New TCPA Consent Requirements Out the Window: What Businesses Need to Know

The landscape of prior express written consent under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) has undergone a significant shift over the past 13 months. In a December 2023 order, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) introduced two key consent requirements to alter the TCPA, with these changes set to take effect on January 27, 2025. First, the proposed rule limited consent to a single identified seller, prohibiting the common practice of asking a consumer to provide a single form of consent to receive communications from multiple sellers. Second, the proposed rule required that calls be “logically and topically” associated with the original consent interaction. However, just a single business day before these new requirements were set to be enforced, the FCC postponed the effective date of the one-to-one consent, and a three-judge panel of circuit judges unanimously ruled that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA.

A Sudden Change in Course

On the afternoon of January 24, 2025, the FCC issued an order delaying the implementation of these new requirements to January 26, 2026, or until further notice following a ruling from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The latter date referenced the fact that the Eleventh Circuit was in the process of reviewing a legal challenge to the new requirements at the time the postponement order was issued.

That decision from the Eleventh Circuit, though, arrived much sooner than expected. Just after the FCC’s order, the Eleventh Circuit issued its ruling in Insurance Marketing Coalition v. FCC, No. 24-10277, striking down both of the FCC’s proposed requirements. The court found that the new rules were inconsistent with the statutory definition of “prior express consent” under the TCPA. More specifically, the court held “the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA because the 2023 Order’s ‘prior express consent’ restrictions impermissibly conflict with the ordinary statutory meaning of ‘prior express consent.’”

The critical takeaway from Insurance Marketing Coalition is that the TCPA’s “prior written consent” verbiage was irreconcilable with the FCC’s one-to-one consent and “logically and topically related” requirements. Under this ruling, businesses may continue to obtain consent for multiple sellers to call or text consumers through the use of a single consent form. The court clarified that “all consumers must do to give ‘prior express consent’ to receive a robocall is clearly and unmistakably state, before receiving a robocall, that they are willing to receive the robocall.” According to the ruling, the FCC’s rulemaking exceeded the statutory text and created duties that Congress did not establish.

The FCC could seek further review by the full Eleventh Circuit or appeal to the Supreme Court, but the agency’s decision to delay the effective date of the new requirements suggests it may abandon this regulatory effort. The ruling reinforces a broader judicial trend after the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision overturning Chevron deference – and curbing expansive regulatory interpretations.

What This Means for Businesses

With the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the TCPA’s consent requirements revert to their previous state. Prior express written consent consists of an agreement in writing, signed by the recipient, that explicitly authorizes a seller to deliver, or cause to be delivered, advertisements or telemarketing messages via call or text message using an automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice. The agreement must specify the authorized telephone number and cannot be a condition of purchasing goods or services.

This ruling is particularly impactful for businesses engaged in lead generation and comparison-shopping services. Companies may obtain consent that applies to multiple parties rather than being restricted to one-to-one consent. As a result, consent agreements may once again include language that covers the seller “and its affiliates” or “and its marketing partners” that hyperlinks to a list of relevant partners covered under the consent agreement.

A Costly Compliance Dilemma

Many businesses have spent the past year modifying their compliance processes, disclosures, and technology to prepare for the now-defunct one-to-one consent and logical-association requirements. These companies must now decide whether to revert to their previous consent framework or proceed with the newly developed compliance measures. The decision will depend on various factors, including the potential impact of the scrapped regulations on lead generation and conversion rates. In the comparison-shopping and lead generation sectors, businesses may be quick to abandon the stricter consent requirements. However, those companies that have already implemented changes to meet the one-to-one consent rule may be able to differentiate the leads they sell as the disclosure itself will include the ultimate seller purchasing the lead, which provides the caller with a documented record of consent in the event of future litigation.

What’s Next for TCPA Compliance?

An unresolved issue after the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling is whether additional restrictions on marketing calls — such as the requirement for prior express written consent rather than just prior express consent — could face similar legal challenges. Prior express consent can be established when a consumer voluntarily provides their phone number in a transaction-related interaction, whereas prior express written consent requires a separate signed agreement. If future litigation targets these distinctions, it is possible that the courts may further reshape the TCPA’s regulatory landscape.

The TCPA remains one of the most litigated consumer protection statutes, with statutory damages ranging from $500 to $1,500 per violation. This high-stakes enforcement environment has made compliance a major concern for businesses seeking to engage with consumers through telemarketing and automated calls. The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling provides a temporary reprieve for businesses, but ongoing legal battles could continue to influence the regulatory landscape.

For now, businesses must carefully consider their approach to consent management, balancing compliance risks with operational efficiency. Whether this ruling marks the end of the FCC’s push for stricter TCPA consent requirements remains to be seen.

“Don’t You Have to Look at What the Statute Says?” – IMC’s Oral Arguments

As we noted earlier on TCPAWorld, the IMC odds against the FCC might be better than initially thought due to the panel of judges from the Eleventh Circuit hearing the oral arguments. Oral argument recordings are available online.

And the panel did not disappoint in pushing back on the FCC.

The conversation hinged on the FCC’s power to implement regulations in furtherance of the TCPA’s statutory language. This is important because the FCC is limited to implementation, and they are do not have the authority “to rewrite the statute” as was mentioned in the oral arguments.

Judge Luck (HERE) had some concerns with the FCC’s limitations on the consumer’s ability to consent. The statute, according to Luck, intends to allow consumers to agree to receive calls. If that is the case, then a limitation of the consumer’s ability to exercise their rights is an attempt to rewrite the statute.

Luck agreed that implementing the statute is fine, but limiting the right of consumers to receive calls they consent to receive is over reach. Luck continued “Just because you [the FCC] are ineffective at enforcing the authority doesn’t mean you have the right to limit one’s right, a statutory right, or rewrite those rights to limit what it means.”

The FCC attempted to argue that implementation of statute by their very nature is going to lead to restriction, but Judge Luck pushed back on that. According to Luck, there are ways to implement statutes that don’t restrict a consumer’s statutory rights. This exchange was also telling:

LUCK: Without the regulation do you agree with me that the statute would allow it?

FCC: Yes.

LUCK: If so, then it’s not an implementation. It’s a restriction.

Luck was not the only Judge who pushed back on the FCC. Judge Branch (I believe because she was not identified) also strongly pushed back on the FCC’s restriction on topically and logically associated as an element of consent. Branch stated that the FCC was looking at consumer behavior and essentially stated too many consumers didn’t know what they were doing in giving consent. The FCC stated “I think we have to look at how the industry was operating…” only to be interrupted by Branch who questioned that statement by asking “Don’t you have to look at what the statute says?”

YIKES.

Finally, the FCC’s turn in oral argument ended with this exchange:

JUDGE: Perhaps the question should be “We have a problem here. We should talk to Congress about it.”

FCC: Congress did task the agency to implement here.

JUDGE: It’s given you power to implement, not carte blanche.

DOUBLE YIKES.

There was also a conversation around whether or not the panel should issue a stay in this case. The IMC argued that yes – a stay was appropriate due to the uncertainty in the market.

It’s pretty clear that the judges questioned the statutory authority of the FCC to implement the 1:1 consent and the topically and logically related portions of the definition of prior express written consent.

While we don’t have a definitive answer yet on this issue, we do know this is going to be a lot more interesting than everyone thought before the oral arguments.

We will keep you up to date on this and we will have more information soon.

Upcoming Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) Changes in 2025

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), enacted in 1991, protects consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls, robocalls, and texts.

New FCC Consent Rule

On January 27, 2025, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) new consent rule for robocalls and robotexts will take effect. The FCC aims to close the “lead generator loophole” by requiring marketers to obtain “one-to-one” consumer consent to receive telemarketing texts and auto-dialed calls. While the rule primarily targets lead generators, it could affect any business that relies on consumer consent for such communications or purchases leads from third parties.

Under the rule, businesses must clearly and conspicuously request and obtain written consumer consent for robocalls and robotexts from each individual company. Companies can no longer rely on a single instance of consumer consent that links to a list of multiple sellers and partners. Instead, individual written consent will be required for each marketer. Additionally, any resulting communication must be “logically and topically related” to the website where the consent was obtained.

To meet this requirement, businesses may allow consumers to affirmatively select which sellers they consent to hear from or provide links to separate consent forms for each business requesting permission to contact them.

New Consent Revocation Rules

Another change takes effect on April 11, 2025, when the FCC’s new consent revocation rules for robocalls and robotexts are implemented. These rules allow consumers to revoke prior consent through any reasonable method, and marketers may not designate an exclusive means for revocation. Reasonable methods include replying “stop,” “quit” or similar terms to incoming texts, using automated voice or opt-out replies, or submitting a message through a website provided by the caller.

Marketers must honor revocation requests within a reasonable timeframe, not exceeding 10 business days. After that period, no further robocalls or robotexts requiring consent may be sent to the consumer.

Preparing for Compliance

To comply with the January 27, 2025, one-to-one consent rule and the April 11, 2025, consent revocation rule, lead generators and businesses that use or facilitate robocall and robotext communications should:

  • Review their current consent and revocation practices.
  • Ensure compliance by updating policies before the deadlines.
  • Examine where consumer leads are being obtained and adjust policies for using this information to meet the new requirements.

This advisory provides only a summary of the upcoming changes to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

SPAM FROM HOME?: Home Shopping Network (HSN) Hit With New TCPA Class Action Over DNC Text Messages

TCPA class actions against retailers arising out of SMS channel communications continue to roll in, despite Facebook severely limiting the availability of TCPA ATDS claims.

The issue, of course, is the DNC rules that prevent SMS messages to residential phones for marketing purposes absent prior express invitation or permission or an established business relationship.

For instance a consumer in Florida filed a TCPA class action lawsuit against HSN (home shopping network) yesterday in federal court claiming the company sent him promotional text messages without his consent and despite the fact he was on the national DNC list.

Complaint here: HSN COmplaint

The Complaint alleges HSN had a “practice” of sending text messages to consumers on the DNC list and seeks to represent a class of:

All persons throughout the United States (1) who did not provide their
telephone number to HSN, Inc., (2) to whom HSN, Inc. delivered, or
caused to be delivered, more than one call or text message within a 12-
month period, promoting HSN, Inc. goods or services, (3) where the
person’s residential or cellular telephone number had been registered
with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days before
HSN, Inc. delivered, or caused to be delivered, at least two of the calls
and/or text messages within the 12-month period, (4) within four years
preceding the date of this complaint and through the date of class
certification.

As these cases continue to roll in it is critical that retailers and brands keep the DNC rules in mind. Most companies only seek to contact consumers that sign up for their messages but numerous challenges to compliance exist:

  1. Third-party lead suppliers often provide false information;
  2. Consumers enter the wrong phone numbers on POS systems and online; and
  3. Phone numbers change hands regularly.

While tools exist to help limit exposure on these challenges it is critical to maintain a strong DNC policy and attendant training to provide a defense. And don’t forget about the new revocation rules!

TCPA Rules on Revoking Consent for Unwanted Robocalls and Robotexts Effective April 2025

On October 11, 2024, the Federal Communications Commission announced that the effective date for Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) rules on revoking consent for unwanted robocalls and robotexts is set for April 11, 2025.

On February 15, 2024, the FCC adopted the TCPA Consent Order in the above-captioned proceeding. In that rulemaking, the FCC adopted rules making it simpler for consumers to revoke consent to receive unwanted robocalls and robotexts. Callers and texters must honor these opt-out requests in a timely manner.

The TCPA Consent Order established that these rules would become effective six months following publication in the Federal Register that the Office of Management and Budget has completed its review of the modified information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. OMB approved these modified information collection requirements on September 26, 2024.

On October 11, 2024, the FCC announced in the Federal Register that compliance with the amendments and new rules set forth in the TCPA Consent Order as contained in 47 CFR §§ 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F), (10), (11) and (d)(3) is required as of April 11, 2025.

Background of the TCPA Rules on Revoking Consent for Unwanted Robocalls and Robotexts

The TCPA restricts robocalls and robotexts absent the prior express consent of the called party or a recognized exemption. The FCC has made clear that consumers have a right to decide which robocalls and robotexts they wish to receive by exercising their ability to grant or revoke consent to receive such calls and texts.

The FCC has now adopted new rules to strengthen the ability of consumers to decide which robocalls and robotexts they wish to receive, codified the FCC’s past guidance on consent to make these requirements easily accessible and apparent to callers and consumers, and closed purported loopholes that allow wireless providers to make robocalls and robotexts without the ability for the subscriber to opt out.

What is the Practical Impact of the TCPA Revocation Rules?

As previously discussed by FTC defense and telemarketing compliance attorney Richard B. Newman, in March 2024 the Federal Communications Commission announced that it adopted new rules and codified previously adopted protections that make it simpler for consumers to revoke consent to unwanted robocalls and robotexts (specifically, autodialed and/or artificial/ prerecorded voice calls and texts) while requiring that callers and texters honor these requests in a timely manner.

In pertinent part:

  • Revocation of prior express consent for autodialed, prerecorded or artificial voice calls (and autodialed texts) can be made in any reasonable manner (callers may not infringe on that right by designating an exclusive means to revoke consent that precludes the use of any other reasonable method).
  • Callers are required to honor do-not-call and consent revocation requests within a reasonable time not to exceed ten (10) business days of receipt.
  • Text senders are limited to a prompt one-time text message confirming a consumer’s request that no further text messages be sent under the TCPA (the longer the delay, the more difficult it will be to demonstrate that such a message falls within the original prior consent).
  • Revocation of consent applies only to those autodialed and/or artificial/prerecorded voice calls and texts for which consent is required.
  • A revocation to marketing messages precludes all further telephone calls or text messages unless an enumerated exemption exists.

Telemarketers and lead generators should consult with an experienced FTC defense lawyer to discuss the scope of the new rules and protections, including, but not limited to, the scope and applicability of a revocation for one purpose to other communication purposes.

by: Richard B. Newman of Hinch Newman LLP

For more news on FCC TCPA Regulations, visit the NLR Communications, Media, & Internet section.

APPARENTLY NOT AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: Summary Judgment Denied Because Third Party Vendor May Have Had Apparent Authority To Make Calls Without Consent

Hi TCPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have a good case today.

Dickson, v. Direct Energy, LP, et al., No. 5:18-CV-00182-JRA, 2024 WL 4416856 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2024).

Let’s dive in.

Background

In this case, the plaintiff Dickson alleges the defendant Direct Energy sent him ringless voicemails (RVMs) in 2017 without consent.

Direct Energy filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it cannot be held liable under the TCPA because it did not directly make the calls to Dickson (a third-party vendor did) and it cannot be held vicariously liable for the calls under agency principals.

More specifically, Direct Energy argues that Total Marketing Concepts (TMC) was an independent agent and was not acting with actual or apparent authority when it violated the TCPA and Direct Energy did not ratify the illegal acts of TMC.

Law

For those of you not familiar, a motion for summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Under the TCPA, a seller can be held either directly or vicariously liable for violations of the TCPA.

As noted above, Direct Energy did not directly deliver any RVMs to Dickson. So it cannot be directly liable for the calls. Dickson instead seeks to hold Direct Energy vicariously liable for the acts of TMC and TMC’s subvendors.

Let’s first look at the principal/agent relationship.

Direct Energy primarily argued that TMC was NOT its agent because of the terms of their agreement. Specifically, Direct Energy identified TMC as an “independent contractor.” Moreover, TMC was “expressly instructed to send RVMs only with TCPA-compliant opt-in consent.”

Importantly, however, whether an agency relationship exists is based on an assessment of the facts of the relationship and not on how the parties define their relationship.

Listen up folks—contractual terms disclaiming agency will not cut it!

While Direct Energy and TMC did have a provision in their contract which expressly disclaimed any agency relationship, the Court highlighted that the parties entered into an amended agreement which expressly authorized TMC to (among other things) close sales on Direct Energy’s behalf and thereby bind Direct Energy in contracts with customers. In other words, Direct Energy authorized TMC to enter into agreements on its behalf.

The Court also found Direct Energy exerted a high level of control over TMC:

  • Direct Energy had the ability to audit TMC’s records to ensure compliance with its contractual obligations
  • Direct Energy could audit TMC’s subcontractors in the same manner
  • Direct Energy had access to TMC facilities to ensure compliance
  • Direct Energy had the ability to terminate the contract with or without cause
  • Direct Energy authorized TMC to telemarket on its behalf using the Direct Energy trade name as if Direct Energy was making the telemarketing call

Therefore, the Court found Dickson produced evidence which a reasonable jury could find that Direct Energy exerted such a level of control over TMC such that there was a principle/agent relationship, despite their contract expressly providing otherwise.

ACTUAL AUTHORITY

Actual authority exists when a principal explicitly grants permission to an agent to act on their behalf, whether through express or implied means.

Express authority

Pursuant to the Teleservices Agreement, TMC was responsible for complying with the TCPA. Thus, there was no evidence that TMC had express actual authority to contract individuals who had not given consent.

Implied authority

Dickson argued that Direct Energy nonetheless led TMC to reasonably believe it should make telemarketing calls that violate the TCPA. However, the Court found that TMC’s authority was expressly limited to opt-in leads. So, Dickson failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material facts showing that TMC acted actual authority—either express or implied—when it contracted potential customers who had not opted in to receiving such calls.

APPARENT AUTHORITY

Apparent authority arises when a principal’s conduct leads a third party to reasonably believe that an agent has the authority to act on the principal’s behalf, even if such authority has not been explicitly granted.

Here’s where it gets interesting.

Dickson presented evidence that Direct Energy received several thousand complaints regarding the RVMs but did not stop the conduct.

That’s a lot of complaints..

Moreover, Direct Energy authorized TMC to use its trade name and approved the scripts. Thus, Dickson argued Direct Energy allowed third-party recipients of the RVMs to reasonably believe the RVMs were from Direct Energy.

And even though TMC used other third-party telephony services, this was expressly authorized by the agreement between Direct Energy and TMC.

Therefore, the Court found that Dickson demonstrated that Direct Energy authorized and instructed TMC to use its tradename in its RVMs, approved the scripts used by TMC, and knew or should have known of TMC’s improper conduct and that did not take action to prevent that conduct from continuing.

As such, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact existed that TMC acted with apparent authority when it contracted potential customers who had not opted in to receiving such calls.

RATIFICATION

Ratification occurs when an agent acts for the principal’s benefit and the principal does not repudiate the agent’s actions.

A plaintiff must present some evidence that a principal benefitted from the alleged unlawful conduct of its purported agent to hold the principal liable for the acts of the agent under the theory of ratification.

Here, Dickson failed to produce evidence that Direct Energy received any benefit from TMC’s unlawful telemarketing acts. For example, Dickson produced no evidence of any contracts that Direct Energy secured as a result of TMC contacting potential consumers who had not given opt-in consent. Importantly, the Court stated “[p]ure conjecture that Direct Energy must have benefitted in some way because of the volume of calls made by TMC on its behalf is simply not enough to survive summary judgment.”

Therefore, the Court found Dickson failed to demonstrate the existence of a material fact as to whether Direct Energy ratified TMC’s violations of the TCPA.

In light of the above, the Court recommended denying Direct Energy’s motion for summary judgment. Although there was no genuine issue of material fact related to actual authority and ratification, the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact does exist concerning whether TMC acted with apparent authority.

This case highlights the complexities of agency relationships in TCPA cases and serves as a reminder for companies: mere contractual disclaimers of agency will not suffice. Courts can still hold you vicariously liable for the actions of third parties acting on your behalf! Choose the companies you are working with wisely.

EVERYTHING’S FINE: Big TCPA Win For Medical Debt Collector Suggests FCC Rulings Still Binding After Loper Bright–Let’s Hope it Stays That Way

Fascinating little case for you all today.

Consumer visits hospital for treatment. Provides phone number at admission. Receives treatment and is discharged.

Consumer fails to pay resulting invoices. Hospital and provider network turn account over to collections. Debt collector allegedly uses an ATDS to call consumer on the number she provided.

What result?

Prior to the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision the determination would be easy. The FCC held back in 2009 that providing a number in connection with a transaction permits autodialed calls to a consumer in connection with that transaction. And the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has directly held that providing a phone number on hospital intake documents permits later debt collection activity at that number–including via autodialer.

But the Loper Bright decision recently destroyed Chevron deference–meaning courts no longer have to yield to agency determinations of this sort. And while the Hobbs Act affords extra protections to certain FCC rulings, those protections only apply where certain procedural requirements were met by the Commission in adopting the rule.

So does the FCC’s rule from 2009 permitting informational calls to numbers provided in connection with a transaction still bind courts? According to the decision in Woodman v. Medicredit, 2024 WL 4132732 (D. Nv Sept. 9, 2024) the answer is yes!

In Woodman the defendant debt collector moved for summary judgment arguing the Plaintiff consented when she provided her number to the hospital. The Court had little problem applying the FCC’s 2009 order and precedent that came before Loper Bright to grant summary judgment to he defense. So just like that case is gone.

Great ruling for the defense, of course, and it makes me feel a bit better about the whole “no one knows what the law is anymore” thing, but the Woodman court didn’t really address the core issue– was the 2009 ruling enacted with sufficient APA pop and circumstance to merit Hobbs Act deference under PDR Resources. 

Really interesting question and one folks should keep in mind.

The Privacy Patchwork: Beyond US State “Comprehensive” Laws

We’ve cautioned before about the danger of thinking only about US state “comprehensive” laws when looking to legal privacy and data security obligations in the United States. We’ve also mentioned that the US has a patchwork of privacy laws. That patchwork is found to a certain extent outside of the US as well. What laws exist in the patchwork that relate to a company’s activities?

There are laws that apply when companies host websites, including the most well-known, the California Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA). It has been in effect since July 2004, thus predating COPPA by 14 years. Then there are laws the apply if a company is collecting and using biometric identifiers, like Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Companies are subject to specific laws both in the US and elsewhere when engaging in digital communications. These laws include the US federal laws TCPA and TCFAPA, as well as CAN-SPAM. Digital communication laws exist in countries as wide ranging as Australia, Canada, Morocco, and many others. Then we have laws that apply when collecting information during a credit card transaction, like the Song Beverly Credit Card Act (California).

Putting It Into Practice: When assessing your company’s obligations under privacy and data security laws, keep activity specific privacy laws in mind. Depending on what you are doing, and in what jurisdictions, you may have more obligations to address than simply those found in comprehensive privacy laws.

No Arbitration for Lead Buyer: Consent Form Naming Buyer Does Not Give Buyer Right to Enforce Arbitration in Tcpa Class Action

A subsidiary of Move, Inc. bought a data lead from Nations Info, Corp. off of its HudHomesUsa.org website. The subsidiary made an outbound prerecorded call resulting in a TCPA lawsuit against Move. (Fun.)

Move, Inc. moved to compel arbitration arguing that since its subsidiary was named in the consent form–it argued the arbitration clause necessarily covered it because the whole purpose of the clause was to permit parties buying leads from the website to compel TCPA cases to arbitration.

Good argument, but the court disagreed.

In Faucett v. Move, Inc. 2024 WL 2106727 (C.D. Cal. April 22, 2024) the Court refused to enforce the arbitration clause finding that Move, Inc. was not a signatory to the agreement and could not enforce it under any theory.

Most interestingly, Move argued that a motivating purpose behind the publisher’s arbitration clause was to benefit Move because Nations Info listed Opcity —Move’s subsidiary—in the Consent Form as a company that could send marketing messages to Hud’s users. (Mot. 1–2.)

But the Court found the Terms and Consent Form were two different documents, and accepting the one did not change the scope of the other.

The Court also found equitable estoppel did not apply because Plaintiff was not moving to enforce the terms of the agreement. Quite the contrary, Plaintiff denied any arbitration (or consent) agreement existed.

So Move is stuck.

Pretty clear lesson here: lead buyers should make sure the arbitration provisions on any website they are buying leads from includes third-parties (like the buyer) as a party to the clause. Failing to do so may leave the lead buyer stuck without the ability to enforce the provision–and that can lead to a massive class action with potential exposure in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

Lead buyers are already forcing sellers to revise their flows in light of the FCC’s new one to one consent rules. So now would be a GREAT time to revisit requirements around arbitration provisions as well.

Something to think about.

The FCC Approves an NOI to Dive Deeper into AI and its Effects on Robocalls and Robotexts

AI is on the tip of everyone’s tongue it seems these days. The Dame brought you a recap of President Biden’s orders addressing AI at the beginning of the month. This morning at the FCC’s open meeting they were presented with a request for a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to gather additional information about the benefits and harms of artificial intelligence and its use alongside “robocall and robotext”. The following five areas of interest are as follows:

  • First, the NOI seeks, on whether and if so how the commission should define AI technologies for purposes of the inquiry this includes particular uses of AI technologies that are relevant to the commission’s statutory response abilities under the TCPA, which protects consumers from nonemergency calls and texts using an autodialer or containing an artificial or prerecorded voice.
  • Second, the NOI seeks comment on how technologies may impact consumers who receive robocalls and robotexts including any potential benefits and risks that the emerging technologies may create. Specifically, the NOI seeks information on how these technologies may alter the functioning of the existing regulatory framework so that the commission may formulate policies that benefit consumers by ensuring they continue to receive privacy protections under the TCPA.
  • Third, the NOI seeks comment on whether it is necessary or possible to determine at this point whether future types of AI technologies may fall within the TCPA’s existing prohibitions on autodial calls or texts and artificial or prerecorded voice messages.
  • Fourth, NOI seeks comment on whether the commission should consider ways to verify the authenticity and legitimately generate AI voice or text content from trusted sources such as through the use of watermarks, certificates, labels, signatures, or other forms of labels when callers rely on AI technology to generate content. This may include, for example, emulating a human voice on a robocall or creating content in a text message.
  • Lastly, seeks comment on what next steps the commission should consider to further the inquiry.

While all the commissioners voted to approve the NOI they did share a few insightful comments. Commissioner Carr stated “ If AI can combat illegal robocalls, I’m all for it” but he also expressed that he does “…worry that the path we are heading down is going to be overly prescriptive” and suggests “…Let’s put some common-sense guardrails in place, but let’s not be so prescriptive and so heavy-handed on the front end that we end up benefiting large incumbents in the space because they can deal with the regulatory frameworks and stifling the smaller innovation to come.”

Commissioner Starks shared “I, for one, believe this intersectionality is clinical because the future of AI remains uncertain, one thing is clear — it has the potential to impact if not transform every aspect of American life, and because of that potential, each part of our government bears responsibility to better understand the risks, opportunities within its mandate, while being mindful of the limits of its expertise, experience, and authority. In this era of rapid technological change, we must collaborate, lean into our expertise across agencies to best serve our citizens and consumers.” Commissioner Starks seemed to be particularly focused on AI’s ability to facilitate bad actors in schemes like voice cloning and how the FCC can implement safeguards against this type of behavior.

“AI technologies can bring new challenges and opportunities. responsible and ethical implementation of AI technologies is crucial to strike a balance, ensuring that the benefits of AI are harnessed to protect consumers from harm rather than amplifying the risks in increasing the digital landscape” Commissioner Gomez shared.

Finally, the topic around the AI NOI wrapped up with Chairwoman Rosenworcel commenting “… I think we make a mistake if we only focus on the potential for harm. We needed to equally focus on how artificial intelligence can radically improve the tools we have today to block unwanted robocalls and robotexts. We are talking about technology that can see patterns in our network traffic, unlike anything we have today. They can lead to the development of analytic tools that are exponentially better at finding fraud before it reaches us at home. Used at scale, we cannot only stop this junk, we can use it to increase trust in our networks. We are asking how artificial intelligence is being used right now to recognize patterns in network traffic and how it can be used in the future. We know the risks this technology involves but we also want to harness the benefits.”