Illinois Ruling on Civil Liability for Employers Confirms Risks to Companies

Since their inception, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.) and Workers’ Occupational Diseases Acts (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq.) (the “Acts” or “Act”) have offered some certainty and predictability with respect to injuries sustained in the course of employment. The Acts provide a clear framework within which injured employees may pursue claims against their employers and ensures they can receive payment of their medical expenses, lost wages associated with their injuries, and compensation for any permanent disabilities and/or disfigurement sustained, without having to prove fault on behalf of the employer. In exchange, the employer pays for these benefits and enjoys some predictability and limitations on the allowable damages under the Acts, assured that the Acts offer the exclusive remedy against the employer, such that no civil lawsuits, where awards may include pain and suffering and be much higher in value, may be brought against them for the same injury. Generally, an employer would be entitled to the exclusive remedies provided under the Acts, assuming that the injury or disease was accidental, arose during and in the course of employment, and is compensable under the Acts. 820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2022); 820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2022). So, understandably, when an employer is sued in a civil court for a work-related injury, they may look to the protection of the Acts, to defend the claim and argue for dismissal based on the Acts’ exclusivity provisions.

The Acts contain a repose period of 25 years for injury or disability caused by exposure to asbestos. See 820 ILCS 310/1(f) and 820 ILCS 305/1(f). Thus, prior to 2019, no claims could be brought under the Acts more than 25 years after the date of last exposure to asbestos. In the 2015 landmark case of Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 43 N.E. 108 (Ill. 2015), Mr. Folta claimed his mesothelioma was caused, at least in part, from exposure to asbestos while working for his employer, Ferro Engineering, for whom he last worked in 1970Mr. Folta was diagnosed with mesothelioma over 40 years later in 2011, and filed a civil lawsuit against Ferro (and others) in state court. Ferro moved to dismiss the civil suit, arguing that Mr. Folta’s exclusive remedy was found in the Workers’ Occupational Disease Act, and could not be brought as a civil action against it. However, Mr. Folta argued that because more than 25 years had passed since his exposure to asbestos at Ferro, his claim would be barred by the 25-year repose period and is not “compensable” under the Act, leaving him without any remedy if not allowed to proceed in state court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that the Act’s 25-year statute of repose acts as a complete bar, and yet still held that the Act provided Mr. Folta’s exclusive remedy against his employer. The Court noted the question of “compensability” turned on whether the type of injury sustained would fall within the scope of the Act, not whether there is an ability or possibility to recover benefits under the Act. Given that Mr. Folta’s injury was compensable, the Act provided his exclusive remedy, and his claim under the Act was time-barred by the 25-year statute of repose.

While acknowledging that the outcome may be a harsh result as to the plaintiff, leaving him with no remedy against his employer for his latent disease, the Court in Folta noted its job is not to find a compromise, but to interpret the statutes as written, suggesting if a different balance should be struck, it would be the duty of the legislature to do so. And that is what happened in 2019, when the Illinois Senate and House introduced two new statutes carving out exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions for both the Workers’ Compensation and Workers’ Occupational Diseases Acts. Under the new statutes, the Acts no longer prohibit workers with latent diseases or injuries from pursuing their claims after the repose period in civil court. The new statute added to the Workers Occupational Disease Act, 820 ILCS 310/1.1, states:

Permitted civil actions. Subsection (a) of Section 5 and Section 11 do not apply to any injury or death resulting from an occupational disease as to which the recovery of compensation benefits under this Act would be precluded due to the operation of any period of repose or repose provision. As to any such occupational disease, the employee, the employee’s heirs, and any person having standing under the law to bring a civil action at law, including an action for wrongful death and an action pursuant to Section 27-6 of the Probate Act of 1975, has the nonwaivable right to bring such an action against any employer or employers.

When Governor J.B. Pritzker signed the bill into law in May 2019, he issued a statement, indicating the purpose of the revised legislation is to allow workers to “pursue justice,” given that in some cases, the 25-year limit is shorter than the medically recognized latency period of some diseases, such as those caused by asbestos exposure. The impact on employers, however, was not addressed. And employers were left with questions, including critically, whether this new change to the law can apply retroactively, when the statute itself is silent as to the temporal scope. Having relied on the provisions of the Acts in place at the time for basic and critical business decisions, including procurement of appropriate insurance and establishment of wages and benefits, employers cannot now go back in time and change those decisions to offset the increased liability which they now face. Further, following Folta, employers have a vested defense in the Acts’ exclusivity and statute of repose provisions. So, retroactive application of the new statutes could impose new liabilities not previously contemplated and could strip defendant employers of their vested defenses, violating Illinois’ due process guarantee. Anticipating plaintiffs’ firms would file latent disease claims against employers in civil court going forward, and with decades of case law to support prospective application only, it was just a matter of time before the issue reached further judicial scrutiny.

And that brings us to the Illinois Supreme Court’s January 24, 2025 decision in the matter of Martin v. Goodrich, 2025 IL 130509. Mr. Martin worked for BF Goodrich Company (“Goodrich”) from 1966 to 2012, where he was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and vinyl chloride-containing products until 1974. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, a disease allegedly caused by exposure to those chemicals, in December of 2019, passing away in 2020. His widow filed a civil lawsuit against Goodrich alleging wrongful death as a result of his exposure, invoking the new exception found in section 1.1 of the Act to bring the matter in civil court. In response, Goodrich moved to dismiss the case based on the Act’s exclusivity provisions, arguing that section 1.1 did not apply because Section 1(f) was not a statute of repose. Alternatively, Goodrich argued that using the exception to revive Martin’s claim would infringe its due process rights under the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied Goodrich’s motion, and Goodrich asked the court to certify two questions to the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for interlocutory appeal: first, whether section 1(f) is a statue of repose for purposes of section 1.1, and second, if so, whether applying section 1.1 to Martin’s suit would violate Illinois’ constitutional due process. Finding the questions impact numerous cases and Illinois’ policy interests, the Seventh Circuit certified the questions, and added a third question: if section 1(f) falls within the section 1.1 exception, what is the temporal reach? Answering these questions, the Illinois Supreme Court held that (1) the period referenced in section 1(f) is a period of repose, (2) the exception in section 1.1 applies prospectively pursuant to the Statute on Statutes, and therefore, (3) it does not violate Illinois’ due process guarantee.

But what did the Court mean when it held that the exception in section 1.1 applies prospectively? Goodrich argued that prospective application would mean that the exception in section 1.1 does not apply to this case, because the last exposure was in 1976, before the amendment was made, and the defendant had a vested right to assert the statute of repose and exclusivity provisions of the Act, which would prohibit the civil suit. The Court pointed out, however, that the amendment did not revive Mr. Martin’s ability to seek compensation under the Act, such that the employer’s vested statute of repose defense would apply. Rather, the amendment gave him the ability to seek compensation through a civil suit outside of the Act. So, the question becomes only whether the employer has a vested right to the exclusivity defense, such that applying section 1.1 would violate due process. The Court held that the exclusivity provisions of the Act are an affirmative defense, such that the employer’s potential for liability exists unless and until the defense is established. And a party’s right to a defense does not accrue until the plaintiff’s right to a cause of action accrues. Applying the new statute prospectively, the Court found the cause of action could be filed in civil court, because the relevant time period for considering applicability of the affirmative defense of the Act’s exclusivity is when the employee discovers his injury. Since Mr. Martin’s cause of action accrued when he was diagnosed in December of 2019, which was after section 1.1 was added, Goodrich did not have a vested exclusivity defense, so Mr. Martin’s claim may proceed without violating due process.

While the court did not apply the new statute retroactively, the effect is essentially the same from the employers’ perspective, as latent injury claims will be allowed to proceed in civil court, as long as the injuries were discovered after expiration of the repose period and after the new statutes went into effect in May of 2019. This was not the outcome defendant employers were hoping to receive, but it is what the Court decided. So, unless or until the legislative tides change again, Illinois employers should be aware of the potential for civil suits for employees’ latent injury or disease claims.

FTC Closely Monitoring Healthcare Lead Generators As Open Enrollment Begins

The Federal Trade Commission is watching the healthcare lead generation industry closely.

On December 10, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission announced that it has sent warning letters to 21 companies that market or generate leads for healthcare plans. The letters were sent as open enrollment season for healthcare plans is ongoing. They provide guidance and provide about deceptive or unfair claims that likely violate laws enforced by the FTC.

The letters were sent to companies that provide marketing or advertising, including lead generation, related to Affordable Care Act Marketplace health insurance and healthcare-related products, such as limited benefit plans and medical discount programs.

“It is critical for consumers’ health and financial well-being that marketers of health plans be honest about the plans they and their partners are offering,” said FTC lawyer Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The FTC has been watching this important sector closely, especially during open enrollment season, and these warning letters put companies on notice that unlawfully marketing or advertising health plans to consumers can result in serious legal consequences.”

Based on information collected by FTC staff and the agency’s enforcement experience in this area, the types of claims FTC staff has warned about include those that may:

  • misrepresent the benefits included in a healthcare plan, including any insurance benefits;
  • misrepresent that a healthcare plan is major or comprehensive medical health insurance or the equivalent of such health insurance;
  • misrepresent the costs of healthcare plan; and
  • falsely claim that consumers who enroll in a healthcare plan will receive free offers, cash rewards, rebates, or other incentives.

Consult with a season FTC defense lawyer if you are a lead generator or marketer of health insurance leads in order to minimize risk of government scrutiny.

The letters provide examples of prior relevant FTC actions against marketers and lead generators that operate in this field, including Simple HealthBenefytt Technologies, Partners in Healthcare Association, and Consumer Health Benefits Association.

While the letters do not allege any wrongdoing by any of the recipients, they encourage the companies to conduct a thorough review of their advertisements to ensure they are complying with applicable laws and rules, and the letters note that the FTC is closely monitoring this marketplace for unlawful conduct that is harming consumers.

The Evolution of AI in Healthcare: Current Trends and Legal Considerations

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the healthcare landscape, offering innovative solutions to age-old challenges. From diagnostics to enhanced patient care, AI’s influence is pervasive, and seems destined to reshape how healthcare is delivered and managed. However, the rapid integration of AI technologies brings with it a complex web of legal and regulatory considerations that physicians must navigate.

It appears inevitable AI will ultimately render current modalities, perhaps even today’s “gold standard” clinical strategies, obsolete. Currently accepted treatment methodologies will change, hopefully for the benefit of patients. In lockstep, insurance companies and payors are poised to utilize AI to advance their interests. Indeed, the “cat-and-mouse” battle between physician and overseer will not only remain but will intensify as these technologies intrude further into physician-patient encounters.

  1. Current Trends in AI Applications in Healthcare

As AI continues to evolve, the healthcare sector is witnessing a surge in private equity investments and start-ups entering the AI space. These ventures are driving innovation across a wide range of applications, from tools that listen in on patient encounters to ensure optimal outcomes and suggest clinical plans, to sophisticated systems that gather and analyze massive datasets contained in electronic medical records. By identifying trends and detecting imperceptible signs of disease through the analysis of audio and visual depictions of patients, these AI-driven solutions are poised to revolutionize clinical care. The involvement of private equity and start-ups is accelerating the development and deployment of these technologies, pushing the boundaries of what AI can achieve in healthcare while also raising new questions about the integration of these powerful tools into existing medical practices.

Diagnostics and Predictive Analytics:

AI-powered diagnostic tools are becoming sophisticated, capable of analyzing medical images, genetic data, and electronic health records (EHRs) to identify patterns that may elude human practitioners. Machine learning algorithms, for instance, can detect early signs of cancer, heart disease, and neurological disorders with remarkable accuracy. Predictive analytics, another AI-driven trend, is helping clinicians forecast patient outcomes, enabling more personalized treatment plans.

 

Telemedicine and Remote Patient Monitoring:

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the adoption of telemedicine, and AI is playing a crucial role in enhancing these services. AI-driven chatbots and virtual assistants are set to engage with patients by answering queries and triaging symptoms. Additionally, AI is used in remote and real-time patient monitoring systems to track vital signs and alert healthcare providers to potential health issues before they escalate.

 

Drug Discovery and Development:

AI is revolutionizing drug discovery by speeding up the identification of potential drug candidates and predicting their success in clinical trials. Pharmaceutical companies are pouring billions of dollars in developing AI-driven tools to model complex biological processes and simulate the effects of drugs on these processes, significantly reducing the time and cost associated with bringing new medications to market.

Administrative Automation:

Beyond direct patient care, AI is streamlining administrative tasks in healthcare settings. From automating billing processes to managing EHRs and scheduling appointments, AI is reducing the burden on healthcare staff, allowing them to focus more on patient care. This trend also helps healthcare organizations reduce operational costs and improve efficiency.

AI in Mental Health:

AI applications in mental health are gaining traction, with tools like sentiment analysis, an application of natural language processing, being used to assess a patient’s mental state. These tools can analyze text or speech to detect signs of depression, anxiety, or other mental health conditions, facilitating earlier interventions.

  1. Legal and Regulatory Considerations

As AI technologies become more deeply embedded in healthcare, they intersect with legal and regulatory frameworks designed to protect patient safety, privacy, and rights.

Data Privacy and Security:

AI systems rely heavily on vast amounts of data, often sourced from patient records. The use of this data must comply with privacy regulations established by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which mandates stringent safeguards to protect patient information. Physicians and AI developers must ensure that AI systems are designed with robust security measures to prevent data breaches, unauthorized access, and other cyber threats.

Liability and Accountability:

The use of AI in clinical decision-making raises questions about liability. If an AI system provides incorrect information or misdiagnoses a condition, determining who is responsible—the physician, the AI developer, or the institution—can be complex. As AI systems become more autonomous, the traditional notions of liability may need to evolve, potentially leading to new legal precedents and liability insurance models.

These notions beg the questions:

  • Will physicians trust the “judgment” of an AI platform making a diagnosis or interpreting a test result?
  • Will the utilization of AI platforms cause physicians to become too heavily reliant on these technologies, forgoing their own professional human judgment?

Surely, plaintiff malpractice attorneys will find a way to fault the physician whatever they decide.

Insurance Companies and Payors:

Another emerging concern is the likelihood that insurance companies and payors, including Medicare/Medicaid, will develop and mandate the use of their proprietary AI systems to oversee patient care, ensuring it aligns with their rules on proper and efficient care. These AI systems, designed primarily to optimize cost-effectiveness from the insurer’s perspective, could potentially undermine the physician’s autonomy and the quality of patient care. By prioritizing compliance with insurer guidelines over individualized patient needs, these AI tools could lead to suboptimal outcomes for patients. Moreover, insurance companies may make the use of their AI systems a prerequisite for physicians to maintain or obtain enrollment on their provider panels, further limiting physicians’ ability to exercise independent clinical judgment and potentially restricting patient access to care that is truly personalized and appropriate.

Licensure and Misconduct Concerns in New York State:

Physicians utilizing AI in their practice must be particularly mindful of licensure and misconduct issues, especially under the jurisdiction of the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) in New York. The OPMC is responsible for monitoring and disciplining physicians, ensuring that they adhere to medical standards. As AI becomes more integrated into clinical practice, physicians could face OPMC scrutiny if AI-related errors lead to patient harm, or if there is a perceived over-reliance on AI at the expense of sound clinical judgment. The potential for AI to contribute to diagnostic or treatment decisions underscores the need for physicians to maintain ultimate responsibility and ensure that AI is used to support, rather than replace, their professional expertise.

Conclusion

AI has the potential to revolutionize healthcare, but its integration must be approached with careful consideration of legal and ethical implications. By navigating these challenges thoughtfully, the healthcare industry can ensure that AI contributes to better patient outcomes, improved efficiency, and equitable access to care. The future of AI in healthcare looks promising, with ongoing advancements in technology and regulatory frameworks adapting to these changes. Healthcare professionals, policymakers, and AI developers must continue to engage in dialogue to shape this future responsibly.

Former Acadia Employees Received Reward for Blowing the Whistle on Healthcare Fraud

The United States Department of Justice settled a False Claims Act qui tam whistleblower lawsuit against inpatient behavioral health facilities operator Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. Under the terms of the settlement, the operator paid almost $20 million to the United States and the States of Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Nevada. The relators, or whistleblowers, who filed suit in 2017, received a reward of 19% of the government’s recovery of misspent Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid funds. According to one of the Relators, Jamie Clark Thompson, a former Director of Nursing at Acadia’s Lakeview Behavioral Health facility, “I am passionate about advocating for improved and quality services for individuals living with mental illness. Unfortunately, our communities have seen the devastating impact when this vulnerable population receives inadequate care. I firmly believe that by continuously working to improve our mental health system, we can support recovery and well-being, benefiting our entire community. I hope that my actions have made a difference, and I know that properly allocating funds is crucial to supporting behavioral health services and those working tirelessly to improve them.”

Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid Fraud Allegations

According to the settlement agreement, the whistleblowers alleged Acadia and certain of its facilities submitted false claims to Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid. Specifically, the facilities allegedly admitted ineligible patients, provided services for longer than was medically necessary or did not provide treatment at all (but still billed the healthcare programs for it), did not provide sufficient care for those who needed acute care or individualized care plans, and hired the wrong people or failed to train their staff to “prevent assaults, elopements, suicides, and other harm resulting from staffing failures.”

Behavioral Health Facility Fraud

Behavioral healthcare facilities provide inpatient, outpatient, and residential care for adolescents, adults, and seniors for mental health conditions. As taxpayer-funded healthcare programs, Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE cover behavioral healthcare. Treating mentally ill Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE beneficiaries as cash cows, and either under-treating, over-treating, or not treating them at all both robs the individuals of the chance to recover, wastes taxpayer resources, and may even jeopardize their safety and well-being.

The Importance of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE Whistleblowers

Whistleblowers who report behavioral health facility fraud are not only protecting vulnerable patients but also making sure federally funded healthcare dollars are being spent to properly treat adolescent, adult and older patients with significant behavioral health conditions. Three employees at different Acadia facilities came forward, faced retaliation for speaking up, and are now being rewarded for helping to fight fraud and abuse and for their courage.

by: Tycko & Zavareei Whistleblower Practice Group of Tycko & Zavareei LLP

What Does the End of Chevron Deference Mean for Federal Health Care Programs?

On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of Chevron deference in the closely watched case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.[1] In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Chevron’s rule that courts must defer to federal agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutes gave the executive branch interpretive authority that properly belonged with the courts. Moreover, the Court concluded that Chevron deference was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), holding that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment when deciding legal issues in the review of agency action.

Loper will have significant and immediate implications for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the federal agency charged with the administration of the federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. As detailed below, the Court’s decision sets a more exacting standard for courts to apply when reviewing HHS’s regulations and legal positions.

What Was Chevron Deference?

The doctrine of Chevron deference was established in 1984 by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[2] In that case, the Court held when a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” raised regarding a statute that the agency administers, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”[3]

Although scholars have debated Chevron’s rationale at length, it generally was read to require deference based upon agencies’ presumed subject matter expertise and an assumption that Congress delegated authority to agencies—rather than courts—to fill in gaps in statutory schemes. Notably, the Supreme Court had not itself invoked Chevron deference since 2016, although lower courts have continued to rely on it regularly.[4]

What Did Loper Decide?

Loper involved two New England fishing companies appealing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that applied Chevron deference to uphold the National Marine Fisheries Service’s interpretation of the Federal Magnuson-Stevens Act (the “Act”) as requiring fishermen to pay for the use of compliance monitors on certain fishing boats, even though the federal law is silent on who must pay. Petitioners used the case as a vehicle to present a broader challenge to Chevron,arguing that the doctrine has led to excessive deference to federal agencies, resulting in overregulation, the abdication of judicial responsibility to interpret statutes, and the unwarranted imposition of regulatory enforcement costs.

The Loper majority firmly rejected Chevron and held that the APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding legal questions that arise in reviewing agency action. As the majority held, “courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”[5]

Importantly, however, Loper noted that deference may still be afforded agencies in certain instances. First, the Court observed that the APA expressly mandates a deferential standard of review for agency policy-making and fact-finding.[6] Second, Loper explained that some statutes are best read to “delegate[] discretionary authority to an agency,” in which case a court’s role is to merely ensure the agency “engaged in ‘reasoned decisionmaking’” within that authority.[7] Lastly, Loper reaffirmed that an agency’s “expertise” remains “one of the factors” that may make an agency’s interpretation persuasive.[8]

How Will Loper Impact Federal Health Care Programs?

Loper’s directive that courts should construe statutes independently and not defer to agencies’ positions has enormous implications for providers and suppliers that participate in federal health care programs. Much of today’s health care landscape is governed by HHS’ regulations, impacting many Americans and much of the federal budget. For example, Medicare currently covers more than 67 million beneficiaries, and Medicare spending comprised 12% of the federal budget in 2022 and 21% of national health care spending in 2021.[9]

Federal health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid are established by statutes that set forth myriad requirements regarding the coverage of items and services, and how, when, and by whom those items and services may be furnished.[10] HHS’s various components—most notably the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—have issued numerous, detailed regulations to implement these statutes. HHS’s components also include FDA, CDC, HRSA, AHRQ, OCR, NIH, and many others that intersect with health care providers and suppliers regularly.

Going forward under Loper, future challenges to agency regulations will take place upon a much different playing field. This has several important implications:

  • More Legal Challenges: We expect to see more legal challenges brought against HHS’s regulations as they are issued. Loper expressly stated that it “does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework,” so prior decisions affirming regulations should be stable.[11] But going forward, Loper means that courts have no “thumb on the scale” in favor of HHS’s legal positions, and so litigants may view Loper as increasing their odds of success. At the same time, this may create more uncertainty for providers and suppliers who must determine how to comply with new regulations under challenge.
  • Less Ability for HHS to Create New Programs or Impose New Requirements: Especially where HHS imposes new substantive requirements that are not clearly authorized by statute, HHS’s regulations may be vulnerable. For example, the challengers to CMS’s minimum-staffing requirements for nursing homes are sure to cite Loper.[12] Likewise, when HHS creates new programs or initiatives by regulation based on broad statutory language (e.g., HHS’s recent creation of rural emergency hospital regulations[13]), the regulations may be more vulnerable to challenges. As another example, legal challenges to FDA’s new rule on Laboratory Developed Tests are pending and will likely invoke Loper.[14]
  • More Incentive to Challenge Reimbursement Rules: Legal challenges are frequently brought to CMS’s rules governing reimbursement, which often have complicated statutory formulas subject to differing interpretations. Whereas in the past, courts often deferred to CMS’s interpretations,[15] Loper now creates more potential for providers and suppliers to seek more favorable legal interpretations to enhance reimbursement.
  • Slower and More Cautious Rulemaking: As HHS promulgates new regulations, it will now have to consider the enhanced litigation risk that Loper creates. This may lead to agencies slowing and proceeding more cautiously in rulemaking as agencies seek to craft defensible regulations.
  • Inconsistent Decisions by Courts: Because Loper directs courts to exercise independent judgment rather than defer to HHS’s interpretations, we expect that courts in different areas of the country may reach differing conclusions regarding HHS regulations. This may make certain geographic locations more advantageous for provider and supplier operations or expansions.

Conclusion

Going forward, courts will be more amenable than ever to siding with challenges to HHS regulations. This creates both challenges and opportunities for providers and suppliers who should carefully assess the legal basis for all new regulations.

The authors acknowledge the contributions of Callie Ericksen, a student at the University of California Davis Law School and 2024 summer associate at Foley & Lardner LLP.


[1] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (June 28, 2024), together with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, available here.

[2] 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[3] Id. at 843 (emphasis added).

[4] See Am. Hosp. Ass’n (“AHA”) v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896, 1904 (2022) (determining that HHS’s preclusion of judicial review “lacks any textual basis,” remaining silent with respect to Chevron); Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354, 2362 (2022) (illustrating that HHS’s reading aligns with the statute’s “text, context, and structure” in calculating the Medicare fraction for purposes of Medicare Part A benefits, without any mention of Chevron); Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,98 F.4th 483 (2024) (holding that CMS’s definitions of “line-extension” and “new formulation” did not conflict with the Medicaid statute).

[5] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 35 (June 28, 2024).

[6] Id. at slip. op. 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E)).

[7] Id. at slip op. 18.

[8] Id. at slip op. 25 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

[9] See KFF, Medicare 101 (published May 28, 2024), available here.

[10] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395lll.

[11] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 34 (June 28, 2024).

[12] See Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 24-cv-114 (N.D. Tex) (challenging the rule issued at 89 Fed. Reg. 40876 (May 10, 2024).

[13] Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. §§ 485.500-485.546 (Subpart E), and Payments, §§ 419.90-419.95 (Subpart J), 87 Fed. Reg. 71748, 72292-93 (Nov. 23, 2022),

[14] 21 C.F.R. § 809, 89 Fed. Reg. 37286 (May 6, 2024).

[15] See, e.g.Baptist Mem’l Hosp. – Golden Triangle, Inc. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2020) (deferring to CMS’s rule addressing “costs incurred” for calculating Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payments).

Poor Oversight: Healthcare Company & Owner to Pay $1 Million for Care Plan Oversight Service Billing Fraud

The United States announced that Chicago-based healthcare company Apollo Health Inc. (Apollo), and its owner, Brian J. Weinstein, will pay $1 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations. The claims state that Apollo, under the direction of Weinstein, submitted bills to Medicare for services that were never performed. The case was brought by two whistleblowers who will be rewarded for their efforts.

From December 2014 through March 2017, Apollo allegedly submitted Medicare claims for care plan oversight services (CPO) that did not occur. CPOs detail a physician’s duties to supervise a patient receiving complex medical care. Weinstein allegedly directed Apollo to submit 12,592 CPO service claims for over two dozen providers employed by Apollo, despite Weinstein’s knowledge that no services had been rendered to Medicare patients, and no CPO services were documented in medical records.
Medicare fraud undermines the trust and integrity of the healthcare system, resulting in significant financial burdens on taxpayers. When individuals or organizations engage in fraudulent activities, such as billing for services not rendered or submitting false claims, they siphon funds from Medicare’s intended beneficiaries. Medicare fraud diminishes the resources available for legitimate healthcare services for truly ill Medicare beneficiaries.
The settlement resolves claims brought by two whistleblowers, also known as relators, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. Javar Jones and Louis Curet, the relators in the case, will receive 20% of the settlement amount for bringing the fraudulent activity to the United States’ attention. Whistleblowers who report fraud against the government via a qui tam lawsuit can earn a 15-25% share of the government’s recovery.

The 80/20 Rule is Here: CMS Finalizes HCBS Care Worker Payment Requirements

In May 2023, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a series of rule changes intended to help promote the availability of home and community-based services (“HCBS”) for Medicaid beneficiaries. Chief among these proposals was a new rule that would require HCBS agencies to spend at least 80% of their Medicaid payments for homemaker, home health aide, and personal care services on direct care worker compensation (the “80/20 Rule”). Intended to help stabilize the HCBS workforce, the proposal faced immediate backlash from HCBS providers and Medicaid agencies, who expressed concern that the 80/20 rule would harm HCBS providers by mandating specific allocations to worker compensation and bogging down providers and Medicaid agencies with burdensome reporting requirements.

After reviewing thousands of comments, CMS released an advance copy of the final rule this week. Defying stakeholder anticipation that the 80/20 Rule would be relaxed, or updated to provide more flexibility for providers, CMS finalized the 80/20 Rule largely as originally proposed, including the following key requirements:

  • HCBS providers must spend at least 80% of Medicaid payments on direct care worker compensation;
  • HCBS providers will have six years (increased from four) from the effective date of the final rule to demonstrate compliance with the 80/20 Rule;
  • States must begin collecting and tracking data on direct care worker compensation within four years of the effective date of the final rule; and
  • States are permitted to establish different standards for smaller HCBS providers and to establish hardship exemptions – in both cases based on objective and transparent criteria.

Under the broad mandate of the 80/20 Rule, there are a number of key definitions that HCBS providers must consider as they evaluate these new requirements:

Direct Care Workers

Because the 80/20 Rule was adopted largely to stabilize the HCBS workforce, a key component is whose compensation qualifies for inclusion. CMS’s proposed definition encompassed almost any person with a role in providing direct care to patients (e.g., RNs, LPNs, individuals practicing under their supervision, home health aides, etc.). Under the final 80/20 Rule, CMS clarified that “direct care workers” also include those whose role is specifically tied to clinical supervision (e.g., nurse supervisors).

Compensation

Compensation of direct care workers means:“[s]alary, wages, and other remunerations as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act and implementing regulations; [b]enefits (such as health and dental benefits, life and disability insurance, paid leave, retirement, and tuition reimbursement); and [t]he employer share of payroll taxes for direct care workers delivering services authorized under section 1915(c) of the Act.” CMS clarified that “compensation” also includes:

  1. Overtime pay;
  2. All forms of paid leave (e.g., sick leave, holidays, and vacations);
  3. Different types of retirement plans and employer contributions; and
  4. All types of benefits: CMS intentionally used the phrase “such as” to indicate the list of benefits was non-exhaustive, and indicated technical guidance to states on this subject is forthcoming.

Excluded Costs

CMS expressed concern that HCBS providers would include training costs for direct care workers as “compensation,” and that calculating compensation in this way could result in negative outcomes, such as diminished training opportunities. To address these concerns, CMS created the concept of “excluded costs,” which are excluded from the percentage calculations under the 80/20 Rule. See § 441.302(k)(1)(iii) (“costs that are not included in the calculation of the percentage of Medicaid payments to providers that are spent on compensation for direct care workers.”). Excluded costs are limited to:

  1. Costs of required direct care worker training;
  2. Direct care worker travel costs (mileage, public transportation subsidy, etc.); and
  3. Personal protective equipment costs.

Medicaid Payments

CMS largely adopted its expansive view of what qualifies as a “Medicaid Payment” for purposes of 80/20 Rule calculations. CMS clarified that the 80/20 Rule encompasses both standard and supplemental payments and applies regardless of whether HBCS services are delivered through fee-for-service or managed care delivery systems. CMS also declined to create a formal carve-out for value-based care or pay-for-performance arrangements, despite recognizing their value.

What Comes Next?

HCBS providers and state Medicaid agencies have six years to sort out their compliance with the 80/20 Rule (though data tracking and reporting begins after year three). On the provider side, this means carefully evaluating the business and economic impacts of compliance with the 80/20 Rule and monitoring CMS and state-level guidance on implementation as it develops over time. For multi-state providers, this process becomes even more complicated, as there is a high likelihood that states will choose to implement the 80/20 Rule in different, and potentially contradictory, ways.

Providers also need to work with the state agencies to address the adequacy of HCBS rates generally. CMS recognized the important role that the underlying rates play in HCBS sustainability but declined to mandate specific payment rates or methodologies. As a result, positive momentum on the rates themselves must come from state initiatives.

What the FTC’s Rule Banning Non-Competes Means for Healthcare

The FTC unveiled its long-awaited final rule banning most non-compete agreements during a live broadcast of a Commission meeting on April 23, 2024. The proposed rule, which was first announced in January 2023, underwent an extensive public comment process in which approximately 26,000 comments were received. According to the FTC, approximately 25,000 of these comments supported a total ban on non-competes. While there was some expectation that the final rule would be less aggressive than the proposed rule, that turned out not to be the case. By late summer 2024, most employers, except for non-profit organizations, will not be able to enforce or obtain non-competes in the U.S. except in extremely narrow circumstances. The new rule will take effect 120 days after it is published in the Federal Register. Assuming the rule is published this week, we can expect it to take effect by late August. That is, of course, if a court does not enjoin the rule first. Shortly after the rule was announced on April 23, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated its intention to sue the FTC. U.S. Chamber to Sue FTC Over Unlawful Power Grab on Noncompete Agreements Ban | U.S. Chamber of Commerce (uschamber.com) The first lawsuit challenging the new rule was filed on April 23, Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24cv986 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2024). Among other relief, the Ryan suit seeks to have the rule vacated and set aside. There are significant legal questions concerning whether the FTC has the authority to take this action by rulemaking or whether this is best left to the legislative process. While some U.S. states have banned non-competes, many U.S. states have not banned them.

As written, the rule will have profound effects on virtually every industry, especially health care, where non-competes are common in physician and mid-level practitioner employment agreements. As several Commissioners indicated during the April 23 meeting, they are particularly concerned about non-competes in health care and believe this rule will save approximately $74-194 billion in reduced spending on physician services over the next decade.

Following is Nelson Mullins’ quick take on what health care employers need to know:

  1. The rule does not apply to non-profits. The basis for the rule making is Section 5 of the FTC Act, which doesn’t apply to non-profits. So, a non-profit health system that has non-competes with physicians or other workers is not impacted by the rule. Be aware, though, that the FTC may be looking to test whether some non-profit health systems are really operating as true non-profits. Tax exempt status alone will not be enough. We believe, however, that given significant and quantifiable charitable benefits that most non-profit systems provide, the FTC may be hard pressed to find a good test case within the non-profit health care industry.
  2. For all others, the rule bans all non-compete agreements for any worker, regardless of title, job function, or compensation, after the effective date. Thus, a for-profit health system or for-profit physician practice that uses non-competes will be significantly limited. The only non-competes that will be allowed to remain in force are non-competes for “Senior Executives” that were entered into before the rule becomes effective.
  3. The rule will take effect 120 days after it is published in the Federal Register. This will likely occur this week, so we expect the effective date to be approximately August 20, 2024.
  4. The rule rescinds existing non-competes for all workers who are not “Senior Executives.”
  5. “Senior Executive” is a narrowly-defined term meaning:
    1. a person in a policy making position; and
    2. who was paid at least $151,164 in the prior year.
  6. Existing non-competes for Senior Executives are not rescinded. New non-competes with Senior Executives entered into prior to the effective date are still allowed. However, no new non-competes with Senior Executives may be entered into after the effective date.
  7. “Policy-making position” means: President, CEO, or equivalent, or other person who has policy making authority, i.e., decisions that control a significant aspect of a business entity. Most clinicians will not meet the definition of “Senior Executive.”
  8. Non-senior executives who are now under a non-compete must be given notice by the effective date that their non-compete will not be, and cannot legally be, enforced. Model language for the notice is in the rule.
For more news on the Implications of the FTC Noncompete Ban on Healthcare, visit the NLR Health Law & Managed Care section.

Importance of Negotiating Assignment and Subletting Provisions in Health Care Leases

In our ongoing series of blog posts, we examine key negotiating points for tenants in triple net health care leases. We also offer suggestions for certain lease provisions that will protect tenants from overreaching and unfair expenses, overly burdensome obligations, and ambiguous terms with respect to the rights and responsibilities of the parties. These suggestions are intended to result in efficient lease negotiations and favorable lease terms from a tenant’s perspective. In our first two blog posts, we considered the importance of negotiating initial terms and renewal terms and operating expense provisions. This latest blog post in our series focuses on negotiating assignment and subletting provisions.

It is imperative for a commercial tenant, particularly a private equity-owned health care tenant, to include provisions in a lease which allow the tenant the flexibility to assign and sublease the commercial space without the necessity of having to obtain the landlord’s consent and/or to meet burdensome landlord conditions.

Most leases prohibit transfers by assignment and subletting or require landlord’s prior written consent subject to meeting certain burdensome conditions. In addition, landlords often include a “change of control” provision which provides that sale of a controlling interest is deemed a transfer requiring landlord consent. A health care tenant looking for flexibility for reorganization or internal transfer subject to private equity control will want to push back on change of control provisions and will want to ensure that their lease allows for certain permitted transfers that do not require landlord consent. Carving out “permitted transfers” customarily includes transfers to: (i) an affiliate of the named tenant under the lease (meaning, any entity, directly or indirectly, which controls, is controlled by or is under common control with tenant); (ii) a successor entity created by merger, consolidation or reorganization of tenant; or (iii) an entity which shall purchase all or substantially all of the assets or a controlling interest in the stock or membership of tenant. If the tenant is a management services organization (MSO), the lease should also include explicit landlord permission for a sublease between the MSO and the provider that will occupy the leased premises.

Landlords may accept the concept of permitted transfers but often seek to impose certain conditions to allowing such transfers. Certain conditions on permitted transfers are reasonable, such as requirements for advance notice, that the proposed permitted transferee assume all obligations under the lease, that the permitted transferee operate only for the permitted use set forth in the lease, and that a copy of the transfer document be provided to landlord. However, other conditions, such as requiring a net worth test for the assignee or financial reporting requirements, can be burdensome and serve to undermine the concept of permitted transfers without landlord consent. We advise our clients in these instances to push back or limit these conditions as much as possible.

Other common assignment and subletting provisions should expressly not apply to permitted transfers. These include recapture provisions which allow a landlord to terminate the lease and recapture the space, excess profit provisions which provide that any excess profits realized as the result of a transfer will be shared between landlord and tenant, and administrative fees and reimbursements to landlord which are often charged to tenants in connection with an assignment or subletting request. Restrictions on transfers should not apply to guarantor entities. Often with private equity, the guarantor is the parent entity and cannot be restricted by a landlord as to transfer, restructuring or reorganization at the top of its organization.

In the case of transfers that do not fall within the definition of “permitted transfers” and require landlord consent, a tenant will want to include language that landlord will not unreasonably withhold, condition, or delay such consent. Other tenant protections should also be considered, including a cap on administrative and review fees reimbursable by tenant to landlord, a reasonably short time period for landlord to approve or disapprove a request (i.e., 30 days) or be deemed to have approved, a reasonably short time period for landlord to exercise recapture rights or be deemed to have approved, and a provision that excess profits will be shared equally rather than all belonging to landlord.

Negotiation of assignment and subletting terms is critical for tenants, particularly with respect to private equity-owned health care tenants. The goal for tenants in negotiating these points is to provide flexibility for addressing future financial and operational needs. As with other highly negotiated lease terms, we recommend addressing assignment and subletting provisions in detail in advance in the letter of intent. This makes expectations of the parties clear, saves time and money by avoiding protracted negotiations, and results in an overall efficient lease negotiation process.

In our next post, we will cover the importance of negotiating maintenance and repair terms and will offer suggestions for limiting a tenant’s exposure.

The Antitrust Investigator Will See You Now: What Healthcare And Pharma Should Expect In A World Of Enhanced Antitrust Scrutiny

Highlights

  • Healthcare entities should expect heightened government scrutiny of mergers, acquisitions, and business behaviors that could be construed as restricting competition in healthcare and pharma
  • The FTC, DOJ, and HHS have advanced a “whole-of-government approach,” including data sharing, cooperative enforcement, and enhanced antitrust training
  • Businesses should take note of practices that are likely to trigger investigatory and enforcement actions

According to media reports, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has opened an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group, which is the owner of the United States’ largest health insurer, UnitedHealthcare. The focus of the inquiry appears to be the relationship between the UnitedHealthcare insurance plan and one of its health services divisions, Optum, and the potential impact on rivals and consumers.

While tech giants have grabbed most of the headlines when it comes to enhanced antitrust scrutiny, this new matter is the DOJ’s second antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group in recent years, giving teeth to the administration’s claim that it has an aggressive antitrust policy in the healthcare sector.

In another example of increased antitrust scrutiny, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced a new initiative in partnership with the DOJ and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to address what they consider to be the effects of anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare and pharmaceutical spaces. According to the government, these new efforts are aimed at lowering consumer costs and will include “partnering on new initiatives which include a joint Request for Information to seek input on how private-equity and other corporations’ control of health care is impacting Americans.”

Although interagency cooperation is the focus of the recent push to ramp up antitrust investigations and enforcement, each agency will still spearheaded their own regulatory activity.

Federal Trade Commission

FTC Chair Lina Khan has made it clear that her agency will devote more resources to enforcement in the healthcare industry, and emphasized that “safeguarding fair competition and rooting out unlawful business practices in health care markets is a top priority for the FTC.” In furtherance of these priorities, the commission has recently taken the following actions:

  • Orange Book Policy: The FTC challenged more than 100 patents held by pharmaceutical companies that they claim are inaccurately or improperly listed in the FDA’s Orange Book. The commission also released a policy statement explaining its renewed focus on Orange Book infractions.
  • Proposed Non-compete Rule: The FTC presented a new rule that would place a ban on non-compete clauses in employee contracts.

U.S. Department of Justice

Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, highlighted the division’s emphasis on the healthcare space when he said, “we are committed to weeding out anticompetitive practices and market consolidation that hinder Americans’ access to quality care at affordable rates, or deprive health care workers of fair wages and opportunity.” The following are just a few examples of how the DOJ has implemented this renewed focus:

  • Criminal Penalties: Recently, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division successfully secured a deferred prosecution agreement against Teva Pharmaceuticals, obtaining the largest monetary penalty ever (over $200 million) against a purely domestic producer that was allegedly operating an antitrust cartel.
  • Blocked Mergers: The Antitrust Division filed a suit to stop Aon plc’s $30 billion proposal to acquire Willis Towers Watson, two of the three largest brokers of health insurance and retirement benefits consulting. The companies later ceased their pursuit of the merger.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra made his agency’s priorities clear when he recently stated that “the Biden-Harris Administration remains laser-focused on increasing access to high-quality, affordable health care for all Americans, like by making hearing aids available for sale over the counter and lowering prescription drug costs through the Inflation Reduction Act.” The department’s initiatives have included:

  • Ownership Transparency: For the first time, HHS, via the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, made ownership data available on federal qualified health centers and rural health clinics on data.cms.gov. HHS hopes the release of this data will help catalyze enforcement actions by identifying common ownership.
  • Medicare Advantage Marketing: HHS also announced new efforts to crack down on what it considers “predatory marketing” that seeks to steer patients towards Medicare Advantage plans that “may not best meet their needs.”

Takeaways

In light of the government’s renewed focus on increased competition, expanded enforcement actions, access to quality care, more affordable services and products, and transparency of ownership in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, legal and compliance departments should consider being proactive about conducting thorough reviews of current practices. This is particularly true for mergers and acquisitions, competitive strategies, and pricing decisions, which are the business activities most likely to conflict with these recently energized regulatory bodies. Even healthcare providers with stellar compliance programs should expect to receive more frequent and targeted requests for information from enforcement authorities about their business partners, payors, and marketing practices.