FTC Issues Report to Congress Highlighting Collaboration with State Attorneys General

On April 10, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission issued a report to Congress on the agency’s collaboration with state attorneys general highlighting current cooperative law enforcement efforts, best practices to ensure continued collaboration and legislative recommendations to enhance such efforts.

The report, directed by the FTC Collaboration Act of 2021, “Working Together to Protect Consumers: A Study and Recommendations on FTC Collaboration with the State Attorneys General” makes legislative recommendations that would enhance these efforts, including reinstating the Commission’s authority to seek money for defrauded consumers and providing it with the independent authority to seek civil penalties.

“Today’s consumer protection challenges require an all-hands-on-deck response, and our report details how the FTC is working closely with state enforcers to share information, stop fraud, and ensure fairness in the marketplace,” said FTC attorney Samuel Levine, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. “We look forward to seeking new opportunities to strengthen these ties and confront the challenges of the future.”

In June 2023, the Commission announced a request for public information (RFI) seeking public comments and suggestions on ways it can work more effectively with state AGs to help educate consumers about, and protect them from, potential fraud. After reviewing and analyzing the comments received, the agency developed the report to Congress issued today. The report is divided into three sections: 1) The FTC’s Existing Collaborative Efforts with State
Attorneys General to Prevent, Publicize, and Penalize Frauds and Scams; 2) Recommended Best Practices to Enhance Collaboration; and 3) Legislative Recommendations to Enhance Collaboration Efforts.

The first section lays out the roles and responsibilities of the FTC and state AGs in protecting consumers from frauds and scams, provides an overview of their respective law enforcement authority, and discusses how federal and state enforcers share their information and expertise to facilitate effective communication and cooperation. It also provides a breakdown of the FTC’s
structure and a description of the Consumer Sentinel consumer complaint database, the largest such information-sharing network in the United States.

The second section details best practices used to enhance strong information-sharing between the FTC and its state law enforcement partners, discusses how the Commission coordinates joint and parallel enforcement actions with state AGs and other state consumer protection agencies, and presents ideas on expanding the sharing of expertise and technical resources between agencies.

Finally, the third section stresses the legislative need to restore the FTC’s Section 13(b) authority to seek equitable monetary refunds for injured consumers, presents ways to enhance collaboration and conserve resources by providing the FTC with the independent authority to seek civil penalties, and describes the agency’s need for clear authority to pursue legal actions against those who assist and facilitate unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

The Commission vote approving the report to Congress was 3-0-2, with Commissioners Melissa Holyoak and Andrew N. Ferguson not participating. Chair Lina M. Khan issued a separate statement, in which she was joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro M. Bedoya. Commissioner Slaughter also issued a separate statement.

U.S. Supreme Court: Forced Transfers of Employees Without Loss of Pay or Rank Violate Title VII

Federal law prohibits employers from relying on certain protected statuses (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) when making employment decisions. Lower courts have required employees suing employers to point to a materially adverse harm caused by the alleged employer discrimination. But is a forced transfer of an employee to another department—with no loss of pay or rank—an “adverse employment” decision? On April 17, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in the affirmative.

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, a female police sergeant alleged she was transferred from one job to another because she is a woman, in violation of Title VII. While her rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities (moving from being a plainclothes intelligence officer to a more administrative role), perks (e.g., no longer having a take-home car), and schedule (fewer weekends off) did not. The District Court reiterated Title VII’s prohibition against basing employment decisions on a person’s gender, but further opined that because the female police sergeant did not demonstrate there was a “significant” change in working conditions producing “material employment disadvantage,” her discrimination claim failed as a matter of law. The District Court reached this conclusion because she suffered no “change in salary or rank,” and therefore, there was no harm and no foul. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, concluding that the plaintiff did not have a viable employment discrimination claim because her job transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.”

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Elena Kagan reversed the Eighth Circuit, ruling that an employee need not show “significant, serious” or “material” change in employment conditions to maintain a discrimination claim “because the text of Title VII imposes no such requirement.” More specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that there is nothing in Title VII that distinguishes “between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones.” All a plaintiff need show in a forced discriminatory transfer case is that the transfer left the employee “worse off,” but not “significantly worse” as numerous federal appellate decisions have previously held.

For All Patent/Trademark Practitioners: USPTO Provides Guidance for Use of AI in Preparing USPTO Submissions

The USPTO expounds a clear message for patent and trademark attorneys, patent agents, and inventors: use of artificial intelligence (AI), including generative AI, in patent and trademark activities and filings before the USPTO entails risks to be mitigated, and you must disclose use of AI in creation of an invention or practice before the USPTO if the use of AI is material to patentability.

The USPTO’s new guidance issued on April 11, 2024 is a counterpart to its guidance issued on February 13, 2024, which addresses AI-assisted invention creation process. In the new guidance issued on April 11, 2024, USPTO officials communicate the risks of using AI in preparing USPTO submissions, including patent applications, affidavits, petitions, office action responses, information disclosure statements, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) submissions, and trademark / Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) submissions. The common theme between the February 13 and April 11 guidance is the duty to disclose to the USPTO all information known to be material to patentability.

Building on the USPTO’s existing rules and policies, the USPTO’s April 11 guidance discusses the following:

(A) The duty of candor and good faith – each individual associated with a proceeding at the USPTO owes the duty to disclose the USPTO all information known to be material to patentability, including on the use of AI by inventors, parties, and practitioners.

(B) Signature requirement and corresponding certifications – using AI to draft documents without verifying information risks “critical misstatements and omissions”. Any submission for the USPTO in which AI helped prepare must be carefully reviewed by practitioners, who are ultimately responsible, to ensure that they are true and submitted for a proper purpose.

(C) Confidentiality of information – sensitive and confidential client information risks being compromised if shared to third-party AI systems, some of which may be located outside of the United States.

(D) Foreign filing licenses and export regulations – a foreign filing license from the USPTO does not authorize the exporting of subject matter abroad for the preparation of patent applications to be filed in the United States. Practitioners must ensure data is not improperly exported when using AI.

(E) USPTO electronic systems’ policies – Practitioners using AI must be mindful of the terms and conditions for the USPTO’s electronic system, which prohibit the unauthorized access, actions, use, modifications, or disclosure of the data contained in the USPTO system in transit to/from the system.

(F) The USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct – when using the AI tools, practitioners must ensure that they are not violating the duties owed to clients. For example, practitioners must have the requisite legal, scientific, and technical knowledge to reasonably represent the client, without inappropriate reliance on AI. Practitioners also have duty to reasonably consult with the client, including about the use of AI in accomplishing the client’s objectives.

The USPTO’s April 11 guidance overall shares principles with the ethics guidelines that multiple state bars have issued related to generative AI use in practice of law, and addresses them in the patent- and trademark-specific context. Importantly, in addition to ethics considerations, the USPTO guidance reminds us that knowing or willful withholding of information about AI use under (A), overlooking AI’s misstatements leading to false certification under (B), or AI-mediated improper or unauthorized exporting of data or unauthorized access to data under (D) and (E) may lead to criminal or civil liability under federal law or penalties or sanctions by the USPTO.

On the positive side, the USPTO guidance describes the possible favorable aspects of AI “to expand access to our innovation ecosystem and lower costs for parties and practitioners…. The USPTO continues to be actively involved in the development of domestic and international measures to address AI considerations at the intersection of innovation, creativity, and intellectual property.” We expect more USPTO AI guidance to be forthcoming, so please do watch for continued updates in this area.

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Final Regulations Released

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the text of the final regulations and interpretative guidance implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) on April 15, 2024. The final regulations are expected to be formally published in the April 19, 2024, Federal Register and will be effective 60 days later.

The EEOC received more than 100,000 public comments, including comments from Jackson Lewis, in response to the Commission’s notice of the proposed regulations issued on Aug. 11, 2023. Although largely unchanged from the proposed regulations, the final regulations provide important clarifications and insights into how the EEOC will enforce the law. Discussed below are some key points employers need to know about the final regulations.

Key PWFA Requirements

The PWFA, which went into effect on June 27, 2023, requires employers with at least 15 employees and other covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s or applicant’s known limitations related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.

Qualified Employee

Under the PWFA, an employee has two ways to establish they are a “qualified employee”:

  1. Like under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), “an employee or applicant who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position” is qualified.
  2. If an employee (or applicant) cannot perform all essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation, the employee can be qualified for accommodations under the PWFA if: (a) the inability to perform an essential job function is for a temporary period; (b) the essential job function(s) could be performed in the near future; and (c) the inability to perform the essential function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. The Act, however, does not define “temporary” or “in the near future.” Several commentors raised concerns about the EEOC’s definition of these terms in the proposed regulations.

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations state that “temporary” means “lasting for a limited time, not permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the final regulations state that assessing whether all essential job functions can be performed in the near future depends on the circumstances:

  • For a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is generally defined as 40 weeks from the start of the temporary suspension of an essential function.
  • For conditions other than a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is not defined as any particular length of time. However, the preamble to the final regulations explains that an employee who needs indefinite leave cannot perform essential job functions “in the near future.”

The final regulations explain that employers should consider whether an employee will be able to perform the essential functions “in the near future” each time an employee asks for an accommodation that requires suspension of an essential job function.

Ultimately, whether an employee is “qualified” involves a fact-sensitive evaluation whether the temporary suspension of essential job functions can be reasonably accommodated by the employer. This is significantly different from the ADA reasonable accommodation obligation and may involve, as the final regulations state, removing essential job functions and other arrangements including, but not limited to, requiring the employee perform the remaining job functions and other functions assigned by the employer, temporarily transferring the employee to another job or assigning the employee to light or modified duty, or allowing the employee to participate in an employer’s light or modified duty program.

Accommodations Only Required for Individual With Limitation

The EEOC explains that the regulations do not require employers to provide accommodations to an employee when an employee’s partner, spouse, or family member — not the employee themselves — has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. For clarity, the EEOC revised the final regulations’ definition of “limited” to state the limitation must be the specific employee.

Known Limitations

Employers are only obligated under the PWFA to accommodate an individual’s “known limitation.”

A “limitation” is defined as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, of the specific employee in question.” The condition may be “modest, minor, and/or episodic, and does not need to meet the definition of “disability” under the ADA.

It becomes “known” to the employer when the employee or the employee’s representative has communicated the limitation to the employer. An employee’s representative may include a family member, friend, healthcare provider, union representative, or other representative.

The limitation may be communicated to a supervisor, a manager, someone who has supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s tasks (or the equivalent in the case of an applicant), human resources personnel, or other appropriate official or by following the steps in the employer’s policy to request an accommodation.

This communication need not be in any specific format and may also be oral.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, Related Medical Conditions

Although the EEOC acknowledged receiving many comments on the scope of the proposed definition of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,” it made no substantive changes to the definition in the final regulations.

“Pregnancy” and “childbirth” are still defined as including current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential or intended pregnancy (which can include infertility, fertility treatments and the use of contraception), labor, and childbirth (including vaginal and cesarean delivery).

The term “related medical conditions” continues to be defined as conditions that are “related to, are affected by, or arise out of pregnancy or childbirth.” The regulations provide the following non-exhaustive list of examples: termination of pregnancy, including by miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion; lactation and conditions related to lactation; menstruation; postpartum depression, anxiety or psychosis; vaginal bleeding; preeclampsia; pelvic prolapse; preterm labor; ectopic pregnancy; gestational diabetes; cesarean or perineal wound infection; maternal cardiometabolic disease; endometriosis; changes in hormone levels; and many other conditions.

The final regulations also reference related medical conditions that are not unique to pregnancy or childbirth, such as chronic migraine headaches, nausea or vomiting, high blood pressure, incontinence, carpal tunnel syndrome, and many other medical conditions. These conditions are covered by the PWFA only if the condition relates to pregnancy or childbirth or are exacerbated by pregnancy or childbirth, although the ADA or other civil rights statutes may apply.

Documentation

The final PWFA regulations continue to provide for a “reasonableness” standard in evaluating the circumstances under which an employer may request documentation from an employee. The final regulations, however, modify the definition of “reasonable documentation.” An employer may only request the “minimum documentation” necessary to confirm the employee has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a limitation) and describe the adjustment or change at work due to the limitation.

In addition to stating when an employer can ask for documentation, the PWFA regulations add a paragraph regarding an employee’s self-confirmation of their pregnancy status. It provides that an employer must accept as sufficient an employee’s self-confirmation when: (1) the pregnancy is obvious; or (2) an employee seeks one of the “predictable assessment” accommodation requests set forth in the regulations (discussed below).

The final PWFA regulations make clear the circumstances where it is not reasonable to seek supporting documentation. These circumstances include when: (1) the limitation and adjustment or change needed is obvious and the employee provides self-confirmation; (2) the employer has sufficient information to determine whether the employee has a qualifying limitation and needs an adjustment or change due to the limitation; (3) when the employee is pregnant a “predictable assessment”; (4) the reasonable accommodation relates to a time and/or place to pump or to nurse during work hours, and the employee provides self-confirmation; or (5) the requested accommodation is available to employees without known limitations under the PWFA pursuant to a policy or practice without submitting supporting documentation.

Importantly, the same prohibitions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations as well as the protection of medical information enforced under the ADA apply with equal force to documentation collected under the PWFA. Employers should ensure they continue to limit inquiries to only those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Employers should also treat all documentation relating to a PWFA accommodation request like they treat ADA documentation — maintain it confidentially and separate from an employee’s personnel file.

Reasonable Accommodations

The PFWA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, which the final regulations define to be generally consistently with the ADA except for temporarily excusing or eliminating the performance of an essential job function. Otherwise, the rule provides that a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the qualified employee’s needs to remove a work-related barrier and provide an employee with equal employment opportunity to benefit from all privileges of employment.

The final regulations include examples of requests that may be reasonable. These include schedule changes due to morning sickness or to treat medical issues following delivery, adjustments to accommodate restrictions for lifting or requests for light duty, time and/or space to pump or nurse during work hours, or time off to recover from childbirth.

Lactation Accommodations

The EEOC’s final regulations require reasonable accommodation for lactation beyond what may be required under the Providing Urgent Maternal Protection for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act). The PUMP Act generally requires reasonable break time and space shielded from view and free from intrusion for a nursing mother to express breast milk. The final PWFA regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of accommodations relating to lactation, including space for pumping that is in reasonable proximity to a sink, running water, and refrigeration for storing milk.

The final regulations add nursing during working hours (as distinct from pumping) to the list of potentially reasonable accommodations. In the comments explaining this addition, the EEOC cautioned that accommodations for nursing mothers during work hours address situations where the employee and child are in close proximity in the normal course of business, such as where the employee works from home or where the employer offers on-site daycare. The EEOC stated this is not intended to create a right to proximity to nurse because of an employee’s preference.

Predictable Assessments

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations recognize four “predictable assessments” that will not impose an undue hardship in “virtually all cases”:

  1. Allowing an employee to carry or keep water near to enable them to drink;
  2. Permitting an employee to take additional restroom breaks as needed;
  3. Allowing an employee whose work requires standing to sit and whose work requires sitting to stand as needed; and
  4. Allowing an employee to take breaks to eat and drink as needed.

Despite stating the predictable assessments above will not “in virtually all cases” impose an undue hardship, the EEOC clarified this does not mean such requests are reasonable per se. The EEOC recognized that in certain industries, these predictable assessments may cause an undue hardship. Accordingly, employers may still conduct an individualized assessment of a predictable assessment accommodation request. However, the final regulations make clear that any such individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

Many individuals and organizations that submitted comments on the proposed regulations suggested the addition of other types of predictable assessment accommodations, including dress code modifications, minor workstation modifications, proximity to a restroom, permitting eating and drinking at a workstation, rest breaks, and personal protective equipment. Although noting agreement with the commenters and stating that employers should be able to provide such requests with “little difficulty,” the EEOC declined to expand the list of predictable assessments beyond the four originally listed that in “virtually all cases” will be considered reasonable and will not pose an undue hardship. In response to comments objecting to predictable assessments based on different challenges by industry, the EEOC guidance recognizes that an employer in certain industries may assert an accommodation request otherwise deemed to be a predictable assessment causes the employer an undue hardship and may deny the request.

Undue Hardship

The EEOC adopted the same standard for undue hardship in the final regulations as was in the proposed regulations. When an employee can perform all their essential job functions, the EEOC stated that undue hardship has the same meaning as under the ADA and generally means significant difficulty or expense for the employer’s operation. If an employee cannot perform all essential functions and the accommodation is temporary suspension of an essential job function, the employer needs to consider the ADA definition of undue hardship and the following relevant factors: (1) the length of time the employee or applicant will be unable to perform the essential function(s); (2) whether there is work for the employee to accomplish by allowing the employee to perform all the other functions of the job, transferring the employee to a different position, or otherwise; (3) the nature of the essential function, including its frequency; (4) whether the covered entity has temporarily suspended the performance of essential job functions for other employees in similar positions; (5) whether there are other employees, temporary employees, or third parties who can perform or be temporarily hired to perform the essential function(s); and (6) whether the essential function(s) can be postponed or remain unperformed for any length of time and for how long.

EEOC Interpretative Guidance

The EEOC’s final regulations include an appendix entitled “Appendix A to Part 1636—Interpretative Guidance on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act” (Interpretative Guidance). The Interpretative Guidance, which becomes part of the final regulations, has the same force and effect as the final regulations.

The Interpretative Guidance addresses the major provisions of the PWFA and its regulations and explains the main concepts pertaining to an employer’s legal requirements under the PWFA to make reasonable accommodations for known limitations (physical or mental conditions related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions). It represents the EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA and, as stated in comments to the final regulations, the EEOC will be guided by the Interpretive Guidance when enforcing the PWFA. The Interpretative Guidance includes many examples and other practical guidance illustrating common workplace scenarios and how the PWFA applies.

Remedies, Enforcement

The final regulations’ remedies and enforcement are the same as proposed. Remedies under the PWFA mirror those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and include injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Employers that demonstrate good faith efforts to work with employees to identify and make reasonable accommodations have an affirmative defense to money damages.

PWFA’s Relationship to Other Federal, State, Local Laws

The final regulations provide that the PWFA does not invalidate or limit the powers, remedies, or procedures available under any federal, state, or local law that provides greater or equal protection for individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. About 40 states and cities have laws protecting employees and applicants from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Accordingly, employers should evaluate whether state and/or local law may provide greater rights and obligations than the PWFA. To the extent such laws provide greater obligations, the PWFA final regulations require employers to comply with both the PWFA and analogous state and local law.

SEC Stays Climate Disclosure Regulations in Response to Consolidated Eighth Circuit Challenges

On April 4, the SEC issued an order staying the implementation of the recently finalized climate disclosure rules (Final Rules) in response to the consolidated legal challenges in the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The SEC has discretion to stay its rules pending judicial review and the SEC stated that a stay would “allow the court of appeals to focus on deciding the merits [of the cases].” However, this voluntary stay should not be taken as a sign that the SEC intends to abandon the Final Rules, as the SEC said it will “continue vigorously defending the Final Rules’ validity in court and looks forward to expeditious resolution of the litigation.”

The Final Rules have faced a slew of legal challenges since adoption and the SEC also noted that the stay avoids potential uncertainty if registrants were to become subject to the Final Rules during the pendency of the legal challenges.

FCC Puts Another Carrier On Notice with Cease and Desist Letter

If you haven’t already figured it out, the FCC is serious about carriers and providers not carrying robocalls.

The FCC sent a cease and desist letter to DigitalIPvoice informing them of the need to investigate suspected traffic. The FCC reminded them that failure to comply with the letter “may result in downstream voice service providers permanently blocking all of DigitalIPvoice’s traffic”.

For background, DigitalIPvoice is a gateway provider meaning they accept calls directly from foreign originating or intermediate providers. The Industry Traceback Group (ITG) investigated some questionable traffic back in December and identified DigitalIPvoice as the gateway provider for some of the calls. ITG informed DigitalIPvoice and “DigitialIPVoice did not dispute that the calls were illegal.”

This is problematic because as the FCC states “gateway providers that transmit illegal robocall traffic face serious consequences, including blocking by downstream providers of all of the provider’s traffic.”

Emphasis in original. Yes. The FCC sent that in BOLD to DigitalIPvoice. I love aggressive formatting choices.

The FCC then gave DigitalIPvoice steps to take to mitigate the calls in response to this notice. They have to investigate the traffic and then block identified traffic and report back to the FCC and the ITG on the outcome of the investigation.

The whole letter is worth reading but a few points for voice service providers and gateway providers:

  1. You have to know who your customers are and what they are doing on your network. The FCC is requiring voice service providers and gateway providers to include KYC in their robocall mitigation plans.
  2. You have to work with the ITG. You have to have a traceback policy and procedures. All traceback requests have to be treated as a P0 priority.
  3. You have to be able to trace the traffic you are handling. From beginning to end.

The FCC is going after robocalls hard. Protect yourself by understanding what is going to be required of your network.

Keeping you in the loop.

For more news on FCC Regulations, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Using an LLC to Protect the Family Vacation Home

Vacation homes offer a retreat from daily life, providing a sanctuary to relax and create cherished family memories. Many owners envision passing down their vacation home for future generations to enjoy, but the lack of proper planning can often lead to intra-family disputes. Leaving a vacation home outright to children or other family members may be the easiest option, but the potential for discord over the control and usage of the property only increases as ownership is passed from one generation to the next. A limited liability company (LLC) can mitigate the risk of conflict and provide a tailored solution to the meet the specific needs of a family.

When a vacation home is owned by an LLC, the membership interests in the LLC are passed down to younger generations, which allows for the continued use and enjoyment of the property by the family. The structure also provides a framework for management through an operating agreement, which governs the LLC. An operating agreement allows the original owner to create a plan for how the property will be used and managed as additional owners are added. The agreement can determine who is responsible for property management, how expenses should be proportioned and paid, how decisions should be made and provide guidelines for scheduling family usage. By establishing clear rules and procedures, an LLC can reduce the likelihood of disputes and encourage fairness among different generations.

Another benefit of an LLC is the ability to prevent unwanted transfers of ownership thus ensuring that the property stays in the family. A well-drafted operating agreement can prohibit membership interests from being transferred to third parties, protecting the family as a whole from an individual’s divorce or creditor problems. The LLC can also hold additional assets, including rental income and deposits of other funds earmarked for property expenditures, which facilitates the proper management and use of resources to cover expenses.

An LLC offers an efficient structure to avoid intra-family turmoil and preserves the spirit of the family vacation home for generations to come.

For more news on Protecting Real Estate Ownership, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

The Hidden Dangers: Long-Term Effects of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic brain injuries can have life-changing impacts on a person’s life, and understandably so because they result from injuries to the brain either through a massive blow to the head or injury by a penetrative object into the brain matter.

However, not all types of traumatic brain injuries have quite dramatic symptoms, and a mild TBI (traumatic brain injury) is one such injury. They result from a relatively minor blow to the head or a jerking of the head, causing injuries to the brain tissue.

While most mild TBIs resolve in a few weeks, some can affect the victim’s life in the long term.

Symptoms of a Mild TBI

If you have suffered a blow to the head in an accident, you need to pay attention to your symptoms, as it can help you identify signs of a mild TBI, also known as a concussion. Symptoms like passing out briefly, headache, memory loss, confusion, loss of balance, sensitivity to light and noise, problems keeping balance, tingling in your fingers, etc., are indicative of a concussion.

However, other injuries can present similar symptoms, so it is best to have a doctor make that determination. Also, it is important to note that concussions can go undetected for days because they tend to have delayed symptoms.

Unfortunately, taking too much time before seeking medical attention for a mild TBI can introduce treatment gaps, which can result in complications when seeking compensation for the long-term effects of a concussion. A timely hospital visit helps create a link between an accident and symptoms that could show days after the accident. Which is why personal injury lawyers always insist on seeking medical attention even when you feel okay.

Long-Term Effects of a Mild TBI

While most effects of a concussion will be gone after 90 days of suffering an accident, and this is for cases of severe injuries, there are situations where the effects of an injury can last years or a lifetime. Common long-term effects of a mild TBI on a person’s life include:

LONG-TERM MEMORY LOSS

Memory loss is pretty common after a concussion. However, it involves losing a recollection of the few minutes before and after an injury.

In some cases, the affected person can start remembering things once forgotten. However, in severe cases, memory loss can impact a person’s life in the long term.

DEPRESSION

Many people will develop symptoms of depression after a concussion, usually as a result of chemical changes resulting from the brain injury. While most symptoms will disappear as the brain recovers, some people may have to live with the symptoms for an extended period.

In some cases, symptoms of depression won’t show until some time after other symptoms are gone.

COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT

In most cases, the effect of a mild TBI on a person’s thinking and cognitive abilities resolves in a few months at most.

But there is no guarantee that your cognitive abilities will return to your pre-injury levels, especially with relatively severe concussions or injuries that went undetected for a long time.

Treatment and Support for Mild TBI

You may not need hospitalization after a TBI. Often, doctors focus on treating the symptoms and may prescribe cognitive and behavioral therapy to address the psychological and injury effects on a person’s mental well-being.

If the injuries resulted from an accident and another person’s negligence was to blame, you could consider talking to a personal injury lawyer to help recover damages.

Is the SEC’s Shadow Trading Win Proof That There is a Federal Common Law of Crime After All?

Last week, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission‘s Director of Enforcement celebrated a jury verdict in its insider trading case against Matthew Panuwat:

As we’ve said all along, there was nothing novel about this matter, and the jury agreed: this was insider trading, pure and simple. Defendant used highly confidential information about an impending announcement of the acquisition of biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc., the company where he worked, by Pfizer Inc. to trade ahead of the news for his own enrichment. Rather than buying the securities of Medivation, however, Panuwat used his employer’s confidential information to acquire a large stake in call options of another comparable public company, Incyte Corporation, whose share price increased materially on the important news.”

I disagree, many have described the SEC’s theory of shadow trading as “novel”. More importantly, you won’t find it in Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the ostensible bases for insider trading prosecutions. I have long decried the “make it up as you go along” aspect of insider trading jurisprudence:

Notably, Rule 10b-5 itself doesn’t explicitly mention insider trading. It would be more than a half century before the SEC finally adopted a rule, Rule 10b5-1 defining just one element of insider trading – when a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material non public information. It is no surprise then that federal courts have struggled to define who can be guilty of insider trading and why. The result is that the crime of insider trading has a decidedly “make it up as you go along” quality. Individuals don’t know where the lines are until the courts draw them and then convict. Consequently, people have gone to prison even as courts have adopted the theories for their convictions. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is still defining the crime more than seven decades after Mr. Freeman cobbled together Rule 10b-5 suggests that the definition of insider trading has been too inchoate to support criminal convictions. However “well tuned to an animating principle” a theory might be, I simply don’t think due process exists when a crime is only defined after a conviction.

If Congress truly believes that insider trading should be a crime, it should define the exact elements of the crime rather than leave it to the courts to make up the rules as they send people to prison. The California legislature has in fact done just that in Corporations Code Section 25402. For more on Section 25402, see my article, California’s Unique Approach to Insider Trading Regulation, 17 Insights 21 (July 2003).

Why Bassam Salman Should Not Have Been Convicted.

The willingness of federal courts to send people to prison based on a crime that isn’t expressed, much less defined, in any federal statute is at odds with the principle that only the people’s elected representatives in the legislature are authorized to make an act a crime. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 11 U.S. 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812). While the SEC’s case against Mr. Panuwat was civil, I expect that this novel theory will soon be applied in a criminal prosecution.

Incorporating AI to Address Mental Health Challenges in K-12 Students

The National Institute of Mental Health reported that 16.32% of youth (aged 12-17) in the District of Columbia (DC) experience at least one major depressive episode (MDE).
Although the prevalence of youth with MDE in DC is lower compared to some states, such as Oregon (where it reached 21.13%), it is important to address mental health challenges in youth early, as untreated mental health challenges can persist into adulthood. Further, the number of youths with MDE climbs nationally each year, including last year when it rose by almost 2% to approximately 300,000 youth.

It is important to note that there are programs specifically designed to help and treat youth that have experienced trauma and are living with mental health challenges. In DC, several mental health services and professional counseling services are available to residents. Most importantly, there is a broad reaching school-based mental health program that aims to provide a behavioral health expert in every school building. Additionally, on the DC government’s website, there is a list of mental health services programs available, which can be found here.

In conjunction with the mental health programs, early identification of students at risk for suicide, self-harm, and behavioral issues can help states, including DC, ensure access to mental health care and support for these young individuals. In response to the widespread youth mental health crisis, K-12 schools are employing the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-based tools to identify students at risk for suicide and self-harm. Through AI-based suicide risk monitoring, natural language processing, sentiment analysis, predictive models, early intervention, and surveillance and evaluation, AI is playing a crucial role in addressing the mental challenges faced by youth.

AI systems, developed by companies like Bark, Gaggle, and GoGuardian, aim to monitor students’ digital footprint through various data inputs, such as online interactions and behavioral patterns, for signs of distress or risk. These programs identify students who may be at risk for self-harm or suicide and alert the school and parents accordingly.

Proposals for using AI models to enhance mental health surveillance in school settings by implementing chat boxes to interact with students are being introduced. The chat box conversation logs serve as the source of raw data for the machine learning. According to Using AI for Mental Health Analysis and Prediction in School Surveys, existing survey results evaluated by health experts can be used to create a test dataset to validate the machine learning models. Supervised learning can then be deployed to classify specific behaviors and mental health patterns. However, there are concerns about how these programs work and what safeguards the companies have in place to protect youths’ data from being sold to other platforms. Additionally, there are concerns about whether these companies are complying with relevant laws (e.g., the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA]).

The University of Michigan identified AI technologies, such as natural language processing (NLP) and sentiment analysis, that can analyze user interactions, such as posts and comments, to identify signs of distress, anxiety, or depression. For example, Breathhh is an AI-powered Chrome extension designed to automatically deliver mental health exercises based on an individual’s web activity and online behaviors. By monitoring and analyzing the user’s interactions, the application can determine appropriate moments to present stress-relieving practices and strategies. Applications, like Breathhh, are just one example of personalized interventions designed by monitoring user interaction.

When using AI to address mental health concerns among K-12 students, policy implications must be carefully considered.

First, developers must obtain informed consent from students, parents, guardians, and all stakeholders before deploying such AI models. The use of AI models is always a topic of concern for policymakers because of the privacy concerns that come with it. To safely deploy AI models, there needs to be privacy protection policies in place to safeguard sensitive information from being improperly used. There is no comprehensive legislation that addresses those concerns either nationally or locally.
Second, developers also need to consider and factor in any bias engrained in their algorithm through data testing and regular monitoring of data output before it reaches the user. AI has the ability to detect early signs of mental health challenges. However, without such proper safeguards in place, we risk failing to protect students from being disproportionately impacted. When collected data reflects biases, it can lead to unfair treatment of certain groups. For youth, this can result in feelings of marginalization and adversely affect their mental health.
Effective policy considerations should encourage the use of AI models that will provide interpretable results, and policymakers need to understand how these decisions are made. Policies should outline how schools will respond to alerts generated by the system. A standard of care needs to be universally recognized, whether it be through policy or the companies’ internal safeguards. This standard of care should outline guidelines that address situations in which AI data output conflicts with human judgment.

Responsible AI implementation can enhance student well-being, but it requires careful evaluation to ensure students’ data is protected from potential harm. Moving forward, school leaders, policymakers, and technology developers need to consider the benefits and risks of AI-based mental health monitoring programs. Balancing the intended benefits while mitigating potential harms is crucial for student well-being.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
by: David P. GrossoStarshine S. Chun of ArentFox Schiff LLP

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