Tag: mergers

2016 Year In Review: Corporate Governance Litigation and Regulation

2016 year in review2016 saw many notable developments in corporate governance litigation and related regulatory developments.  In this article, we discuss significant judicial and regulatory developments in the following areas:

  • Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”): 2016 was a particularly significant year in M&A litigation.  In Delaware, courts issued important decisions that impose enhanced scrutiny on disclosure-only M&A settlements; confirm the application of the business judgment rule to mergers approved by a fully informed, disinterested, non-coerced shareholder vote; inform the proper composition of special litigation committees; define financial advisors’ liability for breaches of fiduciary duty by their clients; and offer additional guidance for calculating fair value in appraisal proceedings.

  • Controlling Shareholders: Delaware courts issued important decisions clarifying when a person with less than majority stock ownership qualifies as a controller, when a shareholder may bring a quasi-appraisal action in a controlling shareholder going-private merger, and when the business judgment rule applies to controlling shareholder transactions. In New York, the Court of Appeals followed Delaware’s guidance as to when the business judgment rule applies to a controlling shareholder squeeze-out merger.

  • Indemnification and Jurisdiction: Delaware courts issued decisions clarifying which employees qualify as officers for the purpose of indemnification and articulating an updated standard for exercising jurisdiction in Delaware over actions based on conduct undertaken by foreign corporations outside of the state.

  • Shareholder Activism and Proxy Access: Shareholder activists remained busy in 2016, including mounting successful campaigns to replace CEOs and board members at Chipotle and Hertz. Additionally, the SEC’s new interpretation of Rule 14a-8 has limited the ability of management to exclude a shareholder proposal from a proxy statement on the grounds that it conflicts with a management proposal.  Also, some companies have adopted “proxy rights” bylaws, which codify a shareholder’s right to directly nominate board members.

I.  M&A

A.Enhanced Scrutiny of Disclosure-Only Settlements

In January 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an important decision, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,1 making clear the court’s renewed scrutiny of—and skepticism towards—so-called disclosure-only settlements of shareholder class actions. In Trulia, shareholders sought to block the merger of real estate websites Zillow and Trulia.  After litigation was commenced, the parties agreed to a settlement in which Trulia would make additional disclosures in proxy materials seeking shareholder approval of the transaction in exchange for a broad release of present and future claims by the class and fees for plaintiffs’ counsel.

Chancellor Bouchard rejected the proposed settlement and criticized disclosure-only settlements as generally unfair to shareholders.  Chancellor Bouchard noted that the Court of Chancery had previously expressed concerns regarding the incentives of plaintiff counsel to settle class action claims in which broad releases were granted in exchange “for a peppercorn and a fee”—i.e., for fees and immaterial disclosures that provided little benefit to shareholders.2  According to the Court, “these settlements rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders and threaten the loss of potentially valuable claims that have not been investigated with vigor.”3

Continue reading at the National Law Review…

ARTICLE BY Nathan Bull, Alejandra Contreras, Jaclyn A. Hall, Jason M. Halper, Hyungjoo Han & Adam Magid of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
© Copyright 2017 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Failure to Comply with Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Just Got More Expensive

FTC Hart-Scott-Rodino AntitrustLast November, President Obama signed into law an amendment to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act (Sec. 701 of Public Law 114-74). The amendment requires federal agencies to adjust the maximum civil penalties for violations of the laws they enforce no later than July 1, 2016.

On June 29, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission revised its Rule 1.98 to reflect the new higher levels for maximum civil penalties. The new maximums will apply to civil penalties assessed by the FTC after August 1, 2016. They include civil penalties for violations that occurred prior to the effective date. (Going forward, the maximums will be adjusted for inflation each January.)

Of particular significance to corporations that acquire, sell, or merge with other businesses, the penalties for violating the premerger reporting and waiting requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act have been increased from $16,000 per day to $40,000 per day, an increase of 150%.

As most businesspersons know, under the HSR Act, the parties to mergers and acquisitions that meet the dollar thresholds of the Act and are not otherwise exempt must file a premerger notification form, pay the appropriate fees, and wait 30 days (or possibly more) prior to closing the transaction. Failure to file the required notification or to observe the mandatory waiting period will subject the parties to civil penalties, which are now significantly higher.

Note that for continuing violations of the HSR Act, each day is a separate violation. As a result, the maximum civil penalty may be multiplied by the number of days for each violation of the applicable statute or order. (For example, a company or individual that is required to report but fails to do so for one year would be facing a fine of up to $14.6 million under the new levels.)

But statutory maximums are not automatically imposed. Before levying a civil fine, the Commission considers various factors in determining whether the maximum should be mitigated. Those factors include:

  1. Harm to the public

  2. Benefit to the violator

  3. Good or bad faith of the violator

  4. The violator’s ability to pay

  5. Deterrence of future violations by this violator and others

  6. Vindication of the FTC’s authority

Why does it happen that a company or individual fails to make the required HSR filing? The FTC reports that it frequently sees two specific scenarios:

  1. Company executives who acquire company voting shares through exercising options or warrants may fail to aggregate the value of such shares with the value of the company shares they already hold and therefore do not realize that they have satisfied the HSR size of transaction threshold test.

  2. Sometimes companies or individuals who have qualified for the “investment-only” exemption in the past may erroneously continue to rely on that exemption even though they have become active investors in the company or their holdings in the company have increased above 10%.

Other recurring scenarios can also trip up acquirers. For example, companies may not realize that patent and other IP licenses are in certain circumstances treated as the acquisition of an asset for HSR Act purposes.

ARTICLE BY William M. Hannay of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

What Is The FTC Looking at When It Reviews Merger Agreements?

In our last post, we spoke about a proposed merger between office supply chains Office Depot and Staples. As we noted, Office Depot shareholders recently voted to go forward with the acquisition, but the Federal Trade Agreement still has to review the agreement and make a decision, which could make or break the process.

FTC_FederalTradeCommission-SealIn reviewing any merger agreement the Federal Trade Commission—or the Department of Justice, depending on which agency reviews the agreement—an important consideration is the impact the transaction will have on the market. Speaking generally, federal law prohibits mergers that would potentially harm market competition by creating a monopoly on goods or services.

According to the FTC, competitive harm often stems not from the agreement as a whole, but from how the deal will impact certain areas of business. Problems can arise when a proposed merger has too much of a limiting effect based on the type of products or services being sold and the geographic area in which the company is doing business.

With that having been said, most mergers—95 percent, according to the FTC—present no issues in terms of market competition. Those that do present issues are often resolved by tweaking the agreement so as to address any competitive threats. In cases where the reviewing agency and the businesses cannot agree on a solution, litigation may be necessary, but it often isn’t.

Any company that plans on going forward with a merger or acquisition needs to have a clear understanding of the law and the review process. This is especially the case if issues come up regarding competitive threats.

ARTICLE BY Business and Corporate Law Practice Group of McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC
© 2015 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC. All rights reserved.

Mergers and Acquisitions and the Affordable Care Act

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As most employers already know, the Affordable Care Act (a/k/a ObamaCare or the ACA) now imposes health care insurance coverage requirements upon certain employers which have a certain number of full time and full time equivalent employees (“FTEs”).  Therefore, it is imperative that consideration be given to whether parties involved in any merger or other acquisition transaction are currently subject to the requirements of the ACA (and if so, whether they are in compliance with such requirements), or will otherwise be subject to the requirements of the ACA following the consummation of the transaction.

