Tag: Oil and Gas

Federal Court Directed to Rule on Challenge to WV Pooling Statute

A federal appeals court has instructed a lower court to resolve a pending suit challenging the constitutionality of West Virginia’s oil and gas pooling and unitization law. The federal district court previously declined to resolve certain constitutional issues presented in the suit on the grounds that those issues should be decided by a state court instead of a federal court.

In 2022, the West Virginia Legislature enacted Senate Bill 694 to revise West Virginia law governing the pooling and unitization of oil and gas formations associated with horizontal well development. Pooling and unitization essentially involves combining separately owned properties into a single “unit” through which one or more horizontal wells are drilled. The oil and gas produced from the horizontal well is then allocated among all the properties in the unit for purposes of calculating production royalties payable to the mineral owners.

Prior to Senate Bill 694 becoming effective on June 7, 2022, formation of a pooled unit for a horizontal well drilled through “shallow” oil and gas formations, which includes the Marcellus Shale, required consent of 100% of the mineral owners for all the properties to be included in the unit. This 100% consent requirement did not apply to horizontal wells drilled through “deep formations” such as the Utica Shale. One of the more significant changes made by SB 694 was to allow the West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to approve units for shallow formations where at least 75% of the mineral owners consent, provided other requirements are also satisfied. This means that up to 25% of a unit could potentially include properties for which the mineral owner did not consent to being part of a unit.

Before Senate Bill 694 became effective, a pair of mineral owners (Scott Sonda and Brian Corwin) filed a lawsuit in the federal District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to preclude the law from taking effect. Governor Jim Justice was the only defendant named in the case. In their suit, Sonda and Corwin alleged that the law was illegal for several reasons, including the claim that the law authorizes the unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation and deprives landowners of due process of law.

Federal Judge John Preston Bailey initially dismissed all of their claims for two reasons. First, Judge Bailey concluded that Sonda and Corwin lacked standing to bring the challenge because (a) their property had not been pooled into a unit without their consent and no operator had sought approval of a unit to include their property without their consent; and (b) the Commission, not the Governor, has the power to directly enforce Senate Bill 694.

Second, Judge Bailey ruled that, even if Sonda and Corwin established standing, Governor Justice had constitutional immunity from the suit because he had no direct authority to implement Senate Bill 694. Rather, the Commission has the authority to implement the law.

Instead of dismissing their suit entirely, Judge Bailey granted leave for Sonda and Corwin to amend their complaint to name the Commission as a defendant instead. Sonda and Corwin did so, and also named as defendants each person who serves on the Commission. The amended complaint still does not allege that mineral properties owned by Sonda or Corwin were pooled into a unit without their consent. Instead, the amended complaint attempts to address the standing issue by alleging that Senate Bill 694 effectively eliminates their ability to challenge whether they are being fairly compensated for oil and gas produced from their property that was pooled into a unit with their consent.

The Commission moved to dismiss the amended complaint for various reasons, including Sonda’s and Corwin’s lack of standing to bring the case. Judge Bailey did not address the standing issue, but agreed with the Commission with respect to three of the five claims asserted by Sonda and Corwin. Judge Bailey then abstained from addressing the Commission’s arguments for dismissal of the other two claims, which asserted constitutional violations, because he believed that those issues were more appropriate for resolution by a state court instead of a federal court.

The Commission appealed Judge Bailey’s decision to abstain from addressing the arguments for dismissal of the constitutional claims. By opinion issued on January 31, 2024, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Bailey should not have abstained. The appellate court also directed Judge Bailey to first address the standing issue before addressing any other pending issue. The opinion does not specify a deadline for Judge Bailey to rule on those issues. If Judge Bailey finds that Sonda and Corwin continue to lack standing to assert their claims, the case will presumably be dismissed on that ground alone. If Judge Bailey concludes that Sonda and Corwin have established standing, Judge Bailey will likely address the merits of the Commission’s other arguments for dismissal.

© Copyright Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C.
For more news on the Constitutionality of West Virginia’s Oil and Gas Laws, visit the NLR Election Law / Legislative News section.

Exporting U.S. Antitrust Law: Are We Really Ready for NOPEC?

The year is 1979. Inflation and lines at the gas pumps caused by a revolution in Iran have stunned Americans. Driven to action, the International Association of Machinists (IAM) files suit in the Central District of California against OPEC and its 14 member countries for participating in a cartel that controls the worldwide price of oil. None of the defendants made any kind of appearance before the court. Nonetheless, the union lost, and its case was dismissed.

Under the Constitution, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A district court has no power to decide a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. The requirement cannot be waived or avoided; a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction has no legal authority to entertain the matter. A federal statute known as the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA) limits the court’s jurisdiction in cases involving foreign sovereigns and, subject to a few specific exceptions, grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The court in IAM v. OPEC raised the FSIA on its own (there being no defendants present) and, finding the OPEC states immune (OPEC itself could not be served), dismissed the case. Thusly did the IAM lose its antitrust case against defendants who never even showed up in court.

The judiciary has resisted the innumerable attempts since 1979 to hold the OPEC cartel accountable for violating U.S. antitrust laws, even though the court’s IAM decision has proven erroneous. Acts by a sovereign “based upon a commercial activity” in the U.S., or affecting U.S. commerce, do not enjoy immunity under FSIA. Although the district court in IAM didn’t think so, the Ninth Circuit on appeal made clear that pricing of oil on world markets is indeed commercial activity that affects the U.S. economy and, therefore, not entitled to sovereign immunity. But the Appeals Court nonetheless sidestepped the case, taking refuge in the judge-made Act-of-State doctrine. The doctrine is prudential, as opposed to jurisdictional, and amounts to a voluntary renunciation of jurisdiction by a court when its decision could interfere with the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch. Indeed, it is easy to see how a suit against the members of OPEC for price fixing might intrude into a sensitive foreign policy area.

In the four decades since IAM, these considerations have obstructed U.S. courts from holding OPEC accountable for a cartel formed for the purpose of and with the effect of stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce, which is illegal per se. As recently as 2010, the Obama administration urged the Fifth Circuit to dismiss an antitrust suit brought by private plaintiffs on Act-of-State grounds, it being up to the executive branch and not the courts to conduct foreign policy and protect national security interests.

Since 2000, when the first No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Act was introduced in the House, the same legislation has been introduced no less than four times. NOPEC came closest to passage in 2007, when different versions of the bill passed the House and the Senate but were not reconciled. The House and Senate judiciary committees have now both approved the bill, and the latest version is on the Senate’s legislative calendar. Congress could act quickly if there is bipartisan support, otherwise it will take several months and require reintroduction in 2023.

NOPEC consists of three operative parts.

  • First, it would amend the Sherman Antitrust Act by adding a new Section 7(a) that explicitly makes it illegal for any foreign state to act collectively with others to limit production, fix prices, or otherwise restrain trade with respect to oil, natural gas, or other petroleum products. Judicial enforcement and a remedy would be available only to the Department of Justice, so the bill does not create a private right of action.

  • Second, it would amend FSIA to explicitly grant jurisdiction to U.S. court against foreign sovereigns to the extent they are engaged in a violation of the new Section 7(a).

  • Third, the legislation clarifies that the Act-of-State doctrine does not prevent U.S. courts from deciding antitrust cases against sovereigns alleged to have violated the new Section 7(a).

Calls for taking a harder line against OPEC are growing stronger in light of recent actions taken by the cartel. In May, for example, Saudi Arabia and 10 other OPEC members voted to slash oil production – resulting in high gas prices – as the U.S. and other nations imposed embargoes on Russian oil. OPEC’s production cuts provided Russia with a substantial lifeline in its increasingly difficult, costly, and prolonged invasion of Ukraine.

The Senate bill is sponsored by ​​Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Chuck Grassley and cosponsors Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) Mike Lee (R-UT), and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who argue that OPEC’s price-fixing goes directly against the idea of fair and open markets, with current laws leaving the U.S. government “powerless” over OPEC. But are we really ready for NOPEC?

The concern over interference with foreign policy is far from trivial.

The American Petroleum Institute (API) recently sent a letter to Congress opposing the NOPEC bill, stating it would harm U.S. military, diplomatic, and business relations. API President and CEO Mike Sommers warned that while NOPEC is a noble endeavor designed to protect consumers, it would open the U.S. up to reciprocal lawsuits by foreign entities, writing that this could devastate certain political relations and trigger retaliation from OPEC countries. Other NOPEC critics say OPEC countries may limit other business dealings with the U.S., including lucrative arms deals or by pulling in their investments, as Saudi Arabia threatened to do in 2007, when the Deputy Saudi Oil Minister said the country would pull out of a multi-billion Texas oil refinery project unless the DOJ filed a statement of interest urging dismissal of an antitrust case then pending in the U.S. courts. In 2019, Saudi Arabia and OPEC threatened to start selling their oil in currencies other than the dollar, which would weaken the dollar’s position as the global vehicle currency.

For these reasons, it’s not clear what the White House would do if NOPEC passes. The Biden administration’s view of the measure seems to have shifted a bit, but it hasn’t come out strongly one way or the other. This is hardly surprising given the delicate and complex nature of the issue, the ongoing impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the great importance voters place on the price of gas. Then-Press Secretary Jen Psaki said on May 5, 2022, that the “potential implications and unintended consequences of this legislation require further study and deliberation.” More recently, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Brian Deese, President Biden’s Director of the National Economic Council, said that nothing is off of the table – that the administration is assessing the situation and inviting recommendations. On Oct. 5 the Department of Energy said it would release another 10 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In making that announcement, Sullivan and Deese said the administration will consult with Congress on “additional tools and authorities to reduce OPEC’s control over energy prices.” They also reiterated the importance of investing in clean American-made energy to reduce reliance on foreign fossil fuels.

OPEC has such tremendous sway over U.S. gas prices and national security it is no wonder Congress continues to try to do something to free U.S. from OPEC’s whims and hold it accountable for going against the ideals of free markets. But whether NOPEC is the right approach remains an open question.

The antitrust laws represent a national ideological perspective on the most beneficial way to organize an economy. Policy differences between nations are supposed to occur in the diplomatic arena, not in the courts of one country or another. And if OPEC or its members lose an antitrust case in a U.S. court, how will the court enforce its judgment?

Article By Jonathan Rubin of MoginRubin

For more antitrust and trade regulation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© MoginRubin LLP

Court of Appeals Rules That Oil and Gas Company Has Ongoing Obligation to Restore Property Despite General Release of Damages in Surface Use Agreement

On April 11, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued a significant decision in Zimmerview Dairy Farms, LLC v. Protégé Energy III LLC establishing that a general release of damages signed in connection with a pad site surface use agreement did not release the oil and gas company from its ongoing obligations to remediate and restore damage to a landowner’s property.

In the Zimmerview case, Plaintiff Zimmerview Dairy Farms (“ZDF”) signed a surface use agreement with Defendant Protégé Energy III LLC (“Protégé”) permitting Protégé to construct and operate a pad-site for Utica Shale wells on a portion of the ZDF farm. The agreement consisted of three documents: a recorded surface use agreement (favorable to Protégé); a confidential supplemental agreement (with terms favorable to ZDF); and a damage release under which ZDF released Protégé from the anticipated damages already paid for by Protégé. This three-document structure is typical, especially for pipelines easements, and one which many oil and gas companies insist on. Often, the damage release is explained by landmen as an unimportant formality and that the company is still going to fix the land as required under the unrecorded agreement. However, what a landman says, what an agreement says and what a company does can differ dramatically.

In Zimmerview, Protégé proceeded to construct and operate its pad-site without adequately remediating, restoring and reseeding the areas disturbed during construction, including the slopes of the pad-site. Over several years, Protégé’s failure to remediate resulted in significant topsoil damage, invasive weed infestations and ongoing erosion, which rendered large portions of the ZDF farm unusable. Protégé refused to pay or fix the ZDF farm, claiming that the damage release signed by ZDF released Protégé from any obligation to remediate or pay for damages caused to the ZDF farm. When ZDF filed suit and won at trial, Protégé appealed.

On appeal, Protégé once again argued that ZDF had released Protégé from all damages resulting from construction and operation of the pad-site including damages from not remediating the ZDF farm. Despite the broad language of the release, however, the Court of Appeals rejected Protégé’s argument on the basis that the damage release, signed when the surface use agreement was executed, could not have been intended to release Protégé from damages that resulted from the ongoing obligations and requirements Protégé had just agreed to under the surface use agreement. Accordingly, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court judgment (and $800,000 verdict for damages) against Protégé. Given the common use (and abuse) of similar damage releases by both operators and pipeline companies, this decision is a welcome addition to Ohio caselaw and should assist (and hopefully encourage) Ohio landowners to insist on producers and pipeline companies meeting their construction and remediation obligations.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress
For more articles about court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Sixth Circuit Compels Arbitration in Putative Class Action between Shell Oil and Ohio Landowners

Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with Defendants (Shell Oil entities) governing extraction of oil and gas from his five-acre property located in Guernsey County, Ohio. The agreement provided a signing bonus to Plaintiff of $5,000 per acre, contingent upon Shell’s timely verification that he possessed good title to the property. The lease also contained a broad arbitration clause providing that any dispute under the lease was to be resolved by binding arbitration. Plaintiff brought suit, individually and on behalf of other landowners having similar contracts with Shell, for breach of contract after Shell allegedly failed to pay the signing bonus. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio subsequently denied Shell’s motion to compel arbitration, and Shell appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, compelling arbitration and a directing the district court to decide whether the lease allowed for class-wide arbitration. The panel found that the district court failed to address the threshold issue of who decides arbitrability and further reasoned that Plaintiff did not attack the enforceability of the “specific arbitration clause” but rather “argued that much of the contract, which happens to include the arbitration clause, is unenforceable.” In so finding, the panel determined that the arbitration clause was triggered at signing, leading to the applicability of the severability doctrine and the determination that an arbitrator must consider the issue first. As to the class-wide arbitration question, the Panel reasoned that because the parties did not identify a provision in the contract that clearly and unmistakably gave the arbitrator the power to decide the matter, and in light of “the importance of this issue to the case, given that the class could include hundreds of Ohio landowners,” that question would be for the district court to decide upon remand. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore opined that the district court was the proper body to decide whether the dispute should be arbitrated in light of the lease agreement’s two distinct triggering events – the signing of the agreement and the payment of the bonus. As such, Judge Moore opined that only after payment of the bonus would the arbitration clause apply.

Rogers v. Swepi LP, No. 18-3229 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018).

 

©2011-2019 Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A.
Read more about Oil and Gas lease agreements on the National Law Review’s Energy and Environment Page.

Colorado Supreme Court Vindicates the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission: Recent Ruling In Favor of the Oil and Gas Industry

In an important victory for Colorado’s oil and gas industry, the Colorado Supreme Court unanimously supported the decision of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (the “Commission”) to decline a rulemaking sought by environmental activists that could have eliminated new oil and gas drilling. The Commission, which has regulatory authority under the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act, declined to act on a proposed rule that would have required oil and gas developers to prove that every future oil and gas development project, individually and cumulatively with other projects, had zero impact on the environment and public health, and would not contribute to climate change.

The Background

The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. Martinez case began in 2013 when environmental activists requested the Commission implement a rule that would have prohibited it from issuing any permits for the drilling of oil and gas wells “unless the best available science demonstrates, and an independent, third-party organization confirms, that drilling can occur in a manner that does not cumulatively, with other actions, impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land resources, does not adversely impact human health, and does not contribute to climate change.”

After holding extensive hearings on the proposed rule, the Commission ultimately declined to consider it given that the state statutes under which the Commission regulates oil and gas development require it to balance certain considerations with other factors, including the responsible development of Colorado’s oil and gas resources. The Commission was also addressing the activists’ concerns in conjunction with the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment.

While a Colorado district court affirmed the Commission’s decision, a panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order in a split decision based on Commission’s construction of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act.

The Decision

On January 14, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its decision in Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, unanimously reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, thereby affirming the Commission’s rejection of the proposed rule. The Supreme Court relied primarily on the language of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act, C.R.S. §34-60-101 et seq., which directs the Commission to foster the development of oil and gas resources, protecting and enforcing the rights of owners and producers, and in doing so, to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts to the extent necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare – but only after taking into consideration cost-effectiveness and technical feasibility.

In addition, the Supreme Court found support in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act’s statutory and legislative history. The Act’s statutory history was initially entirely pro-development and later evolved to include environmental considerations. The Court also considered the Act’s legislative history, particularly how sponsors of the latest amendments that added environmental factors to the Commission’s balancing explained the amendments were not intended to halt all oil and gas production – which the proposed rule would have likely done.

What it means for your business

The proposed rule in Martinez, if adopted and implemented, might have caused a complete shut-down of Colorado’s oil and gas industry. The Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Commission’s rejection of this proposed rulemaking establishes that Colorado’s courts will not presume to direct agencies to implement such potentially significant regulatory proposals, but will defer to the political process to make any such changes to the state’s regulatory landscape.

 

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
This post was written by Bennett L. Cohen, Ghislaine G. Torres Bruner Philip W. Bledsoe and Megan Rose Garnett of Polsinelli PC.
Read more oil and gas news on our Energy and Environment type of law page.