Tag: religious discrimination

Why Employees at Religious Organizations May Not Be Protected Against Discrimination

In Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, the Seventh Circuit recently held in a 2-1 decision that the ministerial exception does not preclude church ministerial employees from asserting hostile work environment claims.

Supreme Court Rulings Clarify Ministerial Exception in Employment Discrimination Cases

The decision in Demkovich was preceded by two significant Supreme Court cases that clarified the reach of the ministerial exception by explaining the test for determining which employees of a religious institution are considered ministers. In the 2012 case Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, in a unanimous decision, the Court recognized that the ministerial exception bars ministerial employees from bringing employment discrimination claims against their religious employers. The issue was whether a teacher in a religious school who taught secular subjects should be considered a minister. The Court held, based on several specific facts about the teacher’s duties and status, that she was in fact a minister in the church’s view and thus was barred from bringing her claim that she was fired because of her disability. The ministerial exception bars all types of employment discrimination claims brought by ministers alleging discrimination under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, at issue in Hosanna-Tabor. Although it appears to protect bad actors, the ministerial exception serves to ensure that the ecclesiastical authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful is not undermined by the state.

More recently, this past July, in a 7-2 decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court held that the primary consideration in determining whether a claim was barred by the ministerial exception turned on the tasks the employee performed. Hence, in determining whether two parochial school teachers who taught fifth and sixth grade classes and claimed they were fired—in one instance because of her age and in the other because she had breast cancer—could assert an age discrimination or a disability claim, the court determined they could not assert such claims, because the tasks they performed were vital religious duties such that the ministerial exception would apply. Specifically, the Court held that both teachers educated their students in the Catholic faith and guided them to live according to that faith.

As explained in the Demkovich decision, these Supreme Court decisions analyzed termination decisions by the religious schools and held that courts could not allow ministerial employees to challenge such decisions regardless of the reasons for their terminations. Demkovich, on the other hand, would determine whether the ministerial exception should apply to bar hostile work environment cases that did not involve such tangible employment action.

Applying the Ministerial Exception in Hostile Work Environment Cases

In September 2012, Mr. Demkovich began working as the Music Director, Choir Director, and Organist for the Archdiocese of Chicago and St. Andrew Parish in Calumet City. His supervisor, Saint Andrews Pastor, Reverend Jacek Dada, often made derogatory comments about Mr. Demkovich’s being an openly homosexual man engaged to a same-sex partner. Mr. Dada called Mr. Demkovich a bitch and his nuptials a fag wedding. Mr. Dada, also aware that Mr. Demkovich suffered from diabetes and a metabolic syndrome that caused weight gain, made additional remarks about his weight—urging him to walk his dog to lose weight, complaining about the cost of keeping him on the parish’s health and dental insurance, and commenting that he needed to lose weight because Mr. Dada did not want to preach at Mr. Demkovich’s funeral. After enduring prolonged verbal abuse, Mr. Demkovich was finally terminated in September 2014 after marrying his same-sex partner.

Mr. Demkovich initiated a Title VII, ADA, and wrongful termination claim. The defendants, Saint Andrews Parish and the Archdiocese of Chicago, moved to dismiss arguing the suit was barred by the ministerial exception. The district court granted the defendant’s motion, holding all the claims were barred. Mr. Demkovich filed an amended complaint dropping his wrongful termination claim, but seeking damages for a hostile work environment caused by discriminatory remarks and insults based on his disability and sex. The district court dismissed his hostile work environment claims based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status because even though the claims were not barred by the ministerial exception, their adjudication would lead to excessive entanglement in matters of faith. The district court certified the following legal question for review by the Seventh Circuit: “Under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, does the ministerial exception ban all claims of a hostile work environment brought by a plaintiff who qualifies as a minister, even if the claim does not challenge a tangible employment action?”

Hostile environment claims do not involve challenges to employment decisions made by religious officials, so the resolution of the question in Demkovich turned on whether litigating the claim would nevertheless result in excessive entanglement between church and state. The Demkovich court discussed both procedural and substantive entanglement. The court concluded there would be no undue procedural entanglement, which refers to the operation of the entire legal process. The church’s concern about the intrusive nature of litigation is shared by all litigants and thus concern of excessive entanglement would not bar hostile work environment claims by ministers any more than by the non-ministerial employees of a church. Next, the court discussed substantive entanglement, analyzing whether civil courts can decide substantive questions of law while avoiding issues of faith. The court discussed a variety of cases allowing claims against churches involving tax disputes, property disputes, tort claims, and application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to church employees. As in those cases, the court determined it was possible for a court to rule on a harassment claim without getting into matters of religious faith. Mr. Demkovich faced ongoing harassment in part due to his sexual orientation. The church argued that all comments made about Mr. Demkovich were motivated by church doctrine and the manner Reverend Dada expressed these beliefs were shielded from judicial scrutiny. The church also argued that haranguing Mr. Demkovich about his health was within his supervisor’s purview in implementing the proper formation of a member of the clergy. Although the district court had accepted the church’s argument in part, dismissing his sexual orientation claim, the court of appeals was not as persuaded that the risk of substantive entanglement was so great that hostile work environment cases should be dismissed without further inquiry. The court emphasized that Reverend Dada could have expressed the church’s views on gay marriage and obesity without being personally abusive, so the content of his religious reprimands did not excuse compliance with valid, neutral laws against harassment.

Courts Split on Reach of Ministerial Exception

The Seventh Circuit decision to narrow the reach of the ministerial exception deepens a split among the circuit courts of appeal. The Seventh Circuit now has joined the conclusion the Ninth Circuit reached in 2004 in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, holding that the ministerial exception does not categorically bar ministers’ hostile work environment claims where the religious employer denies or disavows the conduct. At the same time, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the Tenth Circuit’s opposite conclusion in a 2010 case Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, holding that the ministerial exception bars all hostile work environment claims. Because of this lack of uniformity in applying the ministerial exception, ministerial employees who are victimized by any type of harassment constituting a hostile environment should consult an employment attorney to determine whether they can pursue a claim against their religious employer.

Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP
For more articles on labor discrimination, visit the National Law Review Labor & Employment section.

What Do Colleges and Universities Need to Know About the Executive Order and Title VI?

On Dec. 11, 2019 President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) stating that, “It shall be the policy of the executive branch to enforce Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] against prohibited forms of discrimination rooted in anti-Semitism as vigorously as against all other forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VI.”

This has created a good bit of confusion, with media outlets reporting that the EO “redefines” Judaism as a nationality or ethnicity. Not so. So what does the EO do? What, if anything, is new about it? And how will it affect U.S. colleges and universities that receive federal funding?

Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin in programs and activities that receive federal funding. Applying Title VI to Jewish students is not new. National origin discrimination has been interpreted for years to include discrimination against those who have shared ancestry or ethnicity, to protect religious groups such as Jews, Sikhs and Muslims.

What is new is that the EO directs executive branch agencies and departments charged with enforcing Title VI to consider the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism when investigating allegations of anti-Jewish discrimination (i.e., when they review an Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaint).

The IHRA definition, which has been adopted by the U.S. State Department, provides that:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities[.]

The definition includes a list of non-exhaustive examples of anti-Semitism, which the EO also directs agencies to consider. For example: “[m]aking mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as . . . the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.”

Examples also include discrimination against Jewish individuals who support Israel, e.g., “[a]ccusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations” or “[d]enying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor[.]”

In other words, discriminatory conduct directed at Jewish students who support Israel may constitute anti-Semitism.

Some argue the EO conflicts with the First Amendment, although the EO expressly states that agencies “shall not diminish or infringe upon any right protected under Federal law or under the First Amendment.” Simply put, neither Title VI nor the EO limits speech (or even hate speech); it limits conduct. The perpetrator’s speech may be used as evidence of discriminatory intent.

Universities and colleges will need to carefully consider the impact of the EO in reviewing student complaints.

© 2020 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on Title VI, see the National Law Review Civil Rights type-of-law section.

Third Thursdays with Ruthie: The Intersection of Religion and Labor Law [PODCAST]

In this episode of the Third Thursdays podcast, Ruthie Goodboe examines how religious discrimination and accommodation intersect with traditional labor law. She will cover religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, best practices for handling requests for religious accommodation when an employee is governed by a collective bargaining agreement, and how Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act comes into play with religious accommodation.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

For more labor law developments see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

EEOC Defends “Mark of The Beast” Ruling – Religious Beliefs Don’t Have To Make Sense To Be Protected

EEOCSealIn August 2015, the EEOC prevailed in a religious discrimination lawsuit against Consol Energy and was awarded in excess of $500,000.00.  Former Consol mine worker Beverly Butcher, who had been with the company for over 35 years, refused to use Consol’s new biometric hand scanners that were installed to track employee time and attendance.  He explained that he believed that scanners would leave the “mark of the beast” and would be a sign for the antichrist.  Consol required Butcher to use the scanners and refused to consider alternate means of tracking Butcher’s time, and Butcher believed he had no choice other than to retire.

Consol recently moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, arguing that Butcher had admitted that he did not actually believe the scanner would give him the mark of the beast (or any mark at all), but instead believed that future versions of the device would be capable of doing so. Butcher further admitted that his pastor did not agree with him that the hand scanners had any relationship to the mark of the beast.

The EEOC has responded to Consol’s motion and stated that although Butcher admitted that the current version hand scanner left no mark, he testified that these scanners “are being used as part of a system of identification being put into place that will be used to serve the antichrist as foretold in the New Testament Book of Revelation and which creates an identifier for followers of the antichrist known as ‘The Mark of the Beast,’” and that “[t]he fact that a believer draws a line at the first step in what he sincerely believes to be an immoral process rather than the last step of that process does not alter the employer’s accommodation duty.”

The EEOC responded to Consol’s efforts to poke holes in the logic of Butcher’s beliefs, stating that it is unconstitutional for Consol to demand theological accuracy or consistency.  “[A]s EEOC has previously pointed out, and as the Court instructed the jury, religious beliefs need not be seen as rational, doctrinally consistent, or accurate in order to be protected under Title VII.”

The takeaway of this is that if an employee seeks an accommodation based on religion, an employer should not subjectively evaluate the logic or wisdom of the employee’s beliefs, but instead should only consider whether the employee sincerely believes.

The case is EEOC v. Consol Energy, Inc., 1:13-cv-00215 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.

Article By Douglas M. Oldham of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Statements of Samantha Elauf and David Lopez Following Oral Argument at the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

Samantha Elauf filed the original charge of religious discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that led to today’s argument in the Supreme Court. She has the following statement for the press:

I was born and raised in Tulsa, Oklahoma. When I applied for a position with Abercrombie Kids, I was a teenager who loved fashion.  I had worked in two other retail stores and was excited to work at the Abercrombie store.  No one had ever told me that I could not wear a head scarf and sell clothing.  Then I learned I was not hired by Abercrombie because I wear a head scarf, which is a symbol of modesty in my Muslim faith.  This was shocking to me.

I am grateful to the EEOC for looking into my complaint and taking this religious discrimination case to the courts.  I am not only standing up for myself, but for all people who wish to adhere to their faith while at work. Observance of my faith should not prevent me from getting a job.

David Lopez, General Counsel of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), made the following statement at the conclusion of the Supreme Court argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a case involving religious accommodation.

This year we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, established as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII prohibits discrimination because of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.  The prohibition against religious discrimination reflects this country’s historical tradition of religious freedom and religious tolerance. Since that time, the Commission has led the effort to enforce laws that prohibit religious discrimination for persons of all faiths. Today’s case is the latest effort to ensure all persons protected by  Title VII are not placed in the difficult position of choosing between adherence to one’s faith and a job.

Finally, I would be remiss not to recognize the courage and tenacity of Samantha Elauf.  Regardless of the outcome of this case, her effort to stand up for the important principles at issue is an inspiration.  Samantha now has a brief prepared statement that will be read by Christine Saah Nazer, EEOC spokesperson.

ARTICLE BY

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Statements of Samantha Elauf and David Lopez Following Oral Argument at the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

Samantha Elauf filed the original charge of religious discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that led to today’s argument in the Supreme Court. She has the following statement for the press:

I was born and raised in Tulsa, Oklahoma. When I applied for a position with Abercrombie Kids, I was a teenager who loved fashion.  I had worked in two other retail stores and was excited to work at the Abercrombie store.  No one had ever told me that I could not wear a head scarf and sell clothing.  Then I learned I was not hired by Abercrombie because I wear a head scarf, which is a symbol of modesty in my Muslim faith.  This was shocking to me.

I am grateful to the EEOC for looking into my complaint and taking this religious discrimination case to the courts.  I am not only standing up for myself, but for all people who wish to adhere to their faith while at work. Observance of my faith should not prevent me from getting a job.

David Lopez, General Counsel of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), made the following statement at the conclusion of the Supreme Court argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a case involving religious accommodation.

This year we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, established as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII prohibits discrimination because of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.  The prohibition against religious discrimination reflects this country’s historical tradition of religious freedom and religious tolerance. Since that time, the Commission has led the effort to enforce laws that prohibit religious discrimination for persons of all faiths. Today’s case is the latest effort to ensure all persons protected by  Title VII are not placed in the difficult position of choosing between adherence to one’s faith and a job.

Finally, I would be remiss not to recognize the courage and tenacity of Samantha Elauf.  Regardless of the outcome of this case, her effort to stand up for the important principles at issue is an inspiration.  Samantha now has a brief prepared statement that will be read by Christine Saah Nazer, EEOC spokesperson.

ARTICLE BY

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EEOC Continues Focus on Religious and National Origin Discrimination Involving Muslim and Arab Communities

The National Law Review recently published an article by Robert B. Meyer and David L. Woodard of Poyner Spruill LLP, regarding Discrimination:

 

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has announced on its website that it continues to focus on what it considers to be ongoing religious and national origin discrimination in the workplace, especially against Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian Communities.  The EEOC reports that in the initial months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Commission saw a 250% increase in the number of religion-based charges involving Muslims.  Since that time, the EEOC states that it has continued to track an increase in such charges, as well as those alleging national origin discrimination against those with Middle Eastern background.  While the Commission does not specify how many of those charges were found to have merit, it does report that it has filed nearly 90 lawsuits against employers, many of which involve alleged harassment on the basis of religion and national origin.  Thus, it is apparent that the EEOC is aggressively pursuing investigation and enforcement activities in this area.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants on the basis of religion or national origin.  The harassment of individuals because of their religion or national origin is also prohibited.  Through its interpretations of Title VII, The EEOC has recognized a wide range of actions and conduct that may be potentially unlawful, including: disparate treatment, teasing or insults because of a person’s appearance, customs, language, or accent; requiring employees to speak English in the workplace; disparate treatment, jokes, or insults toward an employee because of the national origin or religion of that person’s spouse; and adverse actions based on perceptions of an employee or applicant’s national origin or religion.

It is important to note that in addition to these prohibitions against discrimination and harassment, Title VII also requires employers to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an employee or applicant, unless doing so would cause an “undue hardship” for the employer.  The EEOC has suggested that reasonable accommodation may include, for example, providing employees with leave to attend religious observances, providing time and/or a place to pray, and permitting employees to wear religious attire in the workplace.  However, the issue of accommodation requires the employer to consider each request for accommodation on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether accommodation is possible and reasonable under the circumstances.

The EEOC also states that it has “intensified its outreach” to educate employees in this area of the law by issuing fact sheets on immigrant employee rights, employment discrimination based on religion and national origin, and employer responsibilities under Title VII with respect to the employment of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs.  These fact sheets provide specific examples of prohibited conduct in the workplace, and also offer instructions on how employees may file charges with the EEOC.  Therefore, and in view of the EEOC’s emphasis on this particular form of discrimination, employers should review carefully these fact sheets as a part of their proactive compliance and training measures.  Employers should also remember that retaliation against anyone who files a charge or otherwise opposes unlawful discrimination is expressly prohibited under Title VII.

© 2012 Poyner Spruill LLP