Tag: supreme court

Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Royalty Calculations For Enhanced Oil Recovery

steptoe-johnsonlogo

In French v. Occidental Permian, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court clarified royalty calculations for enhanced oil recovery.  The Court:

  1. Rejected a royalty owners’ claim that royalties on casinghead gas should be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide (CO2) was not present
  2. Held that, under the applicable leases and Unitization Agreement, the costs of removing CO2 from the gas were post-production expenses that royalty owners must share with the working interest owner

In the opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of efficient production of oil and gas and the prevention of waste.

Background

The Plaintiffs-Appellants, Marcia Fuller French and others (“French”), were lessors on two different oil and gas leases.  Both lease royalty provisions provided that the casinghead gas royalty was net of post-production expenses, but not production expenses.  The Defendant-Appellee, Occidental Permian Ltd. (“Oxy”) owned a working interest.  The parties had entered into a Unitization Agreement to allow secondary recovery operations.

Oxy began injecting wells on these leases with CO2 in 2001 in order boost oil production when waterflooding became less effective.  As a result, the wells produced natural gas that was about 85% CO2.  Although Oxy could reinject the entire casinghead gas stream, Oxy had the gas treated off site to remove the CO2.   It sold the resulting gas and had the extracted CO2 sent back to the well to be reinjected.  Oxy paid royalties on the gas after it was treated and deducted the treatment costs from French’s royalties.

French sued arguing that, except for the removal of contaminants and the extraction of NGL, the costs of processing the casinghead gas (including transportation costs) were production costs that should be borne solely by Oxy.  Conversely, Oxy argued the CO2 removal was necessary to render the gas stream marketable.  At trial, the Court agreed with French and awarded her $10,074,262.33 in underpaid royalties and entered a declaratory judgment defining Oxy’s ongoing royalty obligations.  The court of appeals reversed with a focus on the damages calculations, but did not reach a decision on whether the cost of separating the CO2 from the casinghead gas was a production expense.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court examined the parties’ agreements noting that French consented to the injection of extraneous substances into the oil reservoir and gave Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas.  The Court further pointed out the Agreement provided that the royalty owners agreed to forego royalties on any unitized substances used in the recovery process.  The Court found that French benefited from that decision and therefore must share in the cost of the CO2 removal.  The question then became whether the CO2 processing was a production or post-production cost.

French argued that the CO2 separation was akin to the removal of water from oil, which Oxy treated as a production cost.  The Court, however, found that oil and water are “immiscible” and separation of the two is a relatively simple process, unlike CO2 and gas separation, which requires special technology.  Water separation is necessary for reinjection into the reservoir and to make the oil marketable.  Conversely, CO2 separation is not necessary for continued production of oil.  The Court then noted that Oxy was not required to reinject the casinghead gas.  Therefore, based on the parties’ agreements, “French, having given Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas, and having benefited from that decision, must share in the cost of the CO2removal.”  Id. at 7.

Conclusion

The Court indirectly emphasized efficient production of oil and gas and prevention of waste.  The gas processing was economically beneficial to both French and Oxy.  The CO2 separation increased the value of the stream to both Oxy and French by allowing sale of the extracted NGLs and allowing reinjection of more than 10% of the gas produced directly back into the field.  Because French received the benefit of Oxy’s decision, it had to share in the cost.

This opinion is an important reminder to carefully negotiate and agree to terms in all agreements.  It is a further reminder to proceed in an efficient and economic manner.

ARTICLE BY:

Christina A. Denmark
Of:
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC

New Supreme Court Ruling On EPA Authority Over Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) – Little Clarification on the 111(d) Regulations

Lewis Roca Rothgerber

Last week, the United States Supreme Court issued a significant decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, that substantially restricts the authority of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permitting programs. The Supreme Court’s decision holds that EPA may not impose permitting requirements on facilities based solely on their emissions of GHGs, but may regulate GHG emissions under the PSD and Title V programs, only if a facility is otherwise subject to major source permitting requirements.

Background

EPA interpreted the Clean Air Act to require stationary sources to obtain construction and operating permits under the PSD and Title V programs whenever a facility emits GHGs above certain threshold levels. The threshold levels EPA chose were different than the levels established by Congress in the Clean Air Act, because the statutory levels when applied to GHGs were too low (as compared to criteria pollutant thresholds), and applying those levels to GHG emissions would lead to “absurd results” by subjecting millions of small sources such as shopping malls, hospitals and churches to major source permitting requirements. These thresholds were established in what is known as the “Tailoring Rule.”

The Tailoring Rule triggered regulatory review for two different source categories (for purposes of GHG emissions): sources that were already subject to major source review under the Clean Air Act because of emissions of criteria pollutants in excess of the major source thresholds (so-called “anyway” sources) and those sources that would trigger major source review for the first time based solely on emissions of GHGs in excess of the “tailored” thresholds set by EPA.

Holding

The Supreme Court’s divided 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Scalia, held that EPA’s rulemakings setting “tailored” thresholds for GHGs were invalid. The Court, however, stopped short of holding that GHGs could not be regulated at all under the PSD and Title V programs.

Specifically, the Supreme Court upheld EPA’s approach of requiring “best available control technology” (BACT) standards for GHGs for those sources otherwise required to obtain a PSD permit (the “anyway” sources). The Court emphasized, though, that it was not approving EPA’s current approach to BACT regulation of GHGs, or of any future approach that EPA might adopt. The Supreme Court categorized this aspect of the holding as having only a small impact on the regulated community, stating that 85 percent of all GHG major sources are “anyway” sources, while only an additional 3 percent would be major sources under the GHG tailoring trigger.

The Supreme Court also reaffirmed its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that GHGs qualify as an “air pollutant” for purposes of the term’s general definition in the Clean Air Act.

Takeaways and Import of This Case on 111(d) Regulations:

1)      GHG Emissions Alone Do Not Trigger Major Source Permitting Obligations – The principal legal holding of the decision is also considered the most significant from a practical perspective. Stationary sources cannot, under the Court’s ruling, be subject to permitting requirements based solely on their emissions of GHGs. The Court’s math on the number of sources impacted by this core aspect of the decision is questionable, and there is suspicion that many potentially major sources were specifically planning facilities to avoid major source permitting review by designing facilities to avoid the tailoring trigger for GHGs. In short, the impact of this decision is potentially very significant for the regulated community.

2)      Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are an “Air Pollutant” Subject to Regulation under the Clean Air Act. While the decision holds that GHGs are not an “air pollutant” for purposes of triggering PSD and Title V permitting requirements, it stops short of holding that GHGs are not an “air pollutant” for other purposes. To the contrary, the Court affirmed its prior holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the term “air pollutant,” as generally defined in the Clean Air Act, includes GHGs.

3)      Mixed Signals About EPA’s Authority to Issue NSPS Regulations Under 111(d). The Supreme Court was careful to note that EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions under the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)  were not at issue and did not need to be addressed (that is, the Court specifically did not address the proposed 111(d) rules).

a)      As noted above, the Supreme Court reinforced that GHGs may be regulated as an air pollutant under other aspects of the Clean Air Act (just not PSD or Title V). Though the Supreme Court found that EPA was right to determine that the statutory thresholds for major source review would lead to “absurd results” in the PSD and Title V context for major source triggers, the Court said nothing about EPA’s authority to regulate under the NSPS provisions of Section 111(d). One way to interpret the decision is that it cloaks EPA with apparent authority to address GHGs as an “air pollutant” under Section 111(d).

b)      On the other hand, the Supreme Court took a stern tone in admonishing EPA for over-stepping its bounds. As an example, the Court warns EPA: “[W]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.” That statement was directed at EPA’s attempt to regulate GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs, but the same argument might be made in the 111(d) context.

Conclusion

There are still many questions to be answered surrounding the 111(d) regulations proposed by EPA. This decision clarifies the overall picture of GHG regulation slightly, but does little to provide a clear boundary on EPA’s authority over GHGs. No doubt, this decision will be cited by both those in favor and those against the 111(d) regulations.

Article By:

Adam DeVoe
Of:
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP

Proposed Legislation Introduced to Override Hobby Lobby Ruling

Barnes Burgandy Logo

On July 9th, Senator Democrats introduced proposed legislation known at the Protect Women’s Health from Corporate Interference Act (Act) in an effort override the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision, which was previously discussed in our June 30th Alert.

The Act would reinstate the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage obligations imposed on employers, requiring employers to provide such health insurance. The Act specifically is targeted at the Supreme Court’s 5-4 Hobby Lobby decision, which held closely-held companies (those that are family-owned or have a limited number of shareholders) can exercise their freedom of religion protections to avoid paying for such contraceptive coverage.  Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), one of the three Senators who introduced this legislation, explained that houses of worship and religious non-profits would remain exempt from providing contraceptive coverage under the Act.

The introduction of this legislation in the Senate follows the announcement by two House Democrats last week, indicating they would introduce similar bills in response to the Hobby Lobby decision. If the legislation were to pass the Senate, many experts anticipate it will fail in the Republican-controlled House.

Article By:

Tina A. Syring
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

What Does Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Described by EPA in the “Tailoring Rule” have to do with the Clean Air Act?

steptoe-johnsonlogo

UARG v. EPA: Tailoring Rule Litigation

On June 23, 2014 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether EPA motor vehicle greenhouse gas regulations necessarily automatically triggers permitting requirements under the CAA for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The statements in the opinion concerning EPA’s assertions of power are quite provoking. If read carefully, this opinion launches a warning to EPA about its future regulatory actions relative to greenhouse gases. The text of the opinion can be found here. The following quotes are offered as examples of that warning.

“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American economy,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” Id., at 160; See Also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); Industrial Union Dept., APL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 645-646 (1980) (plurality opinion). Slip op at 19.

“. . . in EPA’s assertion of that authority, we confront a singular situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy while at the same time strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would render the statute “unrecognizable to the Congress that designed” it. “ Slip op at 20.

“We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. We reaffirm the core administrative-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” Slip op at 23.

In a step wise fashion the opinion presents and answers the following:

1.  The question before the Court was “. . .whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that it motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 2.

First we decide whether EPA permissibly interpreted the statute to provide that a source may be required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions. Slip op at 10.

“It is plain as day that the Act does not envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for major emitters of steam, oxygen, or other harmless airborne substances. It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give “air pollutant” a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in the PSD and Title V context when it has been doing precisely that for decades.” Slip op at 12.

“Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.” Slip op at 14.

“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.” Slip op at 16.

2.  . . . we next consider the Agency’s alternative position that its interpretation was justified as an exercise of its “discretion” to adopt “a reasonable construction of the statute.” Tailoring Rule 31517. We conclude that EPA’s interpretation is not permissible.” Slip op at 16.

“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with – in fact, would overthrow – the Act’s structure and design.” Slip op at 17.

“A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” Slip op at 18.

3.  “We now consider whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require those sources to comply with “best available control technology” emission standards for greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 25.

“EPA argues that carbon capture is reasonably comparable to more traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies, . . . and petitioners do not dispute that.” Slip op at 26. “. . . it has long been held that BACT cannot be used to order a fundamental redesign of the facility.” “. . . EPA has long interpreted BACT as required only for pollutants that the source itself emits; accordingly, EPA acknowledges that BACT may not be used to require “reductions in a facility’s demand for energy from the electric grid.” Slip op at 27.

“The question before us is whether EPA’s decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron. We conclude that it is.” Slip op at 27.

“We acknowledge the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of EPA’s current approach, nor as free rein for any future regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context. Our narrow holding is that nothing in the statute categorically prohibits EPA from interpreting the BACT provision to apply to greenhouse gases emitted by “anyway” sources.” Slip op at 28.

Opinion of Breyer, with whom Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rather than exempting certain air pollutants like greenhouse gas emissions from the statute, it makes more sense to read into the statute an exemption for certain sources that were never intended to be subject to PSD.

Opinion of Alito, with whom Thomas joins, comments that Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaw with that decision.

 

The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that ESOP Fiduciaries are not Entitled to a Presumption of Prudence, Clarifies Standards for Stock Drop Claims

Dickinson Wright Logo

On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that there is no special presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”). Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2014) (slip op.).

Background

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) imposes legal duties on fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, including ESOPs.[1] Specifically, ERISA requires the fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to act prudently in managing the plan’s assets.[2] In addition, ERISA requires the fiduciary to diversify plan assets.[3]

ESOPs are designed to be invested primarily in employer securities.[4] ERISA exempts ESOP fiduciaries from the duty of diversify plan assets and from the duty to prudently manage plan assets, but only to the extent that prudence requires diversification of plan assets.[5]

The recent financial crisis generated a wave of ERISA “stock drop” cases, which were filed after a precipitous drop in the value of employer securities held in an ESOP. Generally, the plaintiff alleged that the ESOP fiduciary breached its duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative. Defendant fiduciaries defended on the ground that the plaintiff failed to rebut the legal presumption that the fiduciary acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals that had considered the issue adopted the rebuttable presumption of prudence but split on the issues of (1) whether the legal presumption applied at the pleadings stage of litigation or whether the legal presumption was evidentiary in nature and did not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation and (2) the rebuttal standard that the plaintiff of a stock drop action must satisfy.[6]

Dudenhoeffer held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a legal presumption that they acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[7]

The Dudenhoeffer Case

Fifth Third Bancorp maintained a defined contribution plan, which offered participants a number of investment alternatives, including the company’s ESOP. The terms of the ESOP required that its assets be “invested primarily in shares of common stock of Fifth Third [Bancorp].”[8] The company offered a matching contribution that was initially invested in the ESOP. In addition, participants could make elective deferrals to the ESOP.

ESOP participants alleged that the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of public information that the employer securities were overvalued and an excessively risky investment. In addition, the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of non-public information that the employer securities were overvalued. Plaintiffs contended that a prudent ESOP fiduciary would have responded to this public and non-public information by (1) divesting the ESOP of employer securities, (2) refraining from investing in employer securities, (3) cancelling the ESOP investment alternative, and (4) disclosing non-public information to adjust the market price of the employer securities.

Procedural Posture

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of prudence with respect to their collective decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[9] The District Court concluded that presumption of prudence applied at the pleadings stage of litigation and that the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption.[10]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court judgment, holding that the presumption of prudence is evidentiary in nature and does not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation.[11] The Sixth Circuit concluded that the complaint stated a claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence.[12]

ESOP Fiduciaries Not Entitled to Presumption of Prudence

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a presumption of prudence with regard to their decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative; rather, ESOP fiduciaries are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to other ERISA fiduciaries, except that ESOP fiduciaries need not diversify plan assets.[13]

The Court began its analysis b
y acknowledging a tension within the statutory framework of ERISA. On the one hand, ERISA imposes a duty on all fiduciaries to discharge their duties prudently, which includes an obligation to diversify plan assets. On the other hand, ERISA recognizes that ESOPs are designed to invest primarily in employer securities and are not intended to hold diversified assets. The Court concluded that an ESOP fiduciary is not subject to the duty of prudence to the extent that the legal obligation requires the ESOP fiduciary to diversify plan assets. The Court found no special legal presumption favoring ESOP fiduciaries.

New Standards for Stock Drop Claims

Although the Court rejected the presumption of prudence, it vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (which held that the complaint properly stated a claim) and announced new standards for lower courts to observe in evaluating whether a complaint properly pleads a claim that an ESOP fiduciary breached its fiduciary duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

Public Information

First, the Court concluded that “where a stock is publicly traded, allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.”[14] In other words, a plaintiff generally cannot state a plausible claim of imprudence based solely on publicly available information. An ESOP fiduciary does not necessarily act imprudently by observing the efficient market theory, which holds that a major stock market provides the best estimate of the value of employer securities. To be clear, the Court did not rule out the possibility that a plaintiff could properly plead imprudence based on publicly available information indicating special circumstances affecting the reliability of the market price.

Non-Public Information

Second, the Court concluded that “[t]o state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative action that the [fiduciary] could have taken that would have been consistent with [applicable Federal and state securities laws] and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the [ESOP] than to help it.”[15]

The Court reasoned that where a complaint alleges imprudence based on an ESOP fiduciary’s failure to act on non-public information, a lower court’s analysis should be guided by three considerations. First, ERISA does not require a fiduciary to violate applicable Federal and state securities laws. In other words, an ESOP fiduciary does not act imprudently by declining to divest the ESOP of employer securities or by prohibiting investments in employer securities on the basis of non-public information. Second, where a complaint faults fiduciaries for failing to decide, on the basis of non-public information, to refrain from making additional investments in employer securities or for failing to disclose non-public information to correct the valuation of the employer securities, lower courts should consider the extent to which the duty of prudence conflicts with complex insider trading and corporate disclosure requirements imposed by Federal securities laws or the objectives of such laws. Third, lower courts should consider whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that discontinuing investments in employer securities or disclosing adverse, non-public information to the public, or taking any other action suggested by the plaintiff would result in more harm than good to the ESOP by causing a drop in the value of the employer securities.

Quantifying the Unknowns

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer will undoubtedly reshape the landscape of ERISA litigation and, specifically, stock drop litigation. To fully understand the decision’s impact, a number of questions must still be answered, including the correct application of the standards espoused by the Court. In addition, Dudenhoeffer involved a publicly-traded company; it is unclear what application, if any, the decision will have in the context of employer securities of a privately held company.

Article By:

Christopher T. Horner
Eric W. Gregory
 
Of: 
Dickinson Wright PLLC

 

[1] See generally, ERISA § 404(a).

[2] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).

[3] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).

[4] Code § 4975(e)(7)(A).

[5] ERISA § 404(a)(2).

[6] See e.g. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., Case No. 11-2660, 2013 WL 1688918 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2013); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010);Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2012).

[7] No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ____ at 1-2.

[8] Id.

[9] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 2010).

[10] Id. At 762.

[11] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F. 3d 410, 418-19 (2012).

[12] Id. At 423.

[13] Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ at 1-2.

[14] Id. At 16.

[15] Id. At 18.

Supreme Court: Checking in on Bank Fraud

Bracewell & Giuliani Logo

In Loughrin v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 13-316, the Supremes approved the application of the federal bank fraud statute to a relatively unsophisticated check cashing scheme, leading to the collective hand-wringing by a host of internet commentators who decried the federalization of state crimes and runaway prices at Whole Foods. The defendant in the underlying case was a pillar of the community named Kevin Loughrin, who stole and altered checks so that he could buy merchandise at his local Target stores, leading to six federal bank fraud charges. According the case record, Loughrin intended to buy merchandise with the checks and return them for cash refunds. Let’s face it, this was not the world’s most enterprising criminal.

What was enterprising, however, was Loughrin’s argument that he intended to target Target and not a federally-insured financial institution. According to Loughrin, a conviction for bank fraud required that prosecutors prove intent to defraud the banks on which the checks were drawn. Otherwise, suggested Loughrin, the federal bank fraud statute would extend to ordinary, unsophisticated frauds that simply involve payment by check – an area that was typically left to prosecution by the states.

Setting aside the debate between the breadth and scope of federal criminal laws (sorry, breathless internet commentators!), I’d instead like to talk about how bank fraud may not be bank fraud even though it’s bank fraud. Make sense? No? Hmm. Let me try again.

The Supremes cleared up that bank fraud applies to things like Loughren’s moronic basic check cashing scheme because of the use of checks, right? And this helps with the definition of what bank fraud actually is and what conduct bank fraud actually covers. But while the crime of bank fraud has become a little more clear, there is still absolutely no straightforward way of figuring out whether your local U.S. Attorney’s Office will actually prosecute the case or not.

“What?” you say indignantly. “But crime has been committed! Criminals must be punished! Heads must roll!” Oh, I agree. And you would be hard pressed to find people who do not agree (criminals have terrible lobbyists). But charging decisions are left entirely to the discretion of local U.S. Attorney’s offices, which must balance Department of Justice priorities with local priorities, office staff, and agency resources. So while a bank fraud of $30,000 in Billings, Montana may capture federal attention, the same fraud in Los Angeles, California, is likely going to be declined by federal prosecutors. The problem becomes more acute when the arbitrary lines bisect the same bustling metropolis, like what happens between the Northern and Eastern District of Texas or between the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. It is entirely possible, for example, that federal prosecution in the Dallas area depends on where a criminal decides to exit Highway 75.

Does that sound arbitrary? If so, it’s because it is. But it’s the system that we have. And because of that system, bank fraud may not be bank fraud . . . even though it’s bank fraud.

Article By:

Shamoil T. Shipchandler
Of:
Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Hobby Lobby: The Supreme Court’s View and Its Impact

Proskauer

For the second time in two years the United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) hasruled against the Obama Administration with respect to elements of the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”).  In a 5-4 decision announced today in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.  (“Hobby Lobby”) (f/k/a Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.), the Court ruled that the federal government, acting through Health and Human Services (“HHS”), overstepped its bounds by requiring faith-based private, for-profit employers to pay for certain forms of birth control that those employers argued contradicted their religious beliefs, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).

In Hobby Lobby, the Court found that for-profit employers are “persons” for purposes of the RFRA.  The Court, assuming that the government could show a compelling interest in its desire to provide women with access to birth control, ultimately held that the government could have met this interest in a less burdensome way.

Background

Among its many insurance mandates, the ACA requires non-grandfathered health insurance plans to cover “preventive services” at no cost to participants.

As part of its implementation of the ACA, HHS added 20 contraceptives that were required to be included as preventive services, including four that may have the effect of preventing a fertilized egg from developing.

Hobby Lobby argued that requiring the company to pay for or provide pills and procedures that they believe terminate life—so-called abortifacients—intrudes intrudes on their religious beliefs.   Hobby Lobby sued HHS, asserting that requiring them to pay for or provide abortifacients violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of religion and also violated the RFRA.

The RFRA provides that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest.  The Administration argued, however, that neither Hobby Lobby nor Conestoga or any other for-profit, faith-based employer was a person for purposes of the RFRA or the First Amendment.

The Decision

Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito held that private—as opposed to publicly traded—employers could be considered “persons” for the RFRA.  The Court noted that the law imposed a substantial burden on religious beliefs, requiring the owners of Hobby Lobby to engage in conduct that “seriously violates their sincere religious beliefs.”

The Court noted that for the government to prevail it needed to demonstrate a compelling state interest and that its application was the least restrictive means to achieve its goals.  The Court assumed (with Justice Kennedy providing the swing vote in his concurrence) that the government does, in fact, have a compelling interest to, among other things, promote “public health” and “gender equality” by providing contraceptive coverage for women. However, the Court found that even assuming a compelling interest there were less restrictive alternatives for the government. The government could, the four-person majority noted, simply provide these benefits to all, without charge to the individuals; in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy questioned this, and noted the Court’s opinion does not decide this issue.  But Kennedy and the four-person majority agreed the government could extend the accommodation it made religiously affiliated employers:  they do not have to provide the benefit but their insurers or third-party administrators would without charge to either the employers or the employees.

Because there are less restrictive alternatives, the Court found that HHS had violated the RFRA as applied to these faith-based, for profit, private employers.

The Impact

The Hobby Lobby ruling has a direct impact on a relatively small number of employers—as a percentage of total employers across the country there are very few that can be considered faith-based employers.

However, the ruling is significant in that it signals an ongoing willingness by the Court to exercise its checks-and-balances power.  The Court indicated it may not provide the Administration much leeway in its implementation of the ACA, when implementation impacts and is limited by other federal rights.

The ruling may also be significant for certain religious-affiliated non-profit employers who are operating under the accommodation discussed above.  By identifying the accommodation as a less restrictive alternative, the Court may be signaling it believes that the exception HHS provided them suffices to meet any concerns they may have.  The Court, however, noted it was not deciding this issue, and the “government-pay” approach tendered by four justices may provide a possible opening for relief for the religious-affiliated non-profit employers.

Finally, the Hobby Lobby decision should stand as a reminder that while there may be differences of opinion about specific rules and requirements under the ACA, and some of those differences may be decided against the government, the law itself is not going away.  Employers need to continue to monitor new developments and implement strategies for complying with the ACA.

Article By:

Peter J Marathas, Jr
Stacey Cerrone
Robert W Rachal
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP

Supreme Court Gives Second Win in Two Days to Caregivers Challenging Compulsory Union Dues

Odin-Feldman-Pittleman-logo

The United States Supreme Court acted today in another case involving a scheme to siphon millions of dollars in compulsory union dues from home caregivers assisting public aid recipients.  On June 30, 2014, the Court decided Harris v. Quinn and held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the collection of a compulsory agency fee from rehabilitation program personal assistants who do not want to join or support the union.  Today, the Court applied Harris to Schlaud v. Snyder, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Harris v. Quinn.  As the Schlaud case continues, look for another blow to the forced-dues arrangment perpretrated by various union officials and their friends in government.

Schlaud and other plaintiffs in the case are home childcare providers in Michigan who sought class-action certification in their First Amendment challenge to the state’s compulsory deduction of union dues from subsidies paid to home childcare providers.  In January 2009, the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) began deducting 1.15% from subsidy payments made to home childcare providers. The funds were forwarded to the union, which was a joint venture between the United Auto Workers union and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees union.  According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the union collected $2,000,019.09 in 2009 and at least $1,821,635.21 in 2010.

Schlaud and her co-plaintiffs sought the return of the compulsory union dues that were collected in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the plaintiffs’ proposed class — all home childcare providers in Michigan — because it concluded a conflict of interest existed within the class: some members voted for union representation and others voted against union representation.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and Schlaud sought review by the Supreme Court.

Attorneys at the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed and have litigated both Shlaud and Harris on behalf of personal assistants and home childcaregivers.  In Harris, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality generally of compelling public sector employees to pay union dues or agency fees, but it strongly signaled that the legal analysis of a 1977 Supreme Court decision, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which found compulsory agency-fee requirements to be constitutional, was “questionable.” The Harris opinion opens the door, cracked initially in Knox v. Service Employees, for the Court to revisit the constitutionality of compelling public employees to pay union dues or agency fees as a condition of employment.

Article By:

Timothy M. McConville
Of:
Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

 

U.S. Supreme Court Gives Increased Protection to Government Employees

The Supreme Court recently ruled unanimously that government employees who testify about public corruption are protected by the First Amendment. The case, Lane v. Franks,[1] centered on a public employee, Lane, who worked at an Alabama community college where he led the school’s program for at-risk youth.

While working for the community college, Lane discovered a state representative was on the program’s payroll, despite doing no work for the program. Lane terminated the representative’s employment, and subsequently, the representative was indicted by federal authorities on corruption-related charges. Lane testified, under subpoena, at the representative’s trial in 2008. In 2009, Lane was fired from the college. Lane sued the community college president individually and in his official capacity alleging that the official violated his First Amendment protections.

The college president argued that Lane’s sworn testimony was not protected by the First Amendment because it was based on information that he gathered from his role as a state employee, not as a private citizen. The lower courts agreed with the college president, determining that Lane acted in his official capacity when firing the state representative and had acted in the same capacity when testifying at her trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that Lane testified “as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” According to Justice Sotomayor, “Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment.”

The ruling means that government employees should feel more protected when stepping forward with whistleblower-type information. Both public and private employers should exercise caution when taking negative actions against an employee who has complained of or filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in some kind of investigation or proceeding, as the action could be considered retaliatory.

[1] No. 13-483 (2014).

Article By:

Luke A. Wingfield
Of:
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC

Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That Police Officers Cannot Search the Contents of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without Obtaining a Search Warrant View Edit Track

RCA Logo

In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from searching through the data on an arrested suspect’s cell phone as an “incident to the arrest” and instead ruled that police officers must get a warrant first.

Riley involved the facts of two separate cases. In the first case, officers searched through the smartphone of a suspect arrested for expired registration and possession of illegal firearms and found photos and text messages showing that the arrestee was involved in a gang shooting a few weeks earlier. In the second case, officers arrested a suspect after observing him complete a drug deal, searched his traditional cell phone (not a smart phone) for the phone number associated with his home, traced the number to his house, and found a large amount of drugs and cash, along with a firearm and ammunition. In both cases, the evidence obtained through the warrantless cell phone searches was admitted at trial and both defendants were convicted.

The Court’s analysis focused on the reach of a warrantless search “incident to a lawful arrest.” Under this exception, police officers are permitted to search the person arrested and the area within their immediate control to remove any weapons that may be used to resist arrest or endanger the officers and to prevent the destruction of evidence. SeeChimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court took the time to appreciate the complexity of modern cellphones, describing them as “minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone” that are “a pervasive and insistent part of daily life.” The Court then analyzed the two justifications in Chimel for allowing a search incident to arrest: officer safety and destruction of evidence. With respect to officer safety, the Court concluded that data cannot harm officers and examples of cellphones indirectly contributing to unsafe arrest scenes were insufficient to dispose of the warrant requirement. With respect to the destruction of evidence, the Court found that examples of remote data-wiping of cellphones in police custody were rare and could be prevented by removing the battery or storing the phone in a bag designed to block wireless signals.

As further justification, the Court examined the privacy issues that arise from allowing warrantless searches of cellphones incident to arrest. Because modern cellphones carry the equivalent of “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers” in a person’s pocket, the Court found that searches incident to arrest were not “limited by physical realities” of what a person can carry. Thus, allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest could reveal “far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” The Court also noted that the scope of data that can be reached by cellphones, such as information uploaded to cloud servers, necessitated a warrant requirement and the proposed solutions to allow but limit warrantless searches were unworkable. Finding that cellphones store “the privacies of life,” the Court held that police must do one simple thing before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest: “get a warrant.”

For a full copy of the opinion, click here.

Article By:

Kevin Heaphy
Of:
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, A Professional Corporation