in certain states, businesses that reopen will need to be prepared to take certain precautions to meet their common law duty to provide and maintain reasonably safe premises.

Phase One

The first stage of the plan will affect certain segments of society and businesses differently. For example, schools and organized youth activities that are currently closed, such as day care, should remain closed. The guidance also says that bars should remain closed. However, larger venues such as movie theaters, churches, ballparks and arenas may open and operate but under strict distancing protocols. If possible, employers should follow recommendations from the federal guidance to have workers return to their jobs in phases.

Also, under phase one vulnerable individuals such as older people and those with underlying health conditions should continue to shelter in place. Individuals who do go out should avoid socializing in groups of more than 10 people in places that don’t provide for appropriate physical distancing. Trade shows and receptions, for example, are the types of events that should be avoided. Unnecessary travel also should be avoided.

Assuming the infection rate continues to drop, then the second phase will see schools, day care centers and bars reopening; crowds of up to 50 permitted; and vacation travel resuming. The final stage would permit the elderly and immunologically compromised to participate in social settings. There is no timeline prescribed, however, for any of these phases.

Precautionary Basics

Once businesses are reopened during phase one, there are several common sense and intuitive safety practices that business owners/operators must absolutely ensure are in place to meet their common law duty to provide a reasonably safe environment for those present on their premises.

The guidelines issued by the CDC are the core protocols that form the baseline for minimal safety precautions: persistent hand washing, use of masks/gloves and strict social distancing.

Additional Measures

Given the highly infectious nature of the virus, the fact that it is capable of being transmitted by asymptomatic people who are nonetheless infected, and the apparent viability of transmission through recirculated air or via HVAC systems without negative pressure (per a recent report from China about transmission from one restaurant customer to several others via the air circulation system), there is nothing that reasonably can be adopted that will effectively and readily ensure that a business is completely free of someone who is infected and capable of spreading the virus.

As such, additional measures are advisable beyond the CDC protocols, such as robust cleaning/hygienic regimens/complimentary wipes and hand sanitizer for common areas, buttons and handles; and the necessary protections for employees who interact with the public (e.g., shielding and protective gear for checkout clerks at the supermarket or lobby desk/check-in personnel in hotels and office buildings). In addition, it would not be unreasonable or unduly intrusive to check the temperatures (via no-touch infrared devices) of those entering the premises. In the absence of available portable, instant and unobtrusive virus testing methods, temperature readings are the most practical and reasonable precautionary measure beyond the CDC baseline deterrents.

Conscientious and infallible implementation of maintenance, housekeeping and hygiene protocols for the commercial, hospitality, retail and restaurant industries also will be critical to mitigate potential liability claims for negligently failing to provide an environment reasonably safe from the spread of coronavirus.

Advisability of Warnings

Aside from conspicuously publicizing – via posted signage or announcements – the CDC guidelines relating to persistent hand washing, use of masks/gloves and strict social distancing, the need to warn of the potential for – or a history of – infections generally is not considered to be necessary or essential unless there is an imminent threat of a specific foreseeable harm.

Unless there is a specific condition leading to a cluster of infections within a particular property (unlikely given the ubiquity of the disease and community spread, but the reporting would be to the CDC or local health authorities in such an instance), or an isolated circumstance that can be identified to be the source of likely infections to others who proximately were exposed, there is no need or obligation under existing law or regulatory guidelines to report generally that someone who tested positive for the virus may have been on a particular property.

Moreover, unless the business is an employer who administers a self-funded health plan (who are thus charged with the duty to maintain “protected health information”), businesses that are not health providers are not subject to HIPAA; as such, concerns about HIPAA violations are misplaced to the extent that the identity of someone who is infected is somehow disclosed or otherwise required to be disseminated by a business not otherwise charged with the duty to maintain “protected health information.”

A Coordinated Approach

While the CDC’s guidelines are important, they are not exclusive. Businesses planning to reopen also should consider regulations and guidelines from a number of other sources, including OSHA and state and local departments of public health.


© 2020 Wilson Elser

For more on reopening the economy, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.