Tag: IRS

U.S. Tax Court Rejects Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Restrictive View of Trust Material Participation

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The U.S. Tax Court recently issued a taxpayer favorable opinion regarding how a trust materially participates in its activities. The court’s holding will make it easier for trusts to currently deduct expenses against non-passive income and to exclude income from the reach of the new 3.8% net investment income tax.

In Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, the court held that in determining whether a trust materially participates in its activities, the activities of the trustees, including their activities as employees of the businesses owned by the trust, should be considered. The court’s opinion directly conflicts with recent IRS guidance that only a trustee’s time spent acting in a fiduciary capacity counts toward the trust’s material participation – a standard that would be very difficult for most trusts to meet. See Technical Advice Memorandum 201317010.

In Frank Aragona Trust, a Michigan trust owned rental real estate activities and engaged in holding and developing real estate. The trust conducted some of its activities directly, and others through its wholly-owned business, Holiday Enterprises, LLC. The trust had six trustees, three of whom worked full-time for Holiday Enterprises. The IRS argued that the participation of the trustee-employees should be disregarded. The court disagreed and concluded that the participation of the trustee-employees should be counted and further, that the participation of the trust’s six trustees was sufficient to meet the material participation standard. The court based its decision, in part, on the fact that Michigan law requires trustees to “administer the trust solely in the interest of the trust beneficiaries” even when they are participating through a business wholly-owned by the trust. This decision provides helpful authority for trusts, their trustees and their advisors in navigating the complex passive activity loss and net investment income tax rules.

However, the decision in Frank Aragona Trust does not answer all of the outstanding questions regarding material participation of trusts. In recently finalized regulations implementing the net investment income tax, the Treasury Department and the IRS requested public comments on rules regarding material participation of trusts, which indicates that the IRS may finally undertake a formal project to provide long-awaited guidance on this issue.

Article By:

Michala P. Irons
Randal J. Kaltenmark
William M. Pope
Douglas S. Robson
Howard J. Rubin
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

IRS Clarifies How Plan Sponsors Should Handle Same-Sex Spouses in Qualified Retirement Plans

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On April 4, 2014, the IRS issued Notice 2014-19, requiring that qualified retirement plans apply “spouse” and “marriage” to same-sex spouses just as the plan would to opposite-sex spouses and establishing criteria for what plan amendments are needed and the timing for doing so.

Background

In September of 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provided that same-sex marriages would not be recognized under federal law. On June 26, 2013, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the Windsor case that DOMA’s treatment of such marriages was unconstitutional. Following Windsor, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17 on August 29, 2013 (effective September 16, 2013), requiring same-sex marriages legally performed under state law to be recognized for federal tax purposes in any state regardless of whether the state recognizes the validity of same-sex marriages. This Revenue Ruling further provided that individuals who entered into registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or other similar relationships under state law did not qualify as “spouses” and that these relationships did not qualify as “marriages” for federal tax purposes.

The newly issued April 4 Notice gives further guidance respecting qualified retirement plans on a wide range of subjects including qualified joint and survivor annuity rules, the Retirement Equity Act’s spousal beneficiary safeguards, required minimum distribution calculations and timing, control group determinations, ESOP rules, and the QDRO exceptions to the Code’s anti-alienation rules.

Notice 2014-19

The new IRS Notice describes when qualified retirement plans must be in administrative and documentary compliance with Windsor and the August 2013 Revenue Ruling. Plan sponsors and recordkeepers must have been administering their retirement plans consistent with Windsor as of June 26, 2013, even if these plans did not contemplate valid same-sex marriages. The corollary to this is that failing to recognize same-sex marriages before June 26, 2013, will not disqualify a plan. Furthermore, because last summer’s Revenue Ruling was not effective until September 16, 2013, there will be no risk of disqualification during the gap period between the effective date of Windsor and September 16 for plans that recognized same-sex marriages only if a participant was domiciled in a state that recognized same-sex marriages. The IRS further clarified that plan sponsors could operate their plans prior to June 26, 2013 to reflect Windsor on some or all qualification requirements without risk of disqualification so long as the basic qualification rules were satisfied, i.e., plan sponsors could be more generous than the Code required if it was feasible administratively.

From a documentation standpoint, all qualified retirement plans must be consistent with Windsor and both the IRS Revenue Ruling and the new Notice. Depending on how a plan uses or defines the terms “spouse” and “marriage,” plan amendments may or may not be needed. If a plan uses or defines these terms in a neutral manner without reference to “opposite-sex” or DOMA and they can be reasonably construed in harmony withWindsor and the IRS guidance, then no plan amendment is likely needed. However, if a plan couches the terms “spouse” and “marriage” in accordance with DOMA or inconsistently with Windsor, then the plan will need to be amended retroactively to June 26, 2013 to maintain its qualified status.

The deadline for adopting any needed amendments is generally going to be December 31, 2014, although for some plan sponsors, the amendment deadline could be later depending on their unique circumstances.

Next Steps

In response to Notice 2014-19, plan sponsors will need to review the terms of their retirement plans to ensure each plan contains a proper definition of “spouse” and “marriage” and to timely amend their plans, as necessary. Additionally, plan sponsors should confirm the administrative aspects of their plans with their recordkeepers. Based on all of this, Notice 2014-19 is welcome news as it provides certainty: individuals can better plan their benefits and retirements, recordkeepers can confidently begin any needed programming and website changes, and plan sponsors can undertake any needed revisions to their plan documents, summary plan descriptions and other communications.

Article By:

Jorge M. Leon
Kirk A. Pelikan
Charles P. Stevens
Of:
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies That Severance Pay is Taxable—in Most Cases

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On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-0 decision, ruled that severance payments made to employees who are involuntarily terminated are taxable wages under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).  Quality Stores, Inc., et al., 12-1408.  The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in favor of Quality Stores, which was seeking a $1 million tax refund based on its argument that severance payments were not covered by FICA and were excluded from taxation based on the Internal Revenue Code.  The Court’s ruling resolved a split between the Sixth Circuit and the Federal Circuit, and ended a legal battle with more than $1 billion at stake in potential tax refunds to employers involved in 11 separate cases with more than 2,400 refund claims.

Quality argued that its severance payments to terminated employees were actually supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUB), which are not considered “wages” under the Internal Revenue Code.  According to the company, “a SUB payment is a type of payment that—although made by an employer to [its] former employee—nonetheless does not meet the statutory definition of ‘wages’ because it is not remuneration for services.”  The Court noted that the severance payments were made only to employees and were based on employment-driven criteria including the position held, the employee’s length of service with the company and salary at the time of termination.  Relying on the “broad definition of wages under FICA,” the Court ruled that severance payments to employees who are terminated involuntarily are taxable under FICA.

However, in its decision the Court noted IRS revenue rulings that severance payments tied to the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits “are exempt not only from income tax withholding but also FICA taxation.”  Thus, employers appear to continue to be able to make severance payments not taxable through a carefully crafted structure linking the severance payments to the employee’s receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.

Article By:

Mark D. Nelson
Alejandra Lara
Of:
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Same Sex Marriages: Are You Filing Your Taxes Properly?

Poyner Spruill

 

In late 2013, I met with my first same sex couple clients since the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) last year.  If you recall, DOMA  was the federal law barring the federal government from recognizing same sex marriages legalized by states.  It was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court as violative of the Fifth Amendment.  The IRS issued a statement on August 29, 2013 that provided that same sex couples legally married in a jurisdiction that recognizes their marriage would be treated as married for federal tax purposes regardless of the laws of their domiciliary state.  As a result, same sex couples married in a state that legally recognizes their marriage will be entitled to the estate and gift tax marital deduction, and they must also file their federal income tax returns with the status of married or married filing separately.  (The Department of Labor issued a similar statement in Technical Release No. 2013-4, meaning that for purposes of ERISA, legally married couples are treated as married, regardless of the laws of their domiciliary state.)

North Carolina does not recognize same sex marriage as valid, so for purposes of North Carolina taxes, where does that leave our North Carolina-residing same sex couple clients that were legally married in another state?  NCDOR directive PD-13-1 provides that “Because North Carolina does not recognize same-sex marriage as valid… individuals who enter into a same-sex marriage in another state cannot file a North Carolina income tax return using the filing status of married. Such individuals who file a federal income tax return as married must each complete a separate pro forma federal return for North Carolina purposes with the filing status of single  to determine each individual’s proper adjusted gross income, deductions and tax credits allowed under the Code for the filing status used for North Carolina purposes.”

My clients are considering getting married in a state that recognizes same sex marriage, but they want to understand the legal implications for them if they do.  They are concerned about the “marriage penalty” for federal income tax purposes and the complexity of having different laws and rules for federal and  state purposes. They do not have an estate tax problem, so the availability of the unlimited estate tax marital deduction is of no consequence to them. However, they are considering retitling the house currently owned by one of them into their joint names.  I cautioned them that such transfer would constitute a taxable gift to the extent the value of the interest transferred exceeded the donor owner’s $14,000 annual exclusion. In fact, one partner’s use of funds for the benefit of the other in excess of the donor-partner’s annual exclusion in any year will require the donor-partner to file a gift tax return. If they are legally married, there would be no taxable gifts in those circumstances due to the unlimited marital gift tax deduction. My clients each have a 401(k) plan, so if they were to marry, under ERISA, they must be designated beneficiary of each other’s accounts unless the spouse waives that right.

As an advisor, if you have same sex couple clients who have been married in a state that recognizes same sex marriage and they have paid taxes or used exemptions (income, gift or estate tax) based on separate status, you may consider whether they can and should file amended returns based on married filing status to recoup taxes or exemptions. And they should be advised to revisit their beneficiary designations and their estate planning documents if they have not done so already.

Article by:

Westray B. Veasey

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP

Show Me the Money: When Can I Expect My Tax Refund?

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Tax filing season got a late start this year thanks to the 2013 government shutdown; the IRS pushed back its official return acceptance date from January 21 to January 31. Now that IRS is accepting returns, when can taxpayers expect to see their refund?

The IRS claims that 9 out of 10 refunds are issued in less than 21 days. The IRS website has a tool called, “Where’s My Refund?” that can be used to check the status of a return 24 hours after the agency receives it electronically or 4 weeks after it is received by mail (i.e., paper return).

The IRS and tax professionals alike strongly encourage taxpayers to file electronically. Doing so can result in a quicker refund. In addition, how a taxpayer elects to receive a refund, via direct deposit or paper check, can affect wait times. Generally, the closer to the deadline (April 15th) that a return is filed, the longer the wait will be (as a majority of filers tend to wait until the deadline approaches).

It is important to note that a return can be filed without immediate payment. No penalty or interest will be levied until the April 15th deadline. Of course, there is always the option of filing for an extension, but generally speaking it is better to timely file your return, and it is important to remember that payments are still due by April 15th even when an extension has been timely filed.

In some cases, individuals can receive tax breaks and refundable credits even if they do not have to pay income tax for a given year. Thus, just because a tax return is not filed does not mean that an individual cannot benefit from professional assistance.

Don’t delay – April 15th will be here before you know it!

Article by:

H. Trigg Mitchell

Of:

McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC

2014 Update for California Employers

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While 2013 was marked by some novel and interesting judicial and administrative decisions, including Quicken Loans (in which the National Labor Relations Board invalidated certain common employee handbook policies), Vance v. Ball State University (in which the U.S. Supreme Court established the parameters of who could be deemed a “supervisor” for employment discrimination purposes), Nelson v. Knight (in which the Iowa Supreme Court opined that an attractive female employee could be terminated because she was “too distracting” to the small business owner), and Purton v. Marriott (in which the California Court of Appeal addressed an employer’s liability for accidents caused by alcohol consumption at its holiday party), the California Legislature also enacted a number of new bills that become effective in 2014.

Among the most significant of these are the following:

Minimum Wage Increase and Resulting Salary Increase to Maintain Exempt-Employee Status (AB 10)

The California minimum wage will increase to $9.00 per hour, effective July 1, 2014, and to $10.00 per hour effective January 1, 2016. A less-advertised consequence of this increase, however, is the impact it will have on the salary test for preserving an employee’s exempt status. Under California law, a supervisor classified as exempt must be paid a monthly salary that is no less than two times the wages paid to a full-time minimum wage employee. After July 1, 2014, the minimum monthly salary to preserve exempt status under California Labor Code section 515, will rise to $3,120 per month, annualized to $37,440. As this change is scheduled to occur mid-year, employers are advised to make their adjustments early, if needed, to avoid this potential pitfall. In addition, under AB 442 the penalties available for minimum wage violations will now include “liquidated damages.”

Wage Rate Increases for Computer Software Employees and Physicians

Labor Code sections 515.5 and 515.6 provide exemptions for overtime for certain computer software employees and licensed physicians who earn a set minimum wage that is adjusted annually by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. Effective January 1, 2014, the minimum hourly rate increased to $40.38 (from $39.90) for computer professionals and to $73.57 (from $72.70) for physicians, reflecting a 1.2 percent increase in the California Consumer Price Index. Affected employers should adjust their rates accordingly.

Meal Periods, Rest Breaks, And Now “Recovery Periods” (SB 435)

For several years, the California Code of Regulations has required employers of outdoor-working employees to allow their outdoor workers the opportunity to “take a cool-down rest in the shade for a period of no less than five minutes when they feel the need to do so to protect themselves from overheating.” (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 8, § 3395, subd. (d)(3).) Previously, an employer who failed to provide these cool-down recovery periods was subject to a citation issued by the California Division of Safety and Health. But now, effective January 1, 2014, SB 435 provides employees with a right, under California Labor Code § 226.7, to seek recovery of statutory damages each workday that an employer fails to provide an employee with these cool-down recovery periods. Employers with outdoor-working employees should review their current policies and practices to ensure that meal periods, rest breaks, and recovery periods are addressed and afforded. 

Making It Harder For Prevailing Employers To Obtain Attorney’s Fees And Costs In Wage Cases (SB 462)

California Labor Code Section 218.5 allows the “prevailing party” to recover attorney’s fees and costs in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages (e.g., minimum or overtime wages), fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund contributions. SB 462 amends Labor Code Section 218.5 to make it more difficult for employers to obtain attorney’s fees and costs under this section. Indeed, effective January 1, 2014, to obtain attorney’s fees and costs under Labor Code Section 218.5, an employer must not only be the “prevailing party” in such an action, but the court must also find that the “employee brought the court action in bad faith.” On the other hand, due to the enactment of AB 1386, which amends Section 98.2 of the Labor Code, a final order of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement can create a lien on the employer’s real property to secure amounts due to a prevailing employee-claimant. Unless the lien is satisfied or released, it will continue for 10 years after the date of its creation.

The IRS To Begin Enforcing Its Rule That Automatic Gratuities Are Wages, Not Tips

Restaurants often add automatic gratuities on the bill of large parties (for example, a 20% automatic gratuity for parties of eight or more). Previously, for IRS purposes, these automatic gratuities were considered part of an employee’s “tips,” and thus the employee could pocket their share of automatic gratuities, and it was up to the employee to report them to their employer and on their tax return. Starting in 2014, however, the IRS will treat an employee’s portion of automatic gratuities as the employee’s regular wages and, as such, they will be subject to tax withholdings by the employer. Thus, employees will now receive their portion of automatic gratuities as part of their normal paychecks, and employers will be tasked with the responsibility of actively monitoring these wages, performing the necessary tax withholdings, and correctly reporting these wages to the IRS. Notably, because automatic gratuities will now be considered part of an employee’s regular wages for IRS purposes, employers should analyze whether they are required to account for these automatic gratuities when computing an employee’s overtime rate.

