Tag: Insurance Law

The Financial Toll of the Arab Spring

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Jared Wade of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding political and social turmoil often disrupt business operations:

Political and social turmoil often disrupt business operations. And when we’re talking about revolutions like those seen throughout the Middle East in 2011, those disruptions — and the associated costs — amplify.

The Financial Times is here to provide some examples of just how much damage some companies have suffered. The start by noting a Grant Thornton survey from June that claims a whopping 22% of the world’s companies were affected by the Arab Spring. Globalization indeed.

International companies in sectors such as retail, travel and construction have unsurprisingly been early losers.

In July, Thomas Cook, the tour operator, said it expected operating profits this year of just £320m – compared with analysts’ estimates of £380m – because of declining business in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

Cyril Sweett, a British consultancy and property company, warned last month that its next financial results would be hit because Middle Eastern turmoil had led to a number of projects being scrapped.

Other companies are struggling to collect payment for bills for projects disrupted by protest, armed conflict or regime change.

Dana Gas, a fuel producer heavily dependent on Egypt, is owed $200m by the country for invoices related to natural gas sales, according to Ahmed Al-Arbeed, chief executive, adding that some will be repaid this year.

Rentokil Initial, the pest-control to cleaning services company, said it would be “nice to get back” £4.8m it says it is owed for a rat-catching contract signed while Colonel Muammer Gaddafi was still in power in Libya, although it is as yet undecided on whether to revive its operations in the country.

Great anecdotes to help show the depth of the problem. And on the macro-level, here’s an infographic from Grant Thornton listing what percentage of companies in different regions have been negatively affected by the uprisings.



 

 

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

ANALYSIS: 'ObamaCare' label is sticking

Posted on September 29, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by Wendell Potter  of Center for Public Integrity regarding backers of the president’s health plan are loosing the public relations battle:

Backers of the president’s health plan are losing the public relations battle

The Kaiser Family Foundation just released the findings of its annual survey of businesses to determine how much the cost of employer-sponsored health coverage has gone up. There were some unexpected findings.

Tea Party members protest President Obama’s health care mandate in Cincinnati. Tom Uhlman/AP

One was that the average cost of annual premiums for family coverage is now more than $15,000. The 9 percent increase in the cost of health insurance over last year caught many people by surprise, because it represented a bigger hike in premiums than in recent years.

What seems clear is that insurers decided last year to charge their customers considerably more than necessary this year to be able to meet Wall Street’s profit expectations; insurance companies are also concerned that such increases will be more difficult once health care reform is fully implemented in 2014.

Here’s another surprise. Kaiser found that 50 percent of small employers are aware that they are now eligible for a tax credit from the federal government—thanks to the Affordable Care Act—if they provide subsidized coverage to their employees. I can hardly believe the awareness of the tax credit is that high.

As I have traveled across the country in recent weeks, speaking to a wide range of audiences, one thing has become abundantly clear: the provisions of the Affordable Care Act already in effect are anything but abundantly clear to people.

That’s because opponents of health care reform have won the public relations battle in defining the Affordable Care Act.

While the most recent Kaiser survey did not seek the views of the general population nor ask employers what they think or know about the Affordable Care Act, other polls show that advocates of the new law have been losing ground in the battle for public support.

This week I have been speaking at Florida churches —  a Catholic church in Winter Park, outside Orlando, Monday night, and a Unitarian Universalist church in Clearwater Tuesday night.  The hosts wanted an overview of what’s in the new law and what’s not—to provide factual, unbiased information and also to dispel many of the myths that have gained traction, starting before the law was even enacted.

What the hosts told me—and what I learned from talking to people who attended the forums—is that the Obama Administration and the national groups that backed  the legislation have essentially been missing in action when it comes to explaining the benefits of the law.

Kaiser’s finding that 50 percent of small businesses were familiar with the tax credit would certainly come as a shock to Dr. Patrick Cannon, advocacy director for Florida CHAIN (Community Health Action Information Network). He has been traveling the state trying to reach small business owners and educate them about the tax credit.

