Litigation Archives - Page 26 of 51 - The National Law Forum

Hillary Clinton’s Intellectual Property Litigation Experience

Many people are surprised to learn that Hillary Clinton was an intellectual property attorney when she practiced law from 1977-1992 for the Rose Law Firm. While the New York Times has reported that former colleagues cannot remember any cases she tried and that court reporters in Little Rock say she appeared in court infrequently, there are at least three reported court decisions on which she is named as counsel. A review of those decisions provides an interesting glimpse into Clinton’s background with intellectual property.

In a case involving allegations of false advertising, Clinton represented Maybelline Co. in a suit against Noxell Corp. regarding Noxell’s “Cover Girl Clean Lash” mascara product.^[1] According to the complaint, Maybelline’s principal place of business and only factory in the United States was located in North Little Rock, Arkansas. Maybelline asked the court to restrain Noxell from advertising the Clean Lash mascara as being waterproof. Maybelline submitted to the court a videotape of a Clean Lash commercial in which a voice-over claimed that “water won’t budge” Clean Lash and that it “laughs at tears,” and then submitted independent laboratory tests contradicting those claims. Maybelline argued that the commercials were deceptive. Unfortunately for Clinton, it was found that Maybelline brought suit in the wrong venue because Noxell was not doing business in the Eastern District of Arkansas.^[2] The case was transferred to a court in New York and settled.^[3]

In a trademark infringement case, Clinton represented First Nationwide Bank against Nationwide Savings and Loan Association regarding the use of the mark “Nationwide Savings.”^[4] In particular, First Nationwide Bank sought an injunction against the Savings and Loan Association’s use of the phrase “Nationwide Savings” for financial services. First Nationwide Bank argued that the use of the disputed phrase was likely to cause confusion among customers as to the provider of the financial services and was an attempt by the Savings and Loan Association to benefit from the valuable goodwill and reputation established by First Nationwide Bank. Clinton helped to secure injunctive relief for the Bank to prevent the Savings and Loan Association from using the mark.

In another case involving allegations of trademark infringement, Clinton represented Holsum Baking Co. against W.E. Long Co.^[5]regarding the use of the “Holsum” trademark in the marketing of bakery products. Long registered the “Holsum” mark on bakery products in Arkansas and later entered into an agreement granting Holsum Baking the right to use the “Holsum” name for advertising purposes in certain areas for three years. After that time, Holsum Baking began using the composite mark “Holsum Sunbeam” until more than 40 years later when it introduced a wheat bread product and marketed it as “Holsum Grains” with no mention of Sunbeam. Long then contacted the packaging suppliers of Holsum Baking and advised them not to sell packaging bearing the “Holsum” mark to Holsum Baking. Holsum Baking sought injunctive relief to reinstate its packaging source with the “Holsum” mark, arguing that the earlier agreement had been breached or abandoned by the parties and that Holsum Baking had acquired the rights to the “Holsum” mark due to use for more than 44 years. Clinton helped to secure a preliminary injunction for Holsum Baking.

While the number of reported cases involving Clinton is too small to draw any definitive conclusions, the above three cases demonstrate Clinton’s advocacy for companies that had their IP rights threatened. Some commentators have criticized Hillary Clinton’s current intellectual property platform as being vague, consisting of passing references to patent litigation reform and copyright policy. However, given her past experience, she may have more detailed thoughts on IP policy–an area that rarely is a focus in presidential campaigns.

ARTICLE BY Justin M. Sobaje of Foley & Lardner LLP

^{[1] Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ark. 1986).}

^{[2] Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1987).}

^{[3] Morrison, T.C., “The Regulation of Cosmetic Advertising under the Lanham Act,” 44 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 49, 57 1989.}

^{[4] First Nationwide Bank v. Nationwide Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 682 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Ark. 1988).}

^{[5] W.E. Long Co. v. Holsum Baking Co., 307 Ark. 345 (Ark. 1991).}

Pokémon GO – Next Stop: Regulation & Litigation

As everyone is aware, the Pokémon GO craze has taken the world by storm in the past month. Reports estimate there have been over 75 million downloads of the digital game since the program became available on July 6. Apple has not issued any concrete numbers, but has confirmed that it was the most downloaded app ever in its first week of availability.

When the game was first offered, users were required to grant permission not only to use a player’s smartphone camera and location data but also to gain full access to the user’s Google accounts — including email, calendars, photos, stored documents and any other data associated with the login. The game’s creator, Niantic, responded to a public outcry – including a letter from Minnesota Senator Al Franken – stating that the expansive permission requests were “erroneous” and that Pokémon GO did not use anything from players’ accounts other than basic Google profile information. The company has since issued a fix to reduce access only to users’ basic Google account profile information.

As is often the case, remarkable success naturally attracts critics who take aim. In a letter dated July 22, 2016, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) wrote to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requesting government oversight on Niantic’s data collection practices. EPIC is a non-profit public interest research center in Washington, D.C., focusing public attention on privacy and civil liberties issues.

Niantic’s Privacy Policy

EPIC’s letter highlighted a number of alleged issues with Niantic’s privacy policy:

Niantic does not explain the scope of information gathered from Google profiles or why this is necessary to the function of the Pokémon GO app.
Niantic collects users’ precise location information through “cell/mobile tower triangulation, wifi triangulation, and/or GPS.” The Company’s Privacy Policy states Niantic will “store” location information and “some of that location information, along with your … user name, may be shared through the App.” The Privacy Policy does not indicate any limitations on how long Niantic will retain location data or explain how indefinite retention of location data is necessary to the functionality of the Pokémon GO app.
With Pokémon GO, Niantic has access to users’ mobile device camera. The Terms of Service for Pokémon GO grant Niantic a “nonexclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, transferable, sublicensable, worldwide, royalty-free license” to “User Content.” The Terms do not define “User Content” or specify whether this includes photos taken through the in-app camera function.
The Pokémon GO Privacy Policy grants Niantic wide latitude to disclose user data to “third-party service providers,” “third parties,” and “to government or law enforcement officials or private parties as [Niantic], in [its] sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate.” Niantic also deems user data, including personally identifiable information, to be a “business asset” that it can transfer to a third party in the event the company is sold. This issue has been identified as a particular concern to another non-profit organization – Common Sense Media, an independent non-profit organization focusing on children and technology. According to Common Sense Media, location information and history of children should not be considered a “business asset.”

EPIC’s Request to the FTC

Based on the issues highlighted above, EPIC requested that the FTC use its authority to regulate unfair competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) to prohibit practices by Niantic and other similar apps that fail to conform with FTC’s Fair Information Practices and the principles set forth in The White House 2012 report, “Consumer Data Privacy In A Networked World.”

According to EPIC, Niantic’s unlimited collection and indefinite retention of detailed location data, violates 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) because it is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”

EPIC also contends that the unlimited collection and indefinite retention of detailed location data violate the data minimization requirements under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which requires providers to “retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.

Private Lawsuit Filed Against Niantic

Subsequently, a Pokémon GO user has filed suit in Florida State Court alleging that the terms of service and privacy policy are deceptive and unfair, which violates the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Beckman v. Niantic Inc., case number 50-2016-CA-008330, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit for Palm Beach County, Florida.

Practice Pointer

The issue of consumer privacy continues to garner significant attention. Whether you are an app developer or any other company that collects and retains personal information, it is time to review your applicable policies and take appropriate steps to ensure that your company is not the subject of government agency inquiry, litigation, or a data breach.

For employers whose employees may be bumping into each other in the hallway while playing the game, consideration should be given to ban or otherwise regulate employee involvement. Certainly a drop in productively is a concern. However, even if accessing the game during work time is barred, employers should be concerned about the potential compromise to proprietary and confidential information that could occur as the result of data breaches or through counterfeit games that are designed to allow hackers access to your protected information.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey M. Schlossberg of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Massachusetts Appeals Court Ruling: Contractor Justified Not Paying Subcontractor That Refused To Perform Work

The general contractor on a public demolition project paid nothing to a subcontractor that had performed the majority of its work but refused to perform work that it claimed was outside of its scope of work. The subcontractor sued the general contractor and after cross-motions for summary judgment the Superior Court sided with the general contractor, holding that the work in dispute was within the subcontractor’s scope and that the subcontractor breached the subcontract by refusing to perform the work. The Superior Court also held that the subcontractor was not entitled to be paid for the work it did perform because it had not substantially performed its obligations under the subcontract. The subcontractor appealed, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. Acme Abatement Contractor, Inc. v. S&R Corporation, No. 2014-P-257, 2015 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 855 (Aug. 20, 2015). Click here to view the Appeals Court decision.

Contracting Background

S&R Corp. (“S&R”) was awarded a demolition contract by the Town of Weymouth (the “Town”). Part of S&R’s work included the demolition of concrete bleachers adjacent to an athletic field. S&R subcontracted the asbestos abatement work to Acme Abatement Contractor, Inc. (“Acme”). Among other things, Acme was required to remove asbestos containing paint from the bleachers prior to demolition.

Scope Dispute Arises

After Acme had commenced work, it informed S&R that it would remove paint only from the side walls of the bleachers but not the risers because Acme believed that paint did not contain asbestos and, therefore, was not within its scope. S&R directed Acme to the project specifications and identified the contract language that it believed clearly required Acme to remove the riser paint. Despite this language, Acme claimed it did not have to remove the riser paint and even went so far as to have the riser paint tested, which test results came back negative for asbestos. Even though tests performed after the subcontract was signed and work had commenced showed that the riser paint did not contain asbestos, the subcontract language included the risers within Acme’s scope and Acme “owned” that work. Nevertheless, Acme refused to remove the riser paint.

Acme performed the remainder of its obligations and then abandoned the project without removing the riser paint. S&R was forced to engage a substitute contractor to remove the riser paint because the project schedule was in jeopardy and S&R faced the prospect of being assessed liquidated damages by the Town if it did not complete the project on time. S&R did not issue payment for any of Acme’s work, even the two-thirds of the subcontract work that Acme performed, on the ground that Acme had materially breached its subcontract.

Subcontractor Sues and Contractor Wins Summary Judgment

Acme brought suit against S&R seeking $145,000 in damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Acme also sought treble damages and attorneys’ fees under M.G.L. c. 93A, for a total of damages in excess of $450,000. Both parties eventually moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in S&R’s favor finding that: (1) the subcontract required the removal of the riser paint; (2) the subcontract required that Acme perform the disputed work under protest and that Acme’s failure to do so was a material breach of the subcontract; (3) Acme had failed to provide required closeout documents; and, (4) Acme could not recover under quantum meruit for the work it did perform because it did not substantially complete its subcontract obligations.

Subcontractor Appeals

Acme appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which affirmed the Superior Court’s decision in S&R’s favor. Rather than address whether the removal of the riser paint was within Acme’s scope, the Appeals Court held that Acme breached the subcontract by not performing the disputed work as required by the subcontract. The relevant language provided:

Click here to continue reading…

Article By Andrew G. Wailgum & James F. Radke of Murtha Cullina

Controlled Burn: Attorney Perspective on Lone Pine Orders

A Lone Pine order is basically a controlled burn, or it accomplishes the same objective at least. In theory, it is a “fire” used to prevent the growth or blaze of meritless litigation. Don’t want a nasty, complex lawsuit to grow or blaze out of control? Hit it with a Lone Pine order early on in hopes of killing that volatile vegetation. Is it fair? It depends on which side of the courtroom you’re sitting on. Because it acts essentially as an early motion for summary judgment, generally speaking, plaintiff’s attorneys hate them, defense lawyers love them. Does it work? A recent opinion from the Colorado Supreme Court suggests a similar response is required. It depends on which courtroom you’re sitting in – federal or state (and if state, which one).

So what is a Lone Pine order? It’s basically a case management order from the court that requires plaintiffs to produce a certain measure of evidence to support their claims at a very early stage in the litigation. Typically, the orders require plaintiffs to produce evidence of (1) exposure; (2) damage (a disease or property damage); and (3) causation. Lone Pine orders are most often used in complex litigation to identify meritless claims and streamline the litigation. They are typically issued under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows courts to adopt special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2). This sounds kind of like an ambiguous instruction to The Fixer in the mafia: “We need you to handle this Big Nicky.” As a defense attorney, if you want to put some heat to a complex case, you ask the judge for a Lone Pine order. If plaintiff’s counsel cannot put forth sufficient evidence to support the claims, the case is dismissed. The burn is initiated, the dry, delicate tinder is extinguished and there will be no raging wildfire today.

While defense attorneys will argue the bar is not high ─ in that plaintiff’s counsel should have compiled evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of a Lone Pine order long before filing suit ─ plaintiff’s attorneys see Lone Pine orders as premature summary judgment because it forces them to make a prima facie showing of their claims before they are entitled to a lick of discovery from the defendant. Even assuming the burden can be met, it still requires plaintiff’s counsel to essentially “show their hand” very early in the litigation without a similar requirement from the defense. In short, while a Lone Pine order can be an effective case management tool, it is a pretty high bar to set right out of the gate before any discovery has been conducted in the case. This is likely the reason the Colorado Supreme Court recently struck down the trial court’s use of a Lone Pine order in Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp. No. 13SC576, 2015 WL 1813000 (Colo. Apr. 20, 2015).

In Strudley, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case following their failure to make a sufficient evidentiary showing under a Lone Pine order. Plaintiffs appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed based on its conclusion that Lone Pine orders were not permitted under Colorado law. The Colorado Supreme Court recently affirmed, finding Colorado’s Rule 16 did not provide a trial court with authority to “fashion its own summary judgment” by filtering and dismissing claims during the early stages of litigation. This finding was based primarily on a comparison of the state rule and its federal counterpart and Colorado’s decision not to adopt the “special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protected actions” that are included in the federal version of Rule 16. The court rejected defendant’s arguments that the spirit of the state rule encouraged early dismissal of frivolous claims in explaining a stated goal does not equate to a grant of authority to achieve that goal.

While Strudley was a win for the plaintiff’s side and shows that an overly-aggressive state court Lone Pine order may face scrutiny on appeal, it seems this was an anomaly overall. Most federal courts and many state courts find the federal version of Rule 16 supports use of a Lone Pine order to identify meritless claims and streamline litigation. It’s like a controlled burn of their docket.

Article by Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices
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Deflategate: A Critique of Judge Berman's Decision

By now, almost everyone is familiar with Judge Berman‘s decision vacating Commissioner Roger Goodell’s award upholding a four-game suspension of New England quarterback Tom Brady in connection with the tampering of air levels in footballs during the 2015 AFC Championship game. Judge Berman found that Commissioner Goodell’s award was deficient in the following respects:

(1) that Brady had no notice that the conduct for which he was suspended — being generally aware of the misconduct of an equipment assistant and locker room attendant who deflated the balls and then refusing to cooperate with the subsequent investigation — was prohibited conduct for which he could be disciplined;

(2) that Brady was denied the opportunity to examine one of the two lead investigators who authored the investigative report upon which Commissioner Goodell relied, namely NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash; and

(3) that Brady was denied equal access to investigative files, including witness interview notes.

Judge Berman did not remand to correct these errors, but simply vacated the award.

Did Judge Berman Properly Follow the Standard for Review? How sound was Judge Berman’s decision?

From an analysis of his opinion and well-established Supreme Court authority he was supposed to follow, it may have been the Judge himself who overstepped his bounds. It is important to remember that Commissioner Goodell’s role was that of arbitrator; the collective bargaining agreement permitted him to assume that role if he so chose and he did so choose. The level of deference that courts must give an arbitrator is extreme: in essence, as long as the arbitrator is arguably construing or applying the contract, and acting within the scope of his authority, a court cannot overturn his decision. While Judge Berman superficially acknowledged this standard, it does not appear that he actually followed it. Instead, he appeared to apply some type of “common law of the workplace” to find that Brady’s treatment was fundamentally unfair.

The first sign that Judge Berman was straying from his role was his failure to cite or acknowledge any of the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing the basic principles regarding judicial review of labor arbitration awards in the collective bargaining context. The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that a court is not authorized to reconsider the merits of a labor arbitration award even though the parties may allege the award was decided on errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. The Supreme Court has explained this extreme deference as emanating from the federal policy inherent in Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) favoring the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration. In essence, the parties contracted for the settlement of their dispute by an arbitrator of their choice; if dissatisfied with his decision, they are free to select a different arbitrator in the future.

The Supreme Court’s Garvey Decision

In particular, Judge Berman did not cite or deal with the Supreme Court’s decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey. This was striking, as that case, like Brady’s, arose in the context of the review of an arbitrator’s award under the collective bargaining agreement of a professional players association. The facts and decision the Garvey case are worth reviewing, as they demonstrate just how deferential the Supreme Court expects courts to be:

Steve Garvey, an All-Star first baseman, alleged that his contract with the San Diego Padres had not been extended in the 1988 and 1989 baseball seasons as part of the owners’ collusion in the market for free agents that an arbitrator had found to have taken place. He sought damages under a framework that had been set up to determine and evaluate individual player’s claims for damages due to that finding of collusion. Garvey’s main piece of evidence was a letter from the Padres’ President, Ballard Smith, admitted to the non-extension of the contract due to the collusion. However, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s grievance by discrediting the letter because it contradicted the President’s testimony in the earlier arbitration in which the collusion had been found to exist. Bizarrely, however, in that earlier proceeding the same arbitrator specifically had found that testimony to be non-truthful in concluding there had been collusion.

Finding the arbitrator’s decision “completely inexplicable and border[ing] on the irrational,” the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the award, finding the only justification for the arbitrator’s decision was “his desire to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Reversing, however, the Supreme Court claimed to be “baffled” by what the Court of Appeals did in light of the clearly expressed deferential standard for reviewing labor arbitration awards under Section 301. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ruling may have appeared to the Court of Appeals as “improvident or even silly,” but even so that did “not provide a basis for a court to refuse to enforce the award.” According to the Supreme Court, even when a federal judge considering the arbitration award is “convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, it does not suffice to overturn [the arbitrator’s] decision.” This is also true when an arbitrator’s “procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct,” for a federal court may not “interfere with an arbitrator’s decision that the parties [players and owners] bargained for.”

Judge Berman Relied More on the Federal Arbitration Act Than Cases Under Section 301

Had Judge Berman paid closer heed to decisions such as Garvey, he might have been less inclined to wade into the weeds of assessing Commissioner Goodell’s claimed procedural aberrations. Judge Berman instead appeared to rely more heavily on cases applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which establishes four limited statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award. Judge Berman zeroed in on the FAA’s exceptions allowing vacatur where the arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy” or in “exceeding his powers.”

The problem with relying on the FAA, however, is that the FAA has been held not to apply to labor disputes, although to be sure federal courts have often looked to the FAA for guidance in labor arbitration cases. Section 301, which does apply, does not provide statutory grounds for vacating a labor arbitration award, although, as seen, the Supreme Court has made clear what a court may not do. As the body of case law applying Section 301 has developed, the main reasons a court may vacate a labor arbitration award appear to be if (i) the award does not “draw its essence” from the labor agreement, meaning it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement, or is based on “general considerations of fairness and equity” instead of the exact terms of the agreement; or (ii) it violates a well-settled and prevailing public policy.

The Problems With Judge Berman’s Findings

Judge Berman first found fault in Commissioner Goodell’s award because the Judge found that Brady did not have notice that he could receive a four game suspension for general awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs, or for non-cooperation with the NFL’s investigation. He also attacked Commissioner Goodell’s reasoning in looking to penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy as a justification for upholding a four game suspension. He further found that Brady had no notice he could be suspended rather than fined. Citing decisions by other arbitrators involving NFL players, Judge Berman concluded that Commissioner Goodell violated the “law of the shop” by failing to find there was inadequately notice of prohibited conduct and potential discipline.

In all of this, however, Judge Berman was doing what the Supreme Court has stated a judge should not do: second-guessing the arbitrator. For example, the so-called “law of the shop” is not something akin to the common law that a court must follow. Rather, it is up to the labor arbitrator alone to interpret precedent by other arbitrators or, as the Supreme Court has put it, to simply to conclude “that he was not bound by” a prior arbitrator’s decision. Judge Berman relied heavily on decisions by other arbitrators in other high-profile NFL cases — such as “Bounty-Gate” and the Ray Rice and Reggie Langhorne cases — to find that Brady was entitled to the type of notice that Judge Berman thought he was entitled to. But that simply was not Judge Berman’s role to say.

Moreover, Brady’s notice contentions were acknowledged and rejected by Commissioner Goodell in his post-hearing detailed award that was also based on his assessment of the evidence — including Brady’s credibility and the exhaustive Wells investigative report upon which he relied. There can be no question that in so doing the Commissioner was “arguably construing or applying the contract,” which is all it took to require enforcement of his award. In short, the Commissioner was entitled to disbelieve that two equipment employees would take it on their own to deflate the footballs without the knowledge or involvement of the quarterback of the team, and to conclude that Brady’s awareness was conduct detrimental to public confidence in the integrity of the game. He also was entitled to believe that Brady deserved to be penalized for refusing to cooperate with the investigation and then destroying his cell phone rather than turn it over to the investigators, even if there was no specific rule that said he could not do this.

Judge Berman was on similarly weak footing in attacking the punishment meted out (suspension versus fine) because he thought it was error for Commissioner Goodell to uphold the penalty by borrowing from the schedule of penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy. Again, such judgment calls are quintessentially for the arbitrator, and the suspension penalty echoed the penalty that the Patriots themselves had issued to its equipment employees for their roles.

Relying on the FAA, Judge Berman further justified his decision to vacate Commissioner Goodell’s award based on the latter’s refusal to allow Jeff Pash to testify at the arbitration hearing. Judge Berman found this to be “fundamentally unfair,” because Pash was the co-lead investigator of the investigation, known as the Wells Report. Commissioner Goodell had excluded Pash because Pash had not in fact played substantive role in the investigation, his role having been limited to comments on the draft of the report. Commissioner Goodell moreover regarded any testimony by Pash as cumulative, as Wells, the report’s architect, was allowed to testify. But Judge Berman determined that Pash would have had valuable insight into the course and outcome of the investigation and into the drafting and content of the Wells Report. Therefore, he found that Brady was prejudiced because he could not explore how truly independent the report was.

Again, Judge Berman appeared to have simply second-guessed Commissioner Goodell, given that Commissioner Goodell had substantial discretion to admit or exclude evidence without having to “follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts.” Commissioner Goodell had at least a colorable basis for excluding Pash’s testimony. Indeed, his rationale for excluding that testimony was that which a court might have applied. Further, Judge Berman’s conclusion as to how Brady was prejudiced appeared speculative as to whatever additional value Pash’s testimony would have supplied.

Judge Berman came closest to presenting a valid basis for vacating the award in his determination that Commissioner Goodell had improperly denied Brady equal access to Wells’ investigative files and interview notes. Commissioner Goodell had justified his denial of access to those files, including interview notes, because they had played no role in the disciplinary decisions, which were based on the Wells Report itself. But as Judge Berman observed, the Wells Report was based on those notes. Furthermore, compounding the prejudice to Brady was that Wells’ law firm, Paul, Weiss, acted as both independent counsel and as retained counsel to the NFL during the arbitration hearing. NFL counsel therefore had access to the investigate file for direct and cross examination while Brady had no such access.

These observations have some merit. After all, it does not seem fair that Brady had no access to the notes and interviews upon which the report was based, especially when the same law firm that produced the report also represented the NFL at the arbitration hearing. But Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement expressly limited discovery to the exchange of exhibits upon which the parties intended to rely at the hearing. The Commissioner’s decision to deny additional discovery was based on his interpretation of that provision, such that it at least arguably “drew its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, as stated, Commissioner Goodell asserted that the investigation notes played no role in his decision on appeal, and other notes had been provided, such as the interview notes from the NFL’s own investigators.

Judge Berman Should Have Remanded

The final error in Judge Berman’s decision is that he did not remand the case. The procedural and due process errors appeared to be correctable. For example, Judge Berman could have instructed Commissioner Goodell to reconvene the hearing to allow Brady to access the Wells investigative files and to call Pash as a witness. In the Garvey case, the Supreme Court expressly criticized the Ninth Circuit for not remanding, because by not remanding the court in essence was deciding the case. Here, too, Judge Berman in essence was resolving the dispute, and without even making any judgment as to whether Brady did or did not have a role in the tampering that took place.

Immediately after Judge Berman issued his decision, the NFL announced it was appealing. Based on Judge Berman’s apparent failure to properly follow the applicable highly deferential standard, the NFL’s chances for success on appeal appear to be good.

Article By Irving M. Geslewitz of Much Shelist, P.C.

Deflategate: A Critique of Judge Berman’s Decision

(3) that Brady was denied equal access to investigative files, including witness interview notes.

Judge Berman did not remand to correct these errors, but simply vacated the award.

Did Judge Berman Properly Follow the Standard for Review? How sound was Judge Berman’s decision?

The Supreme Court’s Garvey Decision

Steve Garvey, an All-Star first baseman, alleged that his contract with the San Diego Padres had not been extended in the 1988 and 1989 baseball seasons as part of the owners’ collusion in the market for free agents that an arbitrator had found to have taken place. He sought damages under a framework that had been set up to determine and evaluate individual player’s claims for damages due to that finding of collusion. Garvey’s main piece of evidence was a letter from the Padres’ President, Ballard Smith, admitted to the non-extension of the contract due to the collusion. However, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s grievance by discrediting the letter because it contradicted the President’s testimony in the earlier arbitration in which the collusion had been found to exist. Bizarrely, however, in that earlier proceeding the same arbitrator specifically had found that testimony to be non-truthful in concluding there had been collusion.

Finding the arbitrator’s decision “completely inexplicable and border[ing] on the irrational,” the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the award, finding the only justification for the arbitrator’s decision was “his desire to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Reversing, however, the Supreme Court claimed to be “baffled” by what the Court of Appeals did in light of the clearly expressed deferential standard for reviewing labor arbitration awards under Section 301. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ruling may have appeared to the Court of Appeals as “improvident or even silly,” but even so that did “not provide a basis for a court to refuse to enforce the award.” According to the Supreme Court, even when a federal judge considering the arbitration award is “convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, it does not suffice to overturn [the arbitrator’s] decision.” This is also true when an arbitrator’s “procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct,” for a federal court may not “interfere with an arbitrator’s decision that the parties [players and owners] bargained for.”

Judge Berman Relied More on the Federal Arbitration Act Than Cases Under Section 301

The Problems With Judge Berman’s Findings

Judge Berman Should Have Remanded

Article By Irving M. Geslewitz of Much Shelist, P.C.

Jurors Use Social Media To Research Case Details [VIDEO]

Jurors sometimes use social media sites to research case details, but surprisingly, doing so is not always grounds for reversal of a verdict. This video outlines case examples of this behavior, along with practical steps you can take to reduce the risk of having social media impact your next case.

Courts Must Restore Minimal Diversity to Restore Balance of Justice

Should federal court jurisdiction be expanded, and what effect would an expansion have on the judiciary? Alongside three legal experts, I discussed this question at a panel event hosted by the Federalist Society earlier in June. The discussion kicked off the National Association of Manufacturers’ Center for Legal Action’s Restore Our Courts initiative and centered around the primary criticism of expanding diversity jurisdiction – the impact on federal court caseload.

In my latest study, “Estimating the Impact of a Minimal Diversity Standard on Federal Court Caseloads,” I found that these concerns are largely unfounded. Empirical analysis of almost 3,600 complaints filed in state court shows that replacing complete diversity with a minimal diversity standard would increase existing federal district court caseloads by an estimated 7.7 percent. This translates to an additional 43 cases per year for each judgeship – an inconsequential amount, with great potential to restore the balance in the United States judicial system.

As the Founding Fathers intended, diversity jurisdiction protects out-of-state residents from potentially biased state courts. It is meant to ensure that commercial cases would be heard in an impartial forum to protect foreign litigants from local bias. The traditional diversity statute has been interpreted by the courts to require “complete diversity,” where there cannot exist a common state citizenship between any plaintiff and any defendant. But Article III of the U.S Constitution only requires a “minimal diversity” standard for federal diversity jurisdiction, where at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be diverse in state citizenship.

State courts operating under a complete diversity standard open the door to harmful bias and costly lawsuits. Empirical evidence indicates that, compared to federal judges, many state judges tend to favor in-state plaintiffs over out-of-state defendants. This could be due to the intensifying politicization of state courts and state judicial elections where state court judges rely on voters for reelection and thus conform to the preferences of in-state litigants who are also voters.

Countless examples exist of overt bias in state courts, with state judges favoring local litigants and plaintiffs’ attorneys over out-of-state corporate defendants. State courts in Madison County, Illinois have been accused of favoring plaintiffs’ lawyers over out-of-state corporations in asbestos litigation. In fact, approximately one-third of all asbestos injury suits in the United States are brought in this single rural county.

It is clear that biases against out-of-state and corporate litigants continue to thrive today. Returning to the minimal diversity standard required by the Constitution would extend protection against these biases, enhancing fairness in our civil court justice system and discouraging speculative litigation. Most importantly, to the critics of this effort who cite an increased burden on federal court caseload, I say – an additional 43 cases per year is a small price to pay for equal justice.

ARTICLE BY Joanna M. Shepherd of Emory University School of Law

Puerto Rico Supreme Court: Former Exec Cannot Sue Individual Board Members for Breach of Employment Contract

A former employee cannot sue individual members of a corporation’s board of directors for breach of an employment contract and negligence in execution of fiduciary duties, where: 1) the individual board members are not parties to the employment contract; and 2) the employee and his relatives are not shareholders with standing to sue board members for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held. Randolfo Rivera San Feliz et al v. Junta de Directores de Firstbank Corporate et al., 2015 TSPR 61, 196 DPR ___ (2015).

Plaintiff Randolfo Rivera was a former executive of a banking entity in Puerto Rico. The terms of his employment were established in a contract with the bank. The contract provided that any decision regarding the contract, including termination of employment, had to be approved by at least two-thirds of all the members of the bank’s board of directors. The contract also contained a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy regarding the interpretation of the employment contract.

The bank terminated Rivera’s contract in June of 2010. He filed a lawsuit against the bank in Puerto Rico Superior Court, alleging unjust dismissal and breach of contract under the law of Puerto Rico. While this litigation was pending, Rivera filed a separate lawsuit against each member of the board of directors, requesting damages for breach of contract and alleged negligence in the execution of their fiduciary duties. He asserted the board members wrongfully allowed his termination in violation of his employment contract. Rivera’s partner, children, and siblings were included as co-plaintiffs in the second lawsuit, each alleging emotional and economic damages arising out of the employment termination.

The initial lawsuit between Rivera and the bank was dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction in light of the employment contract’s arbitration provision.

The second lawsuit, against the board of directors, also was dismissed at the pleadings stage. The court held Rivera and his family may not sue individual members of the board of directors for violation of their fiduciary duty, because such a claim was available only to shareholders of a corporation through a derivative action and neither Rivera nor his relatives were shareholders. Rivera and his relatives appealed the dismissal of this lawsuit and the case eventually came before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.

Puerto Rico’s highest court upheld dismissal of the action because a non-shareholder does not have standing to sue individual directors of a corporation for an alleged violation of their fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court reiterated that a breach of fiduciary duty claim requires an existing relationship between plaintiffs and defendants, such as the one that exists between shareholders and a corporation’s board of directors. The Court also held that the board of directors could not be liable for breach of contract because it was the corporation, and not the individual members of the board, that was a party to the contract.

Associate Justice Annabelle Rodriguez-Rodriguez dissented. She noted that the employment contract at issue had a clause that was undisputed which provided for arbitration of all controversies related to interpretation of the contract. Since the second lawsuit was based on alleged breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the termination of the contract, she would have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of the arbitration clause and abstained from analyzing the nature of the claims for purposes of a standing issue.

In light of Puerto Rico law governing employee terminations, employers should tread carefully when drafting employment contracts that contain specific reasons for termination, as well as notification requirements.

ARTICLE BY Maralyssa Álvarez-Sánchez of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Are You Free To Eavesdrop on Pocket Dials?

Most people have experienced a “pocket dial” – be it as the sender or receiver – and some have found themselves in embarrassing situations as a consequence. But should people reasonably expect that conversations overhead during a “pocket dial” call are private and protected? Should the recipient feel obligated to end the call? The Sixth Circuit says no.

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit decided whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to “pocket dialed” communications. Carol Spaw, assistant to the CEO of Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, received a call from James Huff, chairman of the airport board. It didn’t take long for Spaw to figure out that she had received a pocket dial, and that the conversation in the background was not intended for her ears. Spaw stayed on the line for an hour and a half – taking notes and recording the audio as Huff discussed private business matters with another board member, and later with his wife. Spaw sent the recording to a third party company to enhance the quality, and shared the recording with other board members. Huff and his wife sued Spaw for intentionally intercepting their private conversation in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of Spaw, finding no “reasonable expectation” that the conversation would not be heard. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Title III only protects communication when the expectation of privacy is subjectively and objectively reasonable. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that James Huff did not have a reasonable expectation that his conversation was private. Although Mr. Huff did not deliberatelydial the call, he knew that “pocket dials” were possible, and did not take any precautions to prevent them. The court analogized Huff’s situation to a homeowner who neglects to cover his windows with drapes; under the plain view doctrine, the homeowner has no expectation of privacy in his home when the windows are uncovered. Huff could have easily utilized protective settings on his phone to prevent pocket dials.

The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Bertha Huff’s claim. Bertha Huff was communicating with her husband in the privacy of a hotel room. She had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that context, and she was not responsible for her husband’s pocket dial. The Sixth Circuit feared that affirming the district court’s decision with respect to Bertha’s claim would undermine what we currently consider a reasonable expectation of privacy in face-to-face conversations. The court remanded the case back to the district court to decide whether Spaw’s actions made her liable for “intentionally” intercepting oral communications.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision leaves us with this: if you receive a pocket-dialed call, feel free to listen, record, and share (but be wary of the privacy interest of the other participants in the conversation); if you are a pocket dialer, lock your phone.

ARTICLE BY Pierre H. Bergeron of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Lauren Maynard contributed to this article.

Tag: Litigation

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