Tag: supreme court

Understanding the New FLSA Overtime Rule: Texas v. United States Department of Labor

This article is an update to “Understanding the New FLSA Overtime Rule: What Employers Need to Know.”

As you know, on April 23, 2024, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a Final Rule modifying nationwide overtime rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Final Rule increased the salary thresholds in the salary level test for highly compensated and white-collar employees. Under the new Final Rule, salary thresholds for both highly compensated and white collar employees increased in two stages, with the first increase already occurring as of July 1, 2024, and the second increase set to occur on January 1, 2025.

On November 15, 2024, in State of Texas v. Dep’t of Labor, 24-cv-468-SDJ, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas vacated the April 2024 Final Rule.

The district court’s ruling vacates the Final Rule in its entirety on a nationwide basis, including the portion of the rule that went into effect on July 1, 2024, as well as the further increase set for January 1, 2025. This effectively reverted the FLSA minimum threshold for white collar employees back to $35,568 and highly compensated employees back to $107,432.

In its decision, the district court recognized a two-month-old decision by the Fifth Circuit in Mayfield v. United States Department of Labor, 117 F.4th 611 (5th Cir. 2024), which upheld the 2019 increase. In Mayfield, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress had “explicitly delegated authority to define and delimit the terms of the [e]xemption.” However, while the Eastern District acknowledged Mayfield, it nevertheless concluded that, while the DOL has the power to impose some limitations on the scope of terms identified in the white collar exemption, it does not have the authority to “enact rules that replace or swallow the meaning those terms have.”

Significantly, the court also relied upon the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, stating that “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.” 144 S.Ct. 2444, 2273 (2024). Loper Bright is the much-publicized case that overturned the Chevron doctrine, which required courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law. As such, Texas may just be the tip of the iceberg when it comes to battles between courts and agencies.

The Texas court reasoned that while the DOL can use a minimum salary threshold, it cannot do so in a manner that disrupts the other factors considered for the above-described exemptions. Under the court’s interpretation, the April 2024 Final Rule disturbed the balance of other factors, effectively making “salary predominate over duties for millions of employees.”

While this decision may have national implications, it is unclear whether the DOL will appeal the decision. In the meantime, the April 2024 Final Rule sits in limbo. Now, the question on everyone’s mind is simple: “What do we do with employees whose salary we changed in order to comply with the July 1, 2024 increase?”

©2024 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky
For more on the FLSA Overtime Rule, visit the NLR Labor Employment section

Federal District Court in Florida Holds FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions Unconstitutional

In the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., three justices expressed concern that the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions violate Article II of the Constitution and called for a case presenting that question. Justice Clarence Thomas penned a dissent explaining that private relators wield significant executive authority yet are not appointed as “Officers of the United States” under Article II. Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Amy Coney Barrett, concurring in the main opinion, agreed with Justice Thomas that this constitutional issue should be considered in an appropriate case.

Earlier this year, several defendants in a non-intervened qui tam lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida took up the challenge. The qui tam, styled United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC et al., involves allegations of Medicare Advantage coding fraud. After several years of litigation, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the relator’s qui tam action was unconstitutional, citing Justice Thomas’s dissent in Polansky.

The defendants’ motion prompted a statement of interest from the United States and participation as amici by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Anti-Fraud Coalition. The Court also asked for supplemental briefs on Founding-era historical evidence regarding federal qui tam enforcement.

On September 30, 2024, Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle granted the defendants’ motion, agreeing the relator was unconstitutionally appointed and dismissing her complaint. Judge Mizelle, who clerked for Justice Thomas, held a private FCA relator exercises significant authority that is constitutionally reserved to the executive branch, including the right to bring an enforcement action on behalf of the United States and recover money for the U.S. Treasury. In doing so, a relator chooses which claims to prosecute, which theories to raise, which defendants to sue, and which arguments to make on appeal, resulting in precedent that binds the United States. Yet, a relator is not appointed by the president, a department head, or a court of law under Article II, making the qui tam device unconstitutional.

Judge Mizelle distinguished historical qui tam statutes, which were largely abandoned early in our nation’s history, on the ground that few gave a relator the level of authority the FCA does. And while the FCA itself dates back to the Civil War, the statute largely remained dormant (aside from a flurry of use in the 1930s and 40s) until the 1986 amendments set off a new wave of qui tam litigation.

The ruling is significant for the future of the FCA. As Judge Mizelle’s opinion explains, most FCA actions are brought by relators as opposed to the government itself. If the decision is upheld on appeal, a number of outcomes are possible. If the FCA is to continue as a significant source of revenue generation for the government, the DOJ must devote more resources to bringing FCA actions directly. Congress may also consider amending the FCA’s qui tam provisions to limit relators’ authority to conduct FCA litigation, thereby maintaining the statute as a viable avenue for whistleblowing.

One thing is almost certain, however. FCA defendants across the country will likely raise similar arguments in light of Judge Mizelle’s ruling. Whether in Zafirov or another case, it appears the Supreme Court will get to decide the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions sooner rather than later.

© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Qui Tam Provisions, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

Temporary Injunctive Relief for Nondebtors in Bankruptcy Court Post-Purdue Pharma

In June, in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not, as part of a bankruptcy plan, allow nondebtors to receive permanent injunctive relief through nonconsensual releases. Less than a month later, two U.S. bankruptcy courts addressed whether Purdue Pharma bars bankruptcy courts from issuing temporary injunctive relief for the protection of nondebtors, and both courts determined that it does not. And just a couple of weeks ago, a third U.S. bankruptcy court reached the same conclusion.

The Supreme Court clearly limited the scope of its Purdue Pharma ruling to the permanent releases before it. In July, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware tackled a precise question left unresolved by Purdue Pharma: Can a bankruptcy court issue a preliminary injunction to stay claims against nondebtors? Yes, the court held in  Parlement Technologies.

The facts of Parlement Technologies are straightforward. The debtor, Parlement Technologies, and several of its former officers were sued in Nevada state court. While section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code automatically stayed the Nevada action against Parlement Technologies, it did not stay claims against the former officers, and Parlement Technologies therefore sought a temporary stay of those claims. Faced with whether it could temporarily stay an action against nondebtors in light of the Supreme Court’s Purdue Pharma ruling, the court concluded: “Purdue Pharma does not preclude the entry of such a preliminary injunction.” In re Parlement Techs., 24-10755 (CTG) (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 15, 2024).

The court went on to describe the four-factor test for granting a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to plaintiff or movant absent an injunction, (3) harm to defendant or nonmoving party brought about by the injunction, and (4) public interest. In addressing the likelihood of success on the merits, the court considered how Purdue Pharma altered the traditional “success on the merits” calculation. Given the Purdue Pharma holding – that nondebtors may not receive permanent injunctive relief in the form of nonconsensual third-party releases – success on the merits in a temporary stay determination cannot be based on the likelihood that the nondebtors would be entitled to a nonconsensual third-party release. Clearly, that factor would never be met.

Instead, a court should find a likelihood of success on the merits when it concludes that (1) a preliminary injunction is necessary to permit debtors to focus on reorganization, or (2) the parties may ultimately negotiate a plan that includes resolution of the claims against nondebtors. After focusing primarily on the debtor’s failure to meet this first element of the four-factor test – success on the merits – the court declined to issue the preliminary injunction.

The same week that the Parlement Technologies court denied the temporary injunction, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois – in Coast to Coast Leasing – granted a preliminary injunction staying state court litigation against nondebtors. Coast To Coast Leasing, LLC v. M&T Equip. Fin. Corp. (In re Coast to Coast Leasing), No. 24-03056 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2024). The Illinois court addressed both the Purdue Pharma and Parlement Technologies decisions, and relied on a three-factor Seventh Circuit test used to determine whether a bankruptcy court may enjoin proceedings in another court: (1) those proceedings defeat or impair its jurisdiction over the case before it, (2) the moving party established likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) public interest.

The Coast to Coast court issued the temporary injunction. The court stressed that unlike Purdue Pharma, where the nondebtors sought to release and enjoin claims, the case before it involved only a temporary injunction (of two weeks). And unlike in Parlement Technologies, there was a likelihood of success on the merits based on both of the above-noted measures set forth in the Parlement Technologies decision ((1) a preliminary injunction is necessary to permit debtors to focus on reorganization, or (2) the parties may ultimately negotiate a plan that includes resolution of the claims against nondebtors).

These two cases point to the conclusion that Purdue Pharma does not preclude bankruptcy courts from temporarily staying claims against nondebtors. On September 13, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana similarly stated, “under certain circumstances, a bankruptcy court may issue a preliminary injunction that operates to stay actions against nondebtors.” La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Tidewater Landfill, LLC (In re Tidewater Landfill LLC), No. 20-11646 (Bankr. E.D. La. Sep. 13, 2024). That court cited both Parlement Technologies and a pre-Purdue Pharma Fifth Circuit case, Feld v. Zale Corp. (In Re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995), suggesting that preliminary relief should not be treated differently after Purdue Pharma.

That court did not reach the relevant motion, but its clear statement of the law is instructive. Together this trio of cases provides guidance to debtors seeking temporary stays for nondebtors in the wake of Purdue Pharma.

© 2024 Binder & Schwartz LLP. All Rights Reserved
For more news on Purdue Pharma and Bankruptcy, visit the NLR Bankruptcy Restructuring section.

Supreme Court Holds Life Insurance Proceeds Paid to Closely-Held Corporation to Fund Buy-Sell Agreement Increases Estate Tax on Deceased Shareholder’s Estate

In Connelly v. U.S., 144 S.Ct. 1406 (June 6, 2024), the United States Supreme Court upheld an estate tax deficiency of $889,914 in a decision that will impact many families and closely-held businesses. A Buy-Sell Agreement is often used to ensure that a closely-held company will remain within the family after the deaths of its owners or otherwise ensure the continuity of the business after an owner’s death. Many Buy-Sell Agreements, such as the one in Connelly, provide that upon the death of an owner, the surviving owner has the option to purchase the deceased owner’s interest in the company, and if the surviving owner declines, the company must redeem the deceased owner’s interest. To ensure that the company will have funds for the redemption, the company will often obtain life insurance for its owners. For years, planners thought it possible to structure such an arrangement so that life insurance proceeds would not increase the value of the company for estate tax purposes. However, in Connelly, the Court held that the life insurance proceeds paid to a corporation upon the death of a shareholder do increase the value of the corporation’s stock for estate tax purposes and that the corporation’s obligation under a Buy-Sell Agreement to redeem the deceased shareholder’s shares does not offset the life insurance proceeds. Under the Court’s decision, the type of entity does not appear to be relevant, and the holding will equally apply to partnerships and limited liability companies. Thus, if any Buy-Sell Agreement is structured as a redemption funded with entity-owned life insurance, the insurance proceeds may increase the value of the deceased business owner’s interest for estate tax purposes.

In Connelly, two brothers, Michael and Thomas Connelly, owned a business supply corporation. Michael owned 77.18% of the company, and Thomas owned 22.82% of the company. The brothers entered into a Buy-Sell Agreement as described above. The brothers ignored provisions under the agreement that required them to value the company annually and obtain an appraisal upon a shareholder’s death. After Michael’s death in 2013, Thomas and Michael’s son simply agreed to a redemption price of $3 million for Michael’s shares. The company used $3 million of life insurance proceeds to redeem Michael’s shares, and Thomas, as Michael’s executor, reported the value of Michael’s shares as $3 million on Michael’s estate tax return without completing an appraisal. Upon audit of the estate tax return, Thomas belatedly obtained an appraisal that determined the fair market value of 100% of the company at Michael’s death to be $3.86 million, excluding the life insurance proceeds. Based on the valuation of the company at $3.86 million, Thomas argued that the value of Michael’s ownership interest was $3 million ($3.86 million x 77.18%).

Connelly rejects the position of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Blount v. Comm’r., 428 F. 3d 1338 (CA11 2005), that the life insurance proceeds paid to a company are offset by the company’s contractual obligation to redeem a deceased owner’s interest. Rather than allowing an offset for the redemption obligation, the Court focused on the value of the company before and after the redemption. If the entire company was worth $3.86 million, as claimed in Connelly, the value of Michael’s 77.18% would be $3 million and the value of Thomas’ 22.82% would be $860,000. The Court reasoned that upon redemption of Michael’s shares, Michael’s estate would receive $3 million, leaving Thomas with 100% ownership of a company worth $860,000. However, Thomas’ argument meant that post-redemption, 100% of the company that Thomas owned was worth $3.86 million. The Court refused to accept that a company which pays out $3 million to redeem shares was worth the same overall amount before and after the redemption. The Court found that the company’s value should be increased from $3.86 to $6.86 million, accounting for the insurance proceeds, increasing the value of Michael’s ownership from $3 to approximately $5.3 million ($6.86 million × 77.18%). The net result was an additional estate tax of $889,914.

Although the implications of Connelly are wide, there are limitations to the Court’s decision. Connelly will have little impact on a business owner whose estate is well under the estate tax exemption, which is currently $13.61 million for each individual and scheduled to be decreased by 50% in 2026. In addition, the Court did not address the application of Section 2703 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides in relevant part that the value of a deceased owner’s interest in a business may be established by a Buy-Sell Agreement if certain requirements are met. Perhaps the Court did not review Section 2703 because the shareholders did not follow the valuation terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement and arbitrarily determined the redemption price instead. But because Section 2703 was not addressed in Connelly, it may yet be possible to avoid its impact with a properly structured and adhered to, Buy-Sell Agreement.

The Court also explicitly stated in a footnote that the holding does not mean that a redemption obligation can never decrease a corporation’s value. The Court implies that if a company is required to sell an operating asset to redeem shares, the redemption obligation might reduce the company’s value.

The Court acknowledged that a differently structured Buy-Sell Agreement can avoid the risk that insurance proceeds would increase the value of a deceased shareholder’s shares. Specifically, the Court referenced a “cross-purchase agreement” in which business owners, rather than the company, agree to purchase the others’ ownership upon death using proceeds from non-company owned policies. In addition to avoiding the Connelly result, a cross-purchase agreement provides an increased tax basis for the surviving owners who purchase a deceased owner’s interests. However, the more owners a business has, the more complicated a life insurance-funded cross-purchase will be. Other options to avoid the Connelly result may include a life insurance partnership or limited liability company or creatively structured split-dollar arrangements.

After Connelly, all business owners with Buy-Sell Agreements funded with entity-owned life insurance, or with other entity-owned insurance vehicles (split-dollar plans, key-person life insurance, etc.) should evaluate and consider restructuring their arrangements. In some cases, the restructuring of a Buy-Sell Agreement may require the transfer of life insurance policies which raises other tax issues, such as in-kind corporate distributions, S corporation elections, transfer-for-value rules, and incidents of ownership.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
For more news on Life Insurance and Estate Taxes, visit the NLR Estates & Trusts section.

In Rare Summer Opinion, Supreme Court Follows Sixth Circuit’s Lead

In Department of Education v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court issued a rare August opinion to maintain two preliminary injunctions that block the Department of Education’s new rule.  That rule expands Title IX to prevent sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  State coalitions brought challenges; district courts in Louisiana and Kentucky enjoined the rule during the litigation; the Fifth and Sixth Circuits denied the government’s requests to stay the injunctions, nor would the Supreme Court intercede for the government.

All the Justices agreed that aspects of the rule warranted interim relief, most centrally the “provision that newly defines sex discrimination” to include sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  But because the district courts enjoined the entirety of the rule, the scope of relief proved divisive.  A narrow majority agreed to leave the broad injunctions in place, while four Justices in dissent argued to sever the suspect aspects of the rule and allow the remainder of the rule to take effect.  With emphasis on the “emergency posture,” the majority explained that the government had not carried its burden “on its severability argument.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent proposed limiting the injunctions to just the three challenged aspects of the rule.  The dissent focused on the “traditional” limits on courts’ power to fashion “equitable remedies.”  That Justice Gorsuch joined Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson should come as no surprise.  Justice Gorsuch has harped on limiting equitable remedies to party-specific relief (e.g. Labrador v. Poe); cast doubt on severability doctrine (Barr v. AAPC (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part)); and, of course, authored the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County decision that interpreted Title VII to protect against sex discrimination in much the same way the Department wishes to interpret Title IX.

This decision is an unreliable forecast of the Court’s view of what Title IX sex discrimination encompasses.  The Court unanimously agreed to table the debate over the Department’s new definition of sex discrimination while the lower courts proceed “with appropriate dispatch.”  The case concerned the status of the rest of the rule as that litigation continues.

A truer tell on the merits is the Sixth Circuit panel’s order denying the government’s stay request.  The panel found it “likely” “that the Rule’s definition of sex discrimination exceeds the Department’s authority.”  Preliminarily at least, the court thought it unlikely that Title IX—last amended in 1972—addresses sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  The Sixth Circuit has been reluctant “to export Title VII’s expansive meaning of sex discrimination to other settings”—and so it was here.

If “past is not always prologue,” still sometimes it is.  The Sixth Circuit panel divided on the injunction’s scope just like the Supreme Court.  Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Batchelder formed the majority, finding that the three “central provisions of the Rule . . . appear to touch every substantive provision.”  Saddling school administrators with new regulatory requirements on the eve of the new schoolyear tipped the equities toward enjoining the full rule.  Judge Mathis dissented because the injunction disturbed provisions of the rule “that Plaintiffs have not challenged.”

For now, the Department’s new rule yields to the old one.  That rule, too, is being litigated in the Sixth Circuit because guidance documents say the Department will interpret Title IX the same way Bostock interpreted Title VII.  See Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ. and this coverage at the Notice & Comment blog.  To close out with some Supreme Court trivia—this marks its first mid-summer opinion since Alabama Association of Realtors v. DHHS in 2021, where the Court ended the Biden Administration’s Covid-era moratorium on evictions.  Before that may be the Court’s September 2012 decision Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission involving a challenge to West Virginia’s congressional districts.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on SCOTUS Decision in Department of Education v. Louisiana, visit the NLR Public Education Services section.

In Trio of Decisions, Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Splits on Arbitration

Three recent Supreme Court Decisions—Coinbase v. Suski, Smith v. Spizzirri, and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries—based on consumer and employment disputes have resolved significant circuit splits over arbitration. These cases were all decided by a unanimous Court, with Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Roberts authoring the three opinions.

Supreme Court Considers Arbitrability Based on Conflicting Contracts

In Coinbase v. Suski (May 23, 2024), the Supreme Court held that where there is a conflict between one or more contracts between same parties regarding the arbitrability of a dispute, a court alone (and not the arbitrator) must decide which contract governs. The appeal arose from a sweepstakes dispute wherein the official rules of the sweepstakes conflicted with the defendant’s user agreement.

After the plaintiff consumers brought a class action in California federal court, the defendant sought a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration provision in the user agreement. The district court denied the defendant’s motion based on the forum selection clause in a contract detailing the sweepstakes’ rules. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the forum selection clause, which gave sole jurisdiction over sweepstakes-related disputes to California courts, superseded the arbitration provision in the user agreement.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that courts, not arbitrators, must decide the threshold question of whether a subsequent agreement supersedes an arbitration provision, dismissing concerns that the holding would invite challenges to delegation clauses that empower arbitrators to decide disputes concerning arbitrability.

Prior to the decision in Suski, there was no precedent in the First Circuit addressing the question of who resolves conflicting dispute resolution clauses. However, the Court’s decision accords with the approach of the First Circuit to related questions.

In Biller v. S-H OpCo Greenwich Bay Manor, LLC (2020), the First Circuit held that for parties to agree to have an arbitrator decide gateway questions of arbitrability, they must do by “clear and unmistakable evidence,” safeguarding a court’s jurisdiction to decide questions of arbitrability. Similarly, in McKenzie v. Brennan (2021), the First Circuit held that the court holds the decision-making power to decide whether parties intend to arbitrate a dispute when a new contract between the parties does not contain a broad arbitration clause, but an earlier contract does.

District Courts May Not Dismiss Cases Referred to Arbitration Upon a Request to Stay

In Smith v. Spizzirri (May 16, 2024), the Supreme Court interpreted 9 U.S.C. § 3 to mean that when a district court finds that a contract compels arbitration and a party has requested a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration, the court lacks jurisdiction to dismiss the suit. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that a lower court must stay the proceedings until the dispute is resolved in arbitration or the dispute is brought back before the court.

The decision arose from a California class action alleging delivery drivers had been misclassified as independent contractors and denied required wages and paid leave. While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s discretion to dismiss the action referred to arbitration on a motion by the defendant, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded. Spizzirri may be understood as the complement to an earlier decision also involving Coinbase, Coinbase v. Bielski (June 23, 2023) (see our prior alert here), which held that a district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing.

The First Circuit (as well as the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits) had previously held that a district court has discretion to either dismiss litigation without prejudice or stay the proceedings. Dismissal following a referral to arbitration provided plaintiffs with an opportunity to appeal that final, adverse ruling, with the Supreme Court’s decision now requiring plaintiffs to wait until the arbitration has been completed.

While the First Circuit has not yet passed a decision under following Spizzirri, a recent decision by the Rhode Island District Court may indicate how post-Spizzirri questions will be decided. In De Simone v. Citizens Bank (June 17, 2024) the court directly cited to Spizzirri to conclude that the proceedings in that case must be stayed pending arbitration. At the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit (which previously, like the First Circuit, held that courts have discretion to stay or dismiss) amended its opinion in Herrera v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. (March 11, 2024; amended June, 24, 2024) to reflect the decision in Spizzirri, writing that “Spizzirri made clear that a district court does not have discretion to dismiss the action when granting a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3.”

Supreme Court Holds Workers in Any Industry May Benefit from Arbitration Exemption

In Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St. LLC (May 14, 2024), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for transportation workers at 9 U.S.C. § 1, which protects workers in foreign or interstate transportation from having their employment claims referred to mandatory arbitration, may apply to workers in any industry.

In LePage Bakeries, the defendant companies argued that baked goods delivery drivers were not protected from the exemption because they were not transportation industry employees. The district court and Second Circuit agreed, compelling arbitration of the parties’ dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Second Circuit has created a transportation-industry requirement without any basis in the text of the statute.

The decision resolves a split among the First and Second Circuits in favor of workers seeking to bring class action claims. In two 2023 cases, Canales v. CK Sales Co. and Fraga v. Premium Retail Servs., Inc., the First Circuit explicitly rejected the Second Circuit’s reading of the Federal Arbitration Act that a worker must be employed in the transportation industry to benefit from the exemption to mandatory arbitration. Instead, the First Circuit focused on the worker’s role instead of the employer’s business, a test that the Supreme Court has now embraced. The Court’s decision follows New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) and Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2023) wherein the Court held the exemption applies to independent contractors and airplane cargo loaders.

Recent Decisions Reflect Critical Questions on Jurisdiction Over Arbitration Disputes

The Supreme Court’s trio of unanimous arbitration decisions outline three areas in which district courts retain jurisdiction over arbitration disputes. The rulings reflect the outer limits of a multi-decade trend in which the Supreme Court has consistently issued arbitration-friendly decisions, encouraging the resolution of arbitrable matters without involving the courts.

It is likely that challenges to arbitrability based on conflicting contracts and transportation work will remain flashpoints in federal court litigation for years to come, with federal courts retaining jurisdiction over disputes referred to arbitration, hearing fewer appeals of orders compelling arbitration, and resolving matters that arise during those proceedings. The decisions serve as reminders to businesses that they should work with experienced counsel to draft and regularly review dispute resolution clauses in consumer and employment contracts to ensure that, if disputes do ultimately arise, they will be resolved via the intended procedure.

* * *

Thank you to firm summer associate Jonathan Tucker for his contribution to this post.

©2024 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on Arbitration, visit the NLR ADR Arbitration Mediation section.

Michigan Supreme Court Expands Employer Exposure to Public Policy Retaliation Claims

In Michigan, various state employment laws prohibit employers from retaliating against employees. But can an employee pursue a public policy retaliation claim against the employer in addition to a statutory retaliation claim?

On July 22, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that anti-retaliation provisions in two important workplace safety laws—the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) and Michigan’s Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MIOSHA”)—do not preclude a plaintiff from also asserting a violation of public policy in court. Stegall v. Resource Technology Corp (Case No. 165450, decided July 22, 2024).

Cleveland Stegall, an IT specialist working at FCA through the staffing agency Resource Technology, complained internally about asbestos insulation issues at the assembly plant and threatened to file complaints with the government. He was subsequently terminated. Stegall sued both entities for wrongful discharge under OSHA and MIOSHA’s anti-retaliation provisions, as well as termination in violation of public policy.

At-will employees generally may be terminated for any reason (or no reason at all). But one exception to this rule is that certain terminations violate public policy and therefore create an actionable legal claim. This includes firings for “failure or refusal to violate a law” or exercising a right conferred by the Michigan Legislature.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Stegall’s public policy claim because they concluded that the OSHA and MIOSHA laws already forbid retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the remedies under OSHA and MIOSHA are insufficient, pointing to the truncated 30-day period to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, the discretion granted to the respective investigating agency, and the employee’s lack of control over what occurs after a complaint has been filed. See 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(2) and MCL 408.1065(2).

What does this case mean for employers? The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision provides another avenue for employees to pursue retaliation claims, particularly where the employee raises workplace safety concerns. It is unclear, however, whether courts will extend this ruling and allow employees to pursue public policy wrongful discharge claims if the employee is also seeking relief under another anti-retaliation statute.

© 2024 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC
For more news on Employer Anti-Retaliation Lawsuits, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Full Steam Ahead: NLRB Top Lawyer Signals Continued Focus On Injunction Actions

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Starbucks v. McKinney clarifying the standards courts must use when evaluating requests by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for injunctive relief under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Many view this as, at least in some jurisdictions, heightening the standard the agency must meet in these cases.

NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memo on July 16 noting this ruling will not affect how her office views Section 10(j) cases. According to the press release, “General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo reaffirmed her commitment to seeking Section 10(j) injunctions after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, which set a uniform four-part test applicable to all Section 10(j) injunction petitions.”

The statement then goes on to note, “General Counsel Abruzzo explained that, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks Corp. provides a uniform standard to be applied in all Section 10(j) injunctions nationwide, adoption of this standard will not have a significant impact on the Agency’s Section 10(j) program as the Agency has ample experience litigating injunctions under that standard and has a high rate of success in obtaining injunctions under the four-part test — a success rate equivalent to or higher than the success rate in circuit courts that applied the two-part test.”

Employers should take note, as the NLRB does indeed have a high success rate when seeking these injunctions against employers. For example, in fiscal year 2020, the agency prevailed in every 10(j) case it brought. These actions can be costly from a time and resources perspective for companies, as they are then forced to defend against alleged labor violations before both the NLRB and in federal court simultaneously.

Accordingly, while the recent Supreme Court ruling did offer a uniform standard and clarity around the legal framework for 10(j) cases, it appears this won’t cause a dip in the amount of such matters the NLRB brings.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more news on NLRB Injunction Actions, visit the NLR Labor & Employment  section.

Supreme Court Holds That the Eighth Amendment Does Not Prevent Enforcement of Local Camping Bans, Authorizing a Significant Shift in Local Policies on Homelessness

Until recently, local policies on homelessness have been guided by two controversial rulings from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: Martin v. Boise (9th Cir. 2019) 920 F.3d 584 and Johnson v. City of Grants Pass (9th Cir. 2022) 50 F.4th 787.[1] However, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson(2024) 603 U.S. ____, is likely to transform local jurisdictions’ policy approaches to managing homelessness. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the city’s ban on camping and parking overnight on public property.

By way of background, in Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s restriction against cruel and unusual punishment barred cities from imposing criminal penalties for violations of public-camping ordinances whenever the number of homeless individuals exceeds the number of “practically available” shelter beds in a jurisdiction. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit expanded on Martin and held that a city cannot enforce its camping ban or impose fines or civil penalties unless the city has enough shelter beds for its entire population. Since then, affected cities and states have widely criticized these two Ninth Circuit rulings, which effectively blocked the enforcement of local ordinances prohibiting or regulating camping and sleeping outdoors.

In the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s rulings and held that ordinances prohibiting camping, overnight parking, or sleeping outdoors do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment because these ordinances regulate “conduct” and “actions”, rather than “mere status.”

The Court focused on the practical implications of Martin and Johnson, finding that the Ninth Circuit created an unworkable and confusing test to evaluate public camping ordinances, based on subjective and vague determinations of who is “involuntarily” homeless. The Court also criticized judicial injunctions prohibiting the enforcement of public camping ordinances, finding that these determinations are “public policy responses” best handled by local governments and the legislature (not courts).

In doing so, the Court agreed with local jurisdictions that complained that the Ninth Circuit inappropriately limited available policymaking tools and “undermined” local efforts to address homelessness. The Court emphasized that local governments have “broad power” over the substance and enforcement of their laws and must be afforded “wide latitude” and “flexibility” to address homelessness.

Although the Court’s ruling authorizes the enforcement of public camping ordinances, it does not grant unfettered power to local jurisdictions. The Court acknowledges that public camping ordinances could still implicate other constitutional concerns, including potential violations under the Due Process Clause. The Court further notes that local governments are not required to adopt public camping ordinances, and may choose to narrow such laws by imposing relevant time, place, and manner restrictions.

Even with these limitations, the Court’s decision is likely to significantly alter the future of local policies on homelessness, especially throughout California. Local governments are now authorized to take more aggressive actions to enforce existing ordinances (or enact new ones) prohibiting or otherwise regulating overnight camping and parking on public property. Ordinances that include relevant time, place and manner restrictions (e.g., regulating when, where, and how people sleep in public) are likely to be particularly insulated from constitutional challenges.

We will continue to monitor updates to local policies on the homeless in response to this decision and provide updates as they become available.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See prior article here.

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Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

by: Alexander L. Merritt, Kathryn C. Kafka of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more news on the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

Petition for Certiorari Filed in Supreme Court in False Claims Act Case Seeking Review of Whether “Willful” Under the Anti-Kickback Statute Requires Knowledge that the Conduct is Unlawful

The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to define “willfulness” under the federal criminal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). In a declined qui tam case filed against McKesson Corporation, a pharmaceutical wholesaler, the relator, Adam Hart, a former McKesson employee, filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of a Second Circuit decision that upheld the dismissal of relator’s complaint asserting claims under the civil False Claims Act (FCA) premised on alleged violations of the AKS. U.S. ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 96 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2024). A violation of the AKS requires as the scienter element that the defendant “knowingly and willfully” offered or paid remuneration to induce the recipient of the renumeration to purchase goods or items for which payment may be made under a federal health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). The Second Circuit held that a defendant does not act “willfully” within the meaning of the AKS unless that defendant “act[s] knowing that his conduct is unlawful.” United States ex rel. Hart, 96 F.4th at 154.

The AKS is enforced both as a criminal statute and, as in this case, is frequently used by the government or relators as a predicate violation to support an alleged violation of the civil FCA. Since 2010, Congress has specified that a claim that includes items or services “resulting from” an AKS violation is a false or fraudulent claim under the FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). Though the evidentiary standard in criminal and civil cases differs, the government or relator in civil cases must adequately plead the “knowingly and willfully” scienter element of the AKS.

Hart alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that McKesson offered physician oncology practices two valuable business tools, the Margin Analyzer and the Regimen Profiler, to induce those practices to purchase oncology pharmaceuticals from McKesson. Hart alleged that these business tools were prohibited remuneration, and that McKesson acted “knowingly and willfully” in offering these two tools to its customers in violation of the AKS. Hart’s basis for alleging “willfulness” included: (1) alleged document destruction during the litigation; (2) Hart informed his supervisor during compliance training about the potential AKS violation, yet McKesson continued to provide these tools, worth about $150,000, to medical practices free of charge in exchange for commitments to purchase drugs from McKesson; and (3) Hart’s discussions with other employees that McKesson was inappropriately exploiting the business tools.

After the government declined to intervene, the District Court dismissed the FCA claims in a Second Amended Complaint (after dismissing the prior complaint as well) by ruling that Hart failed to plausibly allege sufficient facts to suggest McKesson acted “willfully”. The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal and agreed that a defendant acts “willfully” under the AKS only if the defendant knows “that its conduct is, in some way, unlawful.”

The Second Circuit rejected the relator’s proposed approach, a looser standard that would meet the “willfully” standard of the scienter element if (a) the company provided something of value in connection with the sale of pharmaceuticals reimbursed by the government, and (b) knew, even through general compliance training, that it is illegal to provide things of value to induce sales. Hart filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the question: “[t]o act ‘willfully’ within the meaning of the [AKS], must a defendant know that its conduct violates the law?”

There is no dispute, under the law, that a defendant does not need “specific intent” to violate the AKS. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h). However, the petition raises questions about how certain sister Circuits interpret “willfully” when addressing violations of the AKS:

  • The Second Circuit held in this case that a defendant does not act “willfully” within the meaning of the AKS unless that defendant “act[s] knowing that his conduct is unlawful, even if the defendant is not aware that his conduct is unlawful under the AKS specifically.” United States ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 96 F.4th 145,154 (2d Cir. 2024).
  • The Eleventh Circuit, in accord with the Second, has also held that a defendant must know that its conduct is unlawful in order to violate the AKS. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o find that a person acted willfully in violation of § 1320a-7b, the person must have acted voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is with a bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
  • The relator argues in the petition that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits are split with the Second Circuit. Relator relies on a Fifth Circuit case holding that “willfully” requires that a “defendant willfully committed an act that violated the . . . Statute” without a requirement that a defendant know its conduct is unlawful. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 210 & n.19 (5th Cir. 2013). However, a more recent Fifth Circuit case, which was cited by the Second Circuit, defines “willfully” to mean “the act was committed voluntarily or purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.” United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
  • The relator cites an Eighth Circuit case holding a defendant’s conduct is willful if a defendant “knew that his conduct was wrongful,” but asserts the Eighth Circuit has not “require[d] proof that [the defendant] . . . knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’” United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996). However, a more recent Eighth Circuit relied on Jain to uphold a jury instruction stating, “[a] defendant acts willfully if he knew his conduct was wrongful or unlawful.” United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 708 (8th Cir. 2011).
  • The Second Circuit did recognize a circuit split, but described its view as in “align[ment] with the approach to the AKS taken by several of our sister courts [including the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits], which have held or implied that to be liable under the AKS, defendants must know that their particular conduct was wrongful.” United States ex rel. Hart, 96 F.4th at 154-55.

It is important to remember that the AKS is a felony statute subject to criminal fines and up to 10 years of imprisonment. It also criminalizes conduct that, in other industries, is not illegal. Further, due to the breadth of the statute and its complexity, Congress and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General (OIG) have developed a complicated set of guidance to help attorneys and compliance professionals understand and provide counsel with respect to AKS compliance, including statutory exceptions, regulatory safe harbors, advisory opinions, and an enormous body of sub-regulatory guidance. The Second Circuit understood this and noted that its “interpretation of the AKS’s willfulness requirement thus protects those (and only those) who innocently and inadvertently engage in prohibited conduct.” Id. at 155-56.

If the Supreme Court takes an interest in this case, it likely will invite the view of the Solicitor General. Any Supreme Court interest in granting this petition will likely attract a wide range of amici participation at the certiorari stage by health care industry groups and associations, pharmaceutical company associations, other business groups, as well as associations of whistleblower counsel and other supporters of the private action qui tam provisions of the FCA. Though the range of holdings by the Courts of Appeal are often nuanced, Supreme Court consideration of the issue would be viewed as very significant, and a decision that creates a rigorous standard for “willfulness,” or alternatively, a lenient one, could considerably impact the Department of Justice (DOJ) and relators’ ability to successfully plead, and prove, an AKS violation as a predicate to an alleged FCA violation.

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