Tag: Litigation

U.S. Supreme Court Directs 5th Circuit Court of Appeals to Re-Examine University of Texas’ Race-Conscious Admissions Policies

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On Monday, June 24, 2013, the U.S Supreme Court issued a much-anticipated ruling in the first affirmative-action case since the 2003 landmark decisions of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.  However,  Monday’s ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin did not reach the merits of the school’s policy, holding that the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review.

For academic institutions that have race-conscious admissions policies, this case does not alter the current legal requirement that such polices be “narrowly tailored” to further the compelling governmental interest of having a diverse student body.  Because the appellate court did not properly apply this “strict scrutiny” standard, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower court for further consideration.

In Fisher, a Caucasian applicant, Abigail Fisher, applied to the University of Texas in 2008. After being rejected for admission, Fisher sued the University, claiming that the school’s race-conscious policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment which requires that racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny.

The District Court granted summary judgment to the University. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, deferring to what it called “a constitutionally protected zone of discretion,” and holding that Fisher could challenge only whether the University’s decision was made in good faith.

In a 7-1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the cursory analysis of both lower courts and held that the proper standard of review must be applied.  Specifically, the Court held that the District Court and appellate court each confined their strict scrutiny analysis too narrowly.  A “meaningful” judicial review, the Court wrote, would have assessed whether the University’s admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve student body diversity that “encompasses a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though im­portant element.”

Fisher presents the most recent challenge to academic affirmative action in the Fifth Circuit, which, in 1996, effectively banned such practices in Texas. See: Hopwood v. State of Texas, 84 F. 3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996). In 2003, the Grutter case overruled that ban and the University of Texas re-implemented a race-conscious admissions policy.

Now that the Fisher case has been remanded to the appellate level, the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in state-funded academic institutions remains unchanged.  Advocates and opponents of affirmative action in public education will have to continue to wait until the Fifth Circuit completes its review and undertakes the level of strict scrutiny review required by the Equal Protection Clause.

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Increased Availability of Health Care Data Means More Oversight and More Litigation

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The increasing availability of health care claims and payment data may portend the future of government and private health care enforcement and litigation.

Data is the lifeblood of health care fraud enforcement efforts.  For many years, Medicare enforcement was hampered by CMS’s use of multiple Medicare contractors to pay and process Medicare claims.  In late 2010, I wrote about how this could change with the allocation of more than $350 million to create integrated Medicare and Medicaid databases designed to enhance government health care fraud detection and enforcement efforts.  It now appears that the future is here.

OIG Report on Medicare Part D Data

Last week, the OIG issued a Report analyzing 2009 Medicare Part D data.  The Report finds that of 1.1 million individual medical practitioners who had prescribed drugs paid for through Part D, 736 general practitioners were “extreme outliers” in terms of five key measures:

  • The average number of prescriptions written per beneficiary;
  • The number of pharmacies filling that provider’s prescriptions;
  • The percentage of prescriptions for Schedule II drugs;
  • The percentage of prescriptions for Schedule III drugs; and
  • The percentage of prescriptions for brand name drugs.

The data analysis uncovered some eye-popping statistics.   One physician was responsible for prescriptions filled by 872 different pharmacies located in 47 states and Guam, another averaged more than 71 prescriptions per individual beneficiary, and another ordered more than 400 prescriptions for each of 16 beneficiaries.  In 2009, Medicare paid more than $352 million on prescriptions written by the 736 physicians identified as extreme outliers.

The Report provides government prosecutors with a roadmap for potential enforcement.  It also illustrates what may be the future of public and private health care fraud enforcement as more and more health care payment data becomes publicly available.  Not only government prosecutors, but also individuals with their own agendas, will be able to analyze the data for aberrations and outliers.

CMS Release of Medicare Claims Processing Data

In recent months, CMS has begun publicly releasing Medicare claims processing data, including hospital charge data for specified outpatient and inpatient treatments.   Multiple media reports have already pointed out discrepancies in the hospital prices reflected in the data.  CMS promises that more health care data will be forthcoming.

Injunction on Release of Physician Payment Information Overturned

On May 31, 2013, a federal judge overturned an injunction that had been in place for 33 years, which had prevented the release of information on what Medicare pays individual physicians.   The injunction was initially issued at the request of the Florida Medical Association, which argued that release of information on what Medicare paid the physicians constituted an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, reasoning the judge found “no longer equitable.”

Medicare Data Access Bill Introduced

After this injunction was lifted, legislation was introduced in the Senate to make Medicare payment data publicly available in a free, searchable database.  The Medicare Data Access for Transparency and Accountability Act would also affirm that data on Medicare payments to physicians and suppliers is public information, not exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.  The bill does not address whether publication of the data constitutes public disclosure for purposes of qui tamsbrought under the federal or state false claims acts.

It is clear that through integrated databases, government investigators are gaining enhanced access to Medicaid and Medicare data that will be mined and analyzed to develop future health care enforcement cases.  It is also clear that insurers, the media, class action counsel, and potential qui tam whistleblowers also may soon be mining this newly available data to identify potential outliers and develop their own health care based litigation efforts.

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Is Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Through the Clean Air Act Becoming “Too Big to Fail”?

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In a much-publicized decision in 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is authorized to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) through the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). A slew of recent cases have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to assert common law claims for damages based on the consequences of past emissions of GHGs. The courts generally have found that USEPA has occupied the role of regulating GHGs, and challenges to the agency’s actions must be brought through the appropriate administrative channels. As the Supreme Court weighs whether to grant certiorari in the Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012), the case that addresses four USEPA GHG rules, the Supreme Court may have difficulty in changing course from the idea that GHGs should be regulated pursuant to the Clean Air Act.

Comer v. Murphy Oil et al., No. 12-60291 (5th Cir. May 14, 2013).

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Gulf residents sued numerous energy companies, alleging that the defendants’ emissions of GHGs exacerbated the severity of and damage caused by the Class 5 hurricane (hereinafter Comer I). The claims ranged from public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence, to fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy. The district court dismissed Comer I with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring these claims and the claims were non-justiciable because they involved a political question.

Comer I became mired in technical details and procedures, and ultimately the plaintiffs tried to refile the case to bring an entirely new lawsuit, Comer II. The Fifth Circuit dismissedComer II because the plaintiffs brought the same claims they alleged in Comer I, and the district court had already dismissed those claims on the merits. The court applied the doctrine of res judicata, which bars parties from litigating the same claim a second time, and, consequently, Comer II was barred by the district court’s original dismissal in Comer I. Because Comer I held that plaintiffs have no standing to challenge GHG emissions through common law claims, it supports the idea that GHGs should be regulated through the Clean Air Act, rather than addressed through litigation.

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. et al., No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012).

Kivalina is a village located on the far northwest shore of Alaska. The village had long been protected by the winter ice that persisted and protected the land mass itself. Due to melting icebergs and rising sea levels, the village land mass is eroding, and remains unprotected by the ice wall for much of the year. The village almost certainly will be either eroded into nothingness or inundated by the Arctic Ocean in the next twenty years. Kivalina sued a large group of energy companies, alleging that the GHGs emitted by them resulted in global warming and their village’s imminent destruction. Under a theory of common law public nuisance, the village sought damages to allow the relocation of the community.

The District Court held that political questions such as those raised by the allegations were not justiciable. Further, the court held the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they could not show that the named defendants likely caused the injuries, nor could the injuries be traced to an act of any of the defendants.

The Ninth Circuit agreed but expounded on the role of federal common law in pollution cases. The Court noted that federal common law has developed to fill gaps arising in cases of transboundary pollution and that those cases generally arise as nuisance claims. Despite its acknowledgement that nuisance claims can be used to regulate pollution, the Ninth Circuit explained that where a statute directly addresses the underlying issue, developing a federal common law was not necessary to address the issue. Accordingly, because the Supreme Court found that Congress acted through the Clean Air Act to address GHG pollution inMassachusetts v. EPA, filling the gap with federal common law (or public nuisance claims) was not necessary. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that federal common law does not fill a gap solely based on the type of relief requested. In other words, the plaintiffs inKivalina sought damages rather than emission reduction, the latter being the type of relief afforded by the Clean Air Act. Although the plaintiffs’ requested relief was not available under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act still displaced federal common law and prevented plaintiffs from seeking damages through a common law claim (such as public nuisance).

Consequently, Kivalina, like Comer, supports the idea that USEPA is charged with regulation of GHGs through the Clean Air Act.

Public Trust Doctrine Cases

Along a similar avenue, a number of public trust doctrine cases have been filed on behalf of children since 2011. In these cases, the plaintiffs allege that children’s futures are being affected by the lack of action to regulate GHGs, and they request that the various agencies cited in the lawsuits — primarily USEPA and Department of the Interior — take immediate action to reduce GHGs. These cases use the public trust doctrine as the basis of the complaint by alleging that the atmosphere is a common resource that must be managed for the public good and the agencies have failed to properly manage that resource. These cases have generally been dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.See Alec L. v. Perciasepe, No. 11-cv-2235 (D.D.C. May 22, 2013); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, No. D-101-cv-2011-01514 (D.N.M. July 14, 2012); Alec L. v. Jackson, No. 1:11-cv-02235 (D.D.C. May 31, 2012); Loorz v. Jackson (D.D.C. April 2, 2012); Filippone v. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Resources, No. 2-1005, 12-04444 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012).

In general, cases arising under the public trust doctrine face two challenges. First, the Supreme Court held in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, No. 10-218 (2012), that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state, not federal, common law and so a federal claim is not justiciable in federal court. Second, in AEP v. Connecticut, No. 10-174 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the role of regulating GHGs, and any consequence(s) of GHGs, has been occupied by the Clean Air Act and therefore challenges to the regulation of GHGs should be brought through the Clean Air Act rather than through a common law claim. Again, these cases are important for the future of GHG regulation because they affirm the agency’s role as the regulator of GHGs through the Clean Air Act.

Montana Envt’l Info. Center v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. cv-11-15-GF-SEH (D. Mont. June 14, 2013).

In another case affirming the role of the Clean Air Act in regulating GHGs, environmental groups claimed that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) failed to adequately consider climate change, global warming, and the emission of GHGs in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) before approving oil and gas leases on federal land in Montana in 2008 and 2010. The environmental groups argued that BLM’s failure to follow NEPA procedures would result in emissions of methane gas from the oil and gas leases at issue. The release of methane gas would cause global warming and climate change, which would present a threat of harm to their aesthetic and recreational interests in lands near the lease sites by melting glaciers, warming streams, and promoting the destruction of forests through the proliferation of plagues of beetles.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit because the environmental groups lacked standing to bring the claim. The court found that the environmental groups failed to demonstrate that BLM’s alleged failure to follow proper procedure created an increased risk of actual, threatened, or imminent harm to their recreational and aesthetic interests in lands near the lease sites. Although the environmental groups had local recreational and aesthetic interests at heart, the court found that the effects of GHG emissions are diffuse and unpredictable, and the groups presented no scientific evidence or recorded scientific observations to support their assertions that BLM’s leasing decisions would present a threat of climate change impacts on lands near the lease sites. Furthermore, the environmental groups did not show that methane emissions from the lease sites would make a meaningful contribution to global GHG emissions or global warming. The court therefore found that the environmental groups failed to establish injury-in-fact and causation. As a result, the court foreclosed another potential avenue for litigating claims surrounding GHG emissions, and potential plaintiffs now seem to be left only with direct challenges to USEPA’s regulations (or lack thereof).

Conclusion

The Court would mark a dramatic shift if it moved away from these cases. By the time the Supreme Court has the opportunity to review climate change regulation again, the Obama administration may have set a “too big to fail” bar with its climate policies. Regardless of what happens in the future, however, as of today, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA appears to have had a pronounced impact, acceding to USEPA the authority to regulate GHGs through the Clean Air Act, and denying common law remedies for impacts tied to climate change.

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Motions To Adjourn – Do They End Or Continue A Meeting?

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I’ve previously remarked on the different usages attached to the word “adjourn”.  Often a meeting will end with a motion to adjourn.  Sometimes, a meeting will be prorogued – that is, continued to another date.  ”Adjourn” is derived from the Latin words “ad” and “diurnus”, meaning “to” and “daily” (a diurnal flower opens only during the day).  The word came into the English language through Old French “ajorner” (“soup du jour” is the soup of the day).  Based on etymology, an adjournment is a moving a meeting to another day.  This is the meaning given by William Shakespeare to Cardinal Campeius (Lorenzo Campeggio) when in Act II, Scene 4 of Henry VII Katherine of Aragon leaves her divorce proceedings:

So please your highness,
The queen being absent, ’tis a needful fitness
That we adjourn this court till further day:

Strangely, many meetings end with a motion to adjourn.  Those inclined to greater precision might move to adjourn the meeting sine die (i.e, without a day – ”diurnus” is an adjective derived from the Latin word for day, “dies”).  Thus, when a motion to adjourn sine die is reduced to its original meaning, it becomes a motion to move to a day without a day!

Corporations Code Section 602(b) allows for either meaning.  It provides:

The shareholders present at a duly called or held meeting at which a quorum is present may continue to transact business until adjournment notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough shareholders to leave less than a quorum, if any action taken (other than adjournment) is approved by at least a majority of the shares required to constitute a quorum or, if required by this division or the articles, the vote of a greater number or voting by classes.

If “adjournment” means the end of the meeting, the statute simply allows shareholders to continue to transact business even though some shareholders have left a quorum has been lost.  In this case, the “until adjournment” is stating the obvious – no shareholder action can be taken after the meeting has ended.  If “adjournment” means until such time as the meeting is continued, then the statute’s special dispensation for quorumless action ends when the meeting is continued.

In a future post, I’ll discuss the question of who has the power to decide to adjourn a meeting.

The Value of Having an In-House E-Discovery Process

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Having an end-to-end process in place for electronic discovery (e-discovery) and litigation management is critical, says Raquel Tamez, Principal/Deputy General Counsel, Litigation, Computer Sciences Corporation and speaker at the marcus evans Chief Litigation Officer Summit Fall 2013. Even if outside counsel and multiple service providers are involved, Chief Litigation Officers (CLOs) need to have a process, identify the various stakeholders, and determine and define their respective responsibilities. According to Tamez, that is the best approach to take.

How should CLOs approach e-discovery?

It is different for each company. There are opportunities for cost savings if companies can bring some of the data collection and processing in-house, but not every company has that capability or the appropriate litigation profile to justify the time and expense of doing so.

Nevertheless, CLOs should have a “process” in place whether entirely outsourced or entirely in-house or a hybrid. Having an end-to-end process for e-discovery is critical. CLOs may be inclined to simply hand-off the e-discovery function to its outside counsel who, in turn, utilize various service providers with different data processing capabilities and various document review platforms. There is a lack of efficiency and cost effectiveness with this hand-off approach. The better approach is for the CLO to have a robust, documented, end-to-end e-discovery process and “playbook” that outside counsel is required to follow. The process, ideally, should identify the CLO’s exclusive, full-service e-discovery service provider or at a minimum a list of service providers that have been vetted by the CLO’s legal staff and the company’s IT personnel. CLOs will, necessarily, have to invest time and some money to create and build out the process. These front-end costs will result in significant cost-savings in the long-run.

What is the next step? How does this lead to cost savings?

The key to cost-savings here is to have a repeatable process and not an ad hoc approach where the wheel must be reinvented every time a piece of litigation or an investigation is initiated. If the e-discovery process is well-executed, all relevant stakeholders, will know what to do, when do it, how to do it, and who to go to if any doubt. The transparency in the process leads to defensibility and ultimately, savings in both time and monies.

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Chief Litigation Officer Summit – September 8-10 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Chief Litigation Officer Summit.

 

Chief Lit Officer Sept 2013

 

When: 8-10 September 2013
Where: The Ritz-Carlton, Amelia Island, FL, USA

The primary objective of the Chief Litigation Officer Summit is to explore the key aspects and issues related to litigation best practices and the protection and defense of corporations. The Summit’s program topics have been pinpointed and validated by leading litigation counsel as the top critical issues they face.

 

Third-Party Litigation Funding Comes of Age

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Law firm Chief Marketing Officers (CMOs) are on the front line of client development, and thus have an unobstructed view of how the legal market for complex litigation is developing. As budget pressures continue to weigh on corporate general counsel, the need for law firms to adjust their pricing to secure new clients is clearly being felt – some firms are now hiring specialty personnel to focus solely on the question of proper pricing. CMOs are thus actively speaking the lingua franca of today’s latest fee structures – from RFPs to AFAs and discounted fees.

Given this, it is surprising to discover that many otherwise business savvy CMOs know little about the emergence of commercial litigation finance. While some are keenly aware of the new industry’s progress – and eager to share their involvement in the funding of multiple cases – others are seemingly unfamiliar with the advent of specialist funding companies and the business development opportunities that they could present for them.

In fairness, due to the often confidential nature of commercial litigation finance, the commercial litigation finance industry has been somewhat constrained in publicizing itself. One example of this is at a recent conference I sat next to the sharp CMO of a top firm who asked me what litigation finance did and what company I worked for. I explained to him that we financed legal fees in multi-million dollar cases, and that we had recently funded a case involving his own firm!

At its most basic level, litigation finance is very straightforward. A third-party funds legal fees and expenses associated with a litigation or arbitration, in return for a portion of the ultimate proceeds (settlement or judgment), if any. Importantly, the funding is typically “non-recourse”, meaning that if there is no recovery for the plaintiff, the litigation financier receives no fee.

Claimants have historically found ways to fund their cases – with available capital, through a bank loan, or by agreeing to a contingency fee with their attorney. What has changed recently is the emergence of specialty finance companies that limit their work to the financing of litigation. These firms – which first appeared in Australia a decade ago, and are now active in the United Kingdom and the United States.  They typically invest in large-scale and complex commercial litigation, with investments (and thus legal fees) on the order of several million dollars.

Not all cases are appropriate for litigation financing, and certain criteria must be met as part of a careful due diligence process. Four considerations include:

  1. the merits of the claim – the case must stand a very strong chance of success on the law and facts;
  2. the ratio of costs/proceeds – the ratio of legal fees (and other costs) must be in proper proportion to the expected proceeds (to allow for reasonable costs associated with financing – typically a ratio of at least 1:4 is required);
  3. the duration of the proceedings – as the cost of financing will usually be related to the time the case takes to resolve (given the time value of money), notice must be paid to the expected length of the case; and
  4. the enforceability of judgment – it must be clear at the outset that, if the claim is successful, the plaintiff will be able to collect its judgment from the defendant.

Once an investment is made, litigation financiers are careful as to their involvement in a given case. Important rules of legal ethics are respected so that the funder does not interfere with case strategy, settlement decisions, or the attorney-client relationship. And, as mentioned above, the financing is typically kept confidential between the parties.

Given the challenge of drawing in new clients, law firm CMOs must leverage every available advantage. In several business development scenarios, the prospect of litigation finance can help:

  • Fee negotiations – in situations where a client would prefer to work with a given firm – but the client will not (or cannot) pay the firm’s standard hourly fees – financing can be used to pay such fees and allow the case to proceed;
  • Alternative to contingency fee – in situations where a firm is asked to act on a contingency fee basis, a litigation financier can step in to provide a similar result: the firm receives its standard hourly fees, paid for by the funder, which in turn only receives compensation in the event of a “win” (sometimes referred to as a “synthetic contingency”);
  • RFP (request for proposal) – in situations where an RFP has been issued by a potential client, a firm’s response may be better received if it makes proper mention of litigation finance as an innovative variation to AFA (alternative fee arrangements); and
  • Fee “fatigue” – in situations where an existing client involved in extended litigation has begun to express concern regarding mounting fees (perhaps on the eve of trial), litigation finance can offer immediate cash-flow relief and allow the firm to receive its full fees.

In short, litigation finance can offer law firm CMOs (and anyone involved in legal business development) a new tool with which to hammer out difficult pricing issues and fee structures for big-ticket litigation.

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Supreme Court Holds That Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Are Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny

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For over a decade, the antitrust enforcers at the Federal Trade Commission have challenged the type of patent settlement where a brand-name drug manufacturer pays a prospective generic manufacturer to settle patent challenges, and the generic manufacturer agrees not to bring its generic to market for a specified number of years. The lower federal courts have over the years rejected the challenges. However, on June 17, 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, and in a 5-3 decision held that such settlements are subject to rule of reason antitrust scrutiny. However, beyond that conclusion, the Court left the questions of how to structure and resolve the rule of reason issue to the lower courts and future cases.

As Justice Breyer’s majority opinion summarized the issue and its holding:

Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is ‘immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’ And since the alleged infringer’s promise not to enter the patentee’s market expired before the patent’s term ended, the Circuit found the agreement legal and dismissed the FTC complaint. In our view, however, reverse payment settlement such as the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws. We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed. (Citations omitted.)

The Court reasoned that even if the settlement agreement’s anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, that fact or characterization cannot immunize the agreement from antitrust attack. Justice Breyer found that “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well” and that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’ — and consequently antitrust law immunity — that is conferred by a patent.”

Justice Breyer acknowledged that a conclusion of antitrust immunity would find some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement of dispute. However, he concludes that this factor should not “determine the result here” but is offset by five sets of considerations:

First, the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. To the Court, even though the settlement permitted the challenger to enter the market before the patent expired, the settlement also entrenched the patent holder for the period the challenger agrees to stay out of the market in exchange for a payment, delaying the potential for lower prices. As the Court put it, “The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.”

Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified. To be sure, in some circumstances, the reverse payment may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement, or compensation for other services the generic has promised to perform. In such circumstances, a patentee is not using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of no infringement. In the antitrust proceeding, the Court concludes, the patentee should have to show that such legitimate justifications are present.

Third, where a reverse payment threatens to inflict unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about.

Fourth, the majority believes that an antitrust action would be administratively feasible. The majority did not believe that it would be necessary to litigate patent validity to normally answer the antitrust question — an unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival. “In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”

Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling in some other way, without the potential to maintain and share patent-generated monopoly profits.

The FTC advocated that the Court adopt a rule that reverse payments are “presumptively unlawful” and that they be analyzed under a “quick look” approach, requiring the patentee to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects. The Court rejected this position, instead instructing the issue undergo a full rule of reason analysis. In doing so, it left to the lower court the structuring of this and other rule of reason antitrust litigation on the issue.

In practical terms, the decision leaves many difficult issues to be grappled with, and the majority’s apparent confidence that the antitrust question is answerable without getting into the patent issues themselves may prove more aspirational than practical. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent exposes one flaw:

The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court. …This is flawed for several reasons.

First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don’t know the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the litigation. But the same is true of any hard legal question that is yet to be adjudicated. Just because people don’t know the answer doesn’t mean that there is no answer until a court declares one. Yet the majority would impose antitrust liability based on the parties’ subjective uncertainty about that legal conclusion.

The Court does so on the assumption that offering a ‘large’ sum is reliable evidence that the patent holder has serious doubts about the patent. Not true. A patent holder may be 95% sure about the validity of its patent, but particularly risk averse or litigation averse, and willing to pay a good deal of money to rid itself of the 5% chance of a finding of invalidity. What is actually motivating a patent holder is apparently a question district courts will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The task of trying to discern whether a patent holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or other legitimate factors like risk aversion, will be made all the more difficult by the fact that much of the evidence about the party’s motivation may be embedded in legal advice from its attorney, which would presumably be shielded from discovery.

The FTC has hailed the decision:

The Supreme Court’s decision is a significant victory for American consumers, American taxpayers, and free markets. The Court has made it clear that [reverse payment] agreements between brand and generic drug companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and it has rejected the attempt by branded and generic companies to effectively immunize these agreements from the antitrust laws. With this finding, the Court has taken a big step toward addressing a problem that has cost Americans $3.5 billion a year in higher drug prices.

The FTC’s “victory lap” is probably premature. To be sure, we now know that blanket antitrust immunity for reverse payment settlements does not exist. However, everything else remains up for grabs. Until there are additional decisions grappling with the actual issue of liability issued, and reviewed, the extent and circumstances of antitrust liability is unclear. The risk-averse patent holder to whom Justice Roberts alluded might well be motivated to avoid utilizing reverse payments in structuring settlements in the future. In addition, the Competition Office of the European Union actively continues to examine reverse payments settlements, and there have been renewed calls for federal legislation banning such settlements.

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New Data Breach Class Action has Two Million Plaintiffs

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Cyber breaches resulting in the release of personal identifiable information (PII) are increasingly common and now we are starting to see class action lawsuits filed as a result. In what will likely be the beginning of a wave of lawsuits filed as a result of cyber breaches, Schnucks Markets, operator of 100 supermarkets across the Midwest, recently removed a class action lawsuit filed against it to federal court stemming from a data breach that occurred in March in which 2.4 million credit card numbers were stolen.

The Class action complaint alleges Schnucks failed to properly and adequately safeguard its customer’s personal and financial data. In addition to common law negligence and disclosure, the plaintiffs allege a violation of the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act which requires a data collector of personal information to notify individuals in the most expedient manner possible and without unreasonable delay. The complaint alleges Schnucks waited over two weeks to notify its customers and then did so only through a press release as opposed to providing actual notice to individual consumers. Apparently Schnucks struggled to find the source of the breach and this delay may have continued to expose the PII of people who shopped at its stores.

cybercrime graphicSchnuck’s notice of removal to federal court states the grounds for removal include a class size of more than 100 people and damages at issue are greater than $5 million. Schnucks also explains that the data breach was the result of criminals hacking into its electronic payment systems at 23 stores. Further, during the relevant period, 1.6 million credit or debit card transactions took place at these stores. Schnucks calculates that 500,000 unique credit or debit cards were involved thus the putative class has at least 500,000 members.

Damages alleged by the plaintiffs include having their credit card data compromised, incurring numerous hours cancelling their compromised cards, activating replacement cards and re-establishing automatic withdrawal payment authorizations as well as other economic and non-economic harm. Given that data breaches are becoming increasingly common it is likely that there will be more lawsuits filed similar to Schnucks in the near future. Legal counsel experienced in cyber risk and insurance can assist retailers and insurance companies with handling such problems as they arise.

U.S. International Trade Commission Grants Injunctive Relief on Standard Essential Patent

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The U.S. International Trade Commission has issued an exclusion order barring importation of certain older model Apple products for infringing a Samsung patent.  The case is significant because the infringed patent was standard essential and encumbered by a commitment to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.  Patent holders and potential defendants should carefully monitor further developments regarding the availability of injunctive relief for infringement of standard essential patents.

On June 4, 2013, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) issued an exclusion order barring the importation and sale of several older model Apple iPhones and iPads for infringing a Samsung patent.  This in itself is unremarkable, as the patent laws permit patent holders to seek monetary and injunctive relief against anyone who infringes their patents, and injunctive relief is commonly granted to prevailing patent holders.  The ITC ruling is noteworthy, however, because the infringed patent was essential to the 3G standard and was subject to a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing commitment.  The ruling therefore runs counter to views expressed by the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies to the effect that injunctive relief should be disfavored when dealing with FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs), underscoring the growing debate as to the appropriate balance between the rights of SEP holders under the patent laws and antitrust policy.

In September 2012, the presiding administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Apple had not infringed any of the patents-in-suit, and that one of those patents was invalid.  Samsung and the staff attorney from the ITC’s Office of Unfair Import Investigations petitioned for review of the ALJ’s decision.  The ITC then requested public comment on its authority to issue an import ban (which is in essence injunctive-type relief) on products that infringe SEPs.  (Monetary damages are not awarded in ITC cases.)  After receiving a number of comments, the ITC issued its decision modifying the ALJ’s construction of certain terms in one of the patents and holding that, as modified, Apple had infringed the patent.  The ITC determined that two of the three remaining patents were not invalid, but also not infringed, and the final of those patents was both invalid and not infringed.  Based on the infringement of one of Samsung’s patents, the ITC issued an import ban with one commissioner dissenting on public interest grounds.

The case arose as part of the broader ongoing intellectual property disputes between Apple and Samsung over popular consumer electronics devices.  The matter has been submitted to the White House and U.S. Trade Representative for a 60-day presidential review period, but it has been decades since an administration overruled an ITC exclusion order.  If the administration does not reverse the decision, Apple can appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

In a recent policy paper entitled “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments,” the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office argued that the ITC and the courts generally should not grant injunctive relief for infringement of SEPs.  The Federal Trade Commission argued the point even more forcefully in a statement submitted last year in ITC investigation 337-TA-752, In re Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, asserting that on the basis of its mandate to consider the public interest, the ITC should not issue exclusion orders related to FRAND-encumbered SEPs.  In support of their position, these agencies have advanced two principal arguments.  First, they assert that the fact that the patentee voluntarily agreed to license the patent on FRAND terms implies that money damages are a sufficient form of relief.  They therefore argue that if the patentee’s first priority was excluding others from using the patent, it would not have bound itself to FRAND terms or tried to secure the patent’s incorporation into a standard.

Second, the agencies argue that injunctive relief may enable patent “hold-ups” by SEP holders.  At the time a standard setting organization is deciding what technology to adopt, patentees often compete with one another as to whose technology will be adopted.  But once a standard is adopted and large investments are made based on that standard, sunk costs often make switching to a different technology or innovating around the patent prohibitively expensive.  Thus, a company wishing to have its patent incorporated into the standard typically must agree to license that patent on FRAND terms.  The antitrust agencies fear that SEP owners can use the threat of injunctive relief to extract above-FRAND royalties from rivals, and that these additional costs are likely to be passed on to consumers.  The agencies therefore argue that the public interest, which the ITC is charged with taking into account, counsels against exclusion orders in these circumstances.

On the other side of the ledger, SEP holders point out that when a patent holder agrees to license its patent on FRAND terms, it is only making a commitment about the terms on which it will grant a license, not surrendering any remedy afforded by the patent laws.  They go on to argue that the position staked out by the agencies places them in an untenable position because prospective licensees may not accept a proposed license on FRAND terms or may disagree with the SEP holder about whether the terms are, in fact, FRAND.  When a dispute arises over the terms on which a SEP will be licensed, patent holders have a legitimate interest in wanting to ensure their ability to pursue all remedies authorized under the patent laws.  These remedies afford patent holders the ability to protect their intellectual property rights and thereby promote innovation.  Making it more difficult to obtain injunctive relief on SEPs would diminish their incentive to invest in innovation, which is one of the fundamental objectives of the patent laws.

The recent ITC decision represents a clear win for SEP holders, but as noted above, it is subject to further review and possible appeal.  And in all events, the underlying policy debate will most assuredly continue.  As a consequence, it is incumbent both upon patent holders and potential defendants to continue to carefully monitor developments in evaluating the availability of injunctive relief in the context of SEPs.

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