To Stalk or Not to Stalk . . . That Is the Question – Using Social Media for Applicant Review

Now more than ever, employers are using social media to screen job applicants. According to a 2018 survey, 70 percent of employers use social media to research candidates. Using social media to research job applicants can provide you with useful information, but it can also get you into trouble.

When you review an applicant’s social media account, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc., you may learn information regarding the applicant’s race, sex, religion, national origin, or age, among other characteristics.

As our readers are aware, a variety of state and federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit employers from choosing not to hire a candidate based on a number of legally protected classes. Just as it would be unlawful to ask an applicant if he or she has a disability during an interview and fail to hire that applicant based on his or her disability, it would also be illegal not to hire an applicant because you observed a Facebook post in which she expressed her hope to be pregnant within the next six months.

Consider the following best practice tips for using social media to screen applicants:

  1. Develop a Policy and Be Consistent – Implement a policy detailing which social media websites you will review, the purpose of the review and type of information sought, at what stage the review will be conducted, and how much time you will spend on the search. Applying these policies consistently will help to combat claims of discriminatory hiring practices should they arise.
  2. Document Your Findings – Save what you find, whether it is a picture or a screenshot of a comment the applicant made. What you find on social media can disappear as easily as you found it. Protect your decision by documenting what you find. In case the matter is litigated, it can be produced later.
  3. Wait Until After the Initial Interview – Avoid performing a social media screening until after the initial interview. It is much easier to defend a decision not to interview or hire an applicant if you do not have certain information early on.
  4. Follow FCRA Requirements – If you decide to use a third party to perform social media screening services, remember that these screenings are likely subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements because the screening results constitute a consumer report. This means the employer will be required to: 1) inform the applicant of the results that are relevant to its decision not to hire; 2) provide the applicant with the relevant social media document; 3) provide the applicant notice of his or her rights under the FCRA and; 4) allow the applicant to rebut the information before making a final decision.
  5. Do Not Ask for Their Password – Many states have enacted laws that prohibit an employer from requesting or requiring applicants to provide their login credentials for their social media and other internet accounts. Although some states still allow this, the best practice is not to ask for it. Further, while it is not illegal to friend request a job applicant, proceed with caution. Friend requesting a job applicant (and assuming the applicant accepts the request) may provide you with greater access to the applicant’s personal life. Many people categorize portions of their profiles as private, thereby protecting specific information from the public’s view. If you receive access to this information you may gain more knowledge regarding the applicant’s protected characteristics. If you are going to friend request applicants, you should include this in your written policy and apply this practice across the board.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

More information for employers considering job applicants on the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Can an Employee be Fired for Being Gay or Transgender?

HR Professionals will soon know the answer to this question.

The United States Supreme Court is preparing to settle a contentious debate on employee protections under federal employment discrimination laws.  On October 7th, the Court returned from its summer break to start the new term.  The Court did not have to wait long before it tackled a complex case because on October 8th, the Court heard two major oral arguments with potentially far-reaching implications for both employers and employees.  Both cases focus on the prohibitions in employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).  Under Title VII, Congress made it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”  The question that the Court will address is whether employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited employment discrimination “because of sex.”

The first case the Court heard was a consolidated matter involving cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia), both of which involve men who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.

Second Circuit: “Sex” is Necessarily a Factor in Sexual Orientation

The plaintiff in Zarda, Donald Zarda, was a skydiving instructor, who died in 2014.  Prior to his death, a female client complained that Zarda inappropriately touched her during a jump.  At some point, Zarda communicated to the client that he was a homosexual and “had an ex-husband,” a practice that Zarda stated he often did with female clients to put them at ease.  Altitude Express terminated Zarda in connection with the complaint; however, Zarda insisted he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

