Tag: Litigation

Federal Court Rules That Patent Infringement Can Violate Antitrust Laws

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Patent infringement can be considered anticompetitive conduct under federal antitrust law, according to a recent ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

This ruling arose out of a dispute between Retractable Technologies, Inc. (Retractable) and Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD),1 in which Retractable alleges, among other claims, that BD’s infringement of Retractable’s patents foreclosed competition and maintained BD’s monopoly power in the hypodermic syringe market, thereby violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2

Retractable manufactures patented safety syringes and IV catheters, which protect against needlestick injuries by automatically retracting the needle after injection.  According to Retractable’s complaint, BD is the leading U.S. manufacturer of hypodermic syringes and holds a very large share of the relevant market.  Retractable claims that BD took steps to protect its dominant position after Retractable’s entry into the market, including by introducing an inferior line of safety syringes that infringe on Retractable’s patents.  Retractable contends that these actions, together with other exclusionary conduct including unlawful bundling and loyalty discounts, impeded the adoption of new and novel safety syringes, including those of smaller rivals such as Retractable, substantially lessening competition and maintaining BD’s dominance.  Retractable also alleges false advertising and other unfair competition claims.

To prove a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (1) possesses monopoly power, and (2) acquired, enhanced, or maintained that power by exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.3 In one of several motions to dismiss, BD asked the court to find that, as a matter of law, patent infringement can never be considered “exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct,” and therefore cannot be the basis of a Section 2 monopolization claim.  BD argued that no court has ever found patent infringement to be an “anticompetitive” act under Section 2 and that Retractable’s claim makes no economic sense, because patent infringement actually increases competition by making more products available to consumers.

On September 9, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Leonard Davis adopted the recommendations of U.S. Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne’s August 5 Report and Recommendation and issued an order denying BD’s motion.  Judge Davis agreed with Judge Payne that the only binding precedent offered by BD in support of its arguments held that patent infringement is not an injury recognized under the Sherman Act,4 but this has nothing to do with patent infringement as anticompetitive conduct.  Both judges noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in U.S. v. American Tobacco Co. that the Sherman Act covers “every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed.”5 Judge Payne further explained in his Report that while patent infringement often increases competition and benefits the end consumer despite harming a specific competitor, in this case Retractable alleges that the effect of BD’s patent infringement was to decrease competition by keeping BD’s inferior products on the market and preventing the sale of other, better quality safety syringes.

The complex interactions between intellectual property rights and the antitrust laws have received significant attention recently in various contexts, such as pay-for-delay settlements in pharmaceutical patent cases and abusive enforcement of standard essential patents.  The decision in this case adds an arrow to the quiver of companies with patented technology that are trying to compete in a market with a large and established player.  Companies with high market shares should take note that this ruling may expose them to additional antitrust risks, and should carefully consider whether any of their business practices would support a Section 2 monopolization claim against them.

1 Retractable Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., Case No. 2:08-CV-00016 (E.D. Tex.).

2 15 U.S.C. § 2.

3 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).

4 A plaintiff must prove antitrust injury in order to recover damages.

5 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).

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The Financial Crises in Detroit and Spain and a New Round of Deaccessioning Debates

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When public institutions are suffering from financial deficits, one question is usually raised: can they sell art to survive? In the museum world it is generally understood that you are to deaccession art only if the work is duplicative of another work in the collection, or for similar collections-related reasons, and the sale proceeds are used exclusively for collections activities. Therefore, for example, you cannot seek to sell art to obtain sufficient liquidity to meet any financial obligation, or make debt service payments. There is little government regulation on deaccessioning (for example, the NY Board of Regents has the power to provide limitations on deaccessioning on New York museums chartered after 1890). However, private institutions such as the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) and the Association of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) have adopted for their members certain policy guidelines on deaccessioning. Their members are subject to sanctions such as censure, suspension and/or expulsion in the event they do not follow these guidelines.

This is the debate currently happening in the city of Detroit, which has recently filed for bankruptcy, and countries in Europe such as Spain, where steep cuts in its budget have affected state-sponsored museums such as the Prado museum.

As for Detroit’s bankruptcy, some have argued whether the Detroit Institute of Arts (“DIA”) should sell its artwork, yielding an estimate of $2 billion (the city of Detroit has a $20 billion debt). The DIA has 600,000 annual visitors and a collection of approximately 65,000 artworks. Michigan’s attorney general, Bill Schuette, has stated that DIA’s artworks were ‘held in trust for the public’ and could only be sold for the purpose of acquiring new art. Others have claimed that the collection should be sold to refrain Detroit’s retired employees from losing part of their pensions.

From a bankruptcy law perspective, municipalities, unlike businesses, cannot be forced to liquidate their municipal assets (the concept which provides that if a debtor wishes to reorganize it must provide creditors with at least as much as they would get in liquidation does not apply to municipalities). A municipal restructuring plan cannot be approved unless it complies with state law, and as mentioned above, Michigan’s attorney general issued a non-binding opinion stating that the artworks were held in trust for the citizens of Michigan, and thus cannot be sold.

As for Spain, the Spanish Official Gazette has published the annual statements of the Prado museum and one thing is clear: art is not immune to Spain’s recession. Patronage from the Spanish government had a 28% drop (from approximately €6.6 million to €4.8 million) in the last 2 years. However, rather than deaccessioning, this drop has been set off by increasing its international loans. Therefore, the museum authorities allocated these foreign loans receipts as deemed patronage, and this has allowed the museum to stabilize its balance sheet. The annual statements report that the main private sponsors for temporary exhibitions were Axa, Telefónica, BBVA and La Caixa, who contributed a total aggregate amount of €625,000. However, the statements do not specify how much the museums actually invested in setting up such temporary exhibitions. The Contemporary Art Institute (Instituto de Arte Contemporáneo) has been criticizing the lack of transparency in museums and art galleries that receive sponsorship or other type of financial assistance from the state. This Institute has created standards of best practices for contemporary art museums (the “Standards”), which attempt to follow the path of the AAM’s National Standards and Best Practices for U.S. Museums (see http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/standards and http://www.iac.org.es/seguimiento-del-documento-de-buenas-practicas/documento-de-buenas-practicas-en-museos-y-centros-de-arte).

Spain’s Ministry of Culture was actively involved in drafting these Standards, which were revised and signed in 2007 by the Ministry of Culture, the Contemporary Art Institute, and other prestigious institutions, such as ADACE (Association of Directors of Contemporary Art in Spain), CG (the Consortium of Contemporary Art Galleries), UAAV (the Association of Visual Artists), CCAV (the Board of Critics of Visual Arts), and UAGAE (the Association of Art Galleries of Spain). As in the United States, the Standards are voluntary. The pressure by funders, regulators, the press and the public may be considerable, but museums still choose to follow, or not, the Standards. As of this date, of all 50 museums ranked by the Contemporary Art Institute, only two museums comply with the Standards’ minimum requirements: the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía and the Artium.

Spain is also trying to overcome the steep cuts in state subsidies and public grants for art institutions by enacting a bill that will heavily increase tax benefits for museum’s private donors (mirroring the French system) through the Patronage Act (Ley de Mecenazgo). If this bill is passed, tax deductions will increase from 25% to 70% for natural persons, and from 35% to 65% for legal persons. Moreover, small donations of less than €150 will be fully deductible. The aim is to achieve France’s success, where revenues increased from €150 million to € 683 million in a seven-year period (2004 to 2011).

In conclusion, the vast majority of museums are nonprofit and ask for public support in return for providing some kind of public good. Thus, it is essential that museums are broadly accountable for their conduct, in particular in times of recession.

Should they sell part of their collection, or should they choose Spain’s path? i.e. advocate for a subset of artworks in the collection to be sent on a 10-year tour (or less) to museums around the world, receiving a revenue stream while having part of its collection available for the public as a representative and emissary of the city of Detroit? Or is there another path?

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Lawsuits Against Creditors of NewPage

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The trustee for the litigation trust resulting from the NewPage Corporation bankruptcy has launched nearly 800 lawsuits against pre-bankruptcy creditors of NewPage Corporation seeking payment to the trust.

The lawsuits (also called adversary proceedings) have been filed in Delaware bankruptcy court by litigation trustee Pirinate Consulting Group LLC to recover allegedly preferential payments made in the months prior to the company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in September, 2011.

Much to the surprise of many who did business with the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing, not only are they waiting for payment on amounts owed, but they will now face claims that they must give back monies previously received.

Defendants should know there are often defenses to these claims, including that the allegedly preferential payments were made in the ordinary course of business or that additional goods were shipped after those allegedly preferential payments were received. Upon receipt of a complaint, defendants should contact counsel knowledgeable about bankruptcy avoidance actions for assistance. Failure to respond to the adversary proceeding complaint in a timely manner, can result in a judgment and collection efforts by the litigation trustee.

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Who’s GINA and What Should I Know About Her? Re: Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act

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GINA is not a who, but rather a what. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) was passed by Congress in 2008. GINA makes it illegal for employers with 15 or more employees to discriminate against employees or applicants on the basis of genetic information. Employers cannot lawfully inquire about (1) an individual’s genetic tests; (2) the genetic tests of an individual’s family members; or, (3) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in the family members of such an individual.

At the end of 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) announced in its Strategic Enforcement Plan that genetic discrimination would be a top priority over the next four years. The EEOC stuck to their word – in May, 2013, the EEOC settled its first lawsuit alleging GINA violations. The suit involved a fabrics distributor, Fabricut, Inc., who allegedly violated the Act by asking a woman for her family medical history in a post-offer medical examination. The company refused to hire the applicant after assessing that she had carpal tunnel syndrome, which led to Americans with Disabilities Act violations as well. The suit was settled for $50,000.

Shortly thereafter, the EEOC filed its second suit against The Founders Pavilion, Inc., a nursing and rehabilitation center. According to the EEOC suit, Founders conducted post-offer medical exams of applicants, which were repeated annually if the person was hired. As part of this exam, Founders requested family medical history, which is a form of information prohibited by GINA.

Employers should ensure that their policies related to employee medical information and any conducted medical exams comply with GINA. In addition, it would be wise for employers to update employee handbooks to state that discrimination on the basis of genetic information is prohibited.

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Second Circuit Rules Against Make-Whole Premium for Refinancing of Accelerated Debt

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld a bankruptcy court’s decision enforcing indenture language providing for the automatic acceleration, without make-whole premium, of secured American Airline, Inc. notes upon American Airline Inc.’s bankruptcy filing.  The Second Circuit’s September 12 opinion generally follows that of the lower court, discussed in our February 20, 2013 blogpost, and likewise holds that the subsequent refinancing of the accelerated notes did not convert the acceleration into a voluntary redemption on which a make-whole premium would have been due.

The Second Circuit’s opinion does not hold that make-whole premiums are unenforceable in bankruptcy, it merely applies express language in a particular indenture stating that the make-whole premium is inapplicable to an acceleration upon bankruptcy.  Accordingly, creditors that wish to preserve the possibility of obtaining a makewhole premium (or other type of prepayment premium) if their debt is repaid in bankruptcy should insist upon express indenture language to the effect that a make whole premium (or other premium) is due upon acceleration.  Whether or not a court would enforce such a premium is left unaddressed by the Second Circuit ‘s decision; however, the opinion aligns the Second Circuit with courts that have held that automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy clauses in debt instruments are enforceable, because the bankruptcy code’s proscription on the enforcement of so-called ipso facto clauses triggered by bankruptcy applies only to executory contracts, and debt instruments are not executory.

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Former Head of Investor Relations Penalized by SEC for Selectively Disclosing Material Nonpublic Information, While Self-Disclosing Company Escapes Charges

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The selective and early disclosure of material non-public information resulted in a Securities and Exchange Commission cease and desist order and civil penalties against the former head of investor relations at First Solar, Inc. (First Solar or the Company), an Arizona-based solar energy company. The SEC determined that Lawrence D. Polizzotto violated Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation FD by informing certain analysts and investors ahead of the market that First Solar would likely not receive an important and much anticipated loan guarantee commitment of nearly $2 billion from the US Department of Energy (DOE). The day after those disclosures, the Company publicly disclosed this information in a press release, causing its stock price to dip six percent.

On September 13, 2011, First Solar’s then-CEO publicly expressed confidence at an investor conference that the Company would receive three loan guarantees of close to $4.5 billion, which the DOE previously committed to granting upon satisfaction of certain conditions. Polizzotto and several other First Solar executives learned a couple of days later that the Company would not receive the largest of the three guarantees. An in-house lawyer expressly advised a group of First Solar employees, including Polizzotto, that they could not answer questions from analysts and investors until the Company both received official notice from the DOE and issued a press release or posted an update on the guarantee to its website. According to the SEC, notwithstanding this instruction, Polizzotto and a subordinate, acting at Polizzotto’s direction, had one-on-one phone conversations with approximately 30 sell-side analysts and institutional investors prior to First Solar’s public disclosure. In the conversations, they conveyed the low probability that First Solar would receive one of the three guarantees. In some instances, Polizzotto went further and said that a conservative investor should assume that the guarantee would not be granted.

Polizzotto agreed to pay $50,000 to settle the charges without admitting or denying any of the SEC’s findings. He, however, was not subject to even a temporary industry bar. The SEC did not bring an enforcement action against First Solar due to the Company’s cooperation with the investigation, as well as its self-disclosure to the SEC promptly after discovering Polizzotto’s selective disclosure. In addition, the SEC emphasized the strong “environment of compliance” at the Company, including the “use of a disclosure committee that focused on compliance with Regulation FD” and the fact that the Company took remedial measures to address improper conduct, including conducting additional compliance training.

In the Matter of Lawrence D. Polizzotto, File No. 3-15458 (Sept. 6, 2013).

Internet Peeping Toms and The Internet of Things Face New Hurdles: Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Settles with TRENDnet, Inc.

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The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently entered into a settlement agreement with TRENDnet, Inc., a company that sells Internet Protocol (“IP”) cameras that allow customers to monitor their homes remotely over the Internet.  Notably, this is the FTC’s first action against a seller of everyday products that connect to the Internet and other mobile devices, commonly referred to as the “Internet of Things.”

The Complaint

In its complaint, the FTC alleged that, despite representing to its customers that TRENDnet’s IP cameras are “secure,” TRENDnet failed to reasonably secure its IP cameras against unauthorized access by third parties.  According to the FTC, TRENDnet transmitted user login credentials in clear, readable text over the Internet and stored user credentials on a user’s mobile device in clear, readable text, despite the availability of free software to secure the transmissions and the stored credentials.  The FTC Further alleged that TRENDnet failed to employ reasonable and appropriate security in the design and testing of the software that it provided consumers for its IP cameras.

Due to TRENDnet’s inadequate security measures, in January 2012, a hacker exploited the vulnerabilities of the TRENDnet system and posted live feeds for nearly 700 of TRENDnet’s IP cameras, including customers that had not made their video feeds public.  These video feeds displayed people in their homes, including sleeping babies and young children playing.  Once TRENDnet learned of this flaw, it uploaded a software patch and attempted to alert its customers of the need to update their IP cameras through TRENDnet’s website.

The Settlement

Last week, TRENDnet entered into a settlement agreement with the FTC to resolve the FTC’s claims.  Pursuant to the settlement agreement, TRENDnet has agreed that it will not misrepresent:

  • the extent to which its products or services maintain and protect the security of its IP cameras;
  • the security, privacy, confidentiality or integrity of the information that its IP cameras or other devices transmit; or
  • the extent to which a consumer can control the security of the information transmitted by the IP cameras.

What’s more, TRENDnet is required to establish, implement and maintain a comprehensive security program that is reasonably designed to address security risks that could result in unauthorized access to the IP cameras or other devices, and to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of the information that its IP cameras or other devices transmit.  TRENDnet is further required to conduct initial and biennial assessment and reports of such security program by an independent third-party professional every two years for the next twenty years.   Again, some real bottom line costs as a result of these settlements.

Finally, in addition to the measures that TRENDnet must take to protect its customers in the future, TRENDnet must also notify all of its current customers about the flaw in the IP cameras that allowed third parties to access the live feed of TRENDnet customers, and TRENDnet must provide these customers with instructions on how to remove this flaw.

The TRENDnet settlement is the FTC’s first step at regulating data security in the land of the Internet of Things.  Keep a look out to see whether this becomes the FTC’s next hot topic.

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Your Face is for Sale! The 4 Most Interesting Things About the Proposed Update to Facebook’s Governing Documents

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If you use Facebook (and you likely do, if only to play some game that apparently involves crushing large amounts of candy), then you received an email last week informing you that Facebook is proposing changes to its Data Use Policy and Statement of Rights and Responsibilities.  The proposed changes are largely in response to the $20 million settlement, approved last month by a federal judge, of a class action brought against Facebook in response to its use of user names and photos in “Sponsored Stories”.

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In January 2011, Facebook implemented the Sponsored Stories advertising mechanism, which turned user “likes” into product endorsements.  The claim argued that Facebook did not adequately inform its users that profile photos and user names would be used by advertisers to recommend products and services.  The claim also argued that Facebook inappropriately did not give users the ability to opt out of the Sponsored Stories advertising feature and allowed the use of the likeness and photos of minors who, the claimants argued, should have automatically been opted out of the program.  Arriving just days after the approval of the settlement, the proposed changes include an interesting mix of responses and clarifications.  These are the most noteworthy:

Your face is for sale.  Under the approved settlement, Facebook agreed to pay $20 million and give its users greater “control” over the use of information by advertisers.  Facebook did not, however, agree to let its users opt out of allowing advertisers to use information entirely.  Under the revised Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, each user gives Facebook permission to use his or her name, profile picture, content and information in connection with commercial, sponsored or related content.  Facebook further clarifies that this means that businesses or other entities will pay Facebook for the ability to display user names and profile pictures.

  • Kids, be sure to ask your parents’ permission.  By using Facebook, each user under the age of 18 represents that at least one parent or guardian has agreed to Facebook’s terms, including the use of the minor’s name, profile picture, content and information by advertisers, on that minor’s behalf.
  • Your profile photo is fair game for facial recognition scanning.  Facebook scans and compares pictures in which you are tagged so that when your friends post more photos of you, it can suggest that they tag you.  The updated Data Use Policy makes it clear that your profile photo will be scanned for this purpose as well.
  • There’s a renewed emphasis on mobile phone data.  The updated policies make it clear that Facebook and, in certain cases, third-party integrated applications, will have access to a broad array of mobile data.  This includes the use of friend lists by third party mobile applications to advertise mobile applications used by an individual’s friends.  Whereas Facebook encountered substantial difficulty in implementing Sponsored Stories and similar advertising mechanisms, Facebook’s program of allowing mobile applications to market themselves as “Suggested Apps”has been a bright spot for the company’s bottom line.  Moreover, Facebook has signed on to an agreement with California Attorney General Kamala Harris that mobile applications constitute “online services” and, as such, are governed by the same disclosure and transparency regulations applicable to websites.  The clarifications related to mobile devices and applications suggest that Facebook intends to further develop the use of mobile data as a revenue stream without risking the same type of legal action.

Facebook’s proposed revisions remain open for public comment.   While the proposed revisions are unlikely to stoke the kind of furor that past changes have inspired, they remain an interesting display of the developing give-and-take between consumers and online service providers who provide a “free” service in exchange for the right to use and monetize personal data.

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It’s the Words, Not the Ideas, that Are Copyrightable

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed a lawsuit claiming that Elton John and his songwriter partner Bernie Taupin had plagiarized their hit song “Nikita” from a song called “Natasha,” explaining that copyright law does not cover general ideas, but only the specific expression of an idea.  Guy Hobbs v. Elton John, Case No. 12-3652 (7th Cir., July 17, 2013) (Manion, J.).

Guy Hobbs composed “Natasha,” a song about a love story between a British man and a Ukrainian woman.  In 1983, Hobbs registered his copyright in the song and then sent the song to several music publishers, one of them being Elton John’s publisher, Big Pig.  However, the song was never published.  John released the Nikita song in 1985, wherein the singer from the west describes his love for a girl named Nikita, who he saw through the wall and who was on the other side of the line.  The copyright in Elton John song was registered with the U.S. Copyright Office by Big Pig.

Hobbs claimed that he first learned of the Nikita song in 2001.  He alleged that the lyrics infringed his copyright of Natasha and sought compensation from John and Taupin.  Hobbs later sued John, Taupin, and Big Pig for copyright infringement.  Hobbs claimed that his work was entitled to copyright protection because his selection and combination of the elements in Natasha constituted a “unique combination.”  Hobbs argued that the number of similar elements between the two works supported a claim for copyright infringement.

The district court held that the elements identified by Hobbs were not entitled to copyright protection when considered alone.  Hobbs had not established a “substantial similarity” between Natasha, a song about a British man and a Ukrainian woman who did meet, and John’s Nikita song describing an East German woman peering through the Berlin wall at a man she never met.  The district court also rejected Hobbs claim that the elements in the song created a unique combination that was copyrightable.  The district court held that although the theme of the two songs had some similar elements in common, the elements identified were not protectable under the Copyright Act.  Hobbs appealed.

The 7th Circuit agreed, concluding that “Natasha and Nikita simply tell different stories, and are separated by much more than small cosmetic differences.”  The 7th Circuit stated that the Copyright Act does not protect general ideas, but only the particular expression of an idea.  In addition, the Copyright Act does not protect “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.”  The 7th Circuit concluded that “as a matter of law Natasha and Nikita are not substantially similar because they do not share enough unique features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another’s work.”

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Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act (FIAFEA): A Novel Approach To Protecting Financial Institutions From Themselves

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In a matter of first impression, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) not only prohibits fraud perpetrated by a third party that harms a financial institution, but also renders unlawful fraudulent conduct committed by a financial institution that results in harm to itself. In the case of U.S. v. Bank of New York Melon (“BNYM”), the Government alleged that BNYM violated FIRREA by engaging in a scheme to defraud its clients regarding the pricing of foreign exchange trades and that the bank was ultimately harmed by its own misconduct.

FIRREA was passed in the late 1980s in reaction to the savings and loan crisis, and although it has been around for nearly a quarter century, it has not been utilized very often until recently. The law allows the Government to bring a civil action against any individual or entity for violating a number of criminal statutes prohibiting fraud, including mail and wire fraud, if the fraud affects a federally insured financial institution. In the case against BNYM, the Government asserted that the bank committed mail and wire fraud by making false representations regarding its pricing of foreign currency trades in connection with its “standing instruction” program. Under BNYM’s standing instruction program, the bank automatically set the price of foreign currency trades, relieving the client of the need to contact the bank directly and negotiate a price. BNYM allegedly represented that its standing instruction program provided “best execution” with respect to its foreign currency trades, which within the financial industry was commonly understood to mean that the client received the best available market price at the time the trade was executed. According to the lawsuit, however, BNYM did not provide best execution as the term was understood within the industry and instead priced its currency trades within a range least favorable to its clients.

Over time, BNYM’s clients allegedly learned about its pricing practices, which led to a number of lawsuits being filed against the bank by investors and customers, potentially exposing the bank to billions of dollars in liability. In addition, many of BNYM’s clients allegedly terminated their relationship with the bank in the wake of the revelations about its currency pricing policies. Thus, according to the lawsuit, BNYM’s fraudulent misrepresentations with regard to its currency pricing practices ultimately harmed the bank by causing it to lose customers and exposing it to liability.

In response, BNYM argued that it could not be held liable under FIRREA because the financial institution harmed by the fraud must be the victim of the fraud or an innocent bystander, not the perpetrator of the fraud. The Court rejected this argument explaining that, in passing FIRREA, Congress’s goal was to broadly deter fraudulent conduct that might put a federally insured financial institution at risk. Accordingly, it was entirely consistent with Congress’s intent to render unlawful fraudulent conduct perpetrated by a financial institution and its employees that affects the financial institution itself in order to deter these institutions from engaging in such misconduct in the future.

This decision represents a potentially important breakthrough for whistleblowers. Under the Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act (“FIAFEA”), a whistleblower that provides information to the Government regarding fraudulent activity affecting a financial institution that constitutes a violation of FIRREA may be entitled to a reward if the Government obtains a monetary recovery. Unlike other whistleblower statutes, a whistleblower recovery under FIAFEA does not hinge on whether the Government has suffered a monetary loss. If a whistleblower is aware of fraudulent conduct affecting a financial institution-even if the only financial institution that is harmed by the fraud is the very same institution that engaged in it-FIAFEA provides an avenue for disclosing the fraud to the authorities with the potential upside of a substantial reward for doing so. Given the recklessness and misconduct that led to the Great Financial Disaster, the Government’s use of FIRREA and FIAFEA to protect financial institutions from their own excesses is not only warranted, but may also deter future misconduct, just as Congress intended.