Attorney Mindfulness When Addressing Emails and Texts: ABA Formal Opinion Provides Ethical Guidance to Lawyers on Electronic Communications

In their roles as advisors, advocates, counselors, negotiators, and client representatives, lawyers communicate extensively though electronic means, particularly email and increasingly text messages. However, the fact that use of these electronic communication tools is commonplace in legal practice doesn’t mean that attorneys shouldn’t exercise caution when crafting their communications. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility published a formal opinion this month that advises lawyers to refrain generally from including their clients on emails and texts sent to opposing counsel.

ABA Formal Opinion 503 focuses on ABA Model Rule 4.2, often referred to as the “no-contact” rule. Under this model rule, a lawyer who is representing a client may not communicate about the subject of the representation with a represented person absent the consent of that person’s lawyer unless the law or court order authorizes such as communication. Most states’ codes of professional legal ethics draw heavily upon the ABA Model Rules, so many states have similar “no-contact” rules for lawyers.

The new formal opinion states that lawyers would not be deemed to violate ABA Model Rule 4.2 if they send a “reply all” response to a group email or text sent by an opposing counsel, even if that communication includes the opposing counsel’s client. The opinion states that, “[a]bsent special circumstances, lawyers who copy their clients on emails or other forms of electronic communication to counsel representing another person in the matter impliedly consent to a ‘reply all’ response from the receiving counsel,” the opinion said. “Accordingly, the reply all communication would not violate Model Rule 4.2.”

As a practical matter, Formal Opinion 503 provides a number of options to lawyers who wish to avoid creating an implied presumption of consent to such “reply all” communications from opposing counsel to their clients. These options include:

  • forwarding the electronic communication separately to the client without including opposing counsel as an addressee,
  • informing receiving counsel expressly and in advance that including the client on the electronic communication does not constitute a consent to a “reply all” response, or
  • sending the communication through other means (such as a mailed hard copy letter) where different norms are in place regarding responding to all addressees.

The full text of ABA Formal Opinion 503 is available here.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

Text Messages Inviting Independent Voters to Political Speeches by Former Presidential Hopeful Howard Schultz Were Not “Solicitations” For His Book Tour

The Western District of Washington recently held in Vallianos. v. Schultz, C19-0464-JCC, 2019 WL 4980649 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2019), that two text messages encouraging recipients to view a livestream of a political speech by the former chairman and CEO of Starbucks Howard Schultz did not amount to “solicitations” under the TCPA. While exploring a run for President, Schultz released a book, “From the Ground Up,” and went on a three-month long cross-country book tour. He also collected from voter records the phone numbers of individuals registered as having “No Party Affiliation” and sent them the text messages at issue. Named plaintiffs Cassandra Vallianos, Stacey Karney, and Mike Barker brought a putative TCPA class action against Schultz alleging that the text messages were sent to them without their consent after they had placed their cell phone numbers on the national Do Not Call Registry.

Specifically, plaintiffs made two claims: first, that Schultz sent the text messages using an auto-dialer and without the plaintiffs’ consent; second, that the calls were solicitations sent in violation of the TCPA’s Do Not Call restrictions. Plaintiffs’ claims were based on two separate text messages Schultz sent Plaintiffs. The first said “Howard Schultz will be speaking in Miami at 12:30! Watch live: https://hs.media.mi-a030[.]” The second said “Howard Schultz will be speaking about his vision for America in Miami at 12:30! Watch live: https://hs.media/mia030[.]” Plaintiffs argued that these text messages were “solicitations” under the TCPA because the text messages were sent with the goal of getting recipients to purchase Schultz’s book. Defendant Schultz moved to dismiss only the Do Not Call claim.

Acknowledging that messages that serve a “dual-purpose” by including both advertising and informational communications are solicitations for purposes of the TCPA, the court looked to the context of the messages to determine whether they constituted “solicitations” under the TCPA. The court reviewed the text messages, the webpage to which the text messages directed recipients, and the speech embedded in the website. The court found that the text messages did not facially discuss Schultz’s book. The court also found that the link in both text messages took Plaintiffs to the homepage of Schultz’s website, which included various video clips, including a livestream of Schultz’s speech and a link to a website where consumers could purchase his book. But the court held that the website was not transformed into a solicitation by the “mere inclusion of a link to a website on which a consumer can purchase a product.” The court found that the speech focused on Schultz’s political views and potential run for president, not his book. The court further found that the website was just a way to facilitate viewing of Schultz’s speech. Thus, the court ultimately determined that the messages did not constitute “telephone solicitations” under the TCPA.

With the seemingly never-ending national campaign season chugging along, we expect to see more such claims filter their way through the courts.


©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on TCPA litigation, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet Law page.

Court Dismisses Text-Message TCPA Suit Against AOL, Finding Instant Messaging Service Does Not Constitute an ATDS

On June 1, the Northern District of California dismissed a putative TCPA class action against AOL, finding that the plaintiff had failed to allege that AOL utilized an automated telephone dialing system (ATDS), as required to state a cause of action under the TCPA.  In dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in Derby v. AOL, the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), which allows individuals to send instant messages as text messages to cell phones, constitutes an ATDS.  Instead, the court agreed with AOL’s argument that AIM relied on “human intervention” to send the messages at issue, which foreclosed the possibility of potential TCPA liability.  (Covington represented AOL in this case.)  The decision should be beneficial to a variety of services that enable their users to send text messages to cell phones.

The TCPA’s prohibitions include a ban on using an ATDS to call cellular telephones for informational purposes without the prior express consent of the recipient.  The FCC and courts have extended the reach of the statute to include text messages.  However, the FCC has stated that only equipment that has the capacity to operate “without human intervention” may qualify as an ATDS.  The plaintiff in Derby alleged that he received three text messages from an AIM user that were intended for another individual, which the court recognized were “presumably . . . the result of the sender inputting an incorrect phone number.”  After the receiving the third message, the plaintiff alleged that he sent a text message to AIM to block future texts from the AIM user, and that he received back a text confirmation of his request.

In analyzing TCPA liability for the first three text messages, the court noted that the plaintiff’s complaint “affirmatively alleges that AIM relies on human intervention to transmit text messages to recipients’ cell phones.”  The court followed precedent from other Ninth Circuit district courts rejecting ATDS arguments where the equipment at issue relied on humans to press buttons on phones or manually enter telephone numbers into the system.  Since the complaint demonstrated that “extensive human intervention is required to send text messages through defendant’s AIM service,” the court held that the complaint failed to state a claim under the TCPA with respect to the three text messages sent by an AIM user.

The court also analyzed potential TCPA liability for the separate confirmation text message that Derby alleged he had received from AIM.  Again citing relevant authority, the court held that “a single message sent in response to plaintiff’s text . . . is not the kind of intrusive, nuisance call that the TCPA prohibits.”  The court concluded that Derby, having sent the “block” request from his cell phone, had “knowingly released” his number to AIM and consented to receive a confirmation text from AIM at that number.  The court’s opinion advocated for a “common sense” approach to TCPA liability, finding that the statute should not be utilized to “punish the consumer-friendly practice of confirming requests to block future unwanted texts.”  Accordingly, the court also dismissed the TCPA claim based on the confirmation text message for failure to state a claim.

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP