Tag: Senate

Post Election – Expect Tax Legislation

I. Introduction

With clear Republican victories in the White House and the Senate, and a very slim majority for either side in the House of Representatives, we can expect tax legislation in the coming year. It is expected that the President elect will likely seek to enact his economic agenda as quickly as possible. While Congress may work for bipartisan support of any such legislation, Congressional Republicans and the Administration have the ability to utilize the filibuster-proof budget reconciliation rules (that eliminate the need for 60 votes in the Senate) to pass such tax legislation. We understand that the advance preparation and work for a 2025 reconciliation bill began in Republican Leadership offices over the summer and will continue through the end of the year.

Key to the current discussions of tax policy are provisions from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the “TCJA”), a large overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code during President Trump’s first term. The TCJA instituted many significant changes to U.S. tax laws, including cutting the corporate rate, lowering individual income tax rates, and introducing a new deduction for passthrough income. However, due to various reasons, including the arcana of procedural rules of Congress associated with the “reconciliation” procedures, many of these provisions were temporary and scheduled to expire at the end of 2025. Exactly which provisions are to be extended, which to be modified, which to be abandoned and how to budget for each of these provisions, is expected to be a part of the legislative agenda next year. It is important to note that, among certain other items, the reduced corporate tax rate enacted in the TCJA is not scheduled to expire.

The most significant expiring provisions of the TCJA are set forth below.

II. Expiring Provisions

A. Changes to non-corporate tax rates, credits, deductions, exemptions and exclusions

The most significant expiring provisions, at least from a political perspective, are the provisions providing significant adjustments to the various tax rates, credits, deductions and similar provisions mostly applicable to individuals, resulting in a broad-scale reversion to the pre-2017 regime for individual taxpayers. The key changes are the following, generally coming into effect in 2026, if not extended or modified:

  • The lower individual income tax rates in the TCJA will expire, and the top marginal rate will go from 37% to 39.6%;
  • The estate and gift tax exclusion amount will be cut in half to $5 million and then adjusted for inflation, so the estate tax exemption will go from approximately $14 million in 2025 to approximately $7 million in 2026;
  • The standard deduction will revert to pre-TCJA levels (almost half the current standard deduction), although the personal exemption amount (which was set to zero under the TCJA) will return to pre-TCJA levels as well;
  • The deduction for miscellaneous itemized expenses, including unreimbursed employee expenses and tax preparation fees will return, and taxpayers will be able to deduct miscellaneous itemized expenses above 2% of adjusted gross income (“AGI”);
  • The phasing-out of itemized deductions for high income taxpayers will return;
  • The TCJA’s cap on the deductibility of state and local tax will expire, so taxpayers will be able to deduct all state and local income taxes (or sales taxes, if selected by the taxpayer) and property taxes—this may be celebrated by higher-income taxpayers in high tax states, but much of the benefit could be tempered by the return of broader scope of the alternative minimum tax discussed immediately below;
  • The alternative minimum tax (the “AMT”), which under the TCJA was limited to a small number of taxpayers, will return to its pre-TCJA form (which applied to a much larger group of individual taxpayers);
  • The deduction limit for cash charitable deductions will revert to 50% of AGI (as compared the current limit of 60% of AGI);
  • The child tax credit will be cut in half so that the maximum credit is $1,000 per child, the refundable portion of the credit will decline from $1,400 to $1,000, and other various adjustments will apply; and
  • The broader mortgage interest exemption available under the pre-TCJA regime will return.

B. Employment-related provisions

Certain employment-related provisions will also expire, and many pre-TCJA rules will return, generally in 2026, if not extended or modified. The most significant changes are the following:

  • The Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which provides a credit to employers who hire members of certain groups, such as veterans, recipients of various federal welfare benefit programs, and residents of empowerment zones, would expire;
  • Employers who pay wages to employees on family and medical leave are generally eligible currently for a credit for a percentage of 12 weeks of paid leave wages—this credit would expire;
  • The deductibility of employer-provided meal expenses, currently limited to 50 percent of the meal expense, will be eliminated; and
  • The suspension of the exclusion for employer reimbursements for moving expenses for persons other than certain members of the armed services, will be lifted, at which point taxpayers will be able once again to exclude from income qualifying moving expense reimbursements received from an employer.

C. Various business provisions

Multiple provisions designed to create tax benefits or tax reductions for certain business operations or activities are also amongst the set of expiring or changing provisions. Among the key provisions that will change, generally in 2026, if not extended or modified are the following:

  • The TCJA introduced the qualified business income deduction for 20% of qualified passthrough income, excluding specified service trade or business income, and ordinary REIT dividends—this deduction would expire, so passthrough income and ordinary REIT dividends will be taxed at ordinary income rates with no deduction;
  • The TCJA’s bonus depreciation allowance will continue to decline over the next few years: only a 40% immediate deduction in 2025, 20% in 2026, and no bonus depreciation after 2026 (with some exceptions);
  • The special “opportunity zone” rules—whereby taxpayers could defer capital gains if the gains are reinvested in such an opportunity zone and exclude capital gains income after a 10-year holding period—will expire. Similarly, the empowerment zone program’s tax benefits and the New Markets Tax Credit will also expire.

D. International tax provisions

The TCJA also made some significant revisions to the international and cross-border tax rules, many of which will have changes that will automatically trigger in 2025 or 2026. The most material are:

  • The “base erosion and anti-abuse tax” (the “BEAT”) minimum tax rate will increase to 12.5% (from 10%) and the calculation of the modified income tax (on which the BEAT minimum tax rate applies) will be adjusted to eliminate the taxpayer’s ability to benefit from certain tax credits;
  • The deductions applicable to global intangible low-taxed income (“GILTI”) inclusions for corporations will be reduced (resulting in an increase in the amount of tax imposed on such inclusions)—the deductions for most income will drop from 50% to 37.5%;
  • The deduction on “foreign derived intangible income” (“FDII”) will drop from 37.5% to 21.875%; and
  • The oft extended “look through” rule (which did not originate in the TCJA) for dividends, interest, rents and royalties received by a controlled foreign corporation from another related controlled foreign corporation is set to expire.

As one can imagine on reading this long list of expiring tax provisions (and not even taking account the many more minor provisions also set to expire or change which are not included above), the likelihood of a new tax bill to address these provisions is high. Given the nature of the Congressional rules around reconciliation and the nature of budget and tax negotiations, attempts to extend many of these provisions would likely involve the addition of new revenue-raising provisions. As such, the prospects of tax reform in 2025 are high. Proskauer closely monitors legislative developments, and additional tax blog posts will be made as specific tax proposals are moved through Congress.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.
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CFIUS Determines it Lacks Jurisdiction to Review Chinese Land Acquisition

In 2022, Fufeng USA, a subsidiary of Chinese company Fufeng Group, purchased 370 acres near Grand Forks, North Dakota, with the intention of developing the land to build a plant for wet corn milling and biofermentation,[1] prompting opposition from federal and state politicians.[2] North Dakota Senators, North Dakota’s Governor, and Senator Marco Rubio urged the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review the acquisition as a potential national security risk for being located within 12 miles from the Grand Forks Air Force Base, which is home to military drone technology and a space networking center.[3] Following CFIUS’ review of Fufeng’s notice submission, CFIUS determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the transaction. This post summarizes the public information about that CFIUS case and provides observations about the responses by North Dakota and CFIUS in the wake of Fufeng’s proposed investment.

CFIUS Review and Determination

1. Procedural History

In conjunction with rising public opposition to its land acquisition, public reports show that Fufeng USA submitted a declaration to CFIUS on July 27, 2022.[4] North Dakota local news outlet Valley News Live obtained a copy of the CFIUS closing letter to that declaration filing, which stated that CFIUS determined on August 31, 2022 that it lacked sufficient information to assess the transaction and requested that the parties file a full notice.[5] (CFIUS has the option under the regulations to request a full notice filing at the conclusion of the abbreviated 30-day review of a declaration filing.) Based on the CFIUS closing letter to that subsequent notice filing, which was likewise obtained and published by Valley News Live, Fufeng USA submitted a notice on October 17, 2022, and CFIUS subsequently concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the transaction in December 2022.[6]

2. Why CFIUS did not Review under its Part 802 Covered Real Estate Authority

According the CFIUS Letter released by Fufeng to Valley News Live, Fufeng submitted its notice pursuant to 31 C.F.R. Part 800 (“Part 800”), which pertains to covered transaction involving existing U.S. businesses.[7] The closing letter made no reference to the transaction being reviewed as a “covered real estate transaction” under 31 C.F.R. Part 802 (“Part 802”).[8] A reason for this could be that, at the time the case was before CFIUS, the land acquisition by Fufeng USA was not within any of the requisite proximity thresholds and, thus, did not fall within Part 802 authority. Under Part 802, CFIUS has authority over certain real estate transactions involving property in specific maritime ports or airports, or within defined proximity thresholds to identified “military installations” listed in Appendix A to Part 802. Grand Forks Air Force Base was not included in Appendix A at that time, nor was the acquired land within the defined proximity of any other listed military installation. Accordingly, the only way for CFIUS to extend authority would be under its Part 800 authority relating to certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses.

3. CFIUS Determined It Lacked Jurisdiction Under its Part 800 Covered Transaction Authority

CFIUS’ closing letter to Fufeng stated that “CFIUS has concluded that the Transaction is not a covered transaction and therefore CFIUS does not have jurisdiction under 31 C.F.R. Part 800.”[9] Part 800 provides CFIUS with authority to review covered control transactions (i.e., those transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person) or covered investment transactions (i.e., certain non-controlling investments directly or indirectly by a foreign person in U.S. businesses involved with critical technology, critical infrastructure, or the collection and maintaining of US citizen personal data). Greenfield investments, however, inherently do not involve an existing U.S. business. As such, greenfield investments would be outside of CFIUS’ jurisdiction under Part 800. Although the justification underlying CFIUS’ determination regarding Fufeng’s acquisition is not publicly available, CFIUS might have determined that it lacked authority under Part 800 because Fufeng’s purchase of undeveloped land was not an acquisition of a U.S. business, but more likely a greenfield investment.

State and Federal Response

Under state and federal pressure, the City of Grand Forks, which initially approved Fufeng’s development of the corn milling facility, “officially decided to terminate the development agreement between the city and Fufeng USA Inc.” on April 20, 2023.[10] This decision was largely impacted by the U.S. Air Force’s determination that “the proposed project presents a significant threat to national security with both near- and long-term risks of significant impacts to our operations in the area.”[11] As of today, the land appears to still be under the ownership of Fufeng USA.[12]

CFIUS’ determination that it lacked authority drew sharp criticism from state and federal politicians. North Dakota Senator Cramer purported that CFIUS may have determined the jurisdictional question too narrowly and indicated that the determination may prompt federal legislative action.[13] Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida) concurred, issuing a statement that permitting the transaction was “dangerous and dumb.”[14] In response to the determination, the Governor of South Dakota announced plans for “legislation potentially limiting foreign purchases of agricultural land” by investigating “proposed purchases of ag land by foreign interests and recommend either approval or denial to the Governor.”[15]

On April 29, 2023, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum signed Senate Bill No. 2371 into law, which prohibits local development and ownership of real property by foreign adversaries and related entities, effective August 1, 2023. Notably, these entities include businesses with a principal executive offices located in China, as well as businesses with a controlling Chinese interest or certain non-controlling Chinese interest.

On May 5, 2023, the U.S. Department of Treasury, the agency tasked with administering CFIUS, also took steps to expand its authority to cover more real property acquisitions. It published a Proposed Rule that would expand CFIUS covered real estate transaction authority over real restate located with 99 miles of the Grand Forks Air Force Base and seven other facilities located in Arizona, California, Iowa, and North Dakota. See a summary of that Proposed Rule and related implications at this TradePractition.com blog post.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See, Alix Larsen, CFIUS requesting Fufeng USA give more information on corn mill development, Valley News Live (Sep. 1, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/09/01/cfius-requesting-fufeng-usa-give-more-information-corn-mill-development/.

[2] See Letter from Gov. Doug Burgum to Secretaries Janet Yellen and Lloyd Austin (Jul. 25, 2022), https://www.governor.nd.gov/sites/www/files/documents/Gov.%20Burgum%20letter%20urging%20expedited%20CFIUS%20review%2007.25.2022.pdf; Letter from Senators Marco rubio, John Hoeven, and Kevin Cramer to Secretaries Janet Yellen and Lloyd Austin (Jul. 14, 2022), https://senatorkevincramer.app.box.com/s/2462nafbszk2u6yosy77chz9rpojlwtl.

[3] See id; Eamon Javers, Chinese Company’s Purchase of North Dakota Farmland Raises National Security Concerns in Washington, CNBC, July 1, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/01/chinese-purchase-of-north-dakota-farmland-raises-national-security-concerns-in-washington.html.

[4] See, Alix Larsen, CFIUS requesting Fufeng USA give more information on corn mill development (Sep. 1, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/09/01/cfius-requesting-fufeng-usa-give-more-information-corn-mill-development/.

[5] See id.

[6] See Stacie Van Dyke, Fufeng moving forward with corn milling plant in Grand Forks (Dec. 13, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/12/14/fufeng-moving-forward-with-corn-milling-plant-grand-forks/.

[7] See id.

[8] Id.

[9] See id.

[10] Bobby Falat, Grand Forks officially terminates Fufeng Deal (Apr. 20, 2023), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2023/04/20/grand-forks-officially-terminates-fufeng-deal/.

[11] News Release, Senator John Hoeven, Hoeven, Cramer: Air Force Provides Official Position on Fufeng Project in Grand Forks, (Jan. 31, 2023), https://www.hoeven.senate.gov/news/news-releases/hoeven-cramer-air-force-provides-official-position-on-fufeng-project-in-grand-forks.

[12] See, Meghan Arbegast, Fufeng Group owes Grand Forks County more than $2,000 in taxes for first half of 2022 (Apr. 5, 2023), https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/local/fufeng-group-owes-grand-forks-county-more-than-2-000-in-taxes-for-first-half-of-2022.

[13] See Josh Meny, Senator Cramer discusses latest on Fufeng in Grand Forks (Dec. 27, 2022), https://www.kxnet.com/news/kx-conversation/senator-cramer-discusses-latest-on-fufeng-in-grand-forks/.

[14] Press Release, Senator Marco Rubio, Rubio Slams CFIUS’s Refusal to Take Action Regarding Fufeng Farmland Purchase (Dec. 14, 2022) https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/12/rubio-slams-cfius-s-refusal-to-take-action-regarding-fufeng-farmland-purchase.

[15] Jason Harward, Gov. Kristi Noem takes aim at potential Chinese land purchases in South Dakota (Dec. 13, 2022),https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/south-dakota/gov-kristi-noem-takes-aim-at-potential-chinese-land-purchases-in-south-dakota.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

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Does the “Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2023” Revive Diagnostic Claims?

On June 22, Senator Chris Coons, along with Thom Tillis introduced the “Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2023” (hereinafter “the Act”) to amend 35 USC s. 101 to clarify the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. Section 101(b) would be amended to delete “includes a new use of a known process” and insert “includes a use, application, or method of manufacture of a known or naturally occurring process.” A section (k) would be added to define the term “useful” as meaning that the invention or discovery has a “specific and practical utility” from the perspective of a POSA. So far, so good. The use of a naturally occurring process can be read to cover the use of a naturally occurring correlation, an “If A then B” claim. The recognition of the discovery of the utility of a naturally occurring correlation, which leads to a diagnostic conclusion would seem to be included in this broad language.

But now things get a bit sketchy. The Act would abolish all the current judicial, e.g. Chakrabarty, exclusions but would add a set of statutory exclusions that overlap the judicial exclusions in some places. The exclusions include “an unmodified human gene”—good-bye Myriad—and an unmodified natural material as that material exists in nature, e.g., water. This exclusion would not jeopardize diagnostic claims since a per se is not being claimed.

More troublesome, Section C of the exclusions would include a process that “occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity.” Diagnostic claims are process claims that are based on the recognition of the utility of a correlation that takes place in the body. The utility of the diagnostic claim lies solely in the recognition of the utility of the correlation. If a man has an elevated level of PSA he is at risk of developing, or may already have, prostate cancer. But isn’t the relationship between PSA levels and cancer/no cancer a process that occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity, such as sampling and measuring the level of PSA in the blood? Please read the Act and tell me why I am wrong.

© 2023 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

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Proposed Senate Bill Would Deny Deductions for NIL Contributions

On September 28, 2022, U.S. Senators Ben Cardin (D-Md.), a member of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Oversight, and John Thune (R-S.D.), ranking member of the Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, introduced the Athlete Opportunity and Taxpayer Integrity Act, which seeks to deny charitable deductions for any contribution used by the donee to compensate college athletes for the use of their name, image, or likeness (“NIL”) by reason of their status as athletes.

One entity type that is impacted by the Athlete Opportunity and Taxpayer Integrity Act are “NIL collectives” that have been established as 501(c)(3) organizations.  These types of NIL collectives have been used to allow donors to make tax deductible contributions that are then used to fund NIL opportunities for college athletes, for example, by having a college athlete provide services to a separate charity in exchange for payment from the NIL collective.  A press release from Senator Cardin noted that “[s]uch activity is inconsistent with the intended purpose of the charitable tax deduction, and it forces taxpayers to subsidize the potential recruitment of – or payment to – college athletes based on their NIL status.”

Notably, the Opportunity and Taxpayer Integrity Act would only apply to charitable deductions.  A person engaged in a trade or business would still be able to deduct payments to college athletes for the use of their name, image, or likeness if such payments qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses.

Although it is not clear at this time whether the Opportunity and Taxpayer Integrity Act will pass, it does indicate increased scrutiny over nonprofit NIL collectives and possibly other NIL arrangements.

Article By Richard T. Hewlett, Shawn A. Strand, and Jessica E. Visser of Varnum LLP

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© 2022 Varnum LLP

A Summary of Inflation Reduction Act’s Main Energy Tax Proposals

On August 7, the Senate passed the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (the “IRA”). The IRA contains a significant number of climate and energy tax proposals, many of which were previously proposed in substantially similar form by the House of Representatives in November 2021 (in the “Build Back Better Act”).

Extension and expansion of production tax credit

Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for renewable electricity production. To be eligible for the credit, a taxpayer must (i) produce electricity from renewable energy resources at certain facilities during a ten-year period beginning on the date the facility was placed in service and (ii) sell that renewable electricity to an unrelated person.[1] Under current law, the credit is not available for renewable electricity produced at facilities whose construction began after December 31, 2021.

The IRA would extend the credit for renewable electricity produced at facilities whose construction begins before January 1, 2025. The credit for electricity produced by solar power –which expired in 2016—would be reinstated, as extended by the IRA.

The IRA would also increase the credit from 1.5 to 3 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity produced.

A taxpayer would be entitled to increase its production tax credit by 500% if (i) its facility’s maximum net output is less than 1 megawatt, (ii) it meets the IRA’s prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements,[2] and (iii) the construction of its facility begins within fifty-nine days after the Secretary publishes guidance on these requirements.

In addition, the IRA would add a 10% bonus credit for a taxpayer (i) that certifies that any steel, iron, or manufactured product that is a component of its facility was produced in the United States (the “domestic content bonus credit”) or (ii) whose facility is in an energy community (the “energy community bonus credit”).[3]

Extension, expansion, and reduction of investment tax credit

Section 48(a) provides an investment tax credit for the installation of renewable energy property. The amount of the credit is equal to a certain percentage (described below) of the property’s tax basis. Under current law, the credit is limited to property whose construction began before January 1, 2024.

The IRA would extend the credit to property whose construction begins before January 1, 2025. This period would be extended to January 1, 2035 for geothermal property projects. The IRA would also allow the investment tax credit for energy storage technology, qualified biogas property, and microgrid controllers.

The IRA would reduce the base credit from 30% to 6% for qualified fuel cell property; energy property whose construction begins before January 1, 2025; qualified small wind energy property; waste energy recovery property; energy storage technology; qualified biogas property; microgrid controllers; and qualified facilities that a taxpayer elects to treat as energy property. For all other types of energy property, the base credit would be reduced from 10% to 2%.

A taxpayer would be entitled to increase this base credit by 500% (for a total investment tax credit of 30%) if (i) its facility’s maximum net output is less than 1 megawatt of electrical or thermal energy, (ii) it meets the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, and (iii) its facility begins construction within fifty-nine days after the Secretary publishes guidance on these requirements.

In addition, a taxpayer would be entitled to a 10% domestic content bonus credit and 10% energy community bonus credit (subject to the same requirements as for bonus credits under section 45). The IRA would also add a (i) 10% bonus credit for projects undertaken in a facility with a maximum net output of 5 megawatts and is located in low-income communities or on Indian land, and (ii) 20% bonus credit if the facility is part of a qualified low-income building project or qualified low-income benefit project.

Section 45Q (Carbon Oxide Sequestration Credit)

Section 45Q provides a tax credit for each metric ton of qualified carbon oxide (“QCO”) captured using carbon capture equipment and either disposed of in secure geological storage or used as a tertiary injection in certain oil or natural gas recovery projects.  While eligibility for the section 45Q credit under current law requires that projects begin construction before January 1, 2026, the IRA would extend credit eligibility to those carbon sequestration projects that commence construction before January 1, 2033.

The IRA would increase the amount of tax credits for projects that meet certain wage and apprenticeship requirements. Specifically, the IRA would increase the amount of section 45Q credits for industrial facilities and power plants to $85/metric ton for QCO stored in geologic formations, $60/metric ton for the use of captured carbon emissions, and $60/metric ton for QCO stored in oil and gas fields.  With respect to direct air capture projects, the IRA would increase the credit to $180/metric ton for projects that store captured QCO in secure geologic formations, $130/metric ton for carbon utilization, and $130/metric ton for QCO stored in oil and gas fields.  The proposed changes in the amount of the credit would apply to facilities or equipment placed in service after December 31, 2022.

The IRA also would decrease the minimum annual QCO capture requirements for credit eligibility to 1,000 metric tons (from 100,000 metric tons) for direct air capture facilities, 18,750 metric tons (from 500,000 metric tons) of QCO for an electricity generating facility that has a minimum design capture capacity of 75% of “baseline carbon oxide” and 12,500 metric tons (from 100,000 metric tons) for all other facilities.  These changes to the minimum capture requirements would apply to facilities or equipment that begin construction after the date of enactment.

Introduction of zero-emission nuclear power production credit

The IRA would introduce, as new section 45U, a credit for zero-emission nuclear power production.

The credit for a taxable year would be the amount by which 3 cents multiplied by the kilowatt hours of electricity produced by a taxpayer at a qualified nuclear power facility and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the taxable year exceeds the “reduction amount” for that taxable year.[4]

In addition, a taxpayer would be entitled to increase this base credit by 500% if it meets the prevailing wage requirements.

New section 45U would not apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2032.

Biodiesel, Alternative Fuels, and Aviation Fuel Credit

The IRA would extend the existing tax credit for biodiesel and renewable diesel at $1.00/gallon and the existing tax credit for alternative fuels at $.50/gallon through the end of 2024.  Additionally, the IRA would create a new tax credit for sustainable aviation fuel of between $1.25/gallon and $1.75/gallon.  Eligibility for the aviation fuel credit would depend on whether the aviation fuel reduces lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50%, which corresponds to a $1.25/gallon credit (with an additional $0.01/gallon for each percentage point above the 50% reduction, resulting in a maximum possible credit of $1.75/gallon). This credit would apply to sales or uses of qualified aviation fuel before the end of 2024.

Introduction of clean hydrogen credit

The IRA would introduce, as new section 45V, a clean hydrogen production tax credit. To be eligible, a taxpayer must produce the clean hydrogen after December 31, 2022 in facilities whose construction begins before January 1, 2033.

The credit for the taxable year would be equal to the kilograms of qualified clean hydrogen produced by the taxpayer during the taxable year at a qualified clean hydrogen production facility during the ten-year period beginning on the date the facility was originally placed in service, multiplied by the “applicable amount” with respect to such hydrogen.[5]

The “applicable amount” is equal to the “applicable percentage” of $0.60. The “applicable percentage” is equal to:

  • 20% for qualified clean hydrogen produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate between 2.5 and 4 kilograms of CO₂e per kilogram of hydrogen;

  • 25% for qualified clean hydrogen produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate between 1.5 and 2.5 kilograms of CO₂e per kilogram of hydrogen;

  • 4% for qualified clean hydrogen produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate between 0.45 and 1.5 kilograms of CO₂e per kilogram of hydrogen; and

  • 100% for qualified clean hydrogen produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate of less than 0.45 kilograms of CO₂e per kilogram of hydrogen.

A taxpayer would be entitled to increase this base credit by 500% if (i) it meets the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements or (ii) it meets the prevailing wage requirements, and its facility begins construction within fifty-nine days after the Secretary publishes guidance on the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements.

FOOTNOTES

[1] All references to section are to the Internal Revenue Code.

[2] The IRA would require new prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements to be satisfied in order for a taxpayer to be eligible for increased credits. To satisfy the prevailing wage requirements, a taxpayer would be required to ensure that any laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors to construct, alter or repair the taxpayer’s facility are paid at least prevailing local wages with respect to those activities. To satisfy the apprenticeship requirements, “qualified apprentices” would be required to construct a certain percentage of the taxpayer’s facilities (10% for facilities whose construction begins before January 1, 2023 and 15% for facilities whose construction begins on January 1, 2024 or after). A “qualified apprentice” is a person employed by a contractor or subcontractor to work on a taxpayer’s facilities and is participating in a registered apprenticeship program.

[3] An “energy community” is a brownfield site; an area which has (or had at any time after December 31, 1999) significant employment related to the extraction, processing, transport, or storage of coal, oil, or natural gas; and a census tract in which a coal mine closed or was retired after December 31, 1999 (or an adjoining census tract).

[4] A “qualified nuclear power facility” is any nuclear facility that is owned by the taxpayer, that uses nuclear energy to produce electricity, that is not an “advanced nuclear power facility” as described in section 45J(d)(1),  and is placed in service before the date that new section 45U is enacted.

“Reduction amount” is, for any taxable year, the amount equal to (x) the lesser of (i) the product of 3 cents multiplied by the kilowatt hours of electricity produced by a taxpayer at a qualified nuclear power facility and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the taxable year and (ii) the amount equal to 80% of the excess of the gross receipts from any electricity produced by the facility (excluding an advanced nuclear power facility) and sold to an unrelated person during the taxable year; (y) over the amount equal to the product of 2.5 cents multiplied by the kilowatt hours of electricity produced by the taxpayer at a qualified nuclear power facility and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the taxable year.

[5] “Qualified clean hydrogen” is hydrogen that is produced (i) through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate of no more than 4 kilograms of CO₂e per kilogram of hydrogen, (ii) in the United States, (iii) in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business, (iv) for sale or use, and (v) whose production and sale or use is verified by an unrelated party. The IRA does not explain what “verified by an unrelated party” means.

Article By David S Miller, Amanda H Nussbaum, Martin T Hamilton, J. Tyler Moser, and Rita N. Halabi of Proskauer Rose LLP

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© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

U.S. House and Senate Reach Agreement on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

On December 14, 2021, lawmakers in the House and Senate announced that they had reached an agreement on compromise language for a bill known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or “UFLPA.”  Different versions of this measure passed the House and the Senate earlier this year, but lawmakers and Congressional staff have been working to reconcile the parallel proposals. The compromise language paves the way for Congress to pass the bill and send it to President Biden’s desk as soon as this week.

The bill would establish a rebuttable presumption that all goods originating from China’s Xinjiang region violate existing US law prohibiting the importation of goods made with forced labor. The rebuttable presumption would go into effect 180 days after enactment.  The compromise bill would also require federal officials to solicit public comments and hold a public hearing to aid in developing a strategy for the enforcement of the import ban vis-à-vis goods alleged to have been made through forced labor in China.

This rebuttable presumption will present significant challenges to businesses with supply chains that might touch the Xinjiang region.  Many businesses do not have full visibility into their supply chains and will need to act quickly to map their suppliers and respond to identified risks.  Importers must present detailed documentaton in order to release any shipments that they think were improperly detained, a costly and time-consuming endeavor.  Notably, the public comment and hearing processes will guide the government’s enforcement strategy, providing business stakeholders an opportunity to contribute to an enforcement process that could have implications for implementation of the import ban more broadly.

China’s Xinjiang region is a part of several critical supply chains, lead among them global cotton and apparel trade, as well as solar module production.  According to the Peterson Institute:

Xinjiang accounts for nearly 20 percent of global cotton production, with annual production greater than that of the entire United States. Its position in refined polysilicon—the material from which solar panels are built—is even more dominant, accounting for nearly half of global production. Virtually all silicon-based solar panels are likely to contain some Xinjiang-sourced silicon, according to Jenny Chase, head of solar analysis at Bloomberg New Energy Finance. If signed into law, the bill will send apparel producers and the US solar industry scrambling to find alternative sources of supply and prices are bound to increase.

Article By Ludmilla L. Kasulke and Rory Murphy of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more legal news and legislation updates, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2021 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Senate Bill Would Amend FIFRA to Prohibit Dangerous Pesticides and Cancel Registrations of Organophosphates, Neonicotinoids, and Paraquat

On November 23, 2021, Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) announced his intention to reintroduce the Protect America’s Children from Toxic Pesticides Act of 2021, that would amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) “to [protect fully] the safety of children and the environment, to remove dangerous pesticides from use, and for other purposes.” Similar legislation was introduced in the House (H.R. 7940) and Senate (S. 4406) in 2020, but the bills did not move out of committee.

Ending Indefinite Delays on Review of Dangerous Pesticides

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 2 to add a provision regarding registration review determination, defined as “the final decision to renew the registration of a pesticide product or active ingredient to authorize the use of the pesticide product or active ingredient” for an additional 15-year period from the date of the previous registration, reregistration, or registration review determination and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Registration review determinations would not include any intermediate determination regarding the continued use of pesticide product or active ingredient.

The bill would allow an interested person to petition the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to designate an active ingredient or pesticide product as a dangerous pesticide, which would be defined as an active ingredient or pesticide product that may:

  • Be carcinogenic;
  • Be acutely toxic;
  • Be an endocrine disruptor;
  • Cause harm to a pregnant woman or a fetus; or
  • Cause neurological or developmental harm.

EPA would have 90 days after receiving the petition to make a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific information indicating that the designation of the petitioned active ingredient or pesticide product as a dangerous pesticide may be warranted. If EPA fails to make a finding, the active ingredient or pesticide product would be deemed to be a dangerous pesticide. In making its finding, EPA “shall fully consider all relevant evidence,” including epidemiological studies or data; peer-reviewed literature; and data generated by a federal or state agency or an agency of a foreign government.

If EPA issues a finding that an active ingredient or pesticide product may warrant designation as a dangerous pesticide, the registration would be suspended immediately and remain suspended until EPA makes a registration review determination. The continued sale and use of existing stocks of a suspended active ingredient or pesticide product would be prohibited. If EPA fails to suspend the registration of an active ingredient or pesticide product that may warrant designation as a dangerous pesticide by no later than 60 days after any deadline described in this subsection, the registration of the active ingredient or pesticide product would be “immediately and permanently canceled” and the sale of existing stocks would be prohibited.

Emergency Review of Other Pesticides Banned in Other Nations

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 6 to require EPA to suspend immediately the registration of any active ingredient or pesticide product that is banned or otherwise prohibited from entering the market by the European Union (EU), one or more EU member states, or Canada. EPA would then complete an expedited review of the justification and rationale for the ban. Unless EPA determines that the decision was “clearly erroneous,” the suspended registration would be canceled not later than two years after the date of completion of the review. EPA “shall fully consider all relevant evidence,” including epidemiological studies or data; peer-reviewed literature; and data generated by a federal or state agency or an agency of a foreign government. In determining whether the ban was “clearly erroneous,” EPA would be prohibited from considering “any economic analysis of the benefits or costs of continuing to register the pesticide.” Before making a final determination, EPA would provide the draft determination for a comment period of not less than 90 days.

Ensuring Accountability in Conditional Registrations

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 3(c)(7) to provide registrants only two years to meet the terms and requirements of conditional registration. If a registrant fails to comply with the conditions by the earlier of the deadlines established by EPA or two years after the effective date of the conditional registration, EPA would cancel the conditional registration. Conditional registrations outstanding at the time the bill is enacted for which the registrant has not met the conditions would be canceled. The continued sale and use of existing stocks of a pesticide for which the conditional registration has been canceled would be prohibited.

Prohibition on the Sale or Use of Existing Stocks of Suspended or Canceled Pesticides

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 6(a) to prohibit the sale or use of existing stocks of a pesticide for which the registration is suspended or canceled, or vacated or set aside by judicial decree.

Amending Emergency Exemption Provisions

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 18 to limit emergency exemptions for the same active ingredient or pesticide product in the same location to two years in any ten-year period. EPA would no longer grant emergency exemptions to use an active ingredient or pesticide product that is not registered for any use or that is registered conditionally.

Adding Transparency for Inert Ingredients

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 2(n) to require that the ingredient statement include:

  • The name and percentage of each active ingredient in the pesticide product;
  • The name and percentage of each inert ingredient in the pesticide product;
  • If applicable, a statement that the pesticide product contains an inert ingredient determined by a state or federal agency, or the Administrator based on epidemiological data or peer-reviewed literature, to be likely:
    • To be carcinogenic;
    • To be an endocrine disruptor;
    • To be acutely toxic;
    • To cause harm to pregnant women or fetuses; or
    • To cause neurological or developmental harm.

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 3(c)(9) so that any required label or labeling must provide a complete list of inert ingredients.

Cancellation of Registration of Organophosphates

On the date of enactment, the bill would deem all organophosphate pesticides “to generally cause unreasonable adverse effects to humans,” and the registration of all uses of organophosphate pesticides would be “immediately and permanently canceled by operation of law and without further proceedings.” Tolerances and exemptions that allow the presence of an organophosphate or any pesticide chemical residue that results from organophosphate use in or on food would be revoked within six months of the date of enactment. The continued sale or use of existing stocks of organophosphate pesticides would be prohibited on the date of enactment. The bill would not allow any future organophosphate registrations and organophosphate pesticides would be ineligible for emergency use.

Cancellation of Registration of Neonicotinoids

On the date of enactment, the bill would deem all active ingredients and pesticide products containing one or more of the active ingredients imidacloprid, clothianidin, thiamethoxam, dinotefuran, acetamiprid, sulfoxaflor, and flupyradifurone (neonicotinoid pesticides) “to generally cause unreasonable adverse effects to the environment,” and the registration of all uses of neonicotinoid pesticides would be “immediately and permanently canceled by operation of law and without further proceedings.” Tolerances and exemptions that allow the presence of a neonicotinoid pesticide or any pesticide chemical residue that results from neonicotinoid pesticide use in or on food would be revoked within six months of the date of enactment. The continued sale or use of existing stocks of neonicotinoid pesticides would be prohibited on the date of enactment. The bill would not allow any future neonicotinoid registrations and neonicotinoid pesticides would be ineligible for emergency use.

Cancellation of Registration of Paraquat

On the date of enactment, the bill would deem paraquat “to generally cause unreasonable adverse effects to humans,” and the registration of all uses of paraquat would be “immediately and permanently canceled by operation of law and without further proceedings.” Tolerances and exemptions that allow the presence of paraquat or any pesticide chemical residue that results from paraquat use in or on food would be revoked within six months of the date of enactment. The continued sale or use of existing stocks of paraquat would be prohibited on the date of enactment. The bill would not allow any future paraquat registrations and paraquat would be ineligible for emergency use.

Empowering Communities to Protect Themselves from Pesticides

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 24 to extend the authority of a state to regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device to “any political subdivision of a State.”

Protecting Farmworkers from Dangerous Pesticides

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 3(c)(9) to require that labels be printed in both English and Spanish. If a pesticide product is known to be used in agriculture by more than 500 individual persons or applicators who speak the same language other than English or Spanish, EPA will provide a translation of the label in that language on its website. The bill would amend FIFRA to include a section concerning farmworker safety. Employers of farmworkers would be required to report to EPA farmworker incidents, defined as exposure of a farmworker to an active ingredient, a pesticide product, a tank mixture of multiple pesticides, a metabolite, or a degradate that results in:

  • An illness or injury:
    • Requiring medical attention or hospitalization of the farmworker; or
    • That requires the farmworker to stop working temporarily or permanently;
  • A permanent disability or loss in function of the farmworker; or
  • Death of the farmworker.

The bill would require EPA to implement an online system to facilitate the reporting of farmworker incidents within 60 days of the bill’s enactment. The online system must allow for anonymous reporting to protect farmworkers from retaliation. Employers that fail to report a farmworker incident would be fined $1,000 per day beginning on the eighth day after the farmworker incident occurs. Employers that knowingly fail to report or that pressure or coerce a farmworker not to report would be liable for a criminal penalty of up to $100,000, six months in prison, or both. The bill calls for EPA to implement a reward system that provides a monetary award of not less than $25,000 per person per farmworker incident that leads to the identification of one or more employers that have failed to report a farmworker incident.

Within 15 days of receiving a report of a farmworker incident, EPA would transmit a report of the incident to the manufacturer of each involved pesticide product and the manufacturer of each involved active ingredient or ingredients. If a farmworker incident results in the death of a farmworker, the pesticide product or active ingredient that caused the death would be immediately suspended, pending a review. Pesticide product manufacturers who receive a farmworker incident report would have 60 days to provide EPA an assessment of the incident, including whether any changes to the label of the pesticide product or active ingredient are warranted at the time of the assessment to avoid future farmworker incidents. Active ingredient manufacturers who receive a report of a farmworker incident would have 60 days to provide to EPA an assessment of the farmworker incident, including whether any changes to the pesticide product or active ingredient are warranted at the time of the assessment to avoid future farmworker incidents.

No later than the earlier of 90 days after receiving an assessment from a pesticide product or active ingredient manufacturer or 180 days after the occurrence of the farmworker incident, EPA will make a draft determination as to whether a change in the label of an involved pesticide product is warranted. EPA will publish its draft determination in the Federal Register for a 30-day comment period. No later than 30 days after the close of the public comment period, EPA will make a final determination as to whether the label should be changed and publish its decision in the Federal Register.

If EPA makes a final determination that the label of the applicable product must be changed and the manufacturer of the pesticide product or active ingredient fails to do so, the pesticide product or active ingredient “shall be immediately and permanently canceled by operation of law and without further proceedings.” If a pesticide product or active ingredient is responsible for ten or more farmworker incidents of any type, or three or more incidents resulting in death, and the pesticide product or active ingredient has not received a final determination regarding a registration review during the preceding 15-year period, EPA will “immediately suspend the pesticide product or active ingredient until a final determination is made regarding the registration review of the pesticide.”

Authority to Bring Civil Action

The bill would amend FIFRA Section 16 to allow any person to bring a civil action where there is an alleged failure of EPA to comply with any of its provisions. The U.S. District Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions.

Employee Protection

The bill would amend FIFRA to add a section regarding employee protection. Employers would be prohibited from discharging or discriminating against an employee because the employee has commenced or is about to commence a proceeding under the Act, has testified in a proceeding, or has assisted or participated in a proceeding. Employees would have 30 days from the date of the alleged violation to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary would have 30 days to conduct an investigation.

Commentary

This bill is unlikely to become law any time soon. This legislation, or anything like it in terms of its presumption that pesticides approved by EPA under current law are fundamentally flawed, would present a radical change to current EPA authority and procedures. Advocates of such change believe otherwise, and point to the fact that FIFRA has not been amended for 25 years. Whether this is sufficient to garner broad support of national environmental and consumer advocacy groups is unclear. Assuming it gains the support of at least a handful of Democrats in the Senate, along with a likely House companion bill, this legislation lays the groundwork for advocating eventual changes to FIFRA. This approach takes a page from the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) reform playbook. Certain Members of Congress and TSCA stakeholders established policy positions for reform five or more years before reauthorization occurred. Similar to TSCA, the legislation is premised on the view that FIFRA is fundamentally flawed, a widely held view with TSCA reform. This view is not widely shared with regard to FIFRA, however. Critics of this proposed legislation will argue that EPA has been effective at implementing FIFRA driven by the requirements of the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act amendments, following a rigorous scientific process with various required safety factors to determine that pesticides used on food meet a “reasonable certainty of no harm” standard. In that view, this bill may be a solution in search of a problem. If this legislation is indeed used as a starting point for reform, there will be many more years before any common ground is found — and common ground likely will be essential for any kind of meaningful FIFRA “modernization.”

©2021 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.
Article by Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.‘s Government Regulation practice group.
For more articles about toxic substance legislation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food & Drug section.

Bipartisan Group of Senators Asks Trump to Explain Reasoning for Firing IC Watchdog

Yesterday, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) and a bipartisan group of senators sent a letter to President Trump asking for more details regarding the firing of Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Michael Atkinson. Atkinson was responsible for alerting Congress to the whistleblower complaint that led to Trump’s impeachment.

Grassley, who serves as chairman of the Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus, argued that Trump provided insignificant reasons for firing the government watchdog.

“Congressional intent is clear that an expression of lost confidence, without further explanation, is not sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the statute. This is in large part because Congress intended that inspectors general only be removed when there is clear evidence of wrongdoing or failure to perform the duties of the office, and not for reasons unrelated to their performance, to help preserve IG independence.”

Trump announced the termination of Atkinson on Friday, citing a lack of “confidence in the appointees serving as inspectors general.” In remarks the following day, Trump defended the decision stating, Atkinson “did a terrible job, absolutely terrible.” He also said Atkinson “took a fake report and gave it to Congress.”

The Senators stressed that “all inspectors general (IG) are designed to fulfill a dual role, reporting to both the President and Congress, to secure efficient, robust, and independent agency oversight.”

The Senators allege that the administration by-passed Congress’s “opportunity for an appropriate dialogue” “by placing the IG on 30 days of administrative leave and naming an acting replacement.”

The Senators ask that President Trump provide a detailed explanation of the removal of Inspector General Atkinson no later than April 13, 2020. And to also explain appointing an acting official before the end of the 30-day notice period comports with statutory requirements.

The day after his termination was made public, Atkinson described how he “faithfully discharged” his duties as “an independent and impartial Inspector General” in a statement encouraging other government whistleblowers to speak up.

Seven other senators signed the letter.

Read the Senator’s letter to President Trump.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.
ARTICLE BY Mary Jane Wilmoth of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto

Ben Kostyack also contributed to this article.

The Impeachment Process: Politics, Procedure and Next Steps

The US House of Representatives is set to vote this week on impeaching President Donald Trump, and the impeachment vote is expected to pass.  This will set the stage for the next step in the impeachment process;  the third-ever Senate impeachment trial.

We thought this would be a good time to recap the steps in the impeachment process to better understand, procedurally, how the impeachment case against President Trump reached this point, and what is expected next.  Also, we wanted to dig into some of the issues which have been brought up as problematic by the Republican minority in the House related to the impeachment process and the structure of the House hearings.

Jeffrey S. Robbins, a litigation partner at the Boston offices of Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, served as Chief Counsel for the Minority (the Democrats) for the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and Deputy Chief Counsel for the Minority for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee during its 1997 investigation into allegations of fundraising improprieties by the Clinton-Gore Administration during the 1996 presidential campaign.  Mr. Robbins was kind enough to share his expertise on past congressional investigations to help sort through some of the procedural issues raised and help us understand if the process, so far, has proceeded in a usual manner.

NLR: Impeachment is a three-step process, beginning with an investigation in the house and then a vote on articles of impeachment, then a trial in the Senate. What kind of evidence is the House looking for during the investigation stage prior to voting on articles of impeachment?

Robbins: The House committees are looking for the strongest quantum of evidence possible that the President engaged in conduct which amounts to an identifiable “crime,” since a conservative reading of the Constitution holds that some form of crime, at least, is necessary for impeachment.

House Republicans have complained about the limited access to closed-door House impeachment investigation and depositions leading up to the House’s impeachment vote should all be public and the transcripts should be released. Access to the House’s investigative hearings has been limited to members of the three House committees involved– Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Oversight, and Reform which have a majority of Democratic House Members but Republican committee members can participate in the investigation and question the parties being deposed. Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, D-Calif., said private sessions are needed to prevent witnesses from hearing each other, the same protocol used by prosecutors in criminal investigations.  House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., called Schiff a liar and a partisan leading a witch hunt and that the venerable Intelligence Committee has become the partisan Impeachment Committee.

NLR: How much of the House’s investigation needs to be in the form of public hearings?

Robbins: There is no Constitutional requirement that impeachment hearings be public or private, but as a practical and a political matter, it is obvious that impeachment hearings need to be conducted in public; after all, building public support for impeachment is a sine qua non (an essential condition) of a vote to impeach, let alone a vote to convict. On the other hand, there is nothing remotely nefarious about what the Minority refers to as “closed door” depositions; Congressional investigations routinely utilize depositions, by definition closed to the public, as a device to ascertain which witnesses have relevant evidence and what that relevant evidence is, in order to assess the strength of a “case” and to more effectively organize any public hearings associated with the investigation.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff said private sessions are needed to prevent witnesses from hearing each other. House and Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy said “I can’t even go down there and read the transcript,” alleging that Republicans have not been allowed to cross-examine the hearing witnesses, which is not accurate.

The reality is that Republicans have participated in each deposition, but their role is limited by the Democratic committee majority. Both Republicans and the Democrats get equal time to ask questions.  Forty-seven Republicans from the Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and Oversight Committees have been allowed to attend and participate in the depositions.

NLR: What actually goes on in Congressional hearings? What is the timeline between the hearings and the public testimony?

Robbins: From personal experience, I can tell you that the preparation to question witnesses in a Congressional investigation is an intense process, made all the more intense by the volume of material that has to be consumed in order to question effectively and by the shortage of time within which to consume it. Here, for example, there is a steady drumbeat of witnesses being called for deposition on only a few days’ notice to all concerned, and then only a week or so between the deposition and the public hearing. The process is made more intense by the fact that there are other staff lawyers, and Members, and communications experts, all of whom quite properly want to weigh in on the thrust of the questioning, the messaging of the questioning, and the like.

In the hearings, according to the Wall Street Journal, Adam Schiff opens with remarks and then invites a Republican counterpart to do the same.  Each party receives a block of time to ask questions, and a timekeeper keeps track and moves the proceedings along.  Rep. Mark Meadows (R., N.C.), told the Wall Street Journal that each party gets equal time.  “There is a clock, with a timekeeper,” he said.  Other Republicans, including Reps. Jim Jordan of Ohio and Scott Perry of Pennsylvania have been attending the hearings regularly.  Besides Mr. Schiff, Reps. Jamie Raskin of Maryland, Sean Patrick Maloney of New York, Eric Swalwell of California and Gerry Connolly of Virginia have been attending for the Democrats.  Eventually, the committee voted down party lines to advance the impeachment proceedings.

Complicating the evidence-gathering process is the lack of cooperation from the White House, including Trump administration officials defying subpoenas.  Per Adam Schiff, the White House isn’t cooperating and is defying several subpoenas, which Schiff predicted would be considered obstruction and additional evidence “of the wrongfulness of the President’s underlying misconduct.”  When the House Leadership unveiled the articles of impeachment on December 10, 2019, they first focused on the Trump’s pressuring of Ukraine to investigate Joe Biden before the 2020 election by delaying a White House meeting and $400 million in US Security Aid, but the second focused on the obstruction related to the investigation into his misconduct.

NLR: What are the consequences if a witness refuses to testify at a hearing, or otherwise ignores a subpoena? 

Robbins: Under law, there are to be consequences to refusal to testify or disobedience of a subpoena to produce documents, in particular, contempt findings that are appropriately enforced by federal courts.

Mr. Schiff, accused by House minority Whip Steve Scalise of “…trying to impeach a president of the United States… behind closed doors,” pointed out that the president’s former attorney, Michael Cohen, pled guilty to lying to Congress out of loyalty to the president, and was recently sentenced to three years in prison as a result. Still, the White House has consistently refused to cooperate with the inquiry, citing executive privilege as justification to keep those subpoenaed from actually appearing under oath. Citing executive privilege is a not-uncommon tactic to prevent disclosure of goings-on at the top end of the executive branch, but it doesn’t always work well for those using it, and the privilege itself remains a cloudy legal concept.

NLR: What privileges, if any, can a witness assert?

Robbins: With respect to privileges, there are, of course, the “Big Three”: the attorney-client privilege, the Executive Privilege, and the Fifth Amendment. When those privileges are invoked, as a practical matter they are beyond being challenged, except in extreme circumstances, and for the purpose of this impeachment proceeding, where the time constraints are what they are, if they are invoked their invocation will effectively block disclosure of evidence.

There have been many examples of witnesses invoking their Fifth Amendment rights to avoid answering questions in Congressional hearings.  One prominent example is the case of Lt. Colonel Oliver North in the hearings around the Iran-Contra affair during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

NLR: If the House votes to ratify the articles of impeachment, the Senate will hold a trial.  Who acts as a prosecutor in this instance, and who acts for the defense?  How is that determined?

Robbins: Since the House is the indicting authority, it will choose who presents the case for removal to the Senate. It will in all likelihood be one or more members of the House.

By way of reference, for President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment trial in 1868, an impeachment committee was made up of seven members of Congress, led by Thaddeus Stevens.  President Bill Clinton’s impeachment featured a team of thirteen House Republicans from the Judiciary Committee.

NLR: Why does the Supreme Court get involved in impeachment proceedings, and what is their role?

Robbins: As for the role of the Supreme Court, it is the Chief Justice who presides over the trial, per the Constitution, and it is he who will be involved in those proceedings, and not the full Court—at least this has not occurred in our limited experience with impeachment.

While it may seem plain that the Supreme Court would have a larger role in the impeachment proceedings, that’s not truly the case. The chief justice is, of course, given the power to preside of the Senate trial by the Constitution as a part of the doctrine of separation of powers – as Justice Joseph Story argued – removing the Vice President from Senate leadership to uphold the trial’s impartiality. Should there be a conviction in the Senate, and the convicted president were to try and engage the highest court, SCOTUS has already found that the Senate’s impeachment procedures are nonjusticiable, because of Article I’s designation of the Senate as the “sole power to try all impeachments” (Nixon v United States, 1993).

Many thanks to Mr. Robbins for his time and for helping break down these complex issues during a complicated time.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

Senate Approves Nominations of Three Key Environmental Posts

In the last hours of the 115th Congress, the Senate on January 2, 2019, approved the nominations of three individuals to serve in key environmental posts:

Alexandra Dapolito Dunn — EPA Toxics Office:  The Senate approved the nomination of Alexandra Dunn to serve as the Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention (OCSPP).  Ms. Dunn had been serving as the administrator for EPA Region 1.  She previously was executive director and general counsel for the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS).  Prior to joining ECOS, Ms. Dunn served as executive director and general counsel for the Association of Clean Water Administrators.  Ms. Dunn also has extensive experience in environmental education, having served as dean of Environmental Law Programs at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.  In addition, she has taught at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, and, most recently, as an adjunct associate professor of law at the American University’s Washington College of Law.  Ms. Dunn received a B.A. in political science from James Madison University and a J.D. from the Columbus School of Law.  More information on Ms. Dunn’s confirmation hearing is available in our blog item Senate EPW Committee Holds Hearing on Nomination of Alexandra Dunn to Lead OCSPP.

Mary Neumayr — CEQ: The Senate also approved the nomination of Mary Neumayr to head the White House’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).  Ms. Neumayr currently serves as chief of staff for the CEQ.  Prior to joining CEQ in March of 2017, she served in a variety of positions with the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the U.S. House of Representatives, including Deputy Chief Counsel, energy and environment in 2017; Senior Energy Counsel from 2011 to 2017; and Counsel from 2009 to 2010.  Ms. Neumayr also served as Deputy Counsel for environment and nuclear programs at the U.S. Department of Energy from 2006 to 2009, and Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the environment and natural resources division at the U.S. Department of Justice from 2003 to 2006.  Prior to her government service, Ms. Neumayr was in private legal practice from 1989 to 2003.  She received her B.A. from Thomas Aquinas College and her J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

Kelvin Droegemeier — OSTP:  Finally, the Senate also approved Kelvin Droegemeier to serve as the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).  A meteorologist from the University of Oklahoma, Mr. Droegemeier previously served as Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin’s secretary of science and technology.  He was also previously on the National Science Board for 12 years during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

©2018 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.