SEC Ramps Up Enforcement against Public Companies and Subsidiaries in FY 2022

The SEC imposed $2.8 billion in monetary settlements, the largest total in any fiscal year recorded in the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database.

New YorkThe U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 68 enforcement actions against public companies and subsidiaries in the first full fiscal year of Chair Gary Gensler’s tenure. Monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary actions reached $2.8 billion, according to a report released today by the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business and Cornerstone Research.

The report, SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries—Fiscal Year 2022 Update, analyzes information from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). The 68 enforcement actions in FY 2022, which ended September 30, reflected a 28% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The SEC imposed monetary settlements on 97% of the 75 public company and subsidiary defendants that settled in FY 2022. Both the dollar amount and the percentage were the largest of any fiscal year recorded in SEED, which covers actions beginning in FY 2010.

“The number of defendants that settled in FY 2022 with admissions of guilt increased substantially from the previous fiscal year. This was driven by actions involving Broker Dealer allegations brought by the SEC in September,” said Stephen Choi, the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University School of Law and director of the Pollack Center for Law & Business. “The 16 defendants admitting guilt was double the largest number in any previous fiscal year in SEED.”

The $2.8 billion in monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary enforcement actions in FY 2022 was $921 million more than in FY 2021 and $321 million more than in any other fiscal year in SEED. The median monetary settlement in FY 2022 was $9 million, the largest in SEED. The average settlement was $42 million.

“The increase in monetary settlements is consistent with the SEC’s public statements that ‘robust remedies’ are an enforcement priority,” said report coauthor Sara Gilley, a Cornerstone Research vice president. “The $1.2 billion in monetary settlements with 16 public broker-dealer subsidiaries for recordkeeping failures represents 44% of total monetary settlements in the fiscal year.”

Issuer Reporting and Disclosure continued to be the most common allegation type in FY 2022, accounting for 38% of actions. Allegations in the SEC’s Broker Dealer classification were the second most common for the first time since FY 2018. Nearly 70% of the 16 Broker Dealer actions were filed against financial institutions for recordkeeping failures.

Click here to read the full report from Cornerstone Research.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

Not Ship Shape: SEC Sues Retired Chief Petty Officer for Fraudulent Offerings to Navy-Related Victims

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (“OIEA”), which dates from last century, is concerned with explaining aspects of the capital markets for “Main Street” investors and warning them against potential risks and fraud schemes. On Sept. 25, 2017, the Commission announced the formation of the Retail Strategy Task Force (“RSTF”) in its Division of Enforcement. Its purpose is to consider and implement “strategies to address misconduct that victimizes retail investors,” according to the SEC Press Release issued that day. A primary focus area of the OIEA and RSTF is so-called “affinity investments,” i.e., investment offerings aimed at groups such as churches, ethnic communities, college alumni groups, etc.

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022, the SEC filed suit in the Federal Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against Robert F. Murray, 42, a retired U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer residing in North Canton, Ohio, for conducting an unregistered offering of securities in Deep Dive Strategies, LLC, an Ohio private pooled investment fund (the “Fund”). Murray controlled the Fund and acted as investment adviser, telling investors the fund would invest in publicly traded securities. Murray marketed the offering through a Facebook group “with over 3500 active duty, reservists and veterans of the U.S. Navy who shared an interest in investing,” according to the Complaint. Most certainly an “affinity” group. Murray also created “a channel on the Discord social media platform where he live-streamed his trading activity and posted trading advice with a focus on options.”

The Fund was organized in September 2020 and solicited investors through February 2021. Although Murray told investors they could change their minds within 15 days and get their money back, in fact he “almost immediately began spending Fund money on personal expenses.” He transferred monies to his personal checking account and even withdrew cash from the Fund, so by February 2021, $148,000, or approximately 42% of the $355,000 invested by the unsuspecting “Goats” (a nickname for the Navy affinity group), had been “misappropriated” (i.e., stolen) by Murray. By March 2021 he had ceased regular communication with the Goats and failed to respond to requests to redeem “invested” dollars. Some of that misappropriated money was lost gambling at casinos in Cleveland and elsewhere in the Midwest.

Murray provided potential investors with both a Disclosure Statement and a copy of the Fund’s Operating Agreement, and the Complaint identifies several material misstatements and omissions in the two documents. In addition, Murray made oral material misstatements and omitted material information when speaking with potential and actual investors. In fact, Murray lost most of the Fund’s brokerage account on Jan. 13, 2021, when GameStop options purchased in the account saw their value plummet. In that connection see my Feb. 2, 2021, Blog “Rupture Rapture: Should the GameStop?” When the SEC began investigating Murray and the Fund, he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and declined to answer questions.

In the Complaint, the Commission charges Murray with seven different securities law violations, each set out in a separate Count as follows:

  1. Violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder by using devices, making untrue statements, and misleading omissions, and engaging in a business which operate as a fraud on securities purchasers.
  2. Violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “33 Act”), by offering and selling securities by means of interstate commerce using devices to defraud.  Violations of the 33 Act can be proven without the need to prove scienter (broadly, intent).
  3. Violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the 33 Act by obtaining money or property in connection with the sale of securities by means of untrue statements of material facts and making misleading omissions, engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on the purchaser, where Murray was at least negligent in engaging in these activities.
  4. Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 33 Act by selling securities without the offering being registered (or exempt from registration), and with the use of a prospectus where the offering was not registered.
  5. Violation of Section 206(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “40 Act”) by acting as an investment adviser using devices to defraud clients and prospective clients.
  6. Violation of Section 206(2) of the 40 Act by acting as an investment adviser engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on clients and prospective clients.
  7. Violation of Section 206(4) of the 40 Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder by acting as an investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle, making untrue statements of material fact and making misleading omissions and engaging in acts that are fraudulent with respect to investors in the pooled investment vehicle.

The SEC seeks entry of findings by the Court of the facts cited in the Complaint and of conclusions of law that concur with the Commission’s assertions of violations. In addition, the SEC seeks entry of a permanent injunction against future violations of the cited securities laws; an order requiring disgorgement of all Murray’s ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest; an order imposing a civil penalty of $1,065,000; and an order barring Murray from serving as an officer or director of any public company.

Murray preyed on his fellow Naval servicemen in violation of the unspoken understandings of the “Goats,” that a fellow Navy NCO would not seek to take financial advantage of them. That is why the SEC’s July 28, 2022, Press Release reporting this matter includes an express warning from the OIEA and the RSTF not to make “investment decisions based solely on common ties with someone recommending or selling the investment.” One wonders whether, if the Goats were to catch up with Murray, he would be keelhauled.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

The “Iron Curtain” has Fallen: A Radical Shift in Lawyers Representing Whistleblowers

Whistleblower Network News (WNN) recently revealed, for the first time, that major corporate law firms specializing in representing defendants before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have, in some cases, switched sides and are now representing whistleblowers who are turning in corporate fraudsters.  All but one of the firms identified by the SEC did not call public attention to their new-found client base – most likely because they did not want to upset their bread-and-butter corporate clients.  It appears that major corporate law firms now understand that the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower reward provisions are incredibly effective in incentivizing corporate insiders to report fraud, even when those insiders are executives usually on the other side of a whistleblower issue.  Lawyers who traditionally represent whistleblowers understand that Dodd-Frank is well designed and is being professionally implemented by the SEC.  Corporate lawyers and their firms have apparently caught on to this new reality and are now representing whistleblowers.

That defense firms are now actively engaged in representing whistleblowers cannot be denied.  Lists of law firms that have prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases, disclosed in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed with the SEC, document that 9.3% of firms that have obtained rewards on behalf of whistleblowers were traditional defense firms.  These firms include some of the largest defense firms in the United States that represent numerous corporations subjected to SEC enforcement actions for violating securities laws as well as firms that have defended corporations against whistleblowers in retaliation cases.

If that statistic holds, it is clear hundreds of corporate defense firms or their attorneys are representing whistleblowers in confidential investigations.  Why are these cases still under review?  Dodd-Frank is still a young law, and the vast majority of cases have not yet resulted in formal reward determinations.  Cases often take five years or more to be finalized, and as of the end of Fiscal Year 2021 over 51,000 whistleblower cases had been filed with the SEC.  Furthermore, under the FOIA requests the SEC only released the names of law firms that prevailed in a whistleblower case.  The names of firms that did not prevail in a claim, or firms that represent whistleblowers in ongoing investigations, were not disclosed.

Time will tell whether defense firms’ representation of whistleblowers who accuse their employers (or other corporate wrongdoers) of fraud is a good or bad development.  But unique issues will arise whenever a firm that primarily generates its profits from representing corporations accused of wrongdoing switches sides and represents a whistleblower who has accused an executive of engaging in fraud.  Although such representations may be permitted under the attorney’s rules of ethics, this does not mean that such representations are always in the best interest of a lawyer’s clients.  There are inherent potential conflicts whenever a defense firm switches sides and decides to represent a whistleblower reporting major corporate crimes.

Regardless of where you stand on this issue, one thing is clear: the ethical, policy and legal implications of defense firms representing whistleblowers is a dramatic shift in legal practice and must be carefully evaluated.  Defense firms must understand that whenever they represent a whistleblower, they must zealously advocate on their behalf, even when the precedents set by their cases may be used against their corporate clients.  Likewise, whistleblowers need to be aware of the implications of choosing a lawyer whose primary practice is representing corporate crooks.  Conflicts of interest may not initially be visible but can unfold as a case progresses.

The Revelation

In August of 2022, Bloomberg Law and a draft non-peer-reviewed article published by University of Kansas Professor Alexander Platt raised the issue of which law firms represent whistleblowers.  Bloomberg and Platt obtained lists of law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases.  They used the lists to identify a small number of firms, all of which could be classified as pro-whistleblower firms.  These firms’ practices are centered on fighting corporate fraud and speculated whether these firms were being given preferential treatment by the SEC. Neither publication offered proof of any wrongdoing.  But Platt and Bloomberg did not list all the law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank cases.  Significantly, neither even mentioned the fact that major defense law firms had already filed and won Dodd-Frank cases on behalf of whistleblowers.  Additionally, the two authors did not explore the special issues that could arise when firms dedicated to defending white-collar criminals quietly switch sides.

In response to Platt and Bloomberg, WNN filed its own Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain access to the documents relied upon in the two articles.  The SEC released over 1000 pages of documents to WNN, including all its correspondence with Platt and all the records provided to Platt (and Bloomberg) that identified law firms that successfully represented whistleblowers.

On September 27, 2022, WNN revealed, for the first time, that the SEC had identified 64 law firms that successfully obtained a reward on behalf of a whistleblower.  Among those firms were six that primarily represent corporations and individuals accused of corporate crimes.  These defense firms included industry giants such as Winston & Strawn and Akin Gump.  Together, the defense firms have already obtained over $56 million in rewards on behalf of whistleblowers.  In response to the Platt, Bloomberg, and WNN FOIA requests, the SEC only identified firms that had already prevailed and obtained a reward on behalf of their clients. Approximately 50,000 cases are pending within the SEC’s reward program, and there is a long delay in processing whistleblower cases.  Therefore, one can assume that numerous other pending cases where these or other defense firms are actively representing whistleblowers that were not disclosed by the SEC.

It is important to note that the Dodd-Frank provisions only apply to large fraud cases.  No reward is available unless the SEC issues sanctions against the entity being investigated in excess of $1 million.  Thus, the cases previously targeted by the defense firms and currently under investigation by the SEC would implicate major frauds.

The defense firms identified by WNN as being listed in the SEC-released materials were:

Winston & Strawn, LLP:  Winston advertises itself as defending “companies and individuals in SEC enforcement and regulatory matters related to allegations involving securities fraud.”  But not mentioned on its webpage is that it also represented a securities law whistleblower who obtained a $2.2 million reward.

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP: Akin Gump also describes its practice as representing “companies and individuals” under investigation by various regulatory agencies, including the SEC.  Akin’s attorneys obtained a Dodd-Frank reward of $800,000 award.

Haynes and Boone, LLP: This 600-lawyer defense firm’s website explained that it has “represented employers” in “whistle blowing.”  However, the SEC documents revealed the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a “20%” award against a corporate fraudster.

Levine Lee LLP:  Although this firm markets itself as successfully representing clients accused of violating anti-fraud laws, like the other defense firms, it has apparently started a whistleblower practice and obtained a reward of $10 million on behalf of a whistleblower.

Leader Berkon Colao & Silverstein LLP:  This defense firm prevailed in cases filed on behalf of two separate whistleblowers and had considerable success.  Their whistleblower clients obtained $15 million and $27 million in awards.

Sallah Astarita & Cox, LLC: Although this firm “regularly represents financial institutions” in “fraud” cases, the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a $1.8 million award.  Sallah Astarita was the only firm that listed its Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower case on its website as among the victories achieved by one of its partners.

The SEC’s Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program

Professor Platt and Bloomberg Law criticized the SEC’s Dodd-Frank program as having a bias in favor of a small number of whistleblower-rights law firms that had employed former SEC lawyers.  However, the information revealed by WNN completely refuted this negative implication raised by Platt and Bloomberg.  Instead, the FOIA documents support a finding that the SEC program is a paradigm of fairness and openness.  The extensive correspondence between Platt and the SEC demonstrates that the Commission freely disclosed the names of the firms that had won cases while carefully balancing the confidentiality needs of the whistleblower clients.  These numbers illustrate a program open to law firms regardless of their reputation or whether they employ former government lawyers.  They also reveal a program open to working directly with whistleblowers and rewarding them even if they had no lawyer.  Not one document produced provided any evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing, bias, or unprofessionalism.  The numbers speak for themselves:

  • Over 50 pro se whistleblowers won cases on their own behalf.  This high percentage of unrepresented applicants who successfully navigated the SEC’s program is remarkable.  In other legal programs, pro se whistleblowers (and other unrepresented persons) lose the vast majority of their cases.  Not so under Dodd-Frank. This demonstrates a high level of commitment by the SEC to helping individual whistleblowers who could not afford or obtain lawyers.
  • Of the 64 law firms that prevailed in a Dodd-Frank reward claim, only 12 had hired former SEC lawyers to assist in the cases.  Thus, the vast majority of successful law firms (52 of the 64) had no “insider” connection to the SEC.   This fact demonstrates the Commission’s staff’s willingness to work closely with attorneys who had no “friends” in the agency and whose information was solely merit-based. Moreover, a significant percentage of the firms that did employ former SEC or Justice Department lawyers were the very defense firms that Bloomberg Law and Platt did not discuss or analyze.
  • The Commission’s staff demonstrated no bias against firms based on their practice areas.  The Commission’s enforcement staff and Whistleblower Office worked with law firms that were defense-based (6) and law firms that traditionally represent whistleblowers or employees in lawsuits against companies (many of the remaining 58).

The FOIA documents support a finding that the Commission’s staff is open to whistleblowers, regardless of whether they represent themselves or whether or not the firms raising the concerns have any “insider” connections.   Organizations such as the National Whistleblower Center, which regularly works with whistleblowers, have widely praised the program, as have the last three Chairs of the SEC, appointed by Presidents ObamaTrump, and Biden.  The Commission itself confirmed that as of September 2021, it returned over $1.3 billion to harmed investors based on whistleblower cases.

The Future Role of Defense Firms in Dodd-Frank Cases

The SEC cannot implement special rules that would be prejudicial to traditional defense firms that file whistleblower cases.   Likewise, whistleblowers have the right to hire counsel of their choice and, in most cases, can knowingly waive potential conflicts of interest.  But the mere fact that traditional defense firms can lawfully represent whistleblowers without violating any SEC or local Bar rules does not address the special problems that may exist when a defense firm represents a whistleblower.  For example, such representations can result in significant conflicts of interest that may not be apparent at the commencement of a case. This may result in the whistleblower’s attorneys not advocating for legal precedents that could harm their other corporate clients.

Traditional defense firms should implement internal procedures to guard against potential problems based on the obvious conflicts that can arise when they represent clients on both sides of whistleblower-disclosure cases.  More significantly, it is absolutely crucial that whistleblowers fully understand the potential for conflicts of interest when deciding on the best attorneys to hire.  Attorneys working for defense firms must clearly spell out these issues and ensure that when representing a whistleblower, their prospective client is fully aware of all the risks and limitations.

Among the rules, procedures, and practices that defense firms should implement or carefully consider are:

  1. At the very least, defense firms representing whistleblowers should identify this on their websites.  Corporate clients should know that the firm also represents whistleblowers and should be able to question counsel on these matters so they feel comfortable that no conflicts would arise.
  2. Whistleblower clients need full disclosure of how the defense firm’s primary practice may impact the representation.  This is particularly true whenever a case would require advocacy on behalf of a whistleblower that could expand legal interpretations benefiting whistleblowers.  It is hard to reconcile how a law firm defending some clients against whistleblowers can effectively argue before administrative agencies or courts of law legal precedents that could expand the rights of whistleblowers.  These expanded rights could and would ultimately not be to the advantage of corporate clients accused of wrongdoing.
  3. Similarly, defense firms need to reconcile how they can advocate for a whistleblower who engaged in tactics, such as removing documents or one-party tape recording, that their corporate clients may find offensive.  This is particularly true when the zealous representation of a whistleblower requires expanding the ability of whistleblowers to obtain evidence of wrongdoing, and the precedent this advocacy establishes may be used against the firm’s current or future corporate clients.
  4. The potential for a conflict of interest needs to be fully explored in every case.  One issue that firms and clients may not be fully aware of is how the “related action” provisions of the laws impact potential conflicts.  Once the SEC obtains a sanction of over $1 million in any case, all “related actions” become eligible for a reward.  Sanctions issued by other law enforcement or regulatory agencies based on “related” claims can form the basis of a reward.   When examining whether a conflict exists, law firms need to look beyond the SEC action and determine witnesses, parties, and issues that may be implicated in a “related action.” This determination is critical even if the related action is not based on any securities law violation.
  5. Defense firms can also explore ways to refer potential whistleblower clients to attorneys whose practices are based solely on representing whistleblowers.  These referrals would help ensure that the defense firm is not conflicted (either as a matter of ethics or marketing) and that the client can obtain the best counsel.

Conclusion: The Iron Curtain has Fallen

Whistleblower representation is entering a new world.  The “iron curtain” that formerly separated law firms that represent corporate crooks from those that represent whistleblowers has fallen. This new reality is not without serious risks to whistleblowers (and corporate clients).  Whistleblowers must be fully aware of the dangers of having a corporate law firm represent them.  Corporate law firms must institute procedures to guard against conflicts of interest and to ensure they can zealously represent whistleblowers.  Zealous representation is needed even when the precedents established in these cases may create trouble for their other client base.

At the end of the day, the fact that defense law firms are now representing whistleblowers affirms the success of Dodd-Frank.  It is an affirmation of the critical nature of the information whistleblowers provide to the government and the role of this insider information in stopping otherwise hard to detect corporate crimes.  The “iron curtain” has fallen, but it has fallen in the direction that helps whistleblowers.  It has fallen in the direction that affirms the quality of their disclosures. It refutes the often-repeated slander that whistleblowers are somehow simply disgruntled employees.

Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring fairness in the markets, holding wrongdoers accountable, and deterring future wrongdoing.  The SEC has publicly recognized this, and now leading corporate defense attorneys have quietly recognized it. Defense firms like Akin Gump, Winston and Strawn, and Hayes and Boone got it right when they advocated for paying whistleblowers substantial rewards.  Whistleblowers whose information holds corporate criminals accountable deserve large rewards. These rewards are in the public interest, and the SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower program must be protected, enhanced and expanded.

Sources:

  1. Whistleblower Network News, “WNN Exclusive: SEC FOIA Documents Reveal Big Law Defense Firms are Confidentially Representing Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers,” (September 27, 2022)
  2. List of Law Firms that Obtained Rewards in Whistleblower Cases as of 2021
  3. List of Awards Obtained by the Six Defense Law Firms
  4. List of pro se Cases where Whistleblowers Obtained a Reward
  5. FAQ on the SEC’s Dodd-Frank Act program
  6. FAQ on Confidentiality of Dodd-Frank Act claims
Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

The SEC Remains in Search of and Is Looking for Finders

Much has been written on the topic of finders and arrangers of securities transactions, including when a person or entity acting as a finder (i.e., someone who merely makes an introduction) has crossed the line and engaged in activities or conduct that requires registration as a broker-dealer. Shortly before the end of Jay Clayton’s term as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), he issued a proposed order providing an exemption from broker-dealer registration requirements for certain “finders” who limit their activities in accordance with the conditions set forth in the proposed order.1 Ultimately, the proposal was not adopted. Today, finders and unregistered securities transaction activity continue to be on the SEC’s radar. The states also closely regulate unregistered securities activities.

Recently, the SEC brought several actions in the federal courts against unregistered finders, confirming that the activity of unregistered persons and entities participating in capital raising remains squarely on the SEC agenda. In SEC v. Sky Group USA, LLC, et al.,2 the SEC brought suit against Sky Group, a payday loan firm, and four of its employees in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging numerous violations of the federal securities laws arising out of a Ponzi scheme in which sales agents sold Sky Group securities to retail investors, collecting millions of dollars in commissions on their sales, even though the sales agents were not registered as broker-dealers. The SEC found indicia of activities requiring registration because, among other actions, the sales agents engaged in the sale of securities in the form of unregistered promissory notes and “earned a commission of one percent of each dollar the investors they recruited invested in the [promissory notes].” Many of the more than 500 alleged victims were low-income members of the South Florida Venezuelan-American community.

The allegations in the complaint are salacious and include charges of fraudulently selling $25 million of unregistered promissory notes and misappropriating at least $2.9 million of investor funds for personal use, “several hundred thousand dollars” of which were used to pay for a wedding of one of the defendants at a chateau on the French Riviera. The complaint alleges that additional amounts were used to pay personal credit card debt of one of the principals and diverted to friends and relatives for “no apparent legitimate business purpose.” The relief requested in the SEC’s complaint includes permanent injunctions, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, civil penalties and an officer and director bar against one of the defendants. Although it appears that there was a flurry of early motion practice after the complaint was filed, the defendants consented to entry of a final judgment on June 29, 2022, which includes disgorgement, interest and civil penalties totaling $39,288,990. The other related defendants also consented to entries of final judgement resulting in disgorgement, interest and civil penalties totaling $8,391,676, and a permanent injunction and officer and director bar against one of the defendants.

In SEC v. Richard Eden, et al.,3 the SEC brought suit against Richard Eden and an affiliated company in the US District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that Eden violated the federal securities laws by engaging in conduct that requires registration with a qualified broker-dealer. The complaint alleges that Eden is a recidivist and the conduct at issue in the present lawsuit occurred while Eden was subject to a previously imposed associational bar arising from his participation in multiple unregistered securities offerings. According to the complaint, Eden started as an “opener” and eventually morphed into a “finder/closer” role. The SEC alleges that Eden engaged in broker-dealer activity requiring registration because he was “responsible for both identifying potential investors and attempting to secure their investments in the [offering],” and was paid on a success fee basis. The relief requested includes a permanent injunction restraining Eden and his affiliated company from soliciting any person or entity to purchase or sell any security, disgorgement and civil penalties. As of this writing, the defendants have yet to file answers to the complaint.

It is not surprising that the factual allegations in these cases would attract regulatory attention. The fact that the SEC remains vigilant in its monitoring of firms and individuals engaged in capital raising requires firms and agents to learn the rules and stay within the permissible boundaries. In addition, they must be mindful of the less-than-crystal clear regulatory guidance on unregistered finders, and more specifically, at what point is a person or entity “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” Persons in this business must understand that no-action letters in this subject area are fact-specific and often tailored to narrow and unique fact patterns. Finders in violation of broker-dealer registration requirements may be subject to severe penalties under federal securities laws. Courts and the SEC have looked to certain factors when determining whether a finder has violated the federal securities laws by failing to register as a broker-dealer. Each determination is very fact-specific, but in general, the SEC will consider:

  • Does the person’s compensation depend on the outcome or size of the transaction (i.e., transaction-based compensation)?
  • Does the person participate in important parts of a securities transaction, including solicitation, negotiation or execution of the transaction or assistance in structuring payments?
  • Does the person actively engage in the marketing of the securities?
  • Does the person give advice on the investment’s structure or suitability?

1 Notice of Proposed Exemptive Order Granting Conditional Exemption from the Broker Registration Requirements of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for Certain Activities of Finders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-90112 (Oct. 7, 2020) (available here).

SEC v. Sky Group USA, LLC, et al., SEC Docket No. 21-cv-23443 (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2021/comp25234.pdf.

SEC v. Richard Eden, et al., SEC Docket No. 22-cv-04833 (July 14, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2022/comp25444.pdf.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Draft SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan Emphasizes Importance of Climate Disclosures

Recently, the SEC issued its five-year strategic plan for public comment.  This strategic plan covers a wide variety of topics, ranging from adapting to new technology to plans for increasing internal SEC workforce diversity.  Significantly, this draft strategic plan stated that “the SEC must update its disclosure framework,” and highlighted three areas in which it should do so: “issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people.”

The SEC has already undertaken steps to enact these proposed updates to its disclosure requirements for public companies.  Notably, this past March it proposed draft climate disclosure rules, which provoked a significant response from the public–including widespread criticism from many companies (as well as praise from environmental organizations).  The fact that the SEC chose to highlight these rules in its (draft) five-year strategic plan indicates the depth of the commitment it has made to these draft climate disclosures, and further suggests that the final form of the climate disclosures is unlikely to be significantly altered in substance from what the SEC has already proposed.  This statement reinforces the commitment of Chairman Gensler’s SEC and the Biden Administration to financial disclosures as a method to combat climate change.

The markets have begun to embrace the necessity of providing a greater level of disclosure to investors. From time to time, the SEC must update its disclosure framework to reflect investor demand. Today, investors increasingly seek information related to, among other things, issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people. In order to catch up to that reality, the agency should continue to update the disclosure framework to address these areas of investor demand, as well as continue to take concrete steps to modernize the systems that support the disclosure framework, to make public disclosures easier to access and analyze and thus more decision-useful to investors. . . . Across the agency, the SEC must continually reassess its risks, including in new areas such as climate risk, and document necessary controls.”

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

What Public Comments on the SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Rules Reveal—and the Impact They May Have on the Proposed Rules

On March 21, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published for comment its much-anticipated proposed rules on climate disclosures, entitled “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”[1]  The SEC invited public comments on these rules, and the response was overwhelming—nearly 15,000 comments were published on the SEC’s website over the course of three months, from individuals and organizations representing all aspects of modern American society.  Few, if any, of the SEC’s rule proposals have ever received such voluminous, significant, and diverse comments.  And the comments themselves range from brief statements to complex legal arguments either in support or in opposition, as well as detailed proposals for further changes to the proposed climate disclosures.  The comment period closed on June 17, 2022, and further action by the SEC to finalize the proposed rule is anticipated this fall.

This article provides a brief summary of the comments, and analyzes and summaries the key points the comments conveyed.

Statistical Analysis of Form and Individualized Submissions

Since the beginning of the public comment period, the SEC has received 14,645 comments on the proposed climate disclosure rules.[2]  To provide some context for how massive that figure is, the SEC has only received 144 comments on its proposed cybersecurity risk management rules, which were announced two weeks before the proposed climate disclosures and have also been the subject of extensive commentary in the press.  Yet despite the prominence of the SEC’s cybersecurity proposal, it has received fewer than 1% of the comments offered on the climate disclosure rule.

Of the 14,645 comments, approximately 12,304, or 84% of the total, are form letters.  This includes 10,589 comments that the SEC itself identified as form letters, and another 1,715 apparently individualized comments that were actually form letters.  However, even when removing these form letters from consideration, fully 2,341 individualized comment letters remain—a substantial number, and a significant percentage (16%) of the volume.[3]

The form letters are worth exploring in more detail.  Of the 12,304 comments, fully 10,861 (88%) broadly express support for the proposed climate disclosure rule, and only 1,443 (12%) are in opposition.  This disparity in the level of support for the two positions is best conveyed by the chart below.

Positions for and against the new SEC Disclosures

Notably, it has been possible to identify some, although not all, of the organizations that sponsored the form letter writing campaign.  In particular, form letters proposed by the Union of Concerned Scientists in support of the proposed climate disclosures were submitted 6886 times—more than 55% of the total volume of form letters.  Additionally, the form letters proposed by the Climate Action Campaign and the National Wildlife Federation in support of the SEC’s proposed disclosures were also quite voluminous among the submissions—1208 and 956 comment letters, respectively.  The most frequent form letters submitted in opposition to the proposed climate disclosure rules—e.g., those proposed by FreedomWorks (348 letters) and the Club for Growth (172 letters)—did not achieve nearly the same volume of submissions.

But the apparent overwhelming majority in favor of the proposed SEC climate disclosure rules, as conveyed by the form letters, is belied by the individualized submissions, which were far more closely divided.  Of the 2341 individualized comment letters submitted, approximately 53% (1238 comment letters) expressed support, about 43% (1015 comment letters) were opposed, and a handful—around 4% (88 comment letters)[4]—did not express a position.  The below chart demonstrates the levels of support expressed by the individualized submissions:

Individual submissions supporting, opposing, and neutral to the new SEC Disclosures

Besides the mere volume of submissions, however, the most noteworthy aspect of the individualized submissions are the substantive arguments—both factual and legal—that these comment letters articulate, whether in support or opposition to the proposed rules, as well as the identity of those making these submissions.

Arguments in Support of the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

The organizations and individuals that chose to offer support for the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures represent a wide swathe of society.  Broadly speaking, these proposed climate disclosures attracted support from, among others: Democratic politicianscivil society organizations (such as environmental NGOs), individual corporationsprofessional services organizations, and academics. While the rationales offered by these different groups varied considerably, in part due to their varying perspectives (e.g., environmental NGOs were more concerned with the impact on the transition to a clean-energy environment, while corporations often focused on the consequences of particular aspects of the rules), the individualized comments in support of the proposed disclosures nonetheless shared some common features.

Specifically, there are a number of common arguments that are frequently featured among the 1239 individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.  Six arguments appear in over 10% of the submissions.  In order of prevalence, these are:

  1. Environmental Protection (347 submissions, 28%): that the proposed rules will help protect the environment
  2. Investor Choice (280 submissions, 23%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to make more informed choices
  3. Investor Protection (263 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to protect themselves and their investments from climate-related risk
  4. Standardization of Climate Disclosures (259 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable the standardization of climate disclosures, making data comparable
  5. Increased Transparency (171 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will increase transparency and hold companies accountable for their emissions
  6. Alignment with International and Foreign Regulatory Frameworks (169 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will bring the United States into alignment with both international frameworks and other countries (e.g., the EU)

No other argument appeared in more than 6% of the individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.

Notably, the most common arguments in favor of the proposed climate disclosures share a common feature: these are all policy arguments, focusing on the benefits to investors and the broader economy from the adoption of the SEC’s proposed disclosures.  Only a single argument among the top ten most frequent arguments in support was a legal argument—namely that the proposed rules fall within the SEC’s statutory authority—and that argument appeared in only around 3% of the submissions (41 submissions).[5]  This focus on policy benefits among supporters of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures is unsurprising, as these public policy rationales were a key factor in encouraging the Biden Administration to pursue this regulatory agenda.  However, the reluctance to engage with critics of the proposed climate disclosures on a legal basis may signal the difficulties that the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures may encounter in future court challenges.

Arguments in Opposition to the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

Those entities and individuals that submitted individualized comment letters opposing the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures also represent a broad range of American society, albeit with a somewhat different focus.  Generally, individualized letters in opposition to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures tended to be submitted by, among others: Republican politiciansindividual corporationstrade industry groups, and NGOs. (Unsurprisingly, the fossil fuel industry and extractive industries were particularly well-represented among the commenters.)  These individualized submissions—frequently lengthy and extensively analyzing the SEC’s regulatory practices and authority—shared a number of common themes.

In particular, there are a number of common arguments that featured frequently among the 1014 individualized submissions to the SEC in opposition to these proposed climate disclosures.  Three (3) arguments appeared in more than ten (10) percent of these submissions:

  1. Ultra vires (322 submissions, 32% ): that the SEC lacks the ability to issue these disclosures as the proposed rule is beyond the scope of the SEC’s legal authority
  2. Compliance Costs (218 submissions, 21% ): that compliance with the proposed rule will impose unreasonable and extensive costs on businesses
  3. Climate Science Skepticism (123 submissions, 12%): that the science concerning climate change is unsettled and therefore the proposed rule is inappropriate

Although no other common argument appeared in more than 7% of the individualized letters in opposition, it should still be noted that there were a large number of letters that objected to the increased burdens placed on particular types of businesses, whether farmers (53 submissions, 5%), fossil fuel companies (49 submissions, 5%), or small businesses (36 submissions, 4%).

Overall, it is striking that around a third of the comments submitted in opposition stated that the SEC had acted beyond its authority (ultra vires) in proposing this new rule.  While this critique is hardly novel—it has been a frequent refrain of the Republican SEC Commissioners ever since this topic was first broached—the prevalence of this argument among the individualized comments suggests that both the public and sophisticated market actors perceive this issue as a key vulnerability in the SEC’s proposal, and that this legal argument will likely be emphasized in the inevitable legal challenge to this SEC rule.  And, based on recent decisions by the Supreme Court, it is altogether likely that this line of attack may find a sympathetic audience in the courts.

Potential Changes to the SEC Climate Disclosure Rules Resulting from Public Comments

Despite the differences between the advocates and opponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, both sides submitted proposals to the SEC to change or adjust the proposed rules.  Although there was often substantial disagreement about the content of these proposed changes, there were also significant areas of convergence.

Some of the changes to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures frequently submitted by supporters of the rule included:

  1. ISSB: that the SEC should further align its proposal with the ISSB and help create a global standard (76 comments);
  2. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (72 comments);
  3. Alignment with International and Foreign Standards: that the SEC should further align its proposal with international and foreign standards, such as the EU or TCFD (66 comments);
  4. Enhance Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to eliminate exemptions so that all companies must disclose Scope 3 GHG emissions (55 comments);
  5. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (53) comments;
  6. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (36 comments);
  7. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (26 comments).

Although certain proposed changes by proponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule are undeniably expected (e.g., removing exemptions for disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions), there are others that seem somewhat surprising on initial review (e.g., extending the phase-in period or removing Scope 3 GHG emissions entirely).  This can most easily be explained by the fact that supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule include corporations and other business interests, which will resist certain burdensome regulations even if generally offering support for the overall thrust of the proposal.  There are also academics and others who continue to express skepticism concerning the utility of disclosing Scope 3 emissions, or even whether it can be adequately measured.

It should be emphasized that these changes proffered by supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule, many of which are designed to render the proposed rule less onerous, may indicate that the support for the proposed rule—or at least the most stringent aspects of it—is relatively weak (or at least among the corporate interests nominally aligned with the SEC).

The most frequent changes suggested by opponents of the rule included:

  1. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (69 comments);
  2. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (35 comments);
  3. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (25 comments);
  4. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (18 comments).

These proposed changes (and others) advanced by opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule are generally designed to make the rules less stringent and also to reduce costs and potential legal liability.

As can be seen by comparing the above lists, there are certain areas where suggested changes to the proposed rule converged.  In particular, there are issues where both opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule and some of its supporters would try to render it less intrusive or impactful, particularly with respect to the elimination of the requirement to report Scope 3 GHG emissions and to extend the phase-in period further.  (Although, as noted, this apparent convergence between opponents and supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule may be due to divergent interests among the supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule with respect to its implementation.)

But, regardless of the specific content of the particular proposed changes, what is undoubtedly significant is that these proposed changes have highlighted the aspects of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule that are likely most sensitive to regulated corporations.  Such an insight reveals not only the areas where active lobbying is most likely to take place, but also previews probable priorities for corporate compliance departments.  In effect, focusing on the aspects of the proposed rule where changes were proposed is a means to identify the key issues from the perspective of the regulated entities and the public at large.

Conclusion

The level of engagement with the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, as demonstrated by the number and detail of the public comments offered, is extraordinary. This degree of attention indicates the significant impact that is expect to result from the ultimate promulgation of these rules (or a revised version thereof).

Of course, the key question here is what changes, if any, are likely to be made to the SEC’s proposed rule based upon the public comments submitted to the SEC.  In this context, it is noteworthy that a handful of key issues have been identified by both proponents and opponents of the proposed disclosures as especially ripe for potential revision.  As noted above, these include, among others, the length of the phase-in period and the disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions.  If any changes are to be made to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule, it is likely that such changes will be related to these issues.

However, given the relative lack of forward momentum with respect to other aspects of the Biden Administration’s climate agenda, there may well be political pressure not to weaken or otherwise rollback the SEC’s proposed rule, as this is one of the few areas where significant—and publicly-recognized—progress has been made with regulations designed to address the issue of climate change.  Further, the Biden Administration’s SEC has certainly recognized the inevitability of a legal challenge to these proposed climate disclosures, and, since no degree of alteration would suffice to preempt such a lawsuit, the SEC may conclude that it is better to seek to implement all aspects of the proposed regulation for the political benefit that can be achieved in the short term, since the substantive aspects of the proposed disclosure may not ultimately survive judicial scrutiny.  The SEC may also prefer to send a strong signal to the market by maintaining its original proposed rule.  Recognizing these pressures, it seems unlikely that the public comments submitted to the SEC will have a significant impact on the final rule promulgated in the coming months—and improbable that the SEC will make the proposed disclosures less robust.


FOO​TNOTES

[1] These proposed rules are discussed more fully in our prior publication:  https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2451/2022-03-30-brief-summary-secs-proposed-climate-related-rules

[2] Although the total number of comments, when including both form letters and individualized letters, is 14,739, there are 94 comment letters on the SEC website that are duplicates, and have thus been removed from the calculation.

[3] For comparison, the proposed SEC rule on disclosing compensation ratios drew about 300,000 form letters and around 1500 individualized comment letters.  In this case, the individualized comment letters represented only about 0.5% of the total volume.  https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml

[4] The eighty-eight comment letters that did not adopt an express position on the proposed climate disclosure rules instead conveyed a number of different points, including proposing narrow changes to the proposed rule without taking a stance on the rule as a whole, or offering further context for the SEC’s actions (e.g., comparing the SEC to other regulators, whether domestic or international).  This category also includes a number of early comments that simply requested that the SEC extend the deadline for submitting comments.

[5] There are public comments in support of the proposed rule that focus on the legal issues.  In particular, the submission of Prof. John Coates of Harvard Law School, a former SEC official, is devoted exclusively to defending the legal authority of the SEC to issue the proposed climate disclosure rule. https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130026-296547.pdf

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

How Changing Beneficial Ownership Reporting May Impact Activism

The SEC in February proposed amendments to Regulation 13D-G to modernize beneficial ownership reporting requirements. Adoption of the amendments as proposed will accelerate the timing – and expand the scope – of knowledge of certain activist activities. The deadline for comments on the proposed rules was April 11 and final rules are expected to be released later this year.

The current reporting timeline creates an asymmetry of information between beneficial owners on the one hand and other stockholders and issuers on the other. The SEC proposal is seeking to eliminate this asymmetry and address other concerns surrounding current beneficial ownership reporting. The accelerated beneficial ownership reporting deadlines will result in greater transparency in stock ownership, allowing market participants to receive material information in a timely manner and potentially alleviating the market manipulation and abusive tactics used by some investors.

The shortened filing deadlines should benefit a company’s overall shareholder engagement activities. The investor relations team at a company will have a more accurate and up-to-date picture of its institutional investor base throughout the year, which should result in more timely outreach to such shareholders.

INVESTOR ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BEFORE DISCLOSURE

Although issuers will likely view the proposed rules as beneficial, many commentators have predicted a negative impact on shareholder activism. Under the current reporting requirements, certain activist investors may benefit by having both additional time to accumulate shares before disclosing such activities and potentially more flexibility in strategizing with other investors.

Many commentators have argued that the proposed shorter timeline for beneficial ownership reporting will negatively impact an activist shareholder’s ability to accumulate shares of an issuer at a potentially lower price than if market participants had more timely knowledge of such activity and intent. In many cases a company’s stock price is impacted once an investor files a Schedule 13D with clear activist intent. This can even occur in some cases once a Schedule 13G is filed by a known activist investor without current activist intent.

If the shorter reporting deadlines reduce such investors’ profit, it is expected that an investor’s incentive to accumulate stock in order to initiate change at a company will also be reduced. Activists instead may be encouraged to engage more with management. In other words, the shorter reporting period may deter short-term activists and encourage more long-term focused activism.

TIMING OF ISSUER RESPONSE

The shorter reporting deadlines are also expected to result in management having earlier notice of any takeover attempt and to give a company the opportunity to react more quickly to any such attempt. There is potential for this to lead to increased use of low-threshold poison pills. But the SEC stated in the proposed rules release that it believes the risk of abundant reactionary low-threshold poison pills is overstated due to scrutiny of such poison pills from courts and academia, limitations imposed by state law and the unlikelihood that the beneficial ownership would trigger the low-threshold poison pills.

Companies that have low-threshold poison pills – such as one designed to protect a company’s net operating losses – may want to review them to confirm that the proposed rules would not be expected to have any impact. For example, such poison pills may link the definition of beneficial ownership to the SEC rules, including Schedule 13D and 13G filings.

‘GROUP’ REPORTING

Another proposed change expected to affect shareholder activism is the expanded definition of ‘group’ for the purposes of reporting under Schedule 13D. The current rules require an explicit agreement between two or more persons to establish a group for purposes of the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds.

Commentators believe that under the current rules, certain investors seeking change at a company may share the fact that they are accumulating shares of a company with other shareholders or activists, which can then act on this information before the general public is aware; in other words, before public disclosure in and market reaction to the Schedule 13D filing. This activity may result in near-term gains for the select few involved before uninformed shareholders can react.

Under the SEC’s proposed amended Rule 13d-5, persons who share information with another regarding an upcoming Schedule 13D filing are deemed to have formed a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) regardless of whether an explicit agreement is in place, and such concerted action will trigger reporting requirements. This proposed change is expected to benefit companies and shareholders overall by preventing certain investors from acting in concert on information not known to a company and its other shareholders.

The full impact of the proposed rule changes on shareholder activism cannot be accurately predicted, but we believe that at a minimum, issuers will find it beneficial to have more regularly updated information on their institutional investor base for, among other things, their shareholder engagement efforts.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP

SEC Issues Two Whistleblower Awards for Independent Analysis

On February 18, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced two whistleblower awards issued to individuals who provided independent analysis to the SEC which contributed to a successful enforcement action. One whistleblower received an award of $375,000 while the other received $75,000.

According to the award order, the whistleblowers “each voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that was a principal motivating factor in Enforcement staff’s decision to open an investigation.”

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers, individuals who voluntarily provide original information which leads to a successful enforcement action, are entitled to a monetary award of 10-30% of funds recovered by the government.

A 2020 amendment to the whistleblower program rules established a presumption of a statutory maximum award of 30% in cases where the maximum award would be less than $5 million and where there are no negative factors present. The SEC notes that this presumption did not apply to the two newly awarded whistleblowers. According to the SEC, the first whistleblower unreasonably delayed in reporting their disclosure and the second whistleblower only provided limited assistance.

In the award order, the SEC justifies its decision to grant the first whistleblower a larger award than the second. According to the SEC, the first whistleblower’s disclosure included high quality about an issue which “was the basis for the bulk of the sanctions in the Covered Action” whereas the second whistleblower’s disclosure did not touch on this pivotal issue. Furthermore, the first whistleblower provided significant ongoing assistance to the SEC staff while the second whistleblower did not.

Since issuing its first award in 2012, the SEC has awarded approximately $1.2 billion to 247 individuals. Before blowing the whistle to the SEC, individuals should first consult an experienced SEC whistleblower attorney to ensure they are fully protected under the law and qualify for the largest award possible.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity Declines Slightly in 2019

Los Angeles—The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) publicly disclosed a combined 81 accounting and auditing enforcement actions during 2019, down slightly from the previous year, according to a Cornerstone Research report released today. Monetary settlements totaled approximately $628 million, $626 million of which was imposed by the SEC.

Cornerstone Research’s report, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity—2019 Review and Analysis, examines publicly disclosed SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions that involve accounting and auditing. The most common allegations in 2019 SEC actions involved financial reporting issues, with revenue recognition violations comprising the largest share. The percentage of PCAOB actions involving revenue recognition increased in 2019.

The SEC and PCAOB have highlighted revenue recognition as one of the areas that may present challenges as a result of the economic impact of COVID-19.

Enforcement actions involving announcements of restatements or internal control weaknesses increased by 65%. The percentage of 2019 SEC actions involving announced restatements and/or material weaknesses in internal controls (42%) was nearly double the 2018 percentage (23%).

Highlights

  • In 2019, the SEC initiated 57 enforcement actions involving accounting and auditing allegations, an 11% decline from the 64 actions in 2018, but near the 2014–2018 average. The SEC brought only 5% of accounting and auditing actions as civil actions, the lowest percentage since 2016.

  • The PCAOB publicly disclosed 24 auditing-related enforcement actions in 2019, up 26% compared to 2018, the year in which the PCAOB disclosed its lowest number of actions since 2014.

  • The percentage of SEC and PCAOB actions involving non-U.S. respondents declined, but remained above the 2014–2018 average.

  • At 115, the total number of respondents in 2019 SEC and PCAOB actions was 23% below the 2014–2018 average.

  • The SEC and PCAOB imposed monetary penalties against 84% of firms and 63% of individual respondents. The median penalty the SEC imposed on firms in 2019 was $4.1 million, nearly three times greater than the 2018 median.

 Read Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity—2019 Review and Analysis.


Copyright ©2020 Cornerstone Research

For more SEC enforcement actions see the National Law Review Securities Law & SEC news section.

North American Securities Administrators Association Proposes Model State Whistleblower Rewards Legislation

The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) announced it released for public comment a proposed model law to help states incentivize individuals to come forward to report suspected wrongful violations of state securities laws and to protect whistleblowers.  According to NASAA President and Chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities Christopher W. Gerold, “The intent of this model legislation is to incentivize individuals who have knowledge of potential securities law violations to report it to state regulators in the interest of investor protection . . . [i]nformation from those with knowledge of securities law violations is a valuable enforcement tool to help regulators detect financial fraud and wrongdoing.”

The SEC whistleblower program that Congress created about 10 years ago in the Dodd-Frank Act has proven effective in combatting securities fraud and protecting investors.  Since the inception of the program, the SEC has paid more than $450 million in awards to whistleblowers.  SEC enforcement actions associated with those awards have resulted in sanctions totaling more than $2 billion.  Whistleblower awards can range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected when the sanctions exceed $1 million.

Proposed Model State Securities Whistleblower Rewards Legislation

The proposed state whistleblower rewards legislation is modeled on the Dodd-Frank Act’s SEC whistleblower rewards provisions. Some of the key features include:

  • A whistleblower could obtain 10 to 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in any related administrative or judicial action stemming from original information that the whistleblower voluntarily provides to a state securities regulator.
  • Factors that would determine the award percentage include:
    • the significance of the original information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the administrative or judicial action;
    • the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower in connection with the administrative or judicial action; and
    • the programmatic interest of the [Securities Administrator] in deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to the successful enforcement of such laws.
  • Information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower would be exempt from public disclosure.
  • There are approximately 11 categories of whistleblowers that would be ineligible to receive an award, including (1) a whistleblower convicted of a felony in connection with the administrative or judicial action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award; (2) a whistleblower who acquires the original information through the performance of an audit of financial statements required under the securities laws; (3) a whistleblower who knowingly or recklessly makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or misrepresentation as part of, or in connection with, the original information provided or the administrative or judicial proceeding for which the original information was provided; and (4) a whistleblower who has a legal duty to report the original information.

The model legislation also includes a whistleblower protection provision that would prohibit an employer from terminating, discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner retaliating against, a whistleblower because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower:

  • in providing information to the [Securities Division] in accordance with this Act;
  • in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or administrative or judicial action based upon or related to such information; or
  • in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.); the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.); 18 U.S.C. 1513(e); any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; or [the Securities Act of this State] or a rule adopted thereunder.

Remedies for a whistleblower prevailing in a retaliation claim include:

  • reinstatement with the same compensation, fringe benefits, and seniority status that the individual would have had, but for the retaliation;
  • two (2) times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with interest;
  • compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees;
  • actual damages; or
  • any combination of these remedies.

Role of State Securities Regulators

Although the SEC is the primary securities market regulator and enforces federal securities laws, state securities regulators enforce “blue sky” laws designed to protect investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities that fall outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction, e.g., offerings that are not required to be registered with the SEC.  Most of the state securities laws are based on the Uniform Securities Act, which is intended to prevent the fraudulent sale of securities to investors.

Securities law enforcement at the state level plays a vital role in protecting investors.  According to the NASAA’s 2018 Enforcement Report, in 2017 state securities regulators received 7,988 complaints, took 2,105 enforcement actions, and ordered $486 million returned to investors. Incentivizing whistleblowers to report securities fraud could significantly enhance the ability of state securities regulators to protect investors.

The proposed model act is open for public comment through June 30, 2020.


© 2020 Zuckerman Law

For more on securities laws, see the National Law Review Securities & SEC law section.