He has found almost no one even knows about it. This undoubtedly helps explain why the number of small businesses offering coverage to their employees dropped significantly in the most recent Kaiser survey.

Cannon believes that one of the reasons is that reform advocates missed an important opportunity to brand the Affordable Care Act in positive terms—starting with the most basic term of all, the name of the law itself.

As Cannon pointed out, opponents of the law  use a single term to describe the law: ObamaCare. The term has so seeped its way into the vernacular that even some of the law’s advocates have started using that pejorative label. The groups that support the law, he notes, use a wide range of terms to describe it.

Cannon is embarking on an effort among supporters to be consistent in calling it the Affordable Care Act.

Because opponents have been able to define the law on their own terms (or term), advocates are finding it increasingly difficult to have civil conversations with people about it—including with independents.

Liz Buckley, executive director of Focus Orlando, told me that, “If you even try to have conversations with people about it, people think you’re just trying to reelect Obama. They just shut down the conversation.”

Why the administration has been so inept or disengaged is baffling. It’s true that people will be skeptical of information about the law that comes straight from the White House, but the folks behind the Obama campaign in 2008 seemed to know how to get third parties motivated and active on behalf of the candidate.

Where are those folks now? If the White House is serious about making sure the law goes forward—and making sure the Obama legacy is a positive one—they better get in gear and turn public awareness and attitudes around. Otherwise, pretty soon,it may be too late.

Reprinted by Permission © 2011, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.

Broker Malpractice Claim Does Not Require Expert Testimony Proving Reasonableness of Underlying Settlement

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Dana Ferestien of Williams Kastner  regarding the reasonableness of an underlying products liability settlement is not a prerequisite to a broker malpractice claim.

 

On September 12, 2011, United States District Judge Lonny Suko ruled in Colman Coil Manufacturing, Inc. v. Seabury & Smith, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102238, that expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of an underlying products liability settlement is not a prerequisite to a broker malpractice claim.

The insured manufacturer had been sued for damages caused by an ammonia link in their equipment. Their liability insurer, Wausau, provided a reservation of rights defense, but filed a separate coverage action seeking a declaration that the policy’s total pollution exclusion eliminated coverage. Based upon advice from both their personal coverage counsel and appointed defense counsel, the insured elected to settle the products liability lawsuit for $1.15 million, with the insured paying $450,000 of the settlement. The insured then sued its broker, Seabury & Smith, alleging that their negligence had resulted in incomplete insurance.

Seabury & Smith argued on summary judgment that the professional malpractice claim failed, as a matter of law, because the insured did not have any expert to establish the reasonableness of the underlying settlement. Judge Sukorejected the argument, noting that there is no Washington authority imposing any expert testimony requirement. Judge Suko distinguished this scenario from cases in which there has been a consent judgment to settle the underlying liability claim. The Court concluded that it is for the finder of fact to weigh whether the insured acted reasonably in settling the underlying claim.

© 2002-2011 by Williams Kastner ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

How the NCAA Has Used the Term “Student-Athlete” to Avoid Paying Workers Comp Liabilities

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Jared Wade of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding the how and the why of the NCAA’s creation and widespread promotion of the term “student-athlete.”

Anyone who has spent much time following college sports should be aware of the NCAA’s hypocrisy. It demands purity from its “amateur” “student-athletes” while at the same time taking in billions in revenue from their on-field and on-court efforts. And whenever the nation expresses outrage at the revelation of yet another “scandal” in which a player received some compensation for their athletic abilities, there is much hand-wringing and finger-pointing from the sport’s governing body, which in turn imposes sanctions and other penalties against the offending schools and players.

Well, never before has anyone detailed this NCAA hypocrisy better than Taylor Branch did in the latest cover story of The Atlantic, “The Shame of College Sports.”If this sort of stuff interests you, the looooong account is well worth your time to read.

For our purposes, however, the most interesting excerpt chronicles the how and the why of the NCAA’s creation and widespread promotion of the term “student-athlete.” According to Branch, the main reason that former NCAA head Walter Byers, in his own words, “crafted the term student-athlete” and soon made sure it was “embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations” was because it was an excellent defense against being held liable for workers compensation benefits that those injured in athletic competition could seek.

“We crafted the term student-athlete,” Walter Byers himself wrote, “and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations.” The term came into play in the 1950s, when the widow of Ray Dennison, who had died from a head injury received while playing football in Colorado for the Fort Lewis A&M Aggies, filed for workmen’s-compensation death benefits. Did his football scholarship make the fatal collision a “work-related” accident? Was he a school employee, like his peers who worked part-time as teaching assistants and bookstore cashiers? Or was he a fluke victim of extracurricular pursuits? Given the hundreds of incapacitating injuries to college athletes each year, the answers to these questions had enormous consequences. The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the school’s contention that he was not eligible for benefits, since the college was “not in the football business.”

The term student-athlete was deliberately ambiguous. College players were not students at play (which might understate their athletic obligations), nor were they just athletes in college (which might imply they were professionals). That they were high-performance athletes meant they could be forgiven for not meeting the academic standards of their peers; that they were students meant they did not have to be compensated, ever, for anything more than the cost of their studies.Student-athlete became the NCAA’s signature term, repeated constantly in and out of courtrooms.

Using the “student-athlete” defense, colleges have compiled a string of victories in liability cases. On the afternoon of October 26, 1974, the Texas Christian University Horned Frogs were playing the Alabama Crimson Tide in Birmingham, Alabama. Kent Waldrep, a TCU running back, carried the ball on a “Red Right 28” sweep toward the Crimson Tide’s sideline, where he was met by a swarm of tacklers. When Waldrep regained consciousness, Bear Bryant, the storied Crimson Tide coach, was standing over his hospital bed. “It was like talking to God, if you’re a young football player,” Waldrep recalled.

Waldrep was paralyzed: he had lost all movement and feeling below his neck. After nine months of paying his medical bills, Texas Christian refused to pay any more, so the Waldrep family coped for years on dwindling charity.

Through the 1990s, from his wheelchair, Waldrep pressed a lawsuit for workers’ compensation. (He also, through heroic rehabilitation efforts, recovered feeling in his arms, and eventually learned to drive a specially rigged van. “I can brush my teeth,” he told me last year, “but I still need help to bathe and dress.”) His attorneys haggled with TCU and the state worker-compensation fund over what constituted employment. Clearly, TCU had provided football players with equipment for the job, as a typical employer would—but did the university pay wages, withhold income taxes on his financial aid, or control work conditions and performance? The appeals court finally rejected Waldrep’s claim in June of 2000, ruling that he was not an employee because he had not paid taxes on financial aid that he could have kept even if he quit football. (Waldrep told me school officials “said they recruited me as a student, not an athlete,” which he says was absurd.)

The long saga vindicated the power of the NCAA’s “student-athlete” formulation as a shield, and the organization continues to invoke it as both a legalistic defense and a noble ideal. Indeed, such is the term’s rhetorical power that it is increasingly used as a sort of reflexive mantra against charges of rabid hypocrisy.

Today, the term “student-athlete” is intended to carry with it the nobility of amateur athletics that the NCAA epitomizes.

Originally?

It was a good protection for keeping those carried off the field from suing the schools.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

Fan Death Re-Emphasizes MLB Ballpark Safety

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding risk, death and baseball…

Risk, death and baseball: three exciting topics that have unfortunately converged to become a grave concern for Major League Baseball this season. One fan recently died in Rangers Ballpark in Arlington, Texas, while reaching over a railing for a ball. Last summer, another fan fell 30 feet and fractured his skull.

Rangers Ballpark, the site of a recent fan death that has caused all MLB teams to re-evaluate fan safety.

Risk, death and baseball: three exciting topics that This, combined with some other high-profile incidents at ballparks in recent years, has led all teams to reconsider the height of their safety railings and ponder other potential solutions to keep spectators safe.

Yesterday, ESPN’s “Outside the Lines” program featured a great investigative report into the matter. You can watch Texas Rangers owner/legend Nolan Ryan discuss the controversy here. And below is the opening paragraphs of their written story.

Ronnie Hargis remembers his right hand brushing Shannon Stone’s shorts as he tried to grab the 6-foot-3-inch firefighter who went over a front-row railing in Section 5 of Rangers Ballpark in Arlington.

But Hargis missed. Stone’s 6-year-old son Cooper, who had been standing next to Hargis, saw his dad fall 20 feet to the concrete below. Stone, 39, died about an hour later.

Even though Hargis struggles to come to terms with the events of July 7, he does not believe that the 33-inch railing that Stone fell over was too low. He joins a cadre of fans who disagree with the Rangers’ decision to raise all front-row railings to 42 inches in response to Stone’s fall and two other falls before it.

As officials with other Major League Baseball ballparks say they’re currently reviewing their railings, baseball fans are divided on whether to raise the railings, keep them where they are, or implement alternative safety measures, such as nets.

It isn’t just the Worldwide Leader who is interested in how teams are keeping fans safe, however.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

Washington Court of Appeals Rules that Liability Insurer Defending under Reservation of Rights is not Entitled to Reimbursement in the Absence of Express Policy Language Expressly Reserving Such a Right

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Dana Ferestien of Williams Kastner regarding when a liability insurer provides a reservation of rights defense, is it ever entitled to reimbursement of defense costs paid if a court later determines that there is no duty to defend?

 

On July 25, 2011, the Court of Appeals addressed what had been an open question in Washington:

The coverage dispute arose from claims that Immunex had artificially inflated the price of prescription drugs. After litigation had been pending for several years and Immunex had already incurred substantial defense fees and costs, Immunex tendered the claims to National Surety, its excess liability insurer, for defense and indemnity. National Surety denied coverage for the claims, but agreed under a reservation of rights to provide a defense with the right to reimbursement if a court later determined that there was no duty to defend.

The King County Superior Court determined that there was no coverage and, therefore, National Surety owed no duty to defend Immunex. But the trial court also ruled that National Surety was obligated to pay Immunex’s defense costs until the date that the court confirmed the claims were not covered, unless National Surety could establish actual prejudice resulting from Immunex’s late tender. Immunex appealed the finding of no coverage, and National Surety cross-appealed the trial court’s determination that its ruling applied prospectively only.

After agreeing that there was no coverage for the underlying claims, the Court of Appeals affirmed that National Surety remained obligated for defense costs incurred up until the trial court’s summary judgment rulings unless National Surety could prove actual prejudice resulting from Immunex’s late tender. Relying upon Washington cases noting the broader scope of a liability insurer’s duty to defend, the court reasoned that “payment of defense costs for claims that are potentially covered is part of the bargained-for exchange between the insurer and the insured” and the reservation of rights defense provides an insurer with “the benefit of insulating itself from a bad faith claim and possibly coverage by estoppel.”

Notably, the court indicated that its decision may have been different had National Surety’s policy included express language reserving to the insurer the right to reimbursement in the event that it defends a claim under a reservation of rights and then obtains a court determination of no coverage. Whether the Court of Appeals would actually enforce such a provision remains to be seen. But liability insurers now should give careful consideration as to whether to include a reimbursement provision in policies issued to Washington insureds.

In reaching this outcome, the Court of Appeals rejected several arguments advanced by National Surety. The court declined to draw any distinction between instances where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights because Washington law is unresolved as to the meaning of policy language as opposed to instances where a claim involves unresolved questions of fact for which there may or may not ultimately be coverage. The Court of Appeals also rejected reimbursement based upon theories of unilateral implied contract or unjust enrichment. And the court declined to reach a different outcome because National Surety had yet to reimburse Immunex for any of its defense costs, explaining that such a result would improperly reward insurers who withhold defense costs payments.

© 2002-2011 by Williams Kastner ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Wisconsin Supreme Court Addresses Issues Concerning the Default Judgment Statute, the Direct Action Statute, and Personal Liability for Corporate Officers

Recently posted  posted in the National Law Review an article by Heidi L. Vogt and Jessica M. Swietlik of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a decision in Casper, et al. v. American International South Ins. Co.

 Casper, et al. v. American International South Ins. Co., et al., 2011 WL 81

On July 19, 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a decision in Casper, et al. v. American International South Ins. Co., et al., 2011 WI 81 (“Casper”) in which it addressed three issues: 1) the excusable neglect standard relative to default judgments; 2) whether an insurance policy must be delivered or issued in the State of Wisconsin in order to subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. §§ 632.24 and 803.04(2); and 3) whether a corporate officer may be held personally liable for non-intentional torts that occur within the scope of employment.

The Casper case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Mark Wearing, a co-employee of Bestway Systems, Inc. (“Bestway”) and Transport Leasing/Contract Inc. (“TLC”), struck the Caspers’ minivan from behind, seriously injuring all five passengers in the Caspers’ vehicle.

Investigators learned that Wearing was under the influence of oxycodone, diazepam, and nordiazepam when the collision occurred. At the time of the accident, Wearing was en route to make a delivery for a Bestway customer. Jeffrey Wenham, the CEO of Bestway, had allegedly approved a driving route for Wearing on this particular delivery that required him to drive 536 miles through several states overnight. Wearing claimed he was told he would be fired if he did not complete the route as planned. However, Wenham had never met Wearing and the route that Wenham apparently approved was designed a year and a half prior to the accident. An expert hired by the Caspers opined that the route violated the hours of service requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) and was unsafe.

The Caspers brought suit against fourteen named defendants, including: Mark Wearing, his co-employers Bestway and TLC, Bestway’s CEO Jeffrey Wenham, and TLC’s excess insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh PA (“National Union”). The appeals in this case stem from three orders issued by the trial court, all of which were affirmed by the court of appeals: 1) its order granting National Union’s request for a 7-day extension to file its answer and denying the Caspers’ motion for default judgment against National Union on the grounds that National Union had demonstrated excusable neglect; 2) its order granting summary judgment to National Union on the grounds that under Kenison v. Wellington Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 700, 582 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1998) the Caspers could not maintain a direct action against National Union because its insurance policy was not issued or delivered in Wisconsin; and 3) its order denying Wenham’s motion for summary judgment on the Caspers’ claims for negligent training and supervision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered each of these issues separately, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions consistent with its decision.

The court affirmed on the first issue, holding that the trial court did not erroneously abuse its discretion by finding that National Union’s “lost in the mail” excuse amounted to excusable neglect such that granting an extension and denying the motion for default judgment was appropriate. The court noted that “although courts should be skeptical of glib claims that attribute fault to the United States Postal Service,” it was satisfied that a reasonably prudent person could neglect a deadline when correspondence gets lost, as was the case with National Union here.

Second, the court reversed on the direct action issue and thereby explicitly overruled Kenison. In doing so, the court acknowledged that the court of appeals properly applied Kenison as it lacked authority to ignore it. In Kenison, the court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 631.01 limited the application of the direct action statute, § 632.24, to insurance policies issued or delivered in Wisconsin. The Casper court disagreed. After carefully examining the plain language and the legislative history of Wis. Stat. §§ 631.01, 632.24, and 803.04(2), the court concluded that “Section 803.04(2) explicitly and § 632.24 by necessary implication are intended to apply to liability insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery outside Wisconsin, so long as the ‘accident, injury or negligence occurred in this state.’” Accordingly, the Caspers should have been allowed to maintain a direct action against National Union even though its policy was neither issued nor delivered in Wisconsin because the accident occurred in Wisconsin.

With regard to the third issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that there are some instances where corporate officers like Wenham can be held personally liable for non-intentional torts committed in the course of employment. Both the trial court and the court of appeals had ended their inquiries there, finding that issues of fact existed regarding Wenham’s alleged negligent supervision and training of Wearing such that summary judgment was not appropriate on those claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered and ultimately reversed on public policy grounds, holding that even if Wenham’s approval of the route that allegedly violated the FMCSR was a cause of the accident, “the results are so unusual, remote, or unexpected that, in justice, liability ought not be imposed.”

Justice Bradley issued an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Chief Justice Abrahamson joined in Justice Bradley’s concurrence/dissent.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

Healthcare Alert: U.S. Announces Process for $3.8B in CO-OP Funds

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Mark E. Rust of Barnes & Thornburg LLP about the announcement that Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) will begin accepting applications for Consumer Oriented and Operated Plan (CO-OP) Start-Up Loans and Solvency Loans on Oct. 17, 2011 :

According to a recently released Federal Opportunity Announcement (FOA), TheCenter for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) will begin accepting applications for Consumer Oriented and Operated Plan (CO-OP) Start-Up Loans and Solvency Loans on Oct. 17, 2011. Section 1322 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) establishes the CO-OP program to foster the creation of nonprofit health insurance issuers. The CO-OP program will dispense $3.8 billion in Start-Up Loans and Solvency Loans to providers and buyers who sponsor new insurers regionally.

The FOA is subject to change pending the CO-OP final rule. Comments on the proposed CO-OP rule are due on Sept. 16, 2011.

The CO-OP program is designed to foster the creation of new consumer-governed, private, nonprofit health insurance issuers, known as CO-OPs. CO-OPs will offer plans under the Affordable Insurance Exchanges (Exchanges) by Jan. 1, 2014. Generally, CMS will provide Start-Up Loans for all costs associated with developing the CO-OP, and Solvency Loans for all state registered reserves (Loans) to CO-OP applicants in each state. The loans are awarded for the purpose of CO OP development and meeting state solvency requirements. The FOA provides general detail regarding the basis upon which loans are awarded.

FOA Application Timeline

Under the FOA, CO-OP applicants must immediately submit a Letter of Intent indicating intent to apply for joint Start-Up Loans and/or Solvency Loans. The CMS underscores the time urgency of application because the agency expects to provide notice of loan awards by Jan. 12, 2012 so that CO OP applicants can be prepared to accept contracts in late 2013. Because of this deadline, the first round of applications are due by Oct. 17, 2011.

Successful CO-OP applications receive a Notice of Award and a Loan Agreement. CO-OP applicants may request reconsideration of loan application to CMS within 30 days of receiving determination notice. CMS notes that redetermination results in a final decision that is not subject to further administrative review or appeal.

FOA CO-OP Loan Application Criteria

Generally, CMS will look for efficiencies and evaluate whether the business plan and budget is sufficient, reasonable, and cost effective to support activities proposed in the CO-OP application. CMS will review applications on a base total of 100 points weighted from five general criteria including: (1) statutory preferences (16 points); (2) project narrative (4 points); (3) business plan (62 points); (4) government and licensure (10 points); and (5) feasibility study (8 points). The feasibility study must be supported by an actuarial analysis.

FOA Loan Details

Both Loans are non-recourse and provided at a low interest rates. Start-Up Loans will be prepaid five years from startup and charged an interest rate equal to the average interest rate on marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity minus one (1%) percentage point (provided that interest shall not be less than 0 percent) on the amount of the drawdown. Solvency Loans will be repaid in 15 years and charged an interest rate equal to the average interest rate on marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity minus two (2%) percentage points (provided that the interest shall not be less than 0 percent) on the amount of the drawdown.

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The New Wave of Insurance Construction Defects? Four States Enact Statutes Favoring Coverage for Faulty Workmanship

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Clifford J. Shapiro and Kenneth M. Gorenberg of Barnes & Thornburg LLP about whether construction defects are covered by commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies and briefly discuss four new statutes in various states.

 

 

Courts across the country remain split on the issue of whether claims alleging construction defects are covered by commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies. The primary battle ground has been whether such claims involve an accidental “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL policy coverage grant. Now this issue is getting substantial attention from state legislatures. Four states recently enacted new legislation addressing insurance coverage for construction defect claims, and each statute favors coverage,albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. These statutes signal that the battle over whether construction defects constitute an “occurrence” may have shifted from the courts to state legislatures. The four new statutes are discussed briefly below.

Colorado

Section 13-20-808 of the Colorado Code, effective May 21, 2010, creates a presumption that a construction defect is an accident, and therefore an “occurrence” within the meaning of the standard CGL insurance policy. To rebut this statutory presumption, an insurer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property damage at issue was intended and expected by the insured. The statute expressly does not require coverage for damage to an insured’s own work unless otherwise provided in the policy, leaving that potentially to be decided by Colorado’s courts. In addition, the act does not address or change any policy exclusions, the scope of which will also remain an issue possibly to be determined in court. Thus, it appears that the Colorado statute resolves in favor of coverage that construction defect claims give rise to an accidental “occurrence” under the CGL policy coverage grant, but leaves most other insurance issues affecting coverage in the construction defect context subject to further attention by the courts.

Hawaii

Chapter 431, Article 1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes provides that “the term ‘occurrence’ shall be construed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time that the insurance policy was issued.” The statute does not declare what the “the law” is now or what “the law” was at any time in the past. However, the preamble explains that the appellate court decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 231 P.3d 67 (Hawaii 2010) “invalidates insurance coverage that was understood to exist and that was already paid for by construction professionals,” and that the purpose of the statute is to restore the coverage that was denied. While not necessarily clear from the appellate court decision, coverage arguably was denied for both defects in the insured’s own work and also consequential property damage caused by faulty workmanship.

Thus, it appears that the legislature’s intent was to allow insurers to deny coverage under policies issued after May 19, 2010 to the extent permitted by the courts based on Group Builders and whatever further judicial decisions may follow, but to require application of the more favorable judicial interpretations of coverage for construction defects that the Hawaii legislature believes existed before that time. In other words, the Hawaii statute appears to be an attempt to preserve more favorable treatment of coverage for construction defect claims for projects currently underway which were insured under policies issued before Group Builders was decided.

This approach, of course, still leaves it to the courts to interpret the applicable law with respect to any particular claim (i.e., the law that existed at the time the policy was issued). But we cannot help but think that the Hawaii courts may be influenced going forward to find more readily in favor of coverage due, at least in part, to the part of the preamble to the legislation that states: “Prior to the Group Builders decision … construction professionals entered into and paid for insurance contracts under the reasonable, good-faith understanding that bodily injury and property damage resulting from construction defects would be covered under the insurance policy. It was on that premise that general liability insurance was purchased.”

Arkansas

Arkansas Code Section 23-79-155 (enacted on March 23, 2011) requires CGL policies offered for sale in Arkansas to contain a definition of occurrence that includes “property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship.”It is unclear whether this requirement applies to policies previously issued. The act also states that it does not limit the nature or types of exclusions that an insurer may include in a CGL policy. Thus, the numerous exclusions related to construction defect claims contained in the typical CGL insurance policy are not affected by the Arkansas statute, and the judicial decisions that have interpreted those exclusions presumably remain good law.

South Carolina

Enacted on May 17, 2011, South Carolina Code Section 38-61-70 provides that CGL policies shall contain or be deemed to contain a definition of occurrence that includes property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty workmanship itself. However, whether the South Carolina statute will change the law in South Carolina is unclear because the statute was immediately challenged in court. On May 23, 2011, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company filed a complaint in the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the new statute violates several provisions of the U.S. and South Carolina constitutions, particularly with respect to existing insurance policies at issue in pending litigation.

Conclusion

The new state statutes are intended to overrule, at least to some extent, judicial decisions that denied insurance coverage for construction defect claims. The thrust of these statues is to require construction defects to be treated as an accidental “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL insurance policy. As such, the legislation generally should make it easier for policyholders in the affected states to establish at least the existence of potential coverage for a construction defect claim, and thereby more easily trigger the insurance company’s duty to provide a defense. Whether these statutes will also result in increased indemnity coverage for construction defect claims, however, remains to be seen. Among other things, the statutes generally do not alter the exclusions that already apply to construction defect claims, and they leave the interpretation of the meaning of these exclusions to the courts.

In short, while this new wave of statutes increases the complexity and divergence among the states of this already fractured area of the law, they also appear to increase the likelihood of insurance coverage for construction defect claims in Colorado, Hawaii, Arkansas and South Carolina.

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Evaluating Insurance Policies After Japan’s Earthquake

Posted on July 14, 2011 in the National Law Review by Risk Management Magazine of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) information about an essential first step is to review insurance coverages for losses caused by natural catastrophes.

Shock and tragedy were the emotions most felt throughout Japan when the March earthquake and tsunami ravaged the nation. But companies doing business there have since moved on to planning mode, looking for ways to mitigate their losses, both those already suffered and the inevitable ones to come from similar exposures in the future.

An essential first step is to review insurance coverages for losses caused by natural catastrophes. Of particular importance is the potential availability ofcontingent business interruption insurance coverage for lost sales to Japanese customers or lost supplies from Japanese producers.

Property insurance policies obviously cover direct property damage caused by natural disasters. But those same policies also cover other types of business losses. Time element coverage pays for the lost profits when damaged property affects a policyholder’s day-to-day operations. The amount covered generally depends on the time it takes to resume normal business operations. Time element coverage can be triggered by damage either to the policyholder’s property or a third party’s property, and the most common kinds are business interruption, extra expense and contingent business interruption.

Business Interruption

The purpose of business interruption coverage is to restore the policyholder to the financial position it was in before the property damage occurred. To recover these losses, the lost profits, at a minimum, must relate to the event that caused the policyholder’s property damage. Once the insured demonstrates covered property damage, the measure of the loss generally is the difference between expected profits during the recovery period after the event and actual profits during that period, less any unrelated losses.

Perhaps the only recent U.S. event comparable to Japan’s earthquake is Hurricane Katrina. In Consolidated Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that business interruption losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina were covered without requiring proof to a level of specificity that the loss stemmed solely from damage to the policyholder’s property as a result of the hurricane. The insurance carrier argued that the policyholder had to prove what its likely performance would have been had Katrina taken place but not damaged the policyholder’s property, reasoning that, even absent damage to the policyholder’s property, profits would have been reduced because of the generally depressed economic conditions following the hurricane. Instead, the court concluded that the loss should be calculated as if Katrina had not struck at all.

Coverage for this interdependent business interruption loss can extend to locations that are distant from the damaged property if the policyholder can show that the undamaged facility operated in concert with the damaged one. An example would be a policyholder’s remote facility outside of Japan that cannot receive inventory because of damage to the policyholder’s manufacturing plant in Japan.

Extra Expense

Extra expense coverage aims to cover additional costs the policyholder incurs to minimize or avoid interruption of its business. Examples of such coverage are: additional utility costs needed to resume business operations; additional costs to store business equipment; moving costs to relocate to temporary facilities; and costs expended for the temporary repair or replacement of property. Most policies also contain a related coverage, similar to extra expense, typically called expense to reduce loss coverage, to reimburse additional costs incurred to mitigate property damage.

Contingent Business Interruption

Many policies protect against profits lost when a policyholder’s supplier or customer cannot conduct business because of property damage “of the type” covered under the policyholder’s policy. This coverage would provide, for example, recovery to a manufacturer of computers outside of Japan that suffers lost profits as a result of a supplier’s inability to provide required components because of damage to the supplier’s Japanese facility. Similarly, a policyholders’ profits affected by property damage to the facilities of a Japanese customer are recoverable. Covered costs also include losses incurred when a civil authority prevents access to the policyholder’s facilities, or when damage to property in the vicinity of the insured property prevents ingress to, or egress from, the policyholder’s facility.

John Banister, Erica Dominitz, Barry Fleishman, Helen Michael, Carl Salisbury and Caroline Spangenberg are all partners at Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor.  Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.