A federal district court granted summary judgment against Zarda, reasoning that his claim was not cognizable under Title VII.  However, the Second Circuit reversed, with a majority of the court believing that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated by sex and, therefore, a “subset of sex discrimination.”  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that federal law prohibits the firing of an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.  Notably, the court reached this conclusion by taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of the text “because of sex.”  Specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII must protect sexual orientation “because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”

Eleventh Circuit: Discharge for Homosexuality Not Prohibited by Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.  The plaintiff in Bostock, Gerald Bostock, was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator in Clayton County for over ten years.  Although Bostock had received good performance reviews for his work, an internal audit was conducted on his program’s funds.  Bostock, who is gay, claimed the audit was a “pretext for discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation.”  During an advisory meeting, where Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one person criticized Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in a gay softball league.

After his complaint was dismissed at the district court level, Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Referring back to a 1979 decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that it had already held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”  While hinting that this earlier ruling may have been wrong, the court held that it had no choice but to follow precedent and affirm the dismissal of Bostock’s claim.

Sixth Circuit: Discrimination on the Basis of Transgender and Transitioning Status is Necessarily Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The second case, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, presents a similar question to Zarda and Bostock.  That is, whether employees can be fired based on their status as transgender.

The case involves Aimee Stephens, who was a funeral director and embalmer for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes.  While working in this position for six years, Stephens dressed and presented herself as a man without issue.  However, once Stephens communicated that she wanted to live and work as a woman before having sex-reassignment surgery, she was terminated.  The owner of the funeral home, a devout Christian, admitted that Stephens was fired because she “was no longer going to represent himself as a man.  He wanted to dress as a woman.”  The owner believed this change would violate “God’s commands.”

After Stephens filed a discrimination charge, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursued a complaint on her behalf against the funeral home.  In ruling in favor of the employer, the district court reasoned that transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII in this instance as doing so would substantially burden the employer’s religious exercise.  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.”  The court further ruled that the RFRA did not apply to protect the funeral home’s actions because the funeral home was not a “religious institution,” and Stephens was not a “ministerial employee” excluded from Title VII’s protections.

Stakeholders: States, Federal Government, Employers, and Employees

The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, which is expected in the spring or summer of 2020, has the potential to be monumental because of the many stakeholders involved.  Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have barred sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by statute or regulation, as have a number of counties and municipalities.  While a few other states provide protection from this type of discrimination either by agency interpretation or court ruling, the remaining states in the country offer no protection under their state laws.  This means that LGBTQ individuals who live in states such as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and even North Carolina (at least with respect to private employers) may have no remedy to this type of employment discrimination outside of Title VII.

Additionally, states who have passed laws in this area may face challenges in enforcing those laws if the Supreme Court decides that Title VII does not protect gay and transgender status.  Many of these states lean on the EEOC’s authority to investigate claims of discrimination against companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and the EEOC has been successful in partnering with states to investigate discrimination claims and enforce such actions.  However, states would lose EEOC assistance should the Court decide that Title VII’s scope does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identification.

Although the EEOC traditionally has been on the side of expanding Title VII protections, the federal government in the most recent litigation has aligned itself with the employers.  In particular, United States Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” does not apply to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Accepting this interpretation, Title VII is limited to barring employers from treating women different from men in the same or similar position, and vice-versa.

Equally important to the states’ and federal government’s interest is the interest of employers.  Companies have lined up on both sides of the debate with over 36 briefs filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, and over 24 briefs filed in support of Clayton County and Altitude Express.  For example, one brief filed in support of Bostock and Zarda includes 206 companies representing businesses such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Uber.  These businesses argued that interpreting Title VII to “exclude sexual orientation or gender identity from protections against sex discrimination would have wide-ranging, negative consequences for businesses, their employees, and the U.S. economy.”  In contrast, the C12 group that represents “the largest network of Christian CEOs, business owners, and executives in the United States” filed a separate brief in support of the employers arguing that interpreting “because of sex” in Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity ignores the natural meaning of the law, “thereby bypassing the political process, shutting down debate, preventing any accommodation of divergent views, and precluding any compromise.”

Makeup of the Court: The Deciding Vote

Prior to his retirement, Justice Anthony Kennedy was the deciding vote in several gay rights cases.  However, Justice Kennedy is no longer on the bench, and these cases present the first opportunity for the public to see how his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will vote on these issues.  Also, Justice Neil Gorsuch, successor to Justice Antonin Scalia, may play a key role in deciding these issues.  Similar to Scalia, it is believed that Justice Gorsuch is more inclined to rule that courts should naturally interpret statutes as they were meant when enacted.  Should Justice Gorsuch hold firm to this view, then there is some thought that he may conclude sexual orientation and gender identity were not meant to be included as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.  The perspectives of these new Justices are likely to dictate the Court’s ultimate decision – a decision which may directly impact the employment landscape for years to come.


© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on Employment Protections, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment and Civil Rights law pages.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.


© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Cases Determining Extent of Title VII Protection for LGBT Workers

The Supreme Court of the United States announced three cases will be argued next term that could determine whether Title VII protects LGBT employees from workplace discrimination.

Title VII prohibits discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” but it does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity.  Federal courts have disagreed on whether discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination.  Differing opinions on this topic exist within the federal government as well:  the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, while the Department of Justice has argued it does not.  The Supreme Court’s decisions may ultimately decide these conflicts.

Two cases represent a split in federal appellate courts regarding the extent, if any, to which Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination.  In Altitude Express v. Zarda, a skydiving company fired Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, after Zarda informed a female client he was gay to assuage her concern about close physical contact during skydives.  The trial court dismissed Zarda’s sexual orientation discrimination claim.  In an opinion written by Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann on behalf of a full panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and held that sexual orientation discrimination is properly understood as a subset of discrimination on the basis of sex.  In other words, in the Second Circuit, sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.  The Second Circuit aligned its thinking with the Seventh Circuit’s April 2017 opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, which held that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Gerald Bostock v. Clayton County Georgia.  Gerald Bostock alleged he was terminated from his county job after the county learned of his involvement in a gay recreational softball league and his promotion of involvement in the league to co-workers.  The trial court dismissed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its own precedent that broadly held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  In other words, in the Eleventh Circuit, Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.

The Supreme Court consolidated the cases into a single case to determine whether the prohibition in Title VII against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation.

The third case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, focuses on whether Title VII applies to transgender employees.  In 2007, a funeral home hired Aimee Stephens, whose employment records identified her as a man.  Later, Stephens told the funeral home’s owner she identified as a woman and wanted to wear women’s clothing to work.  The owner fired Stephens, believing allowing Stephens to wear women’s clothing violated the funeral home’s dress code and “God’s commands.”  The EEOC filed suit on Stephens’ behalf.  The trial court dismissed a portion of the lawsuit because “transgender . . . status is not currently a protected class under Title VII,” but permitted other portions to proceed based on the claim Stephens was discriminated against because the funeral home objected to her appearance and behavior as departing from sex stereotypes.  The Sixth Circuit agreed that Stephens had viable claims.  The Supreme Court will review “[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping” under prior Supreme Court precedent.

All three cases will affect the employment rights of LGBT workers.  Dinsmore & Shohl lawyers will closely monitor the Court’s analysis of these cases.  Dinsmore’s Labor and Employment Practice Group stands ready to assist employers in navigating this developing area of law.  Dinsmore’s experience in this arena includes accomplished labor and employment lawyers, former law clerks to federal judges who have drafted orders on these very issues, former federal government attorneys, litigators and published scholars.

 

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
This post was written by Jan E. Hensel and Justin M. Burns of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Read more on the US Supreme Court  decision on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

Seventh Circuit Breaks New Ground: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Prohibited by Title VII

sex discrimination seventh circuitIn a landmark decision reflecting a potential turning of the tide for the LGBT community, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has become the first federal appeals court in the nation to hold that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, No. 3:14-cv-1791 (7th Cir. April 4, 2017).