Wage Withholdings (SB 390)

Under Labor Code Section 227, it is unlawful for an employer to willfully, or with the intent to defraud, fail to make agreed-upon payments to health and welfare funds, pension funds or vacation plans, or other various benefit plans. SB 390 amends this provision so that it is now also unlawful for an employer to fail to remit withholdings from an employee’s wages that were made pursuant to state, local, or federal law, such as taxes. SB 390 further provides that in criminal proceedings under this section, any withholdings that are recovered from an employer shall be forwarded to the appropriate fund or plan and, if restitution is imposed, the court shall direct to which agency, entity, or person it shall be paid. 

Criminal History Inquiries (SB 530)

On October 10, 2013, Governor Jerry Brown approved SB 530, which amends California Labor Code Section 432.7 to include additional prohibitions for employers related to pre-employment inquiries into an individual’s prior criminal history. California law already prohibits employers from asking applicants to disclose, or from using, arrest records. Effective January 1, 2014, employers are prohibited from asking job applicants to disclose, or from utilizing as a factor in determining any condition of employment, information concerning a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed. SB 530 exempts employers from the above requirements in the following circumstances: (1) the employer is required by law to obtain such information; (2) the applicant would be required to possess or use a firearm during the course of the employment; (3) an individual who has been convicted of a crime is prohibited from holding the position sought by the applicant, regardless of whether that conviction has been expunged, judicially ordered se
aled, statutorily eradicated, or judicially dismissed following probation; and (4) the employer is prohibited by law from hiring an applicant who has been convicted of a crime.

As with the existing version of Section 432.7, SB 530 allows an applicant to recover from an employer the greater of actual damages or two hundred dollars ($200), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, for a violation of the statute and the greater of treble actual damages or five hundred dollars ($500), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, for an intentional violation of the statute. An intentional violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).

This expanded protection for applicants with criminal conviction records supplements the federal government’s recent efforts on this topic. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has published an Enforcement Guidance on the consideration of conviction records in employment decisions. In order to avoid claims of disparate treatment or impact, the EEOC recommends that employers develop narrow policies that determine the specific criminal offenses that may demonstrate unfitness for particular jobs. The EEOC recommends individualized assessments as opposed to blanket policies. Employers should carefully review their job application form to ensure compliance with these new requirements.

Domestic Worker Bill of Rights (AB 241)

Another wage-and-hour change comes from the Domestic Worker Bill of Rights, which took effect January 1, 2014. The new legislation establishes, among other things, overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay to caregivers who work more than nine hours a day or more than 45 hours a week. Covered caregivers include those who provide one-on-one care for 80 percent or more of their duties, such as nannies and in-home caregivers of the elderly or disabled. It does not cover babysitters, family members who provide babysitting services, or caregivers of low-income individuals through California’s In Home Supportive Service. Caregivers who work at facilities that provide lodging or boarding are also excluded.

Victims’ Rights to Time Off From Work (SB 288)

Employers may not retaliate or discriminate against employees who are victims of certain felony crimes, domestic violence or sexual assault for taking time off from work to appear in court or to obtain prescribed relief. A new addition to California Labor Code — Section 230.5 — now will also prohibit an employer from terminating or discriminating against an employee who is a victim of certain additional specified criminal offenses from taking time off to appear in court. These specified offenses include vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, felony child abuse, felony stalking and many other “serious felonies.” The employee-victim may take such time off from work to appear in court to be heard at any proceeding involving a postarrest release decision, plea, sentencing, postconviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue. Employers should include a policy addressing this leave of absence right in their employee handbooks.

Victims of Stalking (SB 400)

Sections 230 and 230.1 of the California Labor Code set forth various protections for victims of domestic violence or sexual assault. SB 400 expands these protections to victims of stalking and also requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to such victims. The bill defines reasonable accommodations to include a transfer, reassignment, modified schedule, changed work telephone, changed work station, installed lock, an implemented safety procedure, or another adjustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement in response to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or referral to a victim assistance organization. As with reasonable accommodations for disabilities, employers must engage in a timely, good faith, and “interactive process” with the affected employee to determine effective reasonable accommodations. Again, language should be added to an employee handbook to address this new right.

Family Temporary Disability Insurance Program (SB 770)

Beginning on July 1, 2014, the scope of the family temporary disability program will be expanded to include time off to care for a seriously ill grandparent, grandchild, sibling or parent-in-law. The employee’s certification required to qualify to take such leave to care for a family member must include a number of items, including a statement that the serious health condition warrants the participation of the employee to care for the family member. “Warrants the participation of the employee” includes providing psychological comfort as well as arranging third party care for the family member.

Sexual Harassment Definition Clarified (SB 292)

SB 292 amends the definition of harassment under California law to clarify that sexually harassing conduct does not need to be motivated by sexual desire. This law is intended to overturn the decision in Kelley v. Conoco Companies which had affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff in a same-sex harassment case on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the alleged harasser harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff. This legislation may signal an interest by Sacramento in passing broader “anti-bullying” protections for California employees.

Expansion of Employee Whistleblower Protections (SB 496)

On October 12, 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law SB 496, which amends Section 1102.5 of the California Labor Code to provide greater whistleblower protections to employees who disclose information related to their employer’s alleged violations of or failure to comply with the law. Specifically, SB 496 now provides that an employee’s disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency regarding their employer’s violation of local rules or regulations is a legally protected disclosure. Formerly, employees were only protected if they disclosed information regarding their employer’s noncompliance with state and federal laws. Employees now enjoy complete whistleblower protection for disclosing information if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information shows a violation of a state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation. Also, disclosures made to a supervisor of another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover and correct the alleged legal violation is a significant expansion of the protection under SB 496. Interestingly, the statute’s expansion now also includes the circumstance where the employer merely “believes the employee disclosed or may disclose information.” Employers are subject to steep civil penalties, up to $10,000 per violation, if they prevent or retaliate against an employee for an employee’s disclosure of information related to their employer’s violation of the law or refusal to participate in any activity which would result in a violation of local, state, or federal law.

Unfair Immigration-Related Practices (AB 263, SB 666)

AB 263 amends several sections of the California Labor Code, all with the goal of providing greater employee protections for making complaints regarding unsafe, unfair and illegal work practices. First, AB 263 amends Section 98.6 of the Labor Code to include an employee’s written or oral complaint of unpaid wages as a legally protected activity. Employers may not discharge or in any manner discriminate, retaliate or take any adverse action against an employee for making such a complaint regarding unpaid wages owed to them. Under AB 263, employers are now at risk of facing a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per employee for each violation for failing to comply with Section 98.6.

AB 263 further amends the Labor Code by adding protections for immigrant
employees. Under the new Unfair Immigration-Related Practices section of the Labor Code (sections 1019 et seq.), employers may not engage in any unfair immigration-related practice, as defined under the statute, against any employee for the purpose or intent of retaliating against employees for the exercise of any right afforded to them under the law. The term “unfair immigration-related practice” is defined to include: (i) requesting more or different documents than are required under federal immigration law, (ii) refusing to honor immigration-related documents that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine; (iii) using the federal E-Verify system to check the employment authorization status of a person at a time or in a manner not required by federal law, (iv) threatening to file or the filing of a false police report, and (v) threatening to contact immigration authorities. Now, without the threat of reprise from their employer regarding their immigration status, employees are allowed to (1) make a good-faith complaint or disclosure of an employer’s violation of or noncompliance with any federal, state or local law; (2) seek information regarding their employer’s compliance with federal, state or local laws; or (3) inform and assist other employees of their rights or remedies under the law. Employers are subject to heavy sanctions for any unlawful threat, attempt, or actual use of an employee’s immigration status to retaliate against an employee for engaging in legally protected workplace activities. Sanctions may include, but are not limited to, up to a 90-day suspension of the employer’s business licenses and a host of other civil damages.

Another legislative enactment, SB 666, provides that businesses licensed under the Business and Professions Code (including lawyers, accountants, engineers, and contractors) are subject to suspension, revocation, or disbarment if they are determined to have reported or threatened to report an employee’s, former employee’s, or prospective employee’s citizenship or immigration status, or the citizenship or immigration status of a family member of the same, to a federal, state, or local agency because the employee, former employee, or prospective employee exercises a right under the provisions of the Labor Code, the Government Code, or the Civil Code. In addition to any other remedies available, the bill provides for a civil penalty, not to exceed $10,000 per employee for each violation, to be imposed against a corporate or limited liability company employer. The bill contains an important exception, stating that an employer is not subject to suspension or revocation for requiring a prospective or current employee to submit, within three business days of the first day of work for pay, an I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification form. (Beginning not later than January 1, 2015, the DMV will be required to issue driver’s licenses to certain non U.S. citizens, although this particular form of driver’s license may not be used to verify employment eligibility for purposes of a Form I-9.)

Finally, certain unfair immigration-related practices are also a crime. For example, Penal Code section 518 defines “extortion” as the obtaining of property from another, with his/her consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear. Extortion is punishable as a felony by up to four years in jail. AB 524, which amends the Penal Code, provides that “wrongful use of force or fear” now includes the threat to report an individual or their family’s immigration status or suspected immigration status.

Expansion of Leaves of Absence for Emergency Duty (AB 11)

Existing California law requires employers to provide temporary leaves of absence for volunteer firefighters so that they could attend required fire or law enforcement trainings. AB 11 expands the protected leave rights for volunteer firefighters, reserve peace officers, and emergency rescue personnel, and allows for leave for emergency rescue training in addition to fire or law enforcement training. The law applies only to employers with 50 or more employees. Under the law, employees that are fired, threatened with being fired, demoted, suspended, or otherwise discriminated against because they took time off for qualifying training are entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits. Employee handbooks should be revised to comply with this expanded law.

Military and Veteran Status Is Now a Protected Category Under the FEHA (AB 556)

AB 556 broadens the scope of “protected categories” under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act to include “military and veteran status.” Under the law, an employee with “military and veteran status” is defined as a member or veteran of the United States Armed Forces, United States Armed Forces Reserve, the United States National Guard, and the California National Guard. The law provides an exemption in circumstances where an employer makes an inquiry into an employee’s military status to afford the employee preferential treatment in hiring. All equal employment opportunity policies should now include this additional protected category.

Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance

San Francisco’s Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance (“FFWO”) became effective on January 1, 2014. As currently written, the ordinance applies to employers with 20 or more employees, although an amendment is expected to pass early in the year which will clarify that the ordinance applies regardless of where the 20 employees are based. The ordinance provides employees who are employed within San Francisco, who have been employed for six months or more, and who work at least eight hours per week with the right to request flexible work arrangements to assist with caregiving responsibilities. Such requests may include but are not limited to modified work schedule, changes in start and/or end times for work, part-time employment, job sharing arrangements, working from home, telecommuting, reduction or change in work duties, and predictability in the work schedule. The employee may request the flexible or predictable working arrangement to assist with care for a child or children under the age of eighteen, a person or persons with a serious health condition in a family relationship with the employee, or a parent (age 65 or older) of the employee. Within 21 days of an employee’s request for a flexible or predictable working arrangement, an employer must meet with the employee regarding the request. The employer must respond to an employee’s request within 21 days of that meeting. An employer who denies a request must explain the denial in a written response that sets out a bona fide business reason for the denial and provides the employee with notice of the right to request reconsideration. The ordinance also has posting and recordkeeping obligations and prohibits retaliation for exercising rights protected by the ordinance. Employers with any San Francisco based employees (whether they telecommute or otherwise) should consider revisions to employee handbooks, comply with posting obligations (in English, Spanish, Chinese and any language spoken by at least 5% of the employees the workplace or job site), and establish a procedure to timely handle written requests for flexible work arrangements under the FFWO.

Employers throughout California (whether in San Francisco or not) should also be aware of possible discrimination against workers with caregiving responsibilities, as this might constitute employment discrimination based on sex, disability or other protected characteristics. Some of these issues are summarized in the EEOC’s guidance entitled “Employer Best Practices for Workers With Caregiving Responsibilities.” 

Article by:

Of:

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Treasury and IRS Provide Thanksgiving Surprise: Proposed 501(c)(4) Political Activity Rules

Womble Carlyle

As most of America travelled over the river and through the woods to Grandma’s house before the Thanksgiving holiday, the Treasury Department and the IRS delivered their own holiday gift.  On Tuesday, November 26, they released proposed guidance aimed at clarifying which conduct by tax-exempt social welfare organizations – 501(c)(4) entities – qualifies as political campaign activity.

Under existing IRS regulations, the promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate.  Over the years, the IRS has used a wide-ranging facts and circumstances test to determine whether an organization is engaged in an impermissible level of political campaign activity.  In the aftermath of the recent IRS scandal regarding the review of 501(c)(4) applications, Treasury and the IRS believe that more definitive political activity rules would reduce the need to conduct fact-intensive inquiries when applying the rules for qualification as a social welfare organization.

To accomplish this objective, Treasury and the IRS have coined a new term, “candidate-related political activity.”  This term encompasses existing definitions of political campaign activity from federal tax and campaign finance laws, and includes the following:

  • Express advocacy communications;
  • Public communications made within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary election that clearly identify a candidate for public office, as well as any other communications that have to be reported to the FEC (including independent expenditures and electioneering communications);
  • Monetary and in-kind contributions to or the solicitation of contributions on behalf of campaign, party and other political committees, and other tax-exempt organizations that engage in political activity; and
  • Other election related activities such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, distribution of candidate or political committee materials, and the preparation and distribution of voter guides.

The proposed rules raise many serious concerns.  For example, candidate-related political activity could include conducting nonpartisan voter registration drives and distributing nonpartisan voter guides.  Moreover, the proposed rules attribute to 501(c)(4) organizations, among other things, political activities conducted by their officers, directors or employees acting in that capacity.

Unfortunately, the draft rules do not elaborate on the possible differences between conduct taken in an official capacity and personal political conduct by an officer, director or employee.  Finally, many contributions from a 501(c)(4) to another tax-exempt organization would appear to qualify as candidate-related activity unless the contributor receives a written confirmation that the recipient does not engage in such activity and the contributor restricts the use of the contribution.

The proposed political activity rules also leave many important issues unaddressed.  Under existing rules, 501(c)(4) entities must be “primarily” engaged in activities that promote the common good or social welfare.  The proposed rules provide no guidance on what proportion of an organization’s activities must be dedicated to this purpose to qualify under section 501(c)(4).   The proposed regulations also do not apply to entities that qualify under Section 501(c)(3) (charitable organizations),  Section 501(c)(5) (labor unions),  Section 501(c)(6) (trade associations), or Section 527 (political organizations).  Treasury and the IRS are, however, accepting comments on the advisability of making changes in each of these areas.  Interested persons may submit comments to the IRS by February 27, 2014.

Article by:

Of:

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

IRS Announces Modification to “Use-It-Or-Lose-It” Rule for Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts

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On October 31, 2013, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) announced a modification to the “use-it-or-lose-it” rule that applies to health care Flexible Spending Arrangements (“FSAs”) under a cafeteria plan. Under the use-it-or-lose-it rule, unused amounts in a participant’s health care FSA for a plan year not used to pay eligible medical expenses incurred during the plan year were required to be forfeited to the employer, unless the employer adopted the 2 1/2 month grace period. The grace period rules permit participants to use amounts remaining from the prior year to pay eligible medical expenses incurred during the first two months and 15 days immediately following the end of the plan year (March 15 for a calendar year plan).

The New Carryover Provision

Under the new rule, an employer, at its option, may permit a participant to carryover to the immediately following plan year up to $500 in unused amounts from a health care FSA. This carryover may be used to pay or reimburse medical expenses under a health care FSA incurred during the entire plan year to which it is carried over. The rule also provides that:

  • The carryover does not count against or otherwise affect the maximum payroll reduction limit for the plan year ($2,500 for 2014).
  • Although the maximum unused amount allowed to be carried over to any plan year is $500, the plan may specify a lower amount.
  • If a plan permits a carryover, the same dollar limit must apply to all plan participants.
  • A plan that adopts the carryover provision is not permitted to provide the FSA grace period.
  • The use of the carryover option does not affect the plan’s ability to provide for the payment of expenses incurred in one plan year during a permitted “run-out” period at the beginning of the following year.
  • A plan is not permitted to allow unused amounts related to an FSA to be cashed out to the participant or used for any other taxable or non-taxable benefit.
  • A plan is permitted to treat reimbursements of all claims that are incurred in the current plan year as reimbursed first from unused amounts credited for the current plan year and, only after exhausting these amounts, as then reimbursed from unused amounts carried over from the previous year.
  • Any carryover amount used to pay for eligible medical expenses in the current plan year will reduce the amounts available to pay claims during the run-out period from the prior plan year.

For example, Jane Smith participates in her employer’s FSA with a calendar plan year, a run-out period from January 1 to March 31, an open enrollment in November for making salary reductions for the following year and the $500 carryover.

In November 2014, Jane elects a salary reduction of $2,500 for 2015. By December 31, 2014, she has $800 remaining from 2014. The plan may treat $500 of the unused $800 as available to pay 2015 expenses. Jane now has a total of $3,000 to spend in 2015. She is reimbursed for a $2,700 claim incurred in July 2015. The plan treats the first $2,500 as reimbursed with 2015 contributions, and the remaining $200 of the claim as reimbursed with unused 2014 contributions (leaving $300 for any further 2015 expenses). If she submits no further claims in 2015, the remaining $300 is carried over to 2016.

Assume these same facts, except that Jane’s $2,700 expense is incurred and submitted in January 2015 (during the 2014 run-out period). Jane is reimbursed for the claim first from 2015 contributions ($2,500) and then from 2014 contributions ($200). Since this claim was incurred during the run-out period, the 2014 run-out amount is reduced to $600 ($800-$200). If on February 1, 2015 Jane receives a medical bill from 2014 for $700 and submits the expense, the plan may only reimburse her for $600 of the total $700 claim. Jane continues to have $300 available for any 2015 expense, which may be carried over to 2016.

Next Steps

An employer that wants to implement the new carryover option must amend its cafeteria plan on or before the last day of the plan year from which amounts may be carried over and the amendment can be made effective retroactively to the first day of that plan year. For example, an employer can amend a calendar year plan on or before December 31, 2013 and have the carryover rule apply for 2013. The employer must notify participants of the new rule.

This increased flexibility will reduce a key barrier for many potential FSA users and may increase enrollment in FSA programs. Participants will no longer have to perfectly predict normally unpredictable health expenses a year in advance. Even though the carryover is limited to $500, the majority of forfeitures under the use-it-or-lose-it rule were less than $500.

Employers should carefully consider whether their employees would benefit from adopting the carryover rule instead of the grace period rule. The carryover rule is limited to $500 but permits the $500 to be used to pay for eligible expenses during the entire year into which it was carried over. In contrast, the grace period rule permits the entire amount of unused dollars in a health care FSA to be used but only to pay expenses incurred during the first 2 1/2 months of the next year.

Employers seeking to modify a 2013 plan that currently has a grace period should also carefully consider the ERISA implications of eliminating the availability of the grace period for 2013 contributions.

Article by:

Eric W. Gregory

Of:

Dickinson Wright PLLC

District Court Holds IRS Lacks Authority to Issue and Enforce Tax Return Preparer Regulations

The National Law Review recently featured an article, District Court Holds IRS Lacks Authority to Issue and Enforce Tax Return Preparer Regulations, written by Gale E. Chan and Robin L. Greenhouse with McDermott Will & Emery:

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On January 18, 2013, the District Court for the District of Columbia (District Court) issued a surprising decision in Loving v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 12-385 (JEB), holding that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) lacked the authority to issue and enforce the final Circular 230 tax return preparer regulations that were issued in 2011 (Regulations).  The District Court also permanently enjoined the IRS from enforcing the Regulations.

Background

As part of the IRS’s initiative to increase oversight of the tax return preparer industry by creating uniform and high ethical standards of conduct, the IRS created a new category of preparers, “registered tax return preparer,” to be subject to the rules of Circular 230.  Attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents and enrolled actuaries were already subject to IRS regulation under Circular 230, and thus, were not affected by the issuance of the Regulations.

In June 2011, the IRS and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued the Regulations relating to registered tax return preparers and practice before the IRS.  T.D. 9527 (June 3, 2011).  Under these rules, registered tax return preparers have a limited right to practice before the IRS.  A registered tax return preparer can prepare and sign tax returns, claims for refunds and other documents for submission to the IRS.  A registered tax return preparer who signs the return may represent taxpayers before revenue agents and IRS customer service representatives (or similar officers or employees of the IRS) during an examination, but the registered tax return preparer cannot represent the taxpayer before IRS appeals officers, revenue officers, counsel or similar officers or employees of the IRS.  In addition, a registered tax return preparer can only advise a taxpayer as necessary to prepare a tax return, claim for refund or other document intended to be submitted to the IRS.

The Regulations also impose additional examination and continuing education requirements on registered tax return preparers in addition to obtaining a preparer tax identification number (PTIN).  Under the rules, to become a “registered tax return preparer,” an individual must be 18 years old, possess a current and valid PTIN, pass a one-time competency examination, and pass a federal tax compliance check and a background check.  The Regulations require a registered tax return preparer to renew his or her PTIN annually and to pay the requisite user fee.  To renew a PTIN, a registered tax return preparer must also complete a minimum of 15 hours of continuing education credit each year that includes two hours of ethics or professional conduct, three hours of federal tax law updates and 10 hours of federal tax law topics.

Loving v. Internal Revenue Service

In Loving, three individual paid tax return preparers (Plaintiffs) filed suit against the IRS, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the United States (collectively, Government) seeking declaratory relief, arguing that tax return preparers whose only “appearance” before the IRS is the preparation of tax returns cannot be regulated by the IRS, and injunctive relief, requesting the court to permanently enjoin the IRS from enforcing the Regulations.  In filed declarations, two of the Plaintiffs indicated that they would likely close their tax businesses if they were forced to comply with the Regulations, and the third Plaintiff, who serves low-income clients, indicated that she would have to increase her prices if forced to comply with the Regulations, likely resulting in a loss of customers.  The Plaintiffs and the Government each filed separate motions for summary judgment.

At issue in the case was the IRS’s claim that it can regulate individuals who practice before it, including tax return preparers.  The IRS relied on an 1884 statute, 31 U.S.C. § 330, which provides the Treasury with the authority to regulate the people who practice before it.  The statute currently provides that the Treasury may “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury.”  31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The statute further requires that a representative demonstrate certain characteristics prior to being admitted as a representative to practice, including “competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their cases.”  31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added).  The statute also gives the Treasury authority to suspend or disbar a representative from practice before the Treasury in certain circumstances, as well as to impose a monetary penalty.  31 U.S.C. § 330(b).

The District Court’s Application of Chevron

The District Court applied the framework of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and concluded that the text and context of 31 U.S.C. § 330 unambiguously foreclosed the IRS’s interpretation of the statute.  Chevron applies a two-step inquiry to determine whether a statute is ambiguous.  The first step asks whether the intent of Congress is clear in the statute—i.e., has Congress “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.  If a court determines that the intent of Congress is clear, under the Chevron framework, that is the end and the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  Id. at 842–43.  However, if the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court must proceed to step two of Chevron and ask whether the agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843.  An agency’s construction under step two is permissible “unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011) (citation omitted).

In Loving, the District Court concluded that 31 U.S.C. § 330 was unambiguous as to whether tax return preparers are “representatives” who “practice” before the IRS for three reasons.  First, the District Court stated that 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) defines the phrase “practice of representatives” in a way that does not cover tax return preparers.  As noted above, 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) requires a representative to demonstrate that he or she is competent to advise and assist taxpayers in presenting their “cases.”  The District Court stated that the statute thus equates “practice” with advising and assisting with the presentation of a case, which the filing of a tax return is not.  Thus, the District Court concluded that the definition in 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) “makes sense only in connection with those who assist taxpayers in the examination and appeals stages of the process.”

Second, the District Court stated that the IRS’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330 would undercut various statutory penalties in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) specifically applicable to tax return preparers.  The District Court noted that if 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) is interpreted as authorizing the IRS to penalize tax return preparers under the statute, the statutory penalty provisions in the Code specific to tax return preparers would be displaced, thereby allowing the IRS to penalize tax return preparers more broadly than is permissible under the Code.  Thus, the District Court stated that the specific penalty provisions applicable to tax return preparers in the Code should not be “relegated to oblivion” and trumped by the general penalty provision of 31 U.S.C. § 330(b).

The District Court also stated that 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) does not authorize penalties on tax return preparers because Section 6103(k)(5) of the Code, which provides that the IRS may disclose certain penalties to state and local agencies that license, register or regulate tax return preparers, does not identify 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) as one of the reportable statutory penalty provisions.

Finally, the District Court stated that if the IRS’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330 is accepted, Section 7407 of the Code would be duplicative.  Section 7407 of the Code provides the IRS with the right to seek an injunction against a tax return preparer to enjoin the preparer from further preparing returns if the preparer engages in specified unlawful conduct.  This right is similar to the authority under 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) to penalize if the IRS’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330 is accepted.  Under the IRS’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330, the IRS could disbar a representative from practice before the IRS if a tax return preparer engages in the conduct described in 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (incompetence, being disreputable, violating regulations and fraud).  Thus, the District Court noted that disbarment under 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) is wholly within the IRS’s control and would be an easier path to penalize a tax return preparer than offered by Section 7407 of the Code.  The District Court stated that under the IRS’s interpretation, the IRS likely would never utilize the remedies available under Section 7407 of the Code, thereby rendering the statute pointless.

Conclusion

The District Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the IRS lacked statutory authority to issue and enforce the Regulations against “registered tax return preparers,” and permanently enjoined the IRS from enforcing the Regulations.  The Government will likely appeal the District Court’s decision.  Nevertheless, the District Court’s decision will have a great impact on the hundreds of thousands of tax return preparers ensnared by the Regulations and the clients they serve.

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery