Tag: Labor Law

Second Circuit's Citigroup Decision Endorses Presumption of Prudence, Upholds Dismissal of Disclosure Claims

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP regarding the decision that employer stock in a 401(k) plan is subject to a “presumption of prudence” that a plaintiff alleging fiduciary breach:

 

 

 

In a much-anticipated decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined five other circuits in ruling that employer stock in a 401(k) plan is subject to a “presumption of prudence” that a plaintiff alleging fiduciary breach can overcome only upon a showing that the employer was facing a “dire situation” that was objectively unforeseeable by the plan sponsor. In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, No. 09-3804, 2011 WL 4950368 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2011). The appellate court found the plaintiffs had not rebutted the presumption of prudence and so upheld the dismissal of their “stock drop” claims.

BACKGROUND

The Citigroup plaintiffs were participants in two 401(k) plans that specifically required the offering of Citigroup stock as an investment option. The plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup’s large subprime mortgage exposure caused the share price of Citigroup stock to decline sharply between January 2007 and January 2008, and that plan fiduciaries breached their duties of prudence and loyalty by not divesting the plans of the stock in the face of the declines. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants breached their duty of disclosure by not providing complete and accurate information to plan participants regarding the risks associated with investing in Citigroup stock in light of the company’s exposure to the subprime market. On a motion to dismiss, the district court found no fiduciary breach because the defendants had “no discretion whatsoever” to eliminate Citigroup stock as an investment option (sometimes referred to as “hardwiring”). Alternatively, the lower court ruled that Citigroup stock was a presumptively prudent investment and the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to overcome the presumption.

SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION

Oral argument in the Citigroup case occurred nearly a year ago, and legal observers have been anxiously awaiting the court’s ruling. In a 2-1 decision, with Judge Chester J. Straub issuing a lengthy dissent, the Second Circuit rejected the “hardwiring” rationale but confirmed the application of the presumption of prudence, which was first articulated by the Third Circuit in Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995). The court also rejected claims that the defendants violated ERISA’s disclosure obligations by failing to provide plan participants with information about the expected future performance of Citigroup stock.

Prudence

Joining the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,[1] the court adopted the presumption of prudence as the “best accommodation between the competing ERISA values of protecting retirement assets and encouraging investment in employer stock.” Under the presumption of prudence, a fiduciary’s decision to continue to offer participants the opportunity to invest in employer stock is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review, which provides that a fiduciary’s conduct will not be second-guessed so long as it is reasonable. The court also ruled that the presumption of prudence applies at the earliest stages of the litigation and is relevant to all defined contribution plans that offer employer stock (not just ESOPs, which are designed to invest primarily in employer securities).

Having announced the relevant legal standard, the court of appeals dispatched the plaintiffs’ prudence claim in relatively short order. The plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup made ill-advised investments in the subprime market and hid the extent of its exposure from plan participants and the public; consequently, Citigroup’s stock price was artificially inflated. These facts alone, the court held, were not enough to plead a breach of fiduciary duty: “[T]hat Citigroup made a bad business decision is insufficient to show that the company was in a ‘dire situation,’ much less that the Investment Committee or the Administrative Committee knew or should have known that the situation was dire.” Nor could the plaintiffs carry their burden by alleging in conclusory fashion that individual fiduciaries “knew or should have known” about Citigroup’s subprime exposure but failed to act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the court of appeals held these bald assertions were insufficient at the pleadings stage to suggest knowledge of imprudence or to support the inference that the fiduciaries could have foreseen Citigroup’s subprime losses.

Disclosure

The court’s treatment of the disclosure claims was equally instructive. Plaintiffs’ allegations rested on two theories of liability under ERISA: (1) failing to provide complete and accurate information to participants (the “nondisclosure” theory), and (2) conveying materially inaccurate information about Citigroup stock to participants (the “misrepresentation” theory).

As to the nondisclosure theory, the court found that Citigroup adequately disclosed in plan documents made available to participants the risks of investing in Citigroup stock, including the undiversified nature of the investment, its volatility, and the importance of diversification. The court also emphasized that ERISA does not impose an obligation on employers to disclose nonpublic information to participants regarding a specific plan investment option.

Turning to the misrepresentation theory, the court found plaintiffs’ allegations that the fiduciaries “knew or should have known” about Citigroup’s subprime losses, or that they failed to investigate the prudence of the stock, were too threadbare to support a claim for relief. Though plaintiffs claimed that false statements in SEC filings were incorporated by reference into summary plan descriptions (SPDs), the court found no basis to infer that the individual defendants knew the statements were false. It also concluded there were no facts which, if proved, would show (without the benefit of hindsight) that an investigation of Citigroup’s financial condition would have revealed the stock was no longer a prudent investment.

IMPLICATIONS

Coming from the influential Second Circuit, the Citigroup decision represents something of a tipping point in stock-drop jurisprudence, especially with respect to the dozens of companies (including many financial services companies) that have been sued in stock-drop cases based on events surrounding the 2007-08 global financial crisis. The Second Circuit opinion gives the presumption of prudence critical mass among appellate courts and signals a potential shift in how stock-drop claims will be evaluated, including at the motion to dismiss stage.[2]

Under the Citigroup analysis, fiduciaries should not override the plan terms regarding employer stock unless maintaining the stock investment would frustrate the purpose of the plan, such as when the company is facing imminent collapse or some other “dire situation” that threatens its viability. Like other circuits that have adopted the prudence presumption, the Citigroup court emphasized the long-term nature of retirement investing and the need to refrain from acting in response to “mere stock fluctuations, even those that trend downhill significantly.” It also sided with other courts in holding that the presumption of prudence should be applied at the motion to dismiss stage (i.e., not allowing plaintiffs to gather evidence through discovery to show the imprudence of the stock). Taken together, these rulings may make it harder for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss, especially where their allegations of imprudence are based on relatively short-lived declines in stock price.

Some had predicted the Second Circuit would endorse the “hardwiring” argument and allow employers to remove fiduciary discretion by designating stock as a mandatory investment in the plan document. The Citigroup court was unwilling to go that far, but it did adopt a “sliding scale” under which judicial scrutiny will increase with the degree of discretion a plan gives its fiduciaries to offer company stock as an investment. This is similar to the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit inQuan and consistent with the heightened deference that courts generally give to fiduciaries when employer stock is hardwired into the plan. Thus, through careful plan drafting, employers should be able to secure the desired standard of review. Language in the plan document and trust agreement (as well as other documents) confirming that employer stock is a required investment option should result in the most deferential standard and provide fiduciaries the greatest protection.

Also noteworthy was the court’s treatment of the disclosure claims. Many stock-drop complaints piggyback on allegations of securities fraud, creating an inevitable tension between disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws and disclosure obligations under ERISA. The Second Circuit did not resolve this tension, but it construed ERISA fiduciary disclosure requirements narrowly and rejected the notion that fiduciaries have a general duty to tell participants about adverse corporate developments. The court made this ruling in the context of SPD disclosures under the 401(k) plan that identified specific risks of investing in Citigroup stock. Plan sponsors should review their SPDs and other participant communications to make sure company stock descriptions are sufficiently explicit about issues such as the volatility of a single-stock investment and the importance of diversification. These disclosures may go beyond what is already required under Department of Labor regulations.

[1]. See Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552, 568 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, ­­­2011 WL 4530151 (2011); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir. 1995).

[2]. That said, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should continue to monitor future developments in Citigroup in light of Judge Straub’s dissenting opinion and the likelihood of a petition for rehearing (or rehearing en banc), which the Citigroup plaintiffs have indicated they intend to seek. In his dissent, Judge Straub rejected the Moench presumption in favor of plenary review of fiduciary decisions regarding employer stock. He also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of ERISA disclosure duties.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

"The Sins of the Father": Third Party Retaliation Claims Allowed to Proceed

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article written by Ralph A. Morris of Schiff Hardin LLP about third-party retaliation claims :

A recent Texas federal court decision has further expanded the bases for Title VII retaliation claims against employers. In Zamora v. City of Houston, Christopher Zamora, a Houston police officer, alleged that the Houston Police Department demoted him in retaliation for the filing of a charge with the U.S. EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In this case, however, the charge was not filed by Christopher Zamora, but by his father, Manuel Zamora, alleging that he, Manuel Zamora, had been discriminated against by the Department.

Earlier this year, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the United States Supreme Court permitted an employee’s Title VII retaliation claim to proceed where the employee’s fiancee had earlier filed an EEOC charge. The Court held that a Title VII retaliation claim could stand where the employee is subject to an adverse employment action because a co-worker to whom the employee is “closely related” engaged in protected activity.

The Supreme Court decided Thompson while the Zamora case was pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. After the Thompson decision was issued, the Zamora court reversed its prior determination that dismissed Christopher Zamora’s claim. The court concluded that under Thompson, Mr. Zamora’s retaliation claim could proceed based on his father’s filing of an EEOC charge. Thus, under Zamora, in addition to a fiancee, a parent-child relationship satisfies the “closely related” test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Thompson.

Retaliation charges and lawsuits typically are more challenging to defend because the employee’s burden of proof is not as difficult to meet, as compared with a charge of discrimination. Thompson and Zamora now place an additional burden on employers by holding that employees themselves do not necessarily need to engage in the protected activity to have standing to sue for retaliation. These decisions may have a greater impact on employers that make it a practice to hire family members and friends of existing employees than on those with anti-nepotism policies.

The Supreme Court refrained from identifying a fixed class of relationships for which third-party retaliation claims are viable. Future cases will have to decide how far retaliation claims will be expanded: whether, for example, partners involved in a romantic relationship but who are not engaged, or familial relationships more distant than parent and child, are sufficiently close so as to fall within the zone of protection. Employers can help reduce the risk for these types of claims by reviewing their EEOC and anti-retaliation policies and ensuring that managers are trained and educated on compliance.

© 2011 Schiff Hardin LLP

IRS Announces Retirement Plan Limitations for 2012 Tax Year – Most Limits Increased

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article written by Alyssa D. Dowse of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding the cost of living adjustments for the 2012 tax year:

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has announced the cost of living adjustments for the 2012 tax year, which affect various dollar limitations for retirement plans. The IRS increased many of these limitations for the first time since 2009. Some limitations remain unchanged. The following chart highlights many of the noteworthy limitations for the 2012 tax year.

Plan Limit

2011

2012
Social Security Taxable Wage Base $106,800 $110,100
Annual Compensation (Code Section 401(a)(17)) $245,000 $250,000
Elective Deferral (Contribution) Limit for Employees who Participate in 401(k), 403(b) and most 457(b) Plans (Code Sections 402(g), 457(e)(15)) $16,500 $17,000
Age 50 Catch-Up Contribution Limit (Code Section 414(v)(2)(B)(i)) $5,500 $5,500
Highly Compensated Employee Threshold (Code Section 414(q)(1)(B)) $110,000 $115,000
Defined Contribution Plan Limitation on Annual Additions (Code Section 415(c)(1)(A)) $49,000 $50,000
Defined Benefit Plan Limitation on Annual Benefit (Code Section 415(b)(1)(A)) $195,000 $200,000
ESOP Distribution Period Rules—Payouts in Excess of Five Years (Code Section 409(o)(1)(C)) $985,000

$195,000

 $1,015,000

$200,000
Key Employee Compensation Threshold for Officers (Code Section (416(i)(1)(A)(i)) $160,000 $165,000

Plan sponsors should review employee communications and update such communications as appropriate based on the 2012 cost of living adjustments. Other cost of living adjustments can be found on the IRS  website: http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=96461,00.html.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

 

 

Hooters Sues Competitor over Alleged Trade Secrets Theft after Top Executives Fly Away

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Eric H. Rumbaugh, Luis I. Arroyo and Steven A. Nigh of Michael Best & Friedrich  LLP regarding  misappropriating its trade secrets and other confidential business information following the departure of several Hooters executives:

 

Hooters of America LLC has sued a competitor in Georgia Federal Court for allegedly misappropriating its trade secrets and other confidential business information following the departure of several Hooters executives to Twin Peaks Restaurants.

Hooters’ complaint alleges that former vice president of operations and purchasing, Joseph Hummel, gained unauthorized access to Hooters’ computers and took trade secrets and other confidential information. Specifically, Hooters claims that around the time of his departure, Hummel downloaded and transferred confidential sales figures, employee training and retention strategies and purchasing information to his personal e-mail account. The suit also accuses Hummel of additional unauthorized access of private business information following the termination of his employment.

Hummel, as well as Hooters’ former Chief Executive Officer and its general counsel, left the beach-themed restaurant franchise to join up with Twin Peaks, which operates a mountain lodge-themed restaurant chain featuring an all-female wait staff. Hooters contends that Hummel’s alleged theft has allowed Twin Peaks to hit the ground running in its efforts to open 35 restaurants in the next decade, several of which are planned for markets with Hooters restaurants.

The case illustrates the potential damage that departing employees, particularly those with access to sensitive information, can wreak on an employer. Hooters has already taken one step towards protecting itself; before Hummel left, he signed a confidentiality agreement requiring him to return all confidential and proprietary information to Hooters. In addition to confidentiality agreements, employers should consider having their top executives or other employees with access to sensitive information sign non-competition agreements. Moreover, most states’ trade secret statutes require businesses to take steps that are reasonable under the circumstances to protect their confidential information in order to preserve the trade secret status of that information. Accordingly, employers should consider implementing electronic security measures beyond just login credentials; limiting the number of employees who are authorized to access confidential information; and regulating employees’ ability to take information off company premises.

Next, when key employees depart, and especially when they depart for a competitor, businesses should consult with counsel immediately, and before examining (and arguably damaging) electronic evidence. Departing employees who take information often leave a shockingly obvious electronic trail; but that trail can be lost quickly if not preserved, or inadvertently destroyed if improperly accessed.

Lastly, businesses engaging talent, and especially talent that comes from a competitor, cannot be too careful or too forceful in making sure that the incoming talent does not make, retain or transfer any copies of information from their previous employer. Businesses engaging talent that acted improperly on the way out can quickly embroil their new employers in costly and risky litigation.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Creating a Social Media Policy

Posted on October 18, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by Brian J. Moore of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding the importance of employers having a social media policy:

It is essential for employers to develop a social networking policy, especially in light of the many legal issues that may arise. Employers must consider the many goals that the policy intends to cover, such as:

  • Protecting the company’s trade secrets, confidential, proprietary and/or privileged information;
  • Protecting the company’s reputation;
  • Protecting the privacy of employees; and
  • Establishing guidelines for whether use of social networking sites during working hours is permitted, and if so, under what circumstances.

Employers must also consider the parameters in developing a new policy, such as:

  • Urging employees to go to human resources with work-related issues and complaints before blogging about them;
  • Setting forth the potential for discipline, up to and including termination, if an employee misuses social networking sites relating to employment;
  • Establishing a reporting procedure for suspected violations of the policy;
  • Enforcing the policy consistently and with regard to all employees;
  • Reiterating that company policies, including harassment and discrimination policies, apply with equal force to employees’ communications on social networking sites;
  • Reminding employees that the computers and email system are company property intended for business use only, and that the company may monitor computer and email usage; and
  • Arranging for employees to sign a written acknowledgment that they have read, understand and will abide by the policy.

As seen is the October 14th issue of Business Lexington

© 2011 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

EEOC and Cracker Barrel Sign National Mediation Agreement

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding Cracker Barrel Old Country Store signing of a National Universal Agreement to Mediate:

WASHINGTON – Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today announced the signing of a National Universal Agreement to Mediate (NUAM) to streamline the handling of employment discrimination claims.

With the signing of this agreement, Cracker Barrel joins more than 200 national and regional private sector employers, including several Fortune 500 companies, who have made similar arrangements with the EEOC. This agreement provides the framework for both organizations to informally resolve any workplace issues that may arise from time to time through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) rather than through a traditional lengthy, formal EEOC investigation or potential litigation. The NUAM includes all Cracker Barrel locations.

“Nationwide mediation agreements like this are a classic win-win,” said Nicholas Inzeo, Director of the EEOC’s Office of Field Programs. “NUAMs are a non-adversarial and efficient way for companies to handle discrimination charges using the EEOC as a partner and advisor. EEOC mediation encourages a positive work environment, and the company saves time and money. Everyone benefits. We are gratified that a major employer such as Cracker Barrel has joined the growing ranks of companies that are making use of this innovative system.”

Cracker Barrel Vice President and General Counsel Michael J. Zylstra said, “Cracker Barrel is committed to providing a fully inclusive workplace, where diversity is welcomed and everyone is treated with courtesy and respect. This innovative agreement builds upon our existing policies and procedures to effectively and fairly resolve employee concerns and demonstrates our shared goal to create a bias-free workplace. We look forward to developing an even stronger relationship with the EEOC.”

Under the terms of the NUAM, any eligible charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC in which Cracker Barrel is named as an employer/respondent will be referred to the EEOC’s mediation unit. The company will designate a corporate representative to handle all inquiries and other logistical matters related to potential charges in order to facilitate a prompt scheduling of the matter for EEOC mediation.

Expanding mediation is a key component of the EEOC’s efforts to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. The EEOC has entered into 233 national and regional Universal Agreements to Mediate (UAMs) with private sector employers, including several Fortune 500 companies. Additionally, EEOC district offices have entered into 1,743 mediation agreements with employers at the local levels within their respective jurisdictions. Since the full implementation of the EEOC’s National Mediation Program in April 1999, more than 136,000 charges of employment discrimination have been mediated, with nearly 70 percent being successfully resolved.

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (Nasdaq: CBRL) was established in 1969 in Lebanon, Tenn., and operates 604 company-owned locations in 42 states. For more information, visit www.crackerbarrel.com.

The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC and its mediation program is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.

Second Circuit Finds that Employers May be Obligated to Accommodate a Disabled Employee's Commute

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorneys James R. Hays, Jonathan Sokolowski and James R. Hays of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding disabled employees and employers requirements to assist them:

 

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, employers may be required to assist disabled employees with their commute.

In Nixon-Tinkelman v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 10-3317-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16569 (2d Cir. N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011), plaintiff Barbara Nixon-Tinkelman (“Plaintiff”), who has cancer, heart problems, asthma, and is hearing impaired, brought suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act alleging that the New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“Defendant” or “DOHMH”) failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. Specifically, following her transfer from Queens to Manhattan, Plaintiff requested that DOHMH accommodate her commute by transferring her back to an office location closer to her home in Queens. DOHMH ultimately denied Plaintiff’s request.

The Southern District of New York dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that activities which “fall outside the scope of the job, like commuting to and from the workplace, are not within the province of an employer’s obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” However, on appeal, the Second Circuit faulted the district court’s holding, explaining that certain circumstances may require an employer to provide commuting assistance to a disabled employee, and furthermore, that providing such assistance is not “inherently unreasonable.” Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court, and tasked it with engaging in the “fact-specific inquiry” necessary to determine whether it would have been reasonable to provide Plaintiff with a commuting accommodation. On remand, the Second Circuit directed the district court to consider the following factors: (a) Defendant’s total number of employees; (b) the number and location of Defendant’s offices; (c) whether other positions exist for which Plaintiff was qualified; (d) whether Plaintiff could have been transferred to a more convenient office without unduly burdening Defendant’s operations; and (e) the reasonableness of allowing Plaintiff to work from home without on-site supervision.

In addition to the above-listed factors, the Second Circuit also noted that the district court should have contemplated whether transferring Plaintiff “back to Queens or another closer location, allowing her to work from home, or providing a car or parking permit” would have accommodated her needs.

Nixon-Tinkelman serves as a reminder to employers that they must carefully assess all requests for reasonable accommodations from disabled employees. Although employers are not required to provide the specific accommodations employees may request, they must nevertheless work with employees to determine what reasonable accommodations, if any, can be made.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

NLRB Delays Implementation of Mandatory Notice Posting Rule

Recently posted in the National Law Review  an article regarding the NLRB postponing the date for employers to post notices informing employees of their rights to join a union  by Aaron J. Epstein of Andrews Kurth LLP:

 

Last week, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) postponed the effective date for its rule requiring most U.S. employers to post workplaces notices informing employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including the right to join a union. The NLRB published the new rule on August 31, 2011, and initially set an effective date of November 14, 2011. However, in the face of two lawsuits challenging the validity of the new rule, and citing the need to conduct enhanced education and outreach, the NLRB has delayed the effective date until January 31, 2012.

Below is a brief overview of the new rule and the steps employers must take to comply.

To Whom the Rule Applies

The notice posting rule applies to all employers covered by the NLRA, whether or not they have a unionized workforce. NLRA coverage is intentionally broad and reaches almost all private sector employers. In the case of retail businesses, the NLRB’s jurisdiction covers any employer with a gross annual volume of business of $500,000 or more. The NLRB’s non-retail jurisdictional standard extends to most other employers. It is based on the amount of goods sold or services provided by an employer out of state, called “outflow,” or goods or services purchased by an employer from out of state, called “inflow.” Under this standard, any employer with an annual inflow or outflow of at least $50,000 is subject to the NLRA.

What the Rule Requires

The NLRB’s new rule dictates that employers post an 11-inch-by-17-inch notice detailing employee rights under the NLRA in a conspicuous place where other notifications of workplace rights and employer policies and rules are customarily posted. Employers are required to take reasonable steps to ensure that the notice is not altered, defaced, covered, or otherwise rendered unreadable. Additionally, employers who post personnel policies or workplaces notices on a company intranet or internet site must also post the NLRA notice on those sites, or they can provide a link to the notice on the NLRB’s website with the title “Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act.”

Copies of the notice, in English and Spanish, are available at www.nlrb.gov or at any of the agency’s regional offices. The notice must be posted in English and in another language if at least 20 percent of employees are not proficient in English and speak the other language. The NLRB will provide translations of the notice, and of the required link to the NLRB’s website, in the appropriate languages. If a workforce includes two or more groups, each constituting at least 20 percent of the workforce, who speak different languages, an employer must post the notice in the language spoken by the larger group, and then may either post the notice in the language(s) spoken by the other group(s) or, at the employer’s option, distribute copies of the notice to those employees in their language(s). If such an employer is also required to post the notice electronically, it must do so in each of those languages.

Failure to Comply with the Rule

Failing to post the notice may, in and of itself, be treated as an unfair labor practice and subject an employer to remedial measures. The NLRB may also extend the six-month statute of limitations for filing a charge involving other unfair labor practice allegations against the employer. Finally, if an employer knowingly and willfully fails to post the notice, the failure may be considered evidence of unlawful motive in an unfair labor practice case dealing with other alleged violations of the NLRA.

© 2011 Andrews Kurth LLP

Medical Marijuana User Not Protected from Termination

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Darren A. Feider  of Williams Kastner regarding medical marijuana and employment:

A developing exception to Washington law of employment at will is the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. This narrow exception was recently tested in Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care, 171 Wn.2d 736 (2011), when a new hire employee asserted that her employer had violated Washington public policy for terminating her for a positive drug test for marijuana.

In Roe, the new hire claimed to suffer from migraine headaches, causing chronic pain, nausea, blurred vision and sensitivity to light. Her physician prescribed medical marijuana and she smoked it four times a day, but ingested it only at home. She was offered a position as a customer service representative contingent on a background check and a drug screening. After failing the drug screening, the new hire informed her supervisor she had been prescribed medical marijuana. Her supervisor informed her that use of medical marijuana violated the company drug policy and terminated her employment during the training phase. She sued the company for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that medical marijuana merely provided an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution under Washington state drug laws but did not imply a civil cause of action in employment. She appealed.

On appeal, the Roe court recognized that the voters of Washington had provided a defense to caregivers and physicians who prescribed marijuana to those with certain illnesses such as the new hire. That statute, however, did not provide protection for employment and specifically noted that the law did not require any accommodation of on-site use of medical marijuana.

The Roe court had focused on the language of the medical marijuana statute which only discussed protecting health care providers. The court also emphasized that there was no evidence that the statute provided employment protection or prohibited an employer from discharging an employee for medical marijuana use. The court found that the statute did not support a broad public policy that would remove all impediments to authorized medical marijuana use or forbid an employer from discharging an employee because she used medical marijuana.

The Roe court also recognized that Washington patients have no legal right to marijuana under federal law, which has the effect of establishing that there is not a broad public policy that would require an employer to allow an employee to engage in illegal activity.

The take-aways from the Roe decision are that Washington courts will move cautiously in expanding the scope of legal protections for employees. Washington courts will not attempt to graft on an expansion of the public policy tort claims. The Roe decision also emphasizes that employment in Washington is at will and that any public policy exceptions are narrowly construed.

© 2002-2011 by Williams Kastner ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Specialty Healthcare 357 NLRB Decision No. 83: Impact on Nursing Home and Resident Care Industry

Posted on September 6, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by  Joshua W. Pollack of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding a decision for those in the nursing home and resident care industry:

 

Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) handed down an important decision for those in the nursing home and resident care industry: Specialty Healthcare, 357 NLRB No. 83. In this decision, the Board redefined the standard for “unit determination” cases for the “non-acute health care industry.” The Board’s conclusion reversed twenty years of precedent and made further unionization in the nursing home industry likely.

The Board’s decision makes unionization more likely because a key factor in the success of an organizing campaign is the size of the bargaining unit. Traditionally, unions fare better when organizing a smaller unit, whereas employers fare better when the union must organize a larger unit. Under the newly announced “traditional community of interest” standard, smaller units will be harder to challenge by employers, and thus are likely to proliferate. The Board summarized the new standard

[when a union] petition[s] for an election in a unit of employees who are readily identifiable as a group (based on job classifications, departments, functions, work locations, skills, or similar factors), and the Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit, despite a contention that employees in the unit could be placed in a larger unit which would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit.

Applying this standard, the Board held that a unit of Certified Nursing Assistants was the appropriate bargaining unit because the employer was unable to show that there was a larger group that had an “overwhelming community of interest” that overlapped the interest of the CNAs. In application, this rule will make it harder for employers to challenge prospective units and increase a union’s ability to organize smaller units.

Employers should be aware that Specialty Healthcare gives unions an advantage in their organizing efforts, and as a result employers should take proactive steps to prepare for a potential union campaign, especially those employers in the non-acute health care industry. At a minimum, supervisors should know the warning signs of unionization and how to respond. Supervisors should also be empowered with the information necessary to articulate the company’s position of a union-free workplace with credibility. Lastly, employers should also institute policies that guide employees regarding union solicitation, union access to facilities, and employee uniform policies.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c