Agriculture Groups Sue FDA on Chlorpyrifos Ban

  • As previously reported, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publishedfinal rule on August 30, 2021 that revoked all tolerances for the pesticide chemical chlorpyrifos on raw agricultural commodities; the rulemaking was driven by toxicity concerns, primarily concerning exposure in children. The tolerances are set to expire on February 28, 2022, effectively banning the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. In light of the expiration, FDA published a guidance document to assist food producers and processors that handle foods which may contain chlorpyrifos restudies.
  • In October of 2021, agriculture stakeholders submitted formal written objections and a request to stay the tolerance revocations to EPA. More than 80 stakeholders signed the document, arguing that significant harms would result from banning chlorpyrifos and urging the agency to stay implementation of the rule until objections were formally addressed by EPA.
  • Agriculture stakeholder groups are now seeking a court injunction against EPA’s ban on chlorpyrifos. On February 10, 2022, agricultural trade groups representing thousands of members filed a lawsuit against EPA before the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that the agency ignored its own scientific findings regarding 11 high-benefit and low-risk crop uses for chlorpyrifos and that the revocation will cause irreparable damage. It remains to be seen how EPA will respond to the lawsuit.
© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

To Search or To Sink: The Importance of Clearing Your Brand

So many times in my three decades of practice I’ve shaken my head at the perils a trademark owner can so easily avoid by searching and clearing a mark. The litigations! The unnecessary attorneys’ fees! The time and resources lost! All because my client (or adversary) didn’t conduct a proper trademark search.

Adopting a Trademark

So what’s all the fuss about? Well, before adopting a trademark (that is, a brand name for goods or services) you should have an attorney commission a proper clearance search, review it, and provide you with a well-reasoned opinion as to the availability of the brand for “use” and “registration.” (Yes, they are different things, as explained below.) I’m not talking about an Internet search or an online search of U.S. Trademark Office records, though both can be useful to make sure there aren’t any easily found barriers to use or registration of a mark before a full search is commissioned.

I’m talking about a full clearance search done by a reputable vendor the attorney commissions to uncover all uses (registered and not) of the same or similar marks for the same or similar goods/services as you want to use your brand for. The resulting vendor’s report sent to the attorney is typically anywhere from 300 pages up to 1000 pages. Then the (experienced trademark) attorney reviews it and lets you know in a detailed opinion if the mark is free for you to use and register without entangling you in the risk of a dispute/lawsuit. If it’s not available, you pick another brand, and search again.

Using a Brand and Registering It

So what’s the difference between freedom to use a brand and freedom to register it? In the U.S., “common law” trademark rights can exist based solely upon use (that is use of a trademark without registration). That’s because consumers can associate a brand with a single source (the trademark owner/producer of goods/services) even if it’s not registered. (It’s different in other countries, and searches should be done in every country for which you want to use your brand.)

So it’s possible that there’s a barrier to use but not to registration, because a common law (unregistered) trademark is too similar to the brand you want to use, and is being used in connection with identical or related goods/services as your proposed brand. That’s why you want clearance to both use and register a mark. (Registration is important because it provides you with nationwide rights in your brand; common law trademarks cover only the geographic territory where sales under the brand occur.)

So please clear your mark. It’s pennies on the dollar compared to what you will spend in a dispute or (heaven forbid) litigation. Here’s to happy searching!

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

New Tools in the Fight Against Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals

The explosive growth of internet pharmacies and direct-to-consumer shipment of pharmaceuticals has provided increased access to, and reduced the cost of, important medications. Unfortunately, these same forces have increased the risks that counterfeit medicines will make their way to consumers, endangering patient safety and affecting manufacturers’ reputation in the public eye.

While the Food and Drug Administration attempts to police such misconduct through enforcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), the resources devoted to enforcement are simply no match for the size and scope of the counterfeiting threat. Fortunately, pharmaceutical manufacturers are not without recourse, as several well-established tools may be used in the right circumstances to stop counterfeiters from profiting from the sale of knock-offs.

Experienced litigators can use the Lanham Act and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act to stop unscrupulous individuals and organizations from deceiving customers with counterfeit versions of trademarked drugs. Until recently, these legal weapons – including search warrants, seizures, forfeitures, and significant penalties – were typically wielded only by the government and only in criminal prosecutions.

As one recent case demonstrates, however, many of the tools that law enforcement has used for years to combat counterfeiters are also available to pharmaceutical manufacturers. In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Safe Chain Solutions, LLC, et al., the manufacturer of several trademarked HIV medications filed a civil complaint, under seal, alleging violations of the Lanham Act and RICO against scores of individuals and companies that were allegedly selling counterfeit versions of these drugs to patients across the country.

By deploying private investigators and techniques typically used by law enforcement, Gilead was able to gather a substantial amount of evidence before even filing the case. The company then used this evidence to secure ex parte seizure warrants and asset freezes, allowing it to locate and seize thousands of counterfeit pills and packaging before they could be shipped to unsuspecting consumers. Through the seizure of the financial proceeds of the alleged counterfeiting, Gilead prevented the dissipation of assets. If the company can successfully prove its RICO case, it stands to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees as well.

Manufacturers of trademarked pharmaceuticals may consider using these and other tools to tackle the threat posed by counterfeiters. By drawing upon the experience and skills of trained litigators – particularly counsel who previously deployed these tools on behalf of the government while serving as federal prosecutors – companies can proactively protect their intellectual property and the consumers who depend on their products.

© 2022 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

WEBSITE LAYOUT PASSES MUSTER: Court Enforces Cruise Line’s TCPA and Arbitration Disclosures Over Objection

Those of you who attended Lead Generation World heard me discuss the big trend from back in 2020 in which Courts were refusing to enforce online disclosures owing to perceived problems with website layout.

Things like “below the button” disclosures and distracting visual elements were often described as defeating a manifestation of assent to disclosure terms in that unfortunate line of cases.

Well, 2022 has brought a couple of cases that have determined website disclosures to be just fine. Yesterday I reported on a big win by Efinancial, and today we have a nice victory by a cruise ship company.

In Barney v. Grand Caribbean Cruises, Inc., CASE NO. 21-CV-61560-RAR, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263 (S.D. Fl. January 17, 2022) the Defendant moved to enforce an arbitration provision on its website arguing that the Plaintiff had agreed to the terms and conditions by submitting a sweepstakes entry form.

Predictably, the Plaintiff argued that the disclosures were not enforceable because the website layout was insufficient–specifically that the font was too small and the terms excessively lengthy.

The Court was not impressed.

Noting that the disclosure was plainly readable and above the button–and it required a check box–the Court simply refused to heed the Plaintiff’s argument that he didn’t know he was agreeing to consent and arbitration. Here’s the analysis:

First, in terms of placement, the Website does not tuck away its statement regarding the Terms & Conditions in an obscure corner of the page where a user is unlikely to encounter it. Rather, the statement is located directly between the contact information fields and the “Submit Entry” button. The user is required to check the box indicating assent to the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted. Id. ¶ 14. Thus, it is impossible that a user would miss seeing the statement regarding the Terms & Conditions or—at the very least—the checkbox indicating assent to them. Second, rather than merely informing the user that the Terms & Conditions exist, the statement directs the user to the precise location where the Terms & Conditions can be accessed—namely, at the “bottom of the page.” Finally, and most significantly, the user is required to check an acknowledgement box to accept the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted through the Website—an affirmative act indicating [*14] assent. The checkbox accompanies the statement, which specifically includes language indicating that the user “agree[s] to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions.” Thus, there is an explicit textual notice that checking the box will act as a manifestation of an intent to be bound. A reasonable user confronting a statement that “I consent to receive e-mail, SMS/Text messages, and calls about offers and deals from an automatic dialing system and/or pre-recorded voice technology” and “confirm that I am over age 25 [and] agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions that are hyperlinked at the bottom of the page” would understand that he or she is assenting to the linked terms, including those pertaining to mandatory arbitration. And the record shows that Plaintiff indeed checked the box before clicking “Submit Entry.” Connolly Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s objections to the design of the Website hold no water. Plaintiff assails the statement regarding the Website’s Terms & Conditions as “lengthy” with “extremely small font that blends into the background.” Resp. at 9. But as seen in the screenshot of the Website on the day of Plaintiff’s visit, the statement’s text is clearly legible [*15] and not overly long. Indeed, it is roughly the same size and color as the text indicating the fields for “First Name,” “Last Name,” “Email,” and “Phone Number.” Plaintiff also objects to the placement of the link to the Terms & Conditions at the bottom of the page. Id. at 10. But, as discussed supra, that is precisely where the statement directed the user to view them.

As you can see the Court found the layout to be perfectly appropriate and was particularly moved by the presence of the opt in check box. Although many cases have recently enforced disclosures WITHOUT checkboxes, they do remain favored by the Courts.

I think Barney represents a case of a pretty clearly enforceable provision. The above-the-button text coupled with the radial button and the clear articulation of the terms being accepted made this an easy case for the court.

I will note that the TCPA consent is connected to the terms and conditions lingo–I don’t love that since the TCPA disclosure should be “separately signed”. But the agreement by the consumer that they are over 25 is a nice touch–helps to protect against claims that minors are supplying consent illegally.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more articles about TCPA litigation, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Greenwashing and the SEC: the 2022 ESG Target

A recent wave of greenwashing lawsuits against the cosmetics industry drew the attention of many in the corporate, financial and insurance sectors. Attacks on corporate marketing and language used to allegedly deceive consumers will take on a much bigger life in 2022, not only due to our prediction that such lawsuits will increase, but also from Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations and penalties related to greenwashing. 2022 is sure to see an intense uptick in activity focused on greenwashing and the SEC is going to be the agency to lead that charge. Companies of all types that are advertising, marketing, drafting ESG statements, or disclosing information as required to the SEC must pay extremely close attention to the language used in all of these types of documents, or else run the risk of SEC scrutiny.

SEC and ESG

In March 2021, the SEC formed the Climate and Environmental, Social and Governance Task Force (ESG Task Force) within its Division of Enforcement. Hand in hand with the legal world’s attention on greenwashing in 2021, the SEC’s ESG Task Force was created for the sole purpose of investigating ESG-related violations. The SEC’s actions were well-timed, as 2021 saw an enormous increase in investor demand for ESG-related and ESG-driven portfolios. There is considerable market demand for ESG portfolios, and whether this demand is driven by institute influencers or simple environmental and social consciousness among consumers is of little importance to the SEC – it simply wants to ensure that ESG activity is being done properly, transparently and accurately.

Greenwashing and the SEC

The SEC has stated that in 2022, it will be taking direct aim at greenwashing issues on many different levels in the investment world. As corporations and investment funds alike increasingly put forth ESG-friendly statements pertaining to their actions or portfolio content, the law has thus far failed to keep pace with the increasing ESG statement activity. It is into this gap that the SEC sees itself fitting and attempting to ensure that the public is not subject to greenwashing. In order to tackle this objective, expect the SEC to focus on the wording used to describe investments or portfolios, what issuers say in filings, and the statements made by investment houses and advisors related to ESG.

From this stem several topics that the SEC’s ESG Task Force will scrutinize, such as: whether “ESG investments” are truly comprised of companies that have accurate and forthright ESG plans; the level of due diligence conducted by investment houses in determining whether an investment or portfolio is “ESG friendly”; how investment world internal statements differ from external public-facing statements related to the level of ESG considerations taken into account in an investment or portfolio; selling “ESG friendly” investments with no set method for ensuring that the investment continues to uphold those principles; and many others.

2022, the SEC, and ESG

Given the SEC’s specific targeting of ESG-related issues beginning in 2021, we predict that 2022 will see a great degree of SEC enforcement action seeking to curb over zealous marketing language or statements that it sees as greenwashing. Whether these efforts will intertwine with the potential for increased Department of Justice criminal investigation and prosecution of egregious violators over greenwashing remains to be seen, but it is nevertheless something that issuers and investment firms alike must closely consider.

While there are numerous avenues to examine to ensure that ESG principles are being upheld and accurately conveyed to the public, the underlying compliance program for minimizing greenwashing allegation risks is absolutely critical for all players putting forth ESG-related statements. These compliance checks should not merely be one-time pre-issuance programs; rather, they should be ongoing and constant to ensure that with  ever-evolving corporate practices, a focused interest by the SEC on ESG, and increasing attention by the legal world on greenwashing claims, all statement put forth are truly “ESG friendly” and not misleading in any way.

Article By John Gardella of CMBG3 Law

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Lifts Preliminary Injunctions on Healthcare Worker Vaccine Mandate

On January 13, 2022, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Interim Final Rule (the “Rule”) in a 5-4 decision, staying the preliminary injunctions issued for 24 states by the District Courts for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Western District of Louisiana.  Therefore, the CMS vaccine mandate is in full effect for all states except Texas, which was not part of the cases before the Court.  The Rule requires nearly all workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities—whether medical personnel, volunteers, janitorial staff, or even contractors who service the facilities—to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption.

The Court based its holding on two main points.  First, the Court held that Congress clearly authorized CMS to put conditions on funding it provides to the Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities.  The Court opined that perhaps CMS’s “most basic” function is to ensure that regulated facilities protect the health and safety of their patients, noting that Medicare and Medicaid patients are often some of the most vulnerable to infection and death from COVID-19.  Because CMS determined that a vaccine mandate is necessary to protect patient health and safety, the Court held the mandate “fits neatly within the language of the [authorizing] statute.”  The Court acknowledged that CMS has never required vaccinations in the past, but attributed this in part to the fact that states typically already require necessary vaccinations like hepatitis B, influenza, and measles for healthcare workers.

Second, the Court held that the mandate is not arbitrary and capricious, and cautioned the district courts that their role is merely to make sure an agency acts within the “zone of reasonableness.”  The Court found the administrative record sufficient to explain CMS’s rationale for the mandate and also accepted that getting the vaccine mandate in place ahead of winter and flu season satisfied the “good cause” standard for skipping the notice and comment period.

Healthcare employers subject to the Rule should immediately start implementing vaccine requirements if they have not already.  It is anticipated that in all states but Texas, CMS will likely begin enforcement of the vaccine mandate in approximately 30 days.  On December 28, 2021, CMS released guidance to state surveyors with enforcement standards to use starting 30 days from the memo, though at the time the memo only applied to the 25 states that were not enjoined.  Healthcare employers should also keep in mind that this is not the end of the road: the Court’s holding only means that the CMS vaccine mandate is in force while the 5th and 8th Circuits complete their review of the underlying state challenges to the mandate.  While the Supreme Court’s opinion sends a strong message that lower courts should uphold the mandate, there is no guarantee they will do so.

The legal landscape continues to evolve quickly and there is a lack of clear-cut authority or bright line rules on implementation.  This article is not intended to be an unequivocal, one-size-fits-all guidance, but instead represents our interpretation of where applicable law currently and generally stands.  This article does not address the potential impacts of the numerous other local, state and federal orders that have been issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including, without limitation, potential liability should an employee become ill, requirements regarding family leave, sick pay and other issues.

Article By Keeley A. McCarty and Ashley T. Hirano of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

The Legal Challenges to the OSHA ETS and CMS Vaccine Mandate Move to the Supreme Court

On December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States issued orders granting review of legal challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing Emergency Temporary Standard (“OSHA ETS”) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Omnibus COVID-19 Health Care Staff Vaccination Interim Final Rule (“CMS Vaccine Mandate”). In a rare move, the Supreme Court set an accelerated timeline for the cases, scheduling oral arguments in both cases on January 7, 2022.

Following a ruling out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on December 17, 2021, OSHA announced that it would not issue citations for non-compliance with any requirements of the OSHA ETS before January 10, 2022 and will not issue citations for noncompliance with testing requirements before February 9, 2022, so long as an employer is exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the OSHA ETS. While it is unknown whether the Supreme Court will be able to issue a ruling by OSHA’s January 10, 2022 compliance date, the Supreme Court’s expedited schedule seems to indicate that it is attempting to give employers some finality concerning their obligations under the federal mandates.

Article By Lilian Doan Davis of Polsinelli PC

For more COVID-19 legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

California Supreme Court Cases Employers Should Be Watching in 2022

The California Supreme Court has been busy in 2021 deciding cases that affect employers from how to pay meal and rest period penalties to when the statute of limitations for a failure to promote runs.

While the state’s high court answered some big questions in this last year, they still have several cases pertaining to employment law awaiting their attention.

Here are the cases employers should be watching in the new year and why.

People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s Inc.

In this case, a complainant filed a timely retaliation complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) claiming immediate termination after complaining about non-payment of wages. Her complaint did not allege any disclosure to a governmental agency, but the retaliatory act of termination upon her direct complaint to her employer. The DLSE undertook an investigation and determined that respondents had violated several Labor Code sections, notably 1102.5 (“Section 1102.5”), California’s whistleblower statute. The DLSE notified the parties involved of its determination on December 22, 2015. Respondents were ordered to do several things, including paying the complainant lost wages and civil penalties of $20,000 each for violations of sections 1102.5 and 98.6. Respondents never complied.

On October 17, 2017, the Labor Commissioner filed an enforcement action against Respondents under the authority of section 98.7, subdivision (c)(1)5, alleging violations of these statutory provisions. Eventually, through a lack of response by the employer-defendant, the Labor Commissioner sought to take a default judgment.

The trial court, however, determined that the Labor Commissioner had not stated a claim under section 1102.5, because the complainant had not approached a governmental agency until after her termination. The trial court found that retaliation under the statute required the complainant to have been terminated as a result of disclosure to a governmental agency, which was not alleged. The trial court also found insufficient evidence for the claimant’s unpaid wages, and that the penalties under Section 98.6 were not appropriate.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of Section 1102.5 claim as it found the after-termination complaint to be defective. It also reversed as to the penalties awarded under Section 98.6 and remanded that portion of the judgment.

The question before the California Supreme Court is limited to whether Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), which protects an employee from retaliation for disclosing unlawful activity, applies when the information is already known to that person or agency.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

Depending on the direction the California Supreme Court takes, its holding will affect the burden on employers defending against whistleblower claims – especially those arising out of allegations that an employee told an employer or agency information that the employer or agency was already aware of.

Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center

FlexCare, LLC (“FlexCare”), a temporary staffing agency, assigned Plaintiff to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (“Eisenhower”). Plaintiff alleged that during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received the required meal and rest periods, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. She then filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Plaintiff’s claims were based solely on her work on assignment to Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class and plaintiff executed a release of claims. The trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement.

A year later, Plaintiff brought a second class action suit against Eisenhower, who had not been named in the previous lawsuit, alleging the same labor law violations. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Plaintiff could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims in the prior class action.

The trial court held a limited trial on the issue of the propriety of the lawsuit and ruled that Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Accordingly, Eisenhower could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case could affect staffing agency employers who may want to utilize broad releases if their “clients” are not also named to avoid duplicative litigation – for which they may have to pay twice – through indemnity clauses.

Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.

This case will explore whether the evidentiary standard set forth in Labor Code section 1102.6 (“Section 1102.6”) replaces the McDonnell Douglas test as the relevant evidentiary standard for retaliation claims brought under section 1102.5.

In this case, Defendant was a manufacturer of paint, stains, caulks, and other products. Plaintiff Lawson (“Lawson”) was a territory manager whose duties included merchandising and claims that he was directed by his supervisor to handle a product in a way that fraudulently removed a slow-selling product from its inventory. Lawson told his supervisor he would not do this, then reported the directive to the company’s ethics hotline on two separate occasions. The second report to the ethics hotline resulted in an investigation. During this time, Lawson received poor ratings for his work, was placed on a performance improvement plan, and eventually, Defendant terminated his employment.

Lawson then filed a complaint against the company in the United States District Court, alleging that he was retaliated against as a whistleblower.

The trial court applied the McDonnell Douglas test, which employs burden-shifting between the plaintiff and the employer. This test originated in the context of Title VII, the federal statute governing workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The trial court concluded that Lawson failed to carry his burden to raise triable issues of fact regarding pretext and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, Lawson argued to the 9th Circuit that the trial court should have applied the evidentiary standard outlined in Section 1102.6. Section 1102.6 states that once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the whistleblower activity was a contributing factor in the retaliation against the employee, the employer’s burden of proof is to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons.

In its question to the California Supreme Court, the 9th Circuit noted that application of the McDonnell Douglas test to whistleblower claims under Labor Code section 1102.5 “seems to ignore [a] critical intervening statutory amendment” by which the California legislature established the evidentiary burdens of the parties participating in a civil action or administrative hearing involving a violation of the statute. Though this statement by the Circuit seems like a decision, the 9th Circuit pointed out three published California appellate court decisions that expressly applied McDonnell Douglas after the amendment.

This contradiction between California’s statute and the court rulings is the root of the 9th Circuit’s question.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

If the California Supreme Court rules that the evidentiary requirement under Section 1102.6 applies, disposing of whistleblower retaliation claims prior to trial will become extremely difficult due to the high clear and convincing evidentiary standard imposed on the employer.

Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.

This case involves a class of security guards who alleged meal break violations and sought premium wages, waiting time penalties, inaccurate pay stub penalties, and attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeal held that unpaid premium wages for meal period violations did not entitle employees to pay stub penalties or waiting time penalties.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case will resolve a long-standing debate on whether waiting time penalties are recoverable for meal and rest period violations. If the California Supreme Court disagrees with the lower courts, it will increase potential penalties for California meal and rest period violations, as violations could be compounded by alleged pay stub penalties and waiting time penalties.

Article By Leonora M. Schloss and Karen Luh of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation and legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021

Court Rejects Netflix’s Challenge to Poaching Injunction

In the latest blow against Netflix’s aggressive recruiting practices, a California appellate court has affirmed a trial court’s injunction against Netflix and in favor of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”), thus permanently barring the streaming giant from poaching Fox executives by inducing them to breach their fixed-term employment contracts.

Netflix challenged the injunction, which was issued two years ago under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), on two grounds. Netflix argued that there are triable issues of fact as to whether: (1) Fox had suffered damages; and (2) Fox’s employment contracts were void as against public policy. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the extent of damages to Fox was not relevant to its UCL claim. The Court also rejected Netflix’s public policy arguments, noting that there is well-settled law that fixed-term contracts are beneficial to both employers and employees and that, in any event, the challenged contractual provisions can be severed, even if they are in any sense unenforceable or unlawful.

The Court of Appeal also rejected Netflix’s challenges to the trial court’s permanent injunction, which barred Netflix from soliciting employees who are subject to fixed-term employment contracts with Fox or inducing such employees to breach their fixed-term employment contracts. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that the injunction was vague or overbroad because Netflix had failed to explain the basis for the objection at the summary judgment hearing, despite having been given ample opportunity to do so. The Court also rejected Netflix’s argument that the injunction resulted in specific performance of personal services contracts, pointing out that the injunction only applied to Netflix’s tortious conduct—and did not bind any current or former Fox executives.

This decision follows a similar ruling late last year, when a trial court ruled in favor of our client Viacom in its anti-poaching lawsuit against Netflix.

A holding the other way for Netflix could have upended the way California employers solicit and retain employees, especially in the entertainment industry, where fixed-term employment agreements are relatively commonplace. Although the recent Court of Appeal decision is unpublished, it presumably sends a strong message to those who would poach the employees of a competitor who are subject to fixed-term employment agreements.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

EPA’s Stormwater General Permit is Safe. Does it Matter?

A Colorado-based NGO has dropped its 9th Circuit lawsuit challenging EPA’s Multi-Sector General Permit for stormwater discharges associated with industrial facilities.

On one hand, this is a victory for EPA which apparently offered nothing to settle the case before the NGO threw up its hands.

On the other hand, the General Permit is only applicable in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico, the three states that have not been delegated the authority to issue such a permit (as well as tribal lands and other lands not subject to state jurisdiction).

Why did the NGO bring this suit to begin with?  Did it hope that the Biden Administration EPA would, when push came to shove, do something dramatically different than the Trump Administration EPA?

Whatever the reason, the NGO has apparently concluded that the current law and permit give it plenty of grounds to bring suits over stormwater discharges in the 9th Circuit and elsewhere.  There are already several such imaginative suits pending on the west coast.

Are the regulators in Massachusetts less able to issue and enforce stormwater permits than than their colleagues in 47 other states?  The answer is of course not.  They are completely able and more able than most.  And they already have authority under state laws and regulations that are broader in their reach than the federal law.

But the Massachusetts legislature has stood in the way, apparently because it doesn’t want to bear the costs of regulating in this area borne by 47 other states.  Uncertainty and the threat, if not the actuality, of litigation has been the unfortunate result of this dereliction for the regulated community, including the municipalities in which we live.

We deserve better.

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is dropping its legal challenge to EPA’s industrial stormwater general permit that sought stricter regulation of plastics pollution after settlement discussions were unfruitful, according to an attorney familiar with the litigation.

Article By Jeffrey R. Porter of Mintz

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2021 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.