Last July, a panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the sexual orientation discrimination claim of Kim Hively, a lesbian who claimed she was denied promotions and a full-time position due to her sexual orientation. (See Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination.) The Seventh Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. Yesterday’s decision followed.

The Seventh Circuit began by observing that the question is not whether the court can, or should, add a new category of protection to Title VII, as that is beyond its authority.  Instead, the court viewed itself as charged with interpreting the existing language of Title VII, specifically, whether discrimination based on “sex” includes sexual orientation.

The court considered a number of interpretive aids. It cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s blessings on expansion of traditional sex discrimination claims in such cases as Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), which expanded the law to include sexual harassment, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), expanding the law to include same-sex harassment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), expanding the law to include discrimination based on gender non-conformity, and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), upholding the right of same-sex couples to marry. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Congress that enacted Title VII in 1964 may not have envisioned the necessity of these protections at the time, but nonetheless, experience has since caused the Supreme Court to recognize them as forms of prohibited sex discrimination.

The court also cited other Supreme Court decisions favoring sexual orientation-based protections, including Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), holding that a provision of the Colorado Constitution forbidding state government from taking action designed to protect “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual” persons, violated the federal Equal Protection Clause; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), wherein a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sex between consenting adults violated the federal Due Process Clause; and United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), striking down the Defense of Marriage Act’s exclusion of same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse.”

Ivy Tech argued that Congress has repeatedly considered—and refused—to add “sexual orientation” to the language of Title VII, and that should be interpreted as Congress’ intent to exclude it. This argument has been recited by numerous federal appellate courts in denying Title VII coverage to such claims. However, the Seventh Circuit noted that the legal landscape has changed over the years, and the Supreme Court has shed more light on the scope of the statute through its decisions, and for these reasons, the court was unable to draw any reliable inference from the failed “truncated legislative initiatives” in Congress.

As to the existence of the significant contrary authority, the court stated: “[T]his court sits en banc to consider what the correct rule of law is now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretations, not what someone thought it meant one, ten, or twenty years ago.” The court reversed dismissal of Hively’s claim and remanded the case to the district court.

Inevitable Result, Uncertain Future

With the landslide of litigation in the courts seeking protections for the LGBT community, it may have been inevitable that one of the federal circuit courts hearing such a case would eventually rule in favor of Title VII protection from sexual orientation discrimination. Indeed, numerous recent decisions that have refused to recognize such protections have acknowledged the untenable results that have come to pass in so holding. The Seventh Circuit’s decision recognized: “It would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’ The effort to do so has led to confusing and contradictory results…”

Indeed, many courts in other jurisdictions continue to find creative ways to allow sexual orientation-based claims to proceed despite the legal roadblock, including most recently, the Second Circuit’s decision last week that allowed a gay advertising executive to proceed with his Title VII claims based on gender non-conformity as opposed to sexual orientation. Christiansen, et. al. v. Omincom Group, Inc., 2017 WL 1130183 (2nd Cir. March 27, 2017).

With yesterday’s ruling, the Seventh Circuit has created a split in the federal circuit courts, making this issue ripe for U.S. Supreme Court determination. The country likely will receive uniform interpretation of Title VII on this issue from the Supreme Court at some point. Until then, the law in this area is truly a mixed bag. Employees in the Seventh Circuit have an additional cause of action to bring under Title VII, and employers in this jurisdiction may see a rise in these claims in the near term. For most employers outside the Seventh Circuit, employees are barred from pursuing sexual orientation bias claims under Title VII.  However, alternate theories may be advanced, such as the plaintiff successfully did in the Second Circuit case. In addition, many state laws include sexual orientation protections.

While the law of the land is unsettled, one thing remains clear: employers that uphold principles of equal opportunity and fairness, and merit-based employment rewards, will fare the best.

© 2017 Schiff Hardin LLP

Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination

sexual orientation discriminationIn the midst of a legal, political and cultural landscape expanding the rights of LGBT individuals, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has held to prior precedent in reaffirming that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, __ S.Ct. __, No. 15-720 (July 28, 2016).  According to the court, though “the writing is on the wall” that sexual orientation discrimination should not be tolerated, because the writing is not in a Supreme Court opinion or Title VII, the court’s hands are tied.

In two 2000 opinions, Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.and Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit had previously held that Title VII offers no protection from sexual orientation discrimination. The court revisited the issue now in order to provide a more detailed analysis in light of recent trends and decisions advancing LGBT rights.

The court recognized the merits of many of Ms. Hively’s arguments, and acknowledged that in light of the recognition of other rights of LGBT individuals the current legal landscape does not make sense. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as unlawful (U.S. v. Windsor) and legalized gay marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). In 2015, the EEOC held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Baldwin v. Foxx (July 16, 2015). Many judicial decisions at the district court level have repeatedly recognized that sexual orientation discrimination cannot be tolerated. Yet, Congress has repeatedly rejected new legislation that would extend Title VII to cover sexual orientation discrimination, and it has not amended the language of Title VII to include sexual orientation.

This creates “a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.” The court observed, “From an employee’s perspective, the right to marriage might not feel like a real right if she can be fired for exercising it.”

Nonetheless, the court stated that Congress’ failure to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation cannot be due to its unawareness of the issue. Thus, Congress must have intended a very narrow reading of the term “sex” when it passed Title VII.

In excluding sexual orientation discrimination from the coverage of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit conveyed its apparent reluctance in doing so:

“Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that  our  society  can  continue  to  condone  a  legal  structure  in  which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled  out  for  undesirable  tasks,  paid  lower  wages,  demoted,  passed  over  for  promotions,  and  otherwise  discriminated  against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, … many of the federal  courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not  condone it …; and this court undoubtedly  does not condone it… . But writing  on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the  form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we  must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent[.]”

The Seventh Circuit went on to offer its further observations:

“Many citizens would be surprised to learn that under federal law any private employer can summon an employee into his office and state, “You are a hard‐working employee and have added much value to my company, but I am firing you because you are gay.” And the employee would have no recourse whatsoever—unless she happens to live in a state or locality with an anti‐discrimination statute that includes sexual orientation.”

Those states are currently California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Other states apply the prohibition to public employment only: Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio; Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Some local city and county ordinances contain similar anti-discrimination provisions.

The bottom line for both employers and LGBT individuals, in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, is that the employment protections afforded to individuals based on sexual orientation remains determined, for now, at the state and local level.

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

Update Company Policies for Transgendered Employees

Although no federal statute explicitly prohibits employment discrimination based on gender identity, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has actively sought out opportunities to ensure coverage for transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions under its Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2016. After the EEOC issued its groundbreaking administrative ruling in Macy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, EEOC Appeal No. 012012081 (April 23, 2012), where it held that transgendered employees may state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, some courts have trended to support Title VII coverage for transgendered employees.

To address potential challenges and lawsuits that may arise, employers should consider updating codes of conduct as well as non-discrimination and harassment policies. While policies may differ based on an employer’s business, there are some key features to consider:

  • Include “gender identity” or “gender expression” in non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. Gender identity refers to the gender a person identifies with internally whereas gender expression refers to how an employee expresses their gender—i.e. how an employee dresses. The way an employee expresses their gender may not line up with how they identify their gender.

  • Establish gender transition guidelines and plans. A document should be established and available to all members of human resources and/or managers to eliminate mismanaging an employee who is transitioning. The guidelines may identify a specific contact for employees, the general procedure for updating personnel records, as well as restroom and/or locker room use.

  • Announcements. After management is informed, and with the employee’s permission, management should disseminate the employee’s new name to coworkers and everyone should begin using the correct name and pronoun of the employee. Misuse of a name or pronouns may create an unwelcome environment which could lead to a lawsuit.

  • Training and compliance. Employers should review harassment and diversity training programs and modules to ensure coverage of LGBTQ issues. All employees should be trained regarding appropriate workplace behavior and consequences for failing to comply with an organization’s rules.

In addition to the potential liability under federal law, some state laws provide a right of action for transgendered employees who are discriminated against at work; therefore, employers should review the laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate to ensure compliance.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Expanding Retaliation: Fourth Circuit Rejects "Manager Rule" in Title VII Cases

After helping an employee report a complaint of harassment, a manager expresses concern over the company’s handling of the situation and tells the employee the complaint is being mishandled. After the complaining employee files (and then settles) a Title VII against the company, the manager is fired for failing to take a “pro-employer” stance and act in the company’s “best interests.” Does the manager have a Title VII retaliation claim? That is the exact question recently decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic.

According to the complaint, which the court accepted as true for purposes of its review, J. Neil DeMasters began working as an employee assistance program consultant for Carilion in 2006. Two years later, DeMasters was consulted by an employee who complained that his supervisor was sexually harassing him. DeMasters relayed the substance of the complaint to human resources, which investigated the allegations and fired the supervisor. The employee was told the supervisor would never be back in the workplace, but a few days later the employee’s department manager allowed the supervisor to return to collect belongings. The employee complained to DeMasters that he felt uncomfortable at work and that he was facing increasing hostility from the supervisor’s allies and friends.

Upon learning this, DeMasters contacted HR to express his concern with how the situation was being handled, and HR confirmed it was aware the employee was being harassed by co-workers. DeMasters offered to coach the HR department on better ways to handle harassment complaints. HR declined, stating it would handle the situation. However, the employee reported to DeMasters that the harassment continued to get worse on a daily basis. DeMasters then opined to the employee that the complaints were being mishandled by HR. With that, DeMasters stopped having contact with the complaining employee.

Two years later, however, the employee filed a Title VII claim, which was settled. A few weeks after the settlement, DeMasters was called into a meeting with corporate counsel, the vice president of HR, and his own department director. DeMasters was told that by not taking the “pro-employer side,” he had put the company at risk of substantial liability. Two days later, DeMasters was fired for, among other reasons explained to him in writing, failing to act in the company’s best interests and failing to protect the company.

DeMasters filed a Title VII retaliation claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court for two reasons. First, the district court found that when DeMasters’ actions were examined individually, each action failed to constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Second, even if he had engaged in protected activity, the “manager rule” prevented him from bringing a Title VII retaliation claim because he was acting within the scope of his job duties when reporting the complaints of the employee and discussing the matter with the company.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit roundly rejected both aspects of the district court’s reasoning. The appellate court found the district court’s individualized assessment of DeMasters’ actions to be “myopic.” The correct approach, the appellate court counseled, was to examine the totality of the circumstances in a “holistic approach.” As the court put it, just as a play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes, so a discrimination claim cannot be understood without looking at the overall scenario. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty finding DeMasters engaged in protected activity by complaining to the company that he felt the complaining employee was still being subjected to unlawful conduct.

The court then turned to the “manager rule,” which finds its origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and requires an employee to “step outside” his role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. Under this theory, DeMasters’ job duties required him to counsel the employee and relay complaints to HR, and therefore his actions were not protected activities.

The Fourth Circuit again roundly rejected the application of the “manager rule” to the Title VII context. The court first found that whatever statutory support the “manager rule” had in the FLSA context did not exist in the Title VII context because the statutory language of Title VII differs from the FLSA in important considerations.

The court then found that two separate Title VII concepts counseled against the “manager rule.” First, under Fourth Circuit case law, an employer can escape Title VII liability if an employee’s conduct at work is sufficiently insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive. If the “manager rule” requires an employee to step outside his job duties in order to engage in protected activities, then it would put an employee in the dilemma of needing to step outside their job duties to have Title VII’s protections but then risk those same protections because stepping outside job duties could be seen as sufficiently insubordinate. Second, because Title VII offers employers the affirmative defense in certain harassment claims that complaining employees failed to follow the company’s internal reporting procedures, implementing a “manager rule” that could discourage employees responsible for helping other employees, such as DeMasters, from reporting concerns of discrimination. Thus, the “manager rule” would prevent Title VII’s overall goal of preventing and eliminating discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

The Fourth Circuit became just the second appellate court to look at and decide the “manager rule” question in the Title VII context in a published opinion. The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that it did not apply, but the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have non-precedential opinions adopting the “manager rule” in the Title VII context. Continued split among the federal courts on this issue increases the likelihood the Supreme Court may one day decide the issue.

For employers, the case serves as another reminder that concerns and complaints expressed by managers in harassment claims should be taken seriously and that great care needs to be taken to ensure employees are not retaliated against. Courts and the EEOC have been taking an increasingly expanded view of what constitutes protected activity and retaliation, and employers not mindful of these developments ignore them at their peril.

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP | Copyright (c) 2015

Expanding Retaliation: Fourth Circuit Rejects “Manager Rule” in Title VII Cases

After helping an employee report a complaint of harassment, a manager expresses concern over the company’s handling of the situation and tells the employee the complaint is being mishandled. After the complaining employee files (and then settles) a Title VII against the company, the manager is fired for failing to take a “pro-employer” stance and act in the company’s “best interests.” Does the manager have a Title VII retaliation claim? That is the exact question recently decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic.

According to the complaint, which the court accepted as true for purposes of its review, J. Neil DeMasters began working as an employee assistance program consultant for Carilion in 2006. Two years later, DeMasters was consulted by an employee who complained that his supervisor was sexually harassing him. DeMasters relayed the substance of the complaint to human resources, which investigated the allegations and fired the supervisor. The employee was told the supervisor would never be back in the workplace, but a few days later the employee’s department manager allowed the supervisor to return to collect belongings. The employee complained to DeMasters that he felt uncomfortable at work and that he was facing increasing hostility from the supervisor’s allies and friends.

Upon learning this, DeMasters contacted HR to express his concern with how the situation was being handled, and HR confirmed it was aware the employee was being harassed by co-workers. DeMasters offered to coach the HR department on better ways to handle harassment complaints. HR declined, stating it would handle the situation. However, the employee reported to DeMasters that the harassment continued to get worse on a daily basis. DeMasters then opined to the employee that the complaints were being mishandled by HR. With that, DeMasters stopped having contact with the complaining employee.

Two years later, however, the employee filed a Title VII claim, which was settled. A few weeks after the settlement, DeMasters was called into a meeting with corporate counsel, the vice president of HR, and his own department director. DeMasters was told that by not taking the “pro-employer side,” he had put the company at risk of substantial liability. Two days later, DeMasters was fired for, among other reasons explained to him in writing, failing to act in the company’s best interests and failing to protect the company.

DeMasters filed a Title VII retaliation claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court for two reasons. First, the district court found that when DeMasters’ actions were examined individually, each action failed to constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Second, even if he had engaged in protected activity, the “manager rule” prevented him from bringing a Title VII retaliation claim because he was acting within the scope of his job duties when reporting the complaints of the employee and discussing the matter with the company.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit roundly rejected both aspects of the district court’s reasoning. The appellate court found the district court’s individualized assessment of DeMasters’ actions to be “myopic.” The correct approach, the appellate court counseled, was to examine the totality of the circumstances in a “holistic approach.” As the court put it, just as a play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes, so a discrimination claim cannot be understood without looking at the overall scenario. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty finding DeMasters engaged in protected activity by complaining to the company that he felt the complaining employee was still being subjected to unlawful conduct.

The court then turned to the “manager rule,” which finds its origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and requires an employee to “step outside” his role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. Under this theory, DeMasters’ job duties required him to counsel the employee and relay complaints to HR, and therefore his actions were not protected activities.

The Fourth Circuit again roundly rejected the application of the “manager rule” to the Title VII context. The court first found that whatever statutory support the “manager rule” had in the FLSA context did not exist in the Title VII context because the statutory language of Title VII differs from the FLSA in important considerations.

The court then found that two separate Title VII concepts counseled against the “manager rule.” First, under Fourth Circuit case law, an employer can escape Title VII liability if an employee’s conduct at work is sufficiently insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive. If the “manager rule” requires an employee to step outside his job duties in order to engage in protected activities, then it would put an employee in the dilemma of needing to step outside their job duties to have Title VII’s protections but then risk those same protections because stepping outside job duties could be seen as sufficiently insubordinate. Second, because Title VII offers employers the affirmative defense in certain harassment claims that complaining employees failed to follow the company’s internal reporting procedures, implementing a “manager rule” that could discourage employees responsible for helping other employees, such as DeMasters, from reporting concerns of discrimination. Thus, the “manager rule” would prevent Title VII’s overall goal of preventing and eliminating discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

The Fourth Circuit became just the second appellate court to look at and decide the “manager rule” question in the Title VII context in a published opinion. The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that it did not apply, but the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have non-precedential opinions adopting the “manager rule” in the Title VII context. Continued split among the federal courts on this issue increases the likelihood the Supreme Court may one day decide the issue.

For employers, the case serves as another reminder that concerns and complaints expressed by managers in harassment claims should be taken seriously and that great care needs to be taken to ensure employees are not retaliated against. Courts and the EEOC have been taking an increasingly expanded view of what constitutes protected activity and retaliation, and employers not mindful of these developments ignore them at their peril.

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP | Copyright (c) 2015

“Employee” Status Not Necessarily Dependent on Compensation

Barnes & Thornburg

While Title VII discrimination claims apply only to “employees” and “employers,” the statute’s definitions of those terms are spectacularly unhelpful. An employee is someone who is employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) & (f). Thanks, Congress! In light of this thoroughly circular definition, courts use agency principles to determine employment status when such is not clear.

An illustrative opinion was recently issued by the Northern District of Illinois in Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad. In Volling, one of the main questions was whether the members of ARS’s volunteer ambulance squad should be considered employees for purposes of Title VII. The opinion can be found here.

Several factors are considered in making this employment determination, including: the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. No single factor is dispositive, but courts will often give great weight to the amount of control the putative employer has over the putative employee.

Defendant ARS argued that the volunteer ambulance squad could not be employees because they received no payment. This view seems to be supported by the Second and Fourth Circuits, which require significant economic remuneration for a worker to be considered an employee for Title VII purposes. The Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, but the district court noted that the Seventh Circuit has rejected labels such as “volunteer” and endorsed the consideration of the common law factors listed above.  Accordingly, the district court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s view that compensation is just one factor to be considered in the employment analysis. Perhaps significantly, the Volling court stated that compensation may well be less important with regard to not-for-profit organizations such as ARS than to commercial employers.

Thus, the court took into consideration the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, which included, among other things, that plaintiffs: are assigned to work specific shifts and defendants control who works those shifts with them; performed their work in the station and ambulances operated and used by ARS; are required to wear uniforms; received training; had to go through probationary periods; and had supervisory subordinate relationships with team leaders and board members of ARS.

Based on the degree of control exercised by ARS and the mandate to construe Title VII broadly to prevent discrimination, the court refused to dismiss the case for a lack of an employment relationship. “A workplace is not necessarily any different for a non-compensated volunteer than it is for a compensated ‘employee,’ and while both are generally free to quit if they don’t like the conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither should have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment.”

This case serves as a good reminder that – similar to problems that can arise from using independent contractors – just because a worker is considered to be and labeled an unpaid volunteer, trainee, or intern doesn’t mean the employer is necessarily shielded from Title VII (or other federal statutory) liability. What counts is how those workers are treated, not how they are labeled.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP