Tag: seventh circuit

Unfashionably Late: Seventh Circuit Rejects Misappropriation Claim Premised On Prototype Created Eleven Years Prior

The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a former employee and his new employer on claims for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to a prototype of an actuator created eleven years prior, holding that the inference that the defendant used his knowledge of the prototype more than a decade later was “barely conceivable” and “exceptionally unreasonable.” REXA, Inc. v. Chester, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 2981167, at *6 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In 2002, Mark Chester, an engineer at Koso America, Inc. (“Koso”), participated in a project to create a new valve for a hydraulic actuator. An actuator is a component of a machine that produces motion. While the project was unsuccessful, it did produce an experimental prototype of another actuator. Koso shelved the experimental prototype due to the improbability of commercial success. The following year, Chester left Koso.

After more than a decade had passed since Chester worked on the 2002 project for Koso, Chester and his new employer, MEA Inc. (“MEA”), built a new actuator prototype, later known as the Hawk. Chester and MEA filed a related patent application, which was approved in part. REXA, Inc. (“REXA”), a company affiliated with Koso, brought suit against Chester and MEA for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), among other claims. REXA argued that Chester and MEA’s actuator incorporated and disclosed confidential designs contained within the prototype Koso developed in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chester and MEA. REXA appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the misappropriation claims. First, the Seventh Circuit agreed that REXA failed to identify a concrete trade secret, as the Court was unable to determine which aspects of the 2002 designs are known to the trade, and which are not. The Court explained that several aspects of the 2002 actuator prototype are widely known in the industry, which by definition, is not sufficiently secret to qualify for protection under the ITSA.

Second, the Seventh Circuit held that even if REXA had identified a trade secret, REXA had not established that defendants misappropriated trade secrets when MEA filed its patent application or developed the Hawk actuator. With respect to MEA’s patent application, the Court explained that REXA’s allegations “rest on a series of untenable inferences.” Id. Indeed, eleven years had passed since Chester worked on the actuator prototype, and it was undisputed that he never saw or took any documents with him when he left Koso. Additionally, REXA did not cite any case where a court “inferred” a misappropriation of trade secrets despite a lack of evidence that the defendant seized or possessed documents, nor could the Seventh Circuit find any such case. As such, the Court found the lack of evidence, coupled with the eleven-year gap, “renders the inferences that REXA asks us to draw exceptionally unreasonable.” Id.

Regarding the design of MEA’s Hawk actuator, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2002 prototype did not include features of the patent application that made the Hawk both a non-obvious improvement over prior art and commercially valuable. Thus, Chester and MEA could not have misappropriated trade secrets contained within the 2002 prototype.

REXA serves as an important reminder that trade secret claimants must identify with specificity the elements that distinguish the alleged trade secret from general knowledge in the field or public domain. Additionally, REXA confirms that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, courts are hesitant to draw inferences supporting misappropriation claims without any evidence the defendant seized or possessed documents from the plaintiff, particularly if a significant period of time passes before the alleged misappropriation occurs.

Article By Mikela T. Sutrina and Jenna G. Crawford of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

In the Weeds? Humira “Patent Thicket” Isn’t an Antitrust Violation

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that welfare benefit plans that bought the drug Humira did not have valid antitrust claims against the patent owner. The Court found that amassing patents by itself is not enough to give rise to an antitrust claim, and that the welfare benefit plans would need to prove that the patents were invalid. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2402 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2022) (Easterbrook, Wood, Kirsch, JJ.)

AbbVie owns a patent covering Humira, which is a drug used to treat arthritic and inflammatory diseases. Humira is not covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act because it is a biologic drug, rather than a synthetic drug. Biologics are covered by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), under which a competitor must ask the US Food and Drug Administration for permission to sell a “biosimilar” drug based on certain guidelines. From the first sale of the original drug, the competitor must wait 12 years to enter the market. If the original drug seller believes that a patent blocks competition and initiates litigation, the competitor is still free to sell its biosimilar drug. The competitor sells at risk of an adverse outcome in the litigation.

The original Humira patent expired in 2016, but AbbVie obtained 132 additional patents related to the drug. After the 12-year BPCIA requirement passed, none of AbbVie’s competitors chose to launch a biosimilar. Instead, competitors settled with AbbVie on terms to enter the US market in 2023. In exchange, AbbVie agreed that enforcement of all 132 of its patents would end in 2023 even if they were not set to expire.

Welfare benefit plans that pay for Humira on behalf of covered beneficiaries accused AbbVie of violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The payors argued that AbbVie’s settlements with potential competitors established a conspiracy that restrained competition in violation of Section 1, and that AbbVie’s “patent thicket” allowed AbbVie to reap unlawful monopoly profits from Humira after expiration of the original patent in violation of Section 2. The district court dismissed the complaint. The payors appealed.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 2 was whether the payors had to prove that all of AbbVie’s Humira-related patents were invalid. Under the Walker Process antitrust doctrine, a party may be liable for an antitrust violation if it knowingly asserts a fraudulently procured patent in an attempt to monopolize a market. The payors did not argue that all 132 of AbbVie’s patents were fraudulent. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the patent laws do not set a cap on the number of patents a person (or company) can hold, the payors would need to prove that each of AbbVie’s 132 Humira-related patents were invalid to succeed in showing a violation under Section 2. Not only did the payors fail to prove that all 132 patents were invalid, but they did not even offer to do so. The Court thus agreed with the district court that AbbVie did not amass a patent thicket to maintain monopoly profits from Humira.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 1 was whether AbbVie’s settlements with potential biosimilar competitors were anticompetitive. The Seventh Circuit found that the payors could have a Section 1 claim if they were injured by the terms of AbbVie’s settlements with its competitors (for example, by showing that AbbVie overpaid a competitor to defer entry). The terms of AbbVie’s settlements allowed the competitors immediate entry to the European market, and AbbVie agreed to US market entry before its last Humira-related patents expired. The Court found that those terms, as well as the payors’ failure to show that AbbVie overpaid the competitors to delay their entry, rendered the settlements lawful.

The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Article By Alexandra Lewis of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

Beyond Meat Sued Over Protein Content Claims

  • A proposed consumer class action lawsuit was filed against Beyond Meat, Inc. on June 10, alleging that the plant-based meat manufacturer embellished the amount of protein contained in its line of plant-based sausages, breakfast patties, meatballs, ground beef, and chicken products.

  • In the complaint, plaintiff Mary Yoon alleges that Beyond Meat falsely labels and advertises its products as providing “equal or superior protein” to animal-derived meat. Her claim is based on the fact that “two different U.S. laboratories have independently and separately conducted testing on a wide range of Beyond Meat products. The test results were consistent with each other: the results of both tests show that Beyond Meat products contain significantly less protein than what is stated on the product packaging.”

  • Plaintiff Yoon alleges that Beyond Meat’s quantitative declaration of protein and percent Daily Value (%DV) are false and misleading because the quantitative amount was calculated using the nitrogen method. According to the complaint, “the nitrogen method is not the most accurate way to describe protein content” and that “[b]y law, Beyond Meat is required to use the PDCAAS calculation for the products rather than some other less-sophisticated method.”

  • In opposition to plaintiff Yoon’s claims, 21 CFR 101.9(c)(7) specifically provides for two different methods to determine protein values, including the nitrogen method. The FDA recently issued a clarifying Q&A supporting the use of either method to calculate protein content (i.e., nitrogen or PDCAAS), but noted that manufacturers are still obligated to include a %DV when protein claims are made and that %DV should be adjusted for protein quality.

Article By Food and Drug Law Practice Group at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more biotech, food, and drug legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

BREAKING: Seventh Circuit Certifies BIPA Accrual Question to Illinois Supreme Court in White Castle

Yesterday the Seventh Circuit issued a much awaited ruling in the Cothron v. White Castle litigation, punting to the Illinois Supreme Court on the pivotal question of when a claim under the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (“BIPA”) accrues.  No. 20-3202 (7th Cir.).  Read on to learn more and what it may mean for other biometric and data privacy litigations.

First, a brief recap of the facts of the dispute.  After Plaintiff started working at a White Castle in Illinois in 2004, White Castle began using an optional, consent-based finger-scan system for employees to sign documents and access their paystubs and computers.  Plaintiff consented in 2007 to the collection of her biometric data and then 11 years later—in 2018—filed suit against White Castle for purported violation of BIPA.

Plaintiff alleged that White Castle did not obtain consent to collect or disclose her fingerprints at the first instance the collection occurred under BIPA because BIPA did not exist in 2007.  Plaintiff asserted that she was “required” to scan her finger each time she accessed her work computer and weekly paystubs with White Castle and that her prior consent to the collection of biometric data did not satisfy BIPA’s requirements.  According to Plaintiff, White Castle violated BIPA Sections 15(b) and 15(d) by collecting, then “systematically and automatically” disclosing her biometric information without adhering to BIPA’s requirements (she claimed she did not consent under BIPA to the collection of her information until 2018). She sought statutory damages for “each” violation on behalf of herself and a putative class.

White Castle before the district court had moved to dismiss the Complaint and for judgment on the pleadings—both of which motions were denied.  The district court sided with Plaintiff, holding that “[o]n the facts set forth in the pleadings, White Castle violated Section 15(b) when it first scanned [Plaintiff’s] fingerprint and violated Section 15(d) when it first disclosed her biometric information to a third party.”  The district court also held that under Section 20 of BIPA, Plaintiff could recover for “each violation.”  The court rejected White Castle’s argument that this was an absurd interpretation of the statute not in keeping with legislative intent, commenting that “[i]f the Illinois legislature agrees that this reading of BIPA is absurd, it is of course free to modify the statue” but “it is not the role of a court—particularly a federal court—to rewrite a state statute to avoid a construction that may penalize violations severely.”

White Castle filed an appeal of the district court’s ruling with the Seventh Circuit.  As presented by White Castle, the issue before the Seventh Circuit was “[w]hether, when conduct that allegedly violates BIPA is repeated, that conduct gives rise to a single claim under Sections 15(b) and 15(d) of BIPA, or multiple claims.”

In ruling yesterday this issue was appropriate for the Illinois Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit held that “[w]hether a claim accrues only once or repeatedly is an important and recurring question of Illinois law implicating state accrual principles as applied to this novel state statute.  It requires authoritative guidance that only the state’s highest court can provide.”  Here, the accrual issue is dispositive for purposes of Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim.  As the Seventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he timeliness of the suit depends on whether a claim under the Act accrued each time [Plaintiff] scanned her fingerprint to access a work computer or just the first time.”

Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit drew a comparison to data privacy litigations outside the context of BIPA, stating that the parties’ “disagreement, framed differently, is whether the Act should be treated like a junk-fax statute for which a claim accrues for each unsolicited fax, [], or instead like certain privacy and reputational torts that accrue only at the initial publication of defamatory material.”

Several BIPA litigations have been stayed pending a ruling from the Seventh Circuit in White Castle and these cases will remain on pause going into 2022 pending a ruling from the Illinois Supreme Court.  While some had hoped for clarity on this area of BIPA jurisprudence by the end of the year, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling means that this litigation will remain a must-watch privacy case going forward.

Article By Kristin L. Bryan of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more data privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2021 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Good News for Companies: Seventh Circuit Holds Removal of Plaintiffs’ Biometrics Privacy Claims to Federal Court OK

In a widely watched case, the Seventh Circuit decided last week that companies that collect individuals’ biometric data may be able to defend their cases in federal court when plaintiffs allege a procedural violation of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).

In Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that certain procedural violations of Illinois’ BIPA constituted actual injuries and therefore satisfied the requirements for federal court standing. Relying on Spokeo, the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case addressing what constitutes an actual injury for standing purposes, the court held that the plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, would demonstrate that she suffered an actual injury based on the fact that Compass did not obtain her consent before obtaining her private information. Therefore, the case could remain in federal court.

The decision now gives defendants that want to defend BIPA claims in federal court a roadmap for their arguments, including access to a larger jury pool, the Federal Rules of Procedure, and other federal court-related advantages. It is also notable because BIPA defendants have attempted to remove BIPA cases to federal court and then file motions to dismiss them for lack of standing. However, the federal courts have typically remanded these cases, forcing defendants back into state court and sometimes even requiring them to pay just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.[1]

What Happened in Bryant v. Compass Group USA

In Compass Group USA, a customer sued a vending machine manufacturer after she scanned her fingerprint into a vending machine to set up an account during her employer’s orientation. She then used her fingerprint to buy items from the vending machine.

The plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated in state court alleging that Compass violated her statutory rights under BIPA by 1) obtaining her fingerprint without her written consent and 2) not establishing a publicly available data retention schedule or destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data as required by the statute.

Shortly after the plaintiff filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court, Compass filed a notice to remove the case to the Northern District of Illinois. Opposing the motion, the plaintiff argued that she did not have federal standing for her BIPA claims because she had not alleged an injury-in-fact as required by Article III.

Compass argued that the plaintiff had alleged an injury-in-fact under Article III, pointing to the recent Illinois Supreme Court case, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., which held that plaintiffs can bring BIPA claims based on procedural violations, even if they have suffered no actual injury. Rosenbach held that, if a company, for example, fails to comply with BIPA’s requirement of establishing destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data, that violation alone – without any actual pecuniary or other injury – creates an actual injury.

The district court sided with the plaintiff and concluded that Rosenbach merely established “the policy of the Illinois courts” to allow plaintiffs to bring BIPA claims without alleging an actual injury. Rosenbach did not interpret procedural BIPA violations to be actual injuries.

Because the plaintiff’s claims did not establish Article III standing, the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court.

The Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on Spokeo. It interpreted Spokeo as holding that injuries may still be particularized and concrete – i.e., actual – even if they are intangible or hard to prove. The court also cited Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Spokeo that distinguished between private rights (which courts have historically presumed to cause actual injuries) and public rights (which require a further showing of injury).

The court held that the plaintiff had alleged that she suffered an actual injury when Compass collected her biometric data without obtaining her informed consent because this was a private right. The court also relied on Fed. Election Comm’n v. Atkins, 525 U.S. 11 (1998).  In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that nondisclosure can be an actual injury if plaintiffs can show an impairment of their ability to use information in a way intended by the statute. The court in Compass similarly held that the defendant had denied the plaintiff the opportunity — and statutory right — to consider whether the terms of the defendant’s data collection and usage were acceptable. As a result, the court held that the plaintiff alleged an actual injury.

By contrast, the court determined that the plaintiff’s other claim – that the defendant violated BIPA by failing to make publicly available a data retention schedule and destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data – implicated a public right and did not cause the plaintiff an actual injury.

[1] See, e.g. Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F. Supp. 3d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Defendant’s professed strategy of removing the case on the basis of federal jurisdiction, only to turn around and seek dismissal with prejudice—a remedy not supported by any of defendant’s cases—on the ground that federal jurisdiction was lacking, unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings. . . . For the foregoing reasons, I grant plaintiff’s motion for remand and attorneys’ fees and deny as moot defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because defendant has not objected to the specific fee amount plaintiff claims, which she supports with evidence in the form of affidavits and billing records, I find that plaintiff is entitled to payment in the amount of $58,112.50 pursuant to § 1447(c).”)

© 2020 Schiff Hardin LLP
For more on BIPA, see the National Law Review Communications, Internet, and Media Law section.

Indiana Federal Court Gives Frostbitten ADA Plaintiff The Cold Shoulder

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana recently granted summary judgment on behalf of a logistics employer in a case alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that because the plaintiff employee could not work in the freezer area of his employer’s warehouse, as was required for his job, he failed to establish that he was a “qualified individual” with a disability.

In Pryor v. Americold Logistics, LLC, the defendant employer operates a cold-storage warehouse that “provides temperature-controlled food warehousing and distribution services,” with “five cooler rooms, two freezer rooms, a loading dock, a designated battery-changing room, and a small office.” The plaintiff was a Lift Truck Operator (LTO) who filled orders by picking items from the various rooms of the warehouse and wrapping them on a skid for pickup by another employee. He had previously “suffered severe frostbite on his left hand after he spent three-quarters of a shift in the freezer with defective gloves,” and due to his prior frostbite “exposure to the freezer’s extreme cold caused pain and risked further injury.”

After treatment (and intervening stints of alternate duty), the plaintiff employee “reached maximum medical improvement” and was put on “a permanent restriction of exposure to the freezer for no more than thirty minutes per workday.” The plaintiff’s LTO role, however, required nearly constant exposure to subzero temperatures. When the plaintiff did not return from leave, he was terminated.

The plaintiff alleged that his employer “discriminated against him by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability and by terminating his employment.” The employer argued that the plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because “he could not perform the essential duties of an LTO with or without a reasonable accommodation.” The district court held that the plaintiff had not “presented sufficient evidence that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation,” and thus granted summary judgement in favor of the employer.

The court explained the employer’s judgment as to which job functions are essential is entitled to consideration. And with regard to the essential functions of the LTO role, the court found that the LTO role required “substantial exposure to freezer temperatures” each workday. The court explained that, because the plaintiff admittedly could not work in the freezer for more than thirty minutes per day, “he could not perform the essential functions of his LTO order selector position without reasonable accommodation.” He was thus a “‘qualified individual’ under the ADA only if he could perform the essential functions with reasonable accommodation.”

As for the question of what a reasonable accommodation might entail, the plaintiff argued that he could have been reassigned to a non-freezer position, a temporary “cooler-only” position, or a position in the loading dock or office. However, the court stated, “it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that a vacant position exists for which he was qualified.” The court explained that the ADA does not require an employer to “create a new position or transfer another employee to create a vacancy,” or to “transfer a disabled employee to a temporary position on a permanent basis.”

Ultimately, with regard “cooler-only” positions, the court held that the plaintiff failed to identify any vacancies, and noted that pursuant to a union contract, those positions had to be filled according to seniority. With regard to the vacant loading dock or office positions, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was qualified. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff failed “to create a genuine issue of material fact whether reassignment was a reasonable accommodation,” and summary judgement in favor of the employer was appropriate.

The key takeaways from the Pryor decision for employers facing ADA claims are that employees must still be able to perform the essential functions of their job, and that courts should consider the employer’s determination of which job functions are essential. Moreover, the Pryor decision reaffirms that the ADA does not require employers to create positions or vacancies as part of the interactive process.

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more ADA cases, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Seventh Circuit: ADA Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Based on Future Impairments

On October 29, 2019, railway operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) prevailed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin – in a case in which the company argued that its refusal to hire an obese candidate due to an unacceptably high risk that the applicant would develop certain obesity-related medical conditions incompatible with the position sought did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Ronald Shell applied for a job with BNSF as a machine operator position.  Per its standard practice when the applied-for position is safety-sensitive, as was the heavy equipment operator position sought by Shell, BNSF required him to undergo a medical examination.  During the medical examination, the examiner determined that Shell’s body mass index (“BMI”) was 47.  BNSF had a practice of refusing to hire individuals with a BMI higher than 40 for safety-sensitive positions.  In Shell’s case, the employer expressed concern that his obesity, although not causing any present disability, would cause Shell disabilities in the future, such as sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease.  BNSF asserted that this risk was significant because a sudden onset of any of these conditions could be catastrophic for a heavy machine operator.  BNSF therefore did not place Shell in the position.

Shell sued, arguing that he was “disabled” under the ADA’s definition of that term because BNSF had “regarded him as” having a disability.  The ADA not only protects individuals who are actually disabled or have a record of being disabled, but also protects individuals who have been subjected to an adverse employment action because of an actual or perceived physical impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits a major life activity.  Shell argued that by refusing to hire him based on the risk of future disabilities that he was at risk of as a result of his obesity, BNSF essentially treated him as though he currently had those conditions.

The Court ruled that the ADA does not protect non-disabled employees from discrimination based on a risk of future impairments.  The Court cited precedent from the Eighth Circuit, where BNSF also faced challenges to its practice of refusing to hire obese applicants due to the risk of future impairments.  The Eighth Circuit, like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also has held that the statutory language of the ADA does not protect non-disabled individuals who have a risk of disability in the future.

Of note, Shell also argued at the trial court level that his obesity constituted an actual disability, rendering BNSF’s refusal to hire him based on this characteristic a violation of the ADA for this reason as well.  However, as you may recall from our blog post from earlier this year, just a few months ago, the Seventh Circuit addressed this argument in another case, Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority, and held that obesity, by itself, is not a disability for purposes of the ADA unless it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder.  Shell did not present any evidence in his case of such an underlying disorder, and thus could not, therefore, claim that he was actually disabled.  Notably, the federal appellate courts are split on this issue, which may tee it up for consideration by the United States Supreme Court in the future.  In contrast, among the appeals courts that have addressed the issue of future disabilities, all have agreed, thus far, that the ADA’s reach does not extend to potential or likely future disabilities of currently non-disabled individuals.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more ADA litigation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Suit Over ‘No Preservatives’ Capri Sun Label Tossed

A proposed class action, filed in the Northern District of Illinois on October 25, 2018, against Kraft Heinz Food Co. accused the company of falsely advertising its Capri Sun juice as containing “no preservatives” when in fact it contains citric acid. Tarzian et al v. Kraft Heinz Food Company, Case No. 1:18-cv-07148. The complaint alleged that the representation that Capri Sun beverages contain “No Artificial Coloring, Flavors, or Preservatives” is unfair and deceptive advertising as the beverages contain a well-known preservative, citric acid.

In an order filed on October 10, 2019, U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras dismissed the lawsuit and found that while the plaintiffs allege practices commonly used to manufacture citric acid throughout the industry, plaintiffs failed to draw a connection between the common industry practice and the actual practice used by Kraft.

This dismissal follows a dismissal of a similar matter in California federal court in 2015. Osborne v. Kraft Heinz Group, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-02653. In that case, plaintiffs accused Kraft of mislabeling Capri Sun drinks as “all natural” when they allegedly contained synthetic ingredients, including citric acid and natural flavor. In a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria found that plaintiff did not know whether the citric acid used in Capri Sun’s drinks was natural or synthetic. The judge ultimately granted Kraft Heinz’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend the complaint. The plaintiff never filed an amended complaint.

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on food labeling laws, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination

sexual orientation discriminationIn the midst of a legal, political and cultural landscape expanding the rights of LGBT individuals, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has held to prior precedent in reaffirming that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, __ S.Ct. __, No. 15-720 (July 28, 2016).  According to the court, though “the writing is on the wall” that sexual orientation discrimination should not be tolerated, because the writing is not in a Supreme Court opinion or Title VII, the court’s hands are tied.

In two 2000 opinions, Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.and Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit had previously held that Title VII offers no protection from sexual orientation discrimination. The court revisited the issue now in order to provide a more detailed analysis in light of recent trends and decisions advancing LGBT rights.

The court recognized the merits of many of Ms. Hively’s arguments, and acknowledged that in light of the recognition of other rights of LGBT individuals the current legal landscape does not make sense. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as unlawful (U.S. v. Windsor) and legalized gay marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). In 2015, the EEOC held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Baldwin v. Foxx (July 16, 2015). Many judicial decisions at the district court level have repeatedly recognized that sexual orientation discrimination cannot be tolerated. Yet, Congress has repeatedly rejected new legislation that would extend Title VII to cover sexual orientation discrimination, and it has not amended the language of Title VII to include sexual orientation.

This creates “a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.” The court observed, “From an employee’s perspective, the right to marriage might not feel like a real right if she can be fired for exercising it.”

Nonetheless, the court stated that Congress’ failure to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation cannot be due to its unawareness of the issue. Thus, Congress must have intended a very narrow reading of the term “sex” when it passed Title VII.

In excluding sexual orientation discrimination from the coverage of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit conveyed its apparent reluctance in doing so:

“Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that  our  society  can  continue  to  condone  a  legal  structure  in  which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled  out  for  undesirable  tasks,  paid  lower  wages,  demoted,  passed  over  for  promotions,  and  otherwise  discriminated  against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, … many of the federal  courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not  condone it …; and this court undoubtedly  does not condone it… . But writing  on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the  form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we  must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent[.]”

The Seventh Circuit went on to offer its further observations:

“Many citizens would be surprised to learn that under federal law any private employer can summon an employee into his office and state, “You are a hard‐working employee and have added much value to my company, but I am firing you because you are gay.” And the employee would have no recourse whatsoever—unless she happens to live in a state or locality with an anti‐discrimination statute that includes sexual orientation.”

Those states are currently California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Other states apply the prohibition to public employment only: Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio; Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Some local city and county ordinances contain similar anti-discrimination provisions.

The bottom line for both employers and LGBT individuals, in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, is that the employment protections afforded to individuals based on sexual orientation remains determined, for now, at the state and local level.

ARTICLE BY Julie Furer Stahr of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

Shaking Down the Thunder From the Sky: Notre Dame's Challenge to the Contraception Mandate

For the second time in as many years, the Seventh Circuit has declined to grant Notre Dame’s request for an injunction exempting the university from the contraception requirements of the Affordable Care Act. 

As was true back in 2014, the court remained skeptical of the link between Notre Dame’s actions (filling out a form noting its religious objections to contraceptives and sending the form to its insurance administrator) and the resulting actions (the administrator then providing the contraceptives directly to the insured). Consequently, the court ruled that Notre Dame did not meet its burden of showing that its religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the contraceptive mandate. Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion, which Judge Hamilton joined while writing a separate concurrence.

The case was back before the Seventh Circuit following the Supreme Court’s vacating of the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 opinion with directions to review the case in light of the Court’s Hobby Lobby opinion. (Odd, then, that the Seventh Circuit’s decision does not begin discussing Hobby Lobby until page 18 and discusses the case for little more than a page in a 25-page opinion.) The court concluded in short order that Hobby Lobby had virtually no application in Notre Dame’s case: In Hobby Lobby, a private sector employer wanted to receive the accommodation afforded to religious organizations, whereas Notre Dame argued that the accommodation itself was insufficient to protect its religious beliefs.

As in the original opinion, Judge Flaum strongly dissented. He once again argued that the majority was inappropriately judging the sincerity of Notre Dame’s beliefs, something he believes was foreclosed by the Hobby Lobby decision.

Perhaps most noteworthy about this opinion is that—nearly 18 months after Notre Dame filed suit—the decision simply affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. As both Judge Posner’s majority opinion and Judge Hamilton’s concurrence note, the record is still barren of the kinds of facts that a trial will bring out—and that could allow Notre Dame to introduce more evidence of the religious burden the contraceptive provisions of the Affordable Care Act place on the school. Yet it seems likely that before that trial occurs, Notre Dame will again petition the Supreme Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. And given the Court’s willingness to weigh in on these issues, the thunderstorm shows no signs of letting up.

ARTICLE BY Ryan N. Parsons of Foley & Lardner LLP
© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP