Tag: Litigation

Litigating Religious Land Use Cases, Second Edition

This second edition of Litigating Religious Land Use Cases is a must have resource for religious entities and practitioners alike. It provides practical advice intended to afford sound instruction for religious entities and lawyers representing them to navigate the challenges and uncertainties surrounding a religious land use claim.

Litigating Religious Land Use Cases, Second Edition is a thorough, detailed treatise that explains how to manage complex religious land use cases book in a manner that is easily understood. Although the subject-matter is complex, the author, an authority on land use issues, took great care to include practical case studies in the book that will assist anyone dealing with religious land use issues or practicing in this area of the law.

This edition includes:
• Updates in case law RLUIPA claims through March 1, 2016.
• An analysis of claims that can be raised in addition to religious land use claims.
• Text of the RLUIPA statute and attorney fee statute.
• Charts every single RLUIPA land use case decided:
o Breaking down the elements, whether a claim was justiciable or not.
o The success of the claims.
• Leading law review articles covering RLUIPA—some of which predate the statute

 

To purchase, please click here.

Trump Continues Focus on State Prosecutorial Experience in United States Attorney Nominations

On June 29, 2017, President Donald Trump made his second group of nominations of prospective United States Attorneys. With the eight lawyers he nominated earlier in June, this group brings the current number of Trump’s United States Attorney nominations to seventeen – around 20% of the total number of positions. The nine lawyers he nominated last week are:

  • Kurt Alme, the President and General Counsel of the Yellowstone Boys and Girls Ranch Foundation, to be the United States Attorney for the District of Montana.

  • Donald Q. Cochran, a Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law, to be the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee.

  • Russell M. Coleman, a member of the Frost Brown Todd law firm, to be the United States Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky.

  • Bart M. Davis, the Majority Leader in the Idaho State Senate since 2002, to be the United States Attorney for the District of Idaho.

  • Halsey B. Frank, an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maine, to be the United States Attorney for the District of Maine.

  • J. Cody Hiland, the District Attorney in Arkansas’s 20th Judicial District, to be the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

  • D. Michael Hurst, Jr., the director of the Mississippi Justice Institute and General Counsel for the Mississippi Center for Public Policy, to be the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi.

  • William C. Lamar, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of Mississippi, to be the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Mississippi.

  • R. Trent Shores, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of Oklahoma, to be the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

So far, thirteen of Trump’s seventeen nominees have come from states with two Republican Senators where the “blue slips” approving Presidential nominations are likely easier to come by. Thirteen of Trump’s nominees are also from small or medium districts as DOJ categorizes them. Small and medium districts are those with fewer personnel resources (especially given the DOJ hiring freeze currently in effect), so adding Presidentially-appointed United States Attorneys to these districts will free up the acting United States Attorneys (career prosecutors who were already in the office) to return to prosecuting cases and other matters – no small addition in offices that may only contain twenty or thirty lawyers.

This batch of Trump nominees is very similar to his initial group, as well as similar to the Obama nominees as a whole:

  • Trump’s first batch of nominees had around 26 years of legal experience on average. Reverting to the mean, Trump’s seventeen nominees as a whole average around 23 years of legal experience – the same as the average Obama nominee.

  • Sixteen of the seventeen Trump nominees have prior state or federal prosecutorial experience (everyone but Idaho’s Bart Davis), compared with the more than 80% of Obama nominees who had prosecutorial experience prior to nomination. Eleven of Trump’s nominees have federal prosecutorial experience, consistent with the approximately 60% of Obama nominees who served as federal prosecutors prior to nomination.

  • Two of Trump’s seventeen nominees are former Congressional staff members: Donald Coleman for current Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, and D. Michael Hurst, Jr., for former Representative Chip Pickering of Mississippi and for the House Judiciary Committee. This is also consistent with the Obama nominees, of which around 10% had service as staffers on the Hill. These types of relationships are thought to be helpful when issues involving DOJ are being decided by Congress.

Despite the similarities, Trump continues to emphasize state prosecutorial experience in a way that Obama did not. While less than a third of the Obama nominees had state prosecutorial experience, over half of Trump’s nominees to this point do. Furthermore, three of Trump’s nominees are elected District Attorneys; while three of Obama’s more than 100 total United States Attorney nominees had prior service as an elected District Attorney, none were serving in that capacity at the time of nomination. As noted before, studies have shown that violent crime is more often addressed by state courts than by federal courts. Trump’s continued focus on lawyers with state prosecution experience is still in keeping with his recent executive order emphasizing DOJ efforts to fight violent crime.

A couple of stray observations:

In 2015, Donald Cochran wrote a research paper for the American Journal of Trial Advocacy about how Malcolm Gladwell’s teachings in his book The Tipping Point can be helpful to lawyers during jury trials, which probably upped his “cool factor” among the law students he taught.

Shortly after Trump’s inauguration, Halsey Frank wrote an editorial in the southern Maine newspaper The Forecaster arguing in part that “President Trump is appointing some able people” – a nifty coincidence, that (or maybe an indicator he thought he might get the nomination?).

And a final note: This batch of nominees puts the pace of Trump’s United States Attorney nominations slightly ahead of Obama’s – Trump began July 2017 with seventeen nominations, while at the end of June 2009 Obama only had nine. Given that Obama finished July 2009 with nineteen total United States Attorney nominations, it is not unlikely that Trump’s nominations will continue to move along somewhat more quickly than Obama’s, at least in the short to medium term.

This post was written by Ripley Rand of  Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC.

Bring on the Bad Word Brands? What Supreme Court’s Decision in Matal v. Tam Means for Trademark Owners

The Supreme Court’s June 19, 2017 decision in the Matal v. Tam case has been burning-up the news wires all week. The decision struck down a 70-year-old ban on federally registering disparaging trademarks, finding that the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act violates the First Amendment principal against banning speech that expresses ideas that offend. The decision was joined by all 8 participating justices. The case was heralded as not just a win for the Asian-American dance-rock band The Slants, but also for the Washington Redskins whose trademark registrations were challenged based on the same disparagement clause.

The USPTO was quick to act, issuing Examination Guide No. 1-17 on June 26, providing a framework for how the PTO will examine applications following the Supreme Court’s decision. Opportunistic brand owners were also quick to act; World Trademark Review reports that at least 11 trademark applications for marks that could possibly be deemed disparaging were filed the day of the ruling.

In light of Tam, two other provisions of Section 2(a) — those that preclude registration of immoral and scandalous marks — also seem likely to fall, as both could be interpreted as banning speech likely to offend. In fact, the constitutionality of the scandalousness provision of 2(a) is currently pending before the Federal Circuit (In re Brunetti), and it seems likely the Fed. Cir. will move forward with Brunetti in the aftermath of Tam.

What does Tam mean to brand owners? It seems unlikely that the ability to now federally register offending marks will herald a seismic shift in branding strategies. The ability to use a trademark was never at issue in Tam, simply the ability to protect a mark by federal registration. Similarly, the public’s appetite for offensive brands will likely also not be enhanced by the new ability to obtain federal registration for such source indicia. Just as it is unlikely that the Court’s decision in Tam will persuade my son’s middle school principal that a T-shirt bearing the phrase HOMEWORK.SUCKS (INTA swag courtesy of the folks at dotSucks) is appropriate classroom attire. As always, the strength of a brand goes not to its novelty, but to its long-term ability to communicate the positive attributes of the associated products and services to consumers.

This post was written by Monica Riva Talley of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules That An SEC Enforcement Claim For Disgorgement Is Subject To A Five-Year Statute Of Limitations

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. The decision in Kokesh v. SEC, No. 16-529, resolved a split among Courts of Appeals whether the statute of limitations that applies to SEC enforcement actions seeking a penalty or forfeiture (28 U.S.C. § 2462) applies when disgorgement is sought. The Court had earlier applied that statute of limitations to claims by the SEC seeking a civil monetary penalty, and held that the limitations period begins to run when the violation occurs, not when it is discovered by the government. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013).

Supreme Court SCOTUS Class-Action WaiverThe five-year statute of limitations applies to “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” The Court held that the imposition of disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action is a “penalty,” thus subject to the five-year limitations period. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that disgorgement is imposed as a consequence of violation of a public law, not because some individual was aggrieved. Another element of the Court’s reasoning was that when disgorgement is ordered in an enforcement action the remedy is not compensatory. Instead, disgorged profits are paid to the court, and it is within the discretion of the court to determine how and to whom the money will be distributed.

Perhaps most important among the Court’s rationales, the primary purpose of disgorgement ordered in an enforcement action is deterrence, and sanctions imposed to deter infractions of public laws are “inherently punitive.” The Court noted that the amount paid is often greater than the defendant’s gain so that the defendant is not, in all cases, merely restored to the status it would have occupied had it not broken the law.

The oral argument in the case included considerable colloquy on the source of a court’s power to order disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action. In its decision the Court stated, “Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings . . . .” (Slip Op., p. 5, n. 3)

The obvious effect of the decision will be to require the SEC to be expeditious in filing cases seeking not only civil monetary penalties but also, now, disgorgement. The Court did not address whether the remedy of an injunction, which often has collateral consequences for the defendant, or of declaratory relief is subject to this statute of limitations. The Court also did not discuss the effect a tolling agreement would have on the running of the statute.

This post was written by Allan Horwich of Schiff Hardin LLP.

Employer No-Recording Policies May Violate NLRA Says the Second Circuit

On June 1, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which covers Connecticut, New York and Vermont, upheld a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) finding that Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.’s no-recording policy was overbroad and violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).

In Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. NLRB, Whole Foods’ employee handbook contained a provision that prohibited employees from recording conversations, phone calls, and meetings, without first obtaining managerial approval.  The court concluded that this no-recording policy violated the NLRA.  The NLRA deems it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights [to, among other things, engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.]  Whole Foods insisted that its policy was not intended to interfere with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity or to prevent them from discussing their jobs, and that it was merely a general prohibition against recording in the workplace.  Whole Foods argued that its policy was “to promote employee communication in the workplace” by assuring employees that their remarks would not be recorded.

Whole FoodsThe Second Circuit found, however, that the seemingly neutral policy was overbroad and could “chill” an employee’s exercise of rights under the NLRA.  In other words, the policy prohibited recording regardless of whether the recording involved an exercise of those rights.  As a result, “’employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit’ recording protected by [the NLRA].”  Despite finding that Whole Foods’ policy violated the NLRA, the Second Circuit said that “[i]t should be possible to craft a policy that places some limits on recording audio and video in the work place that does not violate the [NLRA].”  Such a policy might be acceptable if it was narrow in scope, and furthered a legitimate safety concern.

Previously, in 1989, the Second Circuit held that recording a conversation at work in violation of a no-recording policy might not be sufficient “cause” for the termination of an employment agreement under Connecticut law.  In  Heller v. Champion Int’l Corp, (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit rejected the employer’s assertion that such a recording constituted an act of disloyalty on the employee’s part.  According to the Second Circuit in Heller, the employee’s surreptitious tape-recording to be sure, represents a kind of ‘disloyalty’ to the company, but not necessarily the kind of disloyalty that under these circumstances would warrant dismissal as a matter of law. . . . Considering the range of factors that might have justified [the employee’s] conduct, especially his belief that he was gathering evidence in support of a possible claim of age discrimination, we cannot say that [the employer] had sufficient cause, as a matter of law, to dismiss him.

The Second Circuit’s latest decision in Whole Foods makes clear that an overbroad no-recording policy in the workplace will be stricken in violation of the NLRA.  At the very least, courts may disregard an overbroad policy depending upon the circumstances surrounding the recording.  In order for a no-recording policy to withstand scrutiny, care must be taken to limit the scope of the prohibition, and consider whether the employee’s purpose for recording jeopardizes an employer’s legitimate interest.

This post was written by Salvatore G. Gangemi of Murtha Cullina.

Widespread Use of GOOGLE Trademark as a Verb Does Not Render the Mark Generic

On May 16, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that widespread use of the word “google” as a verb for “searching the internet” – as opposed to use as an adjective for a brand of internet search engine – was insufficient to establish that GOOGLE ceased to function as a trademark. Elliott v. Google, Inc., No 15-15809, slip op. (9th Cir. May 16, 2017). As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Google, Inc. on the plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claim seeking cancellation of the GOOGLE trademark on the ground that it had become generic.

Generic terms are words that are the commonly accepted identification of a type of goods or services. By way of example, “automobile” and “chair” are generic terms when used in connection with their dictionary meanings. Under federal law, generic terms are not protectable as trademarks. Trademarks can become generic over time if they are used as the name for a category of goods or services instead of as a brand name or source identifier. This is commonly known in trademark law as “genericide.” Examples of terms that have lost federal trademark protection due to genericide include “aspirin,” “escalator,” and “thermos,” each of which was once a protectable trademark. A registered trademark may be cancelled if it loses its source-identifying significance by becoming the generic name of a particular type of good or service. 15 U.S.C. §1064(3); Elliott, slip op. at 6.

The question before the Ninth Circuit was “whether the primary significance of the word ‘google’ to the relevant public is as a generic name for internet search engines or as a mark identifying the GOOGLE search engine in particular.” Elliott, slip op. at 12. The plaintiffs argued that the word “google” is primarily understood as “a generic term universally used to describe the act of internet searching.” In support, the plaintiffs presented consumer survey evidence showing that a majority of consumers used the term “google” as a verb for the act of searching the internet.

The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ claim as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the court clarified that “a claim of genericide or genericness must be made with regard to a particular type of good or service.” Elliott, slip op. at 8 (emphasis added). Thus, surviving summary judgment would have required plaintiffs to present evidence that the term “google” is generic specifically with regard to internet search engines. Second, the court concluded that “verb use does not automatically constitute generic use,” thus rejecting plaintiffs’ grammatical argument that a word can only be protectable as a trademark when used as an adjective. Elliott, slip op. at 10. The court noted that the part of speech is not dispositive of the genericide issue, as it is well-established that “a speaker might use a trademark as a noun and still use the term in a source-identifying trademark sense.” Elliott, slip op. at 10-11. For example, a restaurant customer might order “a coke,” using the mark as a noun, while still having a particular source of cola beverages – the Coca-Cola Company – in mind. Id. at 11. As a result, plaintiffs’ consumer survey evidence that the public uses the term “google” as a verb was insufficient as a matter of law, because such evidence did not reveal consumers’ thoughts regarding use of the term with respect to internet search engines. Without more evidence, it was not possible to ascertain whether the survey respondents were using the verb “google” in an indiscriminate sense, with no particular internet search engine in mind; or in a discriminate sense, with the Google search engine in mind.

In light of Elliott, a party claiming that a mark has become generic would be wise to present consumer surveys in which respondents indicate whether they believe a term is a brand name or a common name for a particular good or service, regardless of grammatical function. Any consumer survey submitted should be conducted by qualified experts according to accepted principles. As an example, in Elliott, Google offered a survey in support of its position that the GOOGLE mark is not generic, which began by providing a brief overview of the difference between brand names and common names, then asked respondents to classify various words – such as “Coke,” “Jello,” “Amazon,” “Refrigerator,” “Browser,” and “Website” – as either brand names or common names. Id. at 16. Approximately 93% of respondents described “Google” as a brand name. Unlike plaintiffs’ survey, the Ninth Circuit viewed the results of Google’s survey as evidencing consumers’ primary understanding of the word “google” as it related to search engines.

This case contravenes the conventional guidance to always use trademarks as adjectives that modify a descriptive or generic term. Although the Elliott court acknowledged that using a trademark as an adjective makes it easier to prove the source-identifying function of the mark, this holding makes clear that widespread use of trademarks as nouns and verbs does not make them generic, absent significant evidence of indiscriminate consumer use of the mark to refer to any brand of a particular good or service.

This post was written byThomas A. Agnello and Luke W. DeMarte of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP.

Fourth Circuit Ruling Continues Star-Crossed Fate of Trump Administration Travel Ban

On May 25, 2017 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower court’s nationwide injunction against the Trump administration’s executive order (EO) suspending entry into the United States of foreign nationals from six designated countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. This ruling maintains the current status quo under which key provisions of the travel ban have been blocked. As a result, employees from the designated countries remain free to travel to and request admission into the United States.

The EO at issue in the case, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” is a revised version of the original executive order that had also encountered legal obstacles. Under the revised version of the executive order, the Trump administration had attempted to address some of the early objections to the original executive order by excluding certain foreign nationals from its scope, such as those who already had visas, or who were green card holders or dual nationals traveling on a passport from a non-designated country. Despite those changes, the revised EO, issued on March 6, 2017, met with challenges and legal objections similar to the original. Section 2(c) of the revised EO, “Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period,” was the central focus in this case.

While the court was not directly evaluating the constitutionality of the travel ban, the judges took a close look at the strength of the plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim against the EO. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making any law respecting an establishment of religion. In defense of the EO, the administration has asserted a need to accord deference to the president’s actions taken to protect the nation’s security. The court, however, noted that the president’s authority cannot go unchecked, and included an examination of past statements made by President Donald Trump in its analysis.

Stating that the Trump administration’s travel ban was rooted more in the intent to bar Muslims from the country rather than in the government’s asserted national security interest, the court found that the public interest argued in favor of upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction.

Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a statement confirming that the government intends to appeal the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. A separate nationwide injunction against the EO is currently under appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Oral arguments were heard in that case on May 15, 2017, and a decision is pending. Because the case is still ongoing, this latest decision should not be considered a final determination of the EO’s fate.

This post was written by Jordan C. Mendez and Lowell Sachs of  Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

San Mateo Gardens Teaches College District a Lesson on Picking Thorny Subsequent Review Procedure

The California Supreme Court recently addressed an important California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) issue: Who decides whether CEQA’s subsequent review provisions are applicable when there are changes to an adopted project? Subsequent review provisions include a subsequent Environmental Impact Report (EIR) or Negative Declaration (ND), a supplemental EIR, or an addendum to an EIR or ND.  When a project that has been reviewed and finalized under CEQA is altered, what type of review process under CEQA is required, if any?  As we said before on Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District et al., (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937 (Friends of the College), the Court determined that the lead agency makes this determination.  The question that the lead agency should be analyzing is whether the original document “retains some informational value” – if it does, then CEQA’s subsequent review procedures apply.  Should the lead agency’s decision be challenged, then the Court must decide whether “substantial evidence” supports the lead agency’s conclusion.

The First District Court of Appeal thus took up applying this standard on remand. In Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District et al., (2017 WL *1829176) (San Mateo Gardens), the Court of Appeal upheld the San Mateo County Community College District’s determination that it could proceed under CEQA’s subsequent review provisions.  The District had previously analyzed its project, including the demolition or renovation of some buildings on a San Mateo college campus, through a mitigated negative declaration (MND).  After a failure to obtain funding for renovations to the “Building 20 complex,” the District altered the project to include demolition of Building 20 and its associated gardens (the centerpiece of the dispute) and to renovate two other buildings that were previously slated for demolition.  The District determined that these changes would “not result in a new or substantially more severe impact than disclosed” in the original MND, and thus proceeded to adopt the alteration through a subsequent review procedure document called an addendum.

The Court of Appeal held that the District’s decisions to proceed by CEQA’s subsequent review procedures was supported by substantial evidence. The relevant changes only altered the treatment of three buildings while leaving alone plans to demolish 14 others with attendant mitigation measures.

That the District could proceed by CEQA’s subsequent review procedures, however, only answers the first question. The subsidiary, and more “critical” issue, is “to determine whether the agency has properly determined how to comply with its obligations under those provisions.” Friends of the College, 1 Cal.5th at 953.  In other words, which subsequent review procedure is correct to use.  The Court of Appeal held that a more rigorous standard of review is applicable at this second step when a project is originally accompanied by a negative declaration than when an approved project is originally analyzed through an EIR.  This more rigorous standard looks to whether the negative declaration will require a “major revision.”  A major revision is required when “there is ‘substantial evidence that the changes to a project for which a negative declaration was previously approved might have a significant environmental impact not previously considered in connection with the project as originally approved.’ ” San Mateo Gardens, 2017 WL *1829176 (quoting Friends of the College, 1 Cal.5th at 959).  If the project was previously analyzed through an EIR, however, the agency may proceed without a subsequent EIR so long as substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that no major revisions to the original document are necessary.

It is at this critical second step that the District failed. The Court of Appeal determined that there was substantial evidence that the altered project might have a significant “aesthetic impact”, which is a cognizable environmental impact under CEQA.  The “Building 20 complex” demolition would include removal of gardens which were of particular value to the college community for aesthetic purposes.  The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the District violated CEQA in analyzing the altered project through an addendum when a subsequent EIR or MND was necessary.

The takeaway from this case is that lead agencies will have to be especially keen on determining the impact of project changes when the original project is adopted by a negative declaration. While the original document may retain some residual “informational value,” and thus allow CEQA’s subsequent review procedures, it may be difficult to show that project changes do not require some type of further environmental review. It is the lead agencyiess responsibility to determine the need for and type of further review, but that decision must be based upon substantial evidence.

This article was written by David H. McCray and Jacob P. Duginski of Beveridge & Diamond P.C.

Fox News Lawsuits Highlight Importance of Workplace Culture

Employers should take note of the position Fox News is in due to the proliferation of recent lawsuits against the network by numerous current and former employees. To be clear and fair, the lawsuits only involve allegations at this time – nothing has been proven at trial, or otherwise.  Indeed, Fox News has denied the allegations. However, the common intertwined theme throughout all the lawsuits is that Fox News tolerates harassment, discrimination and retaliation. In short, the lawsuits attack Fox News’ workplace culture.

By having its workplace culture attacked, Fox News faces certain defense challenges. For instance, there is likely an increased risk of copycat or “me too” claims.  In fact, Fox News has stated as much to the media. Additionally, the effectiveness of Fox News’ anti-harassment/discrimination policies and its remedial process addressing harassment or discrimination complaints is at issue. Therefore, the company may face challenges in asserting the defense that those employees or former employees alleging discrimination or harassment never complained about the alleged improper conduct, and therefore never gave the company an opportunity to take appropriate remedial action.  Lastly, Fox News has suffered damage to its public reputation.

So what is the takeaway? Simply put, workplace culture matters. Employers should embrace the creation of a harassment/discrimination free workplace culture.  Such a culture should reduce potential lawsuits because the company would be given the opportunity to redress issues early on. Additionally, such a culture will strengthen the company’s defenses against harassment and discrimination claims, lead to increased employee morale and protect against unfavorable publicity that can damage the employer’s reputation.

The following are tips for employers to help create a harassment/discrimination free workplace:

  • Institute a written harassment/discrimination workplace policy with an effective complaint procedure. The complaint procedure should allow employees to bypass their immediate supervisors and report violations directly to other members of management or directly to the HR department. Convey the message that the policy applies to anyone in the workplace, including supervisors, co-workers, vendors and customers, and that anyone can be a harasser or victim.

  • Provide training or information for current and new employees on policy. Conduct refresher training routinely.

  • Implement training for supervisors and managers on relevant policies, including their supervisory responsibilities and role in ensuring compliance with anti-discrimination and harassment policies.

  • Develop the expectation that any employee who is a victim or witness to harassment or discrimination is required to report it.

  • Communicate that retaliation for raising complaints will not be tolerated.

  • Treat complaints confidentially, to the extent practical.

  • Investigate alleged incidents of harassment/discrimination promptly and objectively. Remember that your selection of the individual(s) conducting the investigation matters. The investigator(s) should have sufficient authority to take appropriate remedial action and should be credible. At the end of the investigation, discuss the results with individual who made complaint.

  • Institute appropriate disciplinary action, up to termination, when investigation determines that a policy violation has occurred.

  • Prior to terminating or taking adverse action against an employee, examine potential basis for a retaliation allegation.

Litigation for Non-Litigious Company [VIDEO]

Press Millen and Sonya Pfeiffer examine how in-house counsel, CEOs, and other executives can prepare for litigation and avoid litigation mistakes that may prove costly. The eight pitfalls of litigation that companies want to avoid are laid out in this episode.

Press Millen is a veteran of complex commercial litigation, with particular experience in antitrust, unfair trade practices, trade secrets, confidentiality and IP cases. Press also is a frequent author, blogger and speaker on trade secrets issues.

ARTICLE BY Pressly M. Millen of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Copyright © 2016 Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC. All Rights Reserved.