If the buyer or seller company is a “small business,” meaning the company has less than 50 FTEs, it should not be subject to the ACA.   However, a determination has to be made as to whether or not individuals who are treated as independent contractors are, for the purposes of the ACA, truly independent contractors, or rather are deemed to be employees.  While the ACA makes reference to certain federal statutes with respect to this determination, it is clear that the Obama administration has uniquely and aggressively interpreted the ACA to accomplish its objectives.  In those circumstances where the seller or buyer company is below 100 FTEs for the year 2015, the company will be exempt from the requirements of the ACA for the year 2015, but subject to the ACA thereafter.  Even in those circumstances where companies clearly are subject to the ACA, the question then becomes whether or not all of the individuals who provide services to that company are classified appropriately (employees v. independent contractors), and whether the requirements of the ACA have been complied with regarding those individuals.

A new level of complexity has been added in this area by a relatively recent interpretation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in a franchise case dealing with the classification issue, in which the NLRB found that the various employees of the franchisees were also employees of the franchisor.  This could automatically create, for any national franchise, a situation where the local franchisee meets the large employer threshold of the ACA, and therefore would be liable to comply with the requirements of the ACA.  Obviously, the position taken by the NLRB will be contested and is a long way off from being established as binding law upon all employers.  Notably, this very issue has already been addressed in various state courts.  For instance, in contrast to the NLRB decision, the California State Supreme Court recently determined in a 4 to 3 decision that the employees of a franchisee are also not employees of the franchisor.

While the ACA references certain federal statutes for determining whether or not an individual is an employee, in the recent case of Sam Hargrove, et al. v. Sleepy’s, LLC , the New Jersey Supreme Court has advised the Third Circuit that for the purposes of the wage and hour laws, the interpretation should follow New Jersey case law, which provides a much stricter definition for independent contractors than the federal law.  Only time and litigation will tell what interpretation will be made under the ACA for the purposes of determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor with respect to the determination as to whether the employer is a small business subject to the ACA and whether or not an individual is entitled to health care coverage.

In summary, careful consideration must be made in any merger or acquisition transaction as to whether the seller company in an asset purchase or equity purchase is, or the combined company in any merger, consolidation or similar combination will be, subject to the onerous requirements of the ACA based on the number of FTEs of the company.   In order to make such a determination, further consideration will need to be made into applicable case law as to whether or not individuals who are designated as independent contractors of the company are truly independent contractors, or rather should be deemed to be employees of the company for purposes of the ACA.  However, because the law in this area is not entirely settled and continues to evolve, companies involved in merger or acquisition transactions and companies contemplating merger or acquisition transactions will need to stay informed on these issues.

ARTICLE BY

Ari G. Burd
Patrick S. Convery
OF
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.

The Real Tax Benefits of Inverting to Canada

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On August 26, Burger King announced that it entered into an agreement to acquire Tim Hortons, Inc., the Canadian coffee-and-doughnut chain, in a transaction that will be structured as an “inversion” (i.e., Burger King will become a subsidiary of a Canadian parent corporation).  The deal is expected to close in 2014 or 2015. The agreement values Tim Hortons at approximately $11 billion, which represents a 30 percent premium over Tim Hortons’ August 22 closing stock price.

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Under the terms of the deal, Tim Hortons shareholders will receive a combination of cash and common shares in the new company. Each common share of Burger King will be converted into 0.99 of a share of the new parent company and 0.01 of a unit of a newly formed, Ontario-based limited partnership controlled by the new parent company. Holders of shares of Burger King common stock, however, will be given the right to elect to receive only partnership units in lieu of common shares of the new parent company, subject to a limit on the maximum number of partnership units issued.  Burger King shareholders who make this election will be able to defer paying tax on the built-in gain in their Burger King shares until the partnership units are sold. 3G Capital, Burger King’s principal shareholder, has elected to receive only partnership units. 3G will own approximately 51 percent of the new Burger King-Tim Hortons company, with current public shareholders of Burger King and Tim Hortons receiving 27 percent and 22 percent, respectively.

Inversions have gotten plenty of negative publicity during the past few years.  Most of the reported deals involve U.S. companies that have acquired smaller foreign companies in low tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, Switzerland, and the U.K.  As with any inversion transaction, the U.S. company will continue to be subject to U.S. federal income tax on its worldwide income.  The U.S. company will benefit, however, from the ability to: (i) reorganize its controlled foreign subsidiaries under a new foreign parent corporation (thereby removing those subsidiaries from the U.S. “controlled foreign corporation” regime and also allowing for the future repatriation of non-U.S. source profits to the foreign parent corporation and avoid U.S. corporate income tax); and (ii) “base erode” the U.S. company with intercompany debt and/or license arrangements with the new foreign parent or its non-U.S. subsidiaries.

It has been reported that Burger King’s effective tax rate was 27.5 percent in 2013 and Tim Hortons was 26.8 percent (15 percent federal rate plus 11.8 percent provincial rate), so “base eroding” Burger King with deductible interest and/or royalty payments to Canada will not provide a significant tax benefit to Burger King.  Where the use of a Canadian parent corporation, however, will benefit Burger King (and other U.S. companies that have inverted into Canada) from a tax perspective is the ability to take advantage of Canada’s (i) “exempt surplus” regime, which allows for the repatriation of dividends from foreign subsidiaries into Canada on a tax-free basis; and (ii) income tax treaties that contain tax sparing provisions, granting foreign tax credits at rates higher than the actual foreign taxes paid.  The United States does not provide either of these tax benefits under its corporate income tax system or treaty network. 

Canadian Exempt Surplus Regime

In general, under Canadian law, dividends received by a Canadian corporation out of the “exempt surplus” of a foreign subsidiary are not subject to corporate income tax in Canada.  Exempt surplus includes earnings of a foreign subsidiary that is resident in, and carrying on an active business in, a country with which Canada has concluded an income tax treaty or, more recently, a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA).  A TIEA is an agreement between two jurisdictions pursuant to which the jurisdictions may request and share certain information that is relevant to the determination, assessment and collection of taxes, the recovery and enforcement of tax claims, and the investigation or prosecution of tax matters.  The extension of the exempt surplus regime to jurisdictions that have signed TIEAs (but not income tax treaties) with Canada is significant because Canada has signed such agreements with low-tax jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the Bahamas. Historically, the use of a Barbados IBC, which has a maximum corporate income tax rate of 2.5 percent, was the preferred jurisdiction for a Canadian parent company operating in a low-tax jurisdiction because of the long standing Canada-Barbados income tax treaty.

On the other hand, dividends received by a Canadian corporation out of the “taxable surplus” of a foreign subsidiary will be taxable in Canada (subject to a grossed-up deduction for foreign taxes) at regular corporate income tax rates. Taxable surplus includes most types of passive income, such as royalties, interest, etc., and active business income of a foreign subsidiary that is resident in, or carrying on business in, a country with which Canada has neither an income tax treaty nor a TIEA.  Special rules may deem certain passive income (such as interest or royalties) to be included in exempt surplus if received by a foreign subsidiary resident in a tax treaty or TIEA jurisdiction, if those amounts are deductible in computing the exempt earnings of another foreign subsidiary.  For example, interest and royalties paid from an active business of a U.K. subsidiary of a Canadian parent corporation to a Cayman Islands subsidiary of such Canadian parent will be eligible to be repatriated to Canada from the Cayman Islands under the exempt surplus regime on a tax-free basis.

It is interesting to note, however, that Burger King will not be able to repatriate most of its foreign-source income to Canada on a tax-free basis under the exempt surplus rules.  The majority of Burger King’s foreign-source income consists of royalties and franchise fees, which will be considered passive income for Canadian income tax purposes.  (Burger King, which operates in about 14,000 locations in nearly 100 countries, has become a franchiser that collects royalty fees from its franchisees, not an operator of restaurants).

Canada’s Tax Sparing Provisions

Another tax benefit offered by a Canadian parent corporation is the ability to utilize the “tax sparing” provisions contained in many Canadian income tax treaties. Canada currently has income tax treaties that contain tax sparing provisions with more than 30 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Israel, Singapore, and Spain. In general, the purpose of a tax spari
ng provision is to preserve certain tax incentives granted by a developing jurisdiction by requiring the other jurisdiction to give a foreign tax credit for the taxes that would have been paid to the developing country had the tax incentive not been granted.  For example, under Article 22 of the Canada-Brazil income tax treaty, dividends paid by a Brazilian company to a Canadian parent corporation are deemed to have been subject to a 25 percent withholding tax in Brazil and therefore, eligible for a 25 percent foreign tax credit in Canada, even though the treaty limits the withholding tax to 15 percent (and in actuality, Brazil does not even impose withholding taxes on dividends under its local law).  A similar benefit is available for interest and royalties paid from Brazil to Canada (e.g., a deemed withholding tax, and therefore foreign tax credit, of 20 percent, even though the treaty caps the withholding tax at 15 percent).  As noted above, the United States does not currently have any income tax treaties that contain tax sparing provisions.

Conclusion

With Burger King’s effective corporate tax rate of 27.5 percent in the United States in 2013 and Tim Hortons 26.8 percent in Canada, the tax benefits of Burger King inverting to Canada are not readily apparent.  Notwithstanding the lack of a significant disparity in these tax rates, Canada does offer the ability to exclude from its corporate income tax dividends received from the earnings of a foreign subsidiary that is resident in, and carrying on an active business in, a jurisdiction that has concluded an income tax treaty or TIEA with Canada.  This key benefit, along with the Canadian income tax treaties that contain tax sparing provisions, provides one more example of why U.S. multinationals are operating at a competitive disadvantage when compared to other OECD countries around the world. 

ARTICLE BY

Jeffrey L. Rubinger
 
OF 
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

Call Waiting: Department of Justice (DOJ) to Maintain Scrutiny of Wireless Industry Consolidation

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The wireless industry has seen steady consolidation since the late 1980s.  Recently, in late 2013, reports began circulating about a potential merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, the nation’s third and fourth-largest wireless carriers, respectively.  Last week, however, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, William Baer, the assistant attorney general for the antitrust division at the Department of Justice (DOJ), cautioned that it would be difficult for the Agency to approve a merger between any of the nation’s top four wireless providers.

T-Mobile’s CEO, John Legere, stated that a merger between his company and Sprint “would provide significant scale and capability.”  Baer, on the other hand, warned that “It’s going to be hard for someone to make a persuasive case that reducing four firms to three is actually going to improve competition for the benefit of American consumers,”  As a result, any future consolidation in the wireless industry is likely to face a huge hurdle in the form of DOJ’s careful scrutiny of any proposed transaction.

Much of the DOJ’s interest in the wireless industry stems from the Agency’s successful challenge of a proposed merger between T-Mobile and AT&T in 2011.  Since then, Baer believes consumers have benefitted from “much more favorable competitive conditions.”  In fact, T-Mobile gained 4.4 million customers in 2013, bringing optimism to the company’s financial outlook after years of losses.  In the final two quarters of 2013, T-Mobile’s growth bested that of both Sprint and AT&T.  The low-cost carrier attracted customers and shook up the competition by upending many of the terms consumers had come to expect from wireless carriers, as well as investing in network modernization and spectrum acquisition.  This flurry of activity has pushed the competition to respond with its own deals, resulting in “tangible consumer benefits of antitrust enforcement,” according to Baer.

The DOJ’s antitrust division has kept careful watch over the wireless industry the past few years. That scrutiny will remain, as the Agency persists to advocate that four wireless carriers are required for healthy market competition.  The cards are beginning to play out from the Agency’s decision, and as Baer stated, “competition today is driving enormous benefits in the direction of the American consumer.”

Article by:

Lisa A. Peterson

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery