Tag: Health Law

The Supreme Court Is Poised to Weigh in on a False Claims Act Circuit Split

Three pending petitions for writ of certiorari have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to the pleading standard for False Claims Act (“FCA”) whistleblower claims.

The FCA creates a right of action whereby either the government or private individuals can bring lawsuits against actors who have defrauded the government. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. Under the FCA, a private citizen can act as a “relator” and bring an action on behalf of the government in what is known as a qui tam suit. The government can elect to intervene, which means participate, in the suit; if it does not, the relator can continue to litigate the case without the direct participation of the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Private individuals can receive a portion of the action’s proceeds or settlement amount. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).

The petitions ask the Court to clarify the level of particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”) to plead a claim under the FCA. Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs alleging “fraud or mistake” to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”

Johnson v. Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care LLC, Case No. 21-462

In their petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioners in Johnson asked the Supreme Court to take up the issue of whether Rule 9(b) requires FCA plaintiffs “who plead a fraudulent scheme with particularity to also plead specific details of false claims.” The Eleventh Circuit earlier affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an FCA claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to plead “specific details about the submission of an actual false claim” to the government. Estate of Helmly v. Bethany Hospice & Palliative Care of Coastal Georgia, LLC, 853 F. App’x 496, 502-03 (11th Cir. 2021).

In particular, the relators alleged that several doctors purchased ownership interests in Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care, LLC (“Bethany Hospice”) and were allocated kickbacks for patient referrals through a combination of salary, dividends, and/or bonus payments.  Id. at 498. Among other allegations, the complaint alleged that both the relators had access to Bethany Hospice’s billing systems, and, based on their review of those systems and conversations with other employees, were able to confirm that Bethany Hospital submitted false claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement to the government.  Id. at 502.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the allegations were “insufficient” under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for fraud cases.  Id. Even though the relators alleged direct knowledge of Bethany Hospice’s billing and patient records, their failure to provide “specific details” regarding the dates of the claims, the frequency with which Bethany Hospice submitted those claims, the amounts of the claims, or the patients whose treatment formed the basis of the claims defeated their FCA claim.  Id. In addition, the relators did not personally participate or directly witness the submission of any false claims.  Id. The Eleventh Circuit also found unpersuasive the relators’ argument that Bethany Hospice derived nearly all its business from Medicare patients, therefore making it plausible that it had submitted false claims to the government.  Id. “Whether a defendant bills the government for some or most of its services,” the Eleventh Circuit stated, “the burden remains on a relator alleging the submission of a false claim to allege specific details about false claims to establish the indicia of reliability necessary under Rule 9(b).”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the relators did not do so here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case.

United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., Case No. 21-936

The Sixth Circuit took a similarly hardline approach in United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., 16 F.4th 192 (6th Cir. 2021), ruling in favor of a strict interpretation of Rule 9(b).  The petition for a writ of certiorari in Owsley asks the Court to take up the same question as in Johnson.

In Owsley, the relator alleged that her employer used fraudulently altered data to make its patient populations seem sicker than they actually were in order to increase Medicare payments received from the government.  Id. at 195. The complaint “describe[d] in detail, a fraudulent scheme,” and alleged “personal knowledge of the billing practices employed in the fraudulent scheme.”  Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Sixth Circuit ruled that these allegations were not enough under Rule 9(b). Instead, to bring a viable FCA claim, a relator’s complaint must identify “at least one false claim with specificity.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A relator can do that in one of two ways: first, by identifying a representative claim actually submitted to the government; or second, by alleging facts “based on personal knowledge of billing practices” that support a strong inference that the defendant submitted “particular identified claims” to the government.  Id. (emphasis in original). Here, though the relator alleged specific instances of fraudulent data – such as upcoding a patient with a leg ulcer to include a malignant cancer diagnosis – she did not identify particular claims submitted to the government.  Id. at 197. “[T]he touchstone is whether the complaint provides the defendant with notice of a specific representative claim that the plaintiff thinks was fraudulent.”  Id. The Owsley relator, the court held, failed to meet that critical touchstone.

Molina Healthcare v. Prose, Case No. 21-1145

The Seventh Circuit adopted a more flexible pleading standard in United States v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., 17 F.4th 732 (7th Cir. 2021). As in Johnson and Owsley, the petition for a writ of certiorari asks the Court to weigh in on the Rule 9(b) standard under the FCA. It also presents an additional question about the requirements for an FCA claim under the implied false certification theory.

In Molina Healthcare, the relator brought an FCA claim against Molina Healthcare (“Molina”) for violating certain requirements of its Medicaid contract. The relator alleged that Molina, which had previously subcontracted with another entity for the provision of certain nursing home services, continued to collect payment for those services from the government even though it no longer provided them. Molina Healthcare, 17 F.4th at 736. Molina Healthcare received fixed payments from the government for different categories of patients. It received the highest per capita payment for patients in nursing facilities: $3,180.30.  Id. at 737-38. The relator alleged that Molina Healthcare knowingly continued to collect this rate from the government when it no longer provided a key service to nursing home patients.  Id.

The relator brought an FCA claim against Molina based on three theories of liability: (1) factual falsity (i.e., presenting a facially false claim to the government); (2) fraud in the inducement (i.e., misrepresenting compliance with a payment condition “in order to induce the government to enter the contract”); and (3) implied false certification (i.e., presenting a false claim with the “omission of key facts” instead of “affirmative misrepresentations”).  Id. at 740-741.

The Seventh Circuit held that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirement under all three theories. First, as to factual falsity, the Court found that the relator provided sufficient information as to the “when, where, how, and to whom” Molina made the allegedly false representations.  Id. at 741. Though the relator did not have access to the defendant’s files, the information he provided “support[ed] the inference” that Molina had submitted false claims to the government.  Id. Second, as to fraud in the inducement, the Seventh Circuit found that the relator’s “precise allegations” regarding “the beneficiaries, the time period, the mechanism for fraud, and the financial consequences” again satisfied Rule 9(b)’s standard.  Id. at 741. The complaint also included details about Molina’s chief operating officer’s statements that indicated that Molina “never intended to perform the promised act that induced the government to enter the contract.”  Id. at 741-42.  Third, as to the implied false certification theory, the court found that the plaintiff adequately alleged that Molina knowingly omitted key material facts while submitting claims to the government.  Id. at 743-44.

The Supreme Court Invites Comment from the Solicitor General

Facing what appears to be a major circuit split, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the views of the United States” in Johnson in January 2022 and in Owsley in May 2022.

The Supreme Court invites the Solicitor General to comment on only a handful of the approximately 7,000 to 8,000 petitions for writ of certiorari that the Court receives in a year. In the 2021 Term, for example, the Solicitor General filed what it calls a “Petition Stage Amicus Brief” in only 19 cases. Four Justices must vote to issue an invitation to the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General’s view on whether the Court should grant certiorari has often been extremely influential. In the 2007 Term, for example, the Court denied certiorari in every case in which the Solicitor General recommended that approach. By contrast, it granted certiorari in 11 out of the 12 cases in which the Solicitor General recommended a grant. More recent data confirm that the Solicitor General’s recommendations as to whether the Court should grant certiorari remain highly influential. One study found that between May 2016 and May 2017, the Supreme Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommended approach in 23 cases (85%). At the same time, even the act of requesting the views of the Solicitor General dramatically increases the chances that the Court will take up a case. For example, between the 1998 Term and 2004 Term, one study found that the Court was 37 times more likely to grant certiorari in cases where it had invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief.

The Solicitor General Urges the Court to Decline Review

On May 24, 2022, the Solicitor General filed its brief in Johnson; it has yet to comment on Owsley. The Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Johnson urges the Court to deny certiorari. The Solicitor General notes that certiorari might be warranted if the courts of appeals applied a rigid, per se rule that required relators to plead “specific details of false claims.” But instead, the brief argues that the courts of appeals have “largely converged” on an approach to FCA pleading requirements that allows relators “either to identify specific false claims or to plead other sufficiently reliable indicia” to support a “strong inference” that the defendant submitted false claims to the government. According to the Solicitor General, the “divergent outcomes” among the circuit courts are merely the result of those courts’ application of a “fact-intensive standard” to various distinct allegations.

The petitioners in Johnson filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s views. They argue that the Solicitor General misinterpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s pleading standard, which effectively requires a relator to allege specific details about false claims to survive a motion to dismiss. In other words, the petitioners argue that in the Eleventh Circuit, the Solicitor General’s “purported” rule that a relator can either allege details about specific false claims or identify reliable indica that false claims were presented are “one and the same.”

Though the Court did not invite the Solicitor General to comment in Molina Healthcare, the petitioners in that case also filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s amicus in Johnson. “Everyone but the Solicitor General agrees that the circuits are hopelessly divided over whether Rule 9(b) requires a relator to plead details of false claims,” the brief argues. The brief notes that the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits do not require plaintiffs to plead specific details of actual false claims; by contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require relators to plead specific details. Accordingly, the brief urges the Supreme Court to resolve the “widely acknowledged circuit split” over Rule 9(b)’s pleading standards.

The Solicitor General has a history of urging the Court to reject certiorari in FCA cases. According to the petitioners’ supplemental brief in Molina Healthcare, since the 1996 Term, the Solicitor General has recommended against review in eleven out of the twelve FCA cases in which the Court invited the Solicitor General’s views. Still, the Court granted certiorari in three of the cases in which the Solicitor General recommended against review.

Given the Supreme Court’s apparent interest in the FCA pleading standard – as evidenced by its calls for the Solicitor General’s views in Johnson and Owsley – there is a chance that it will grant certiorari in at least one of the three cases pending before it. Depending on when the Solicitor General weighs in, the Court may decide to grant certiorari in the fall of 2022.

Any Supreme Court decision that clarifies the pleading standard for FCA cases will likely affect a relator’s ability to successfully litigate qui tam actions in which the government does not intervene more than in cases in which the government does intervene. When a relator files a qui tam action, the government investigates the alleged fraud. If it intervenes in that action, it can file a complaint to include evidence it has discovered in that investigation, allowing it to meet the more stringent version of the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. Relators, however, often do not have access to the same evidence that the government does, such as specific claims data, making it far harder for a relator to meet the more stringent version of pleading standard.

Until the Supreme Court decides to weigh in, qui tam relators will continue to have an easier time satisfying the requirements of Rule 9(b) in those circuits with relaxed pleading standards. In the meantime, and whether the Court takes one of these petitions or not, any FCA whistleblower should seek legal counsel to help her identify the type of factual information that would meet the pleading requirements of the courts that apply a strict pleading requirement.

Article By Kayla Morin of Katz Banks Kumin LLP

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PFAS Health Advisories Under Legal Attack…Again

On June 15, 2022, the EPA issued Health Advisories (HAs) for five specific PFAS, including PFOA and PFOS. On July 29, 2022, the American Chemistry Council filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia challenging the validity of the EPA’s PFOA and PFOS HAs. The group alleges that the EPA did not follow proper procedure in setting the HAs and that the EPA’s determinations were scientifically flawed. The petition follows closely on the heels of a similar challenge to the EPA’s HA for GenX PFAS. Industries that will be impacted by upcoming EPA PFAS regulations will closely follow the petition as it makes its way through court, as it may provide predictive indicators of arguments that will unfold as the EPA’s PFAS regulations increase.

PFAS Health Advisories

In October 2021, the EPA released its PFAS Roadmap, which stated explicit goals and deadlines for over twenty action items specific to PFAS. As part of the Roadmap, the EPA pledged to re-assess the existing Health Advisories (HAs) for PFOA and PFOS, as well as establish HAs for PFBS and GenX chemicals. In June 2022, the EPA fulfilled its promise on all fronts when it set HAs for PFOA (interim), PFOS (interim), PFBS (final) and GenX (final). While not enforceable levels for PFAS in drinking water, the EPA’s PFAS Health Advisories are nevertheless incredibly significant for a variety of reasons, including influence on future federal and state drinking water limits, as well as potential impacts on future PFAS litigation.

The levels set by the EPA’s PFAS Health Advisories were as follows:

PFOA

.004 ppt

PFOS

.02 ppt

GenX

10 ppt

PFBS

2,000 ppt

Legal Challenge To PFAS Health Advisories

On July 13, 2022, The Chemours Company filed a petition challenging the validity of the EPA’s GenX HA. On July 29, 2022, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) followed suit and petitioned to have the EPA’s HAs for PFOA and PFOS vacated. In the petition, the ACC argues that the EPA circumvented procedural requirements in the Safe Drinking Water Act by setting interim HAs for PFOA and PFOS and that the EPA is improperly attempting to create enforcement standards for drinking water that are unattainable. While the HAs themselves are not enforceable, the ACC argues that the HAs are relied upon by states when they set their own drinking water standards and signal an EPA intent to set unachievably low levels of enforceable PFAS standards at the federal level. The ACC points to recent findings by the Science Advisory Board (SAB) that criticized the EPA’s reliance on the same studies and scientific articles upon which the HAs were based.

Conclusion

Now more than ever, the EPA is clearly on a path to regulate PFAS contamination in the country’s water, land and air. The EPA has also for the first time publicly stated when they expect such regulations to be enacted. These regulations will require states to act, as well (and some states may still enact stronger regulations than the EPA). Both the federal and the state level regulations will impact businesses and industries of many kinds, even if their contribution to drinking water contamination issues may seem on the surface to be de minimus. In states that already have PFAS drinking water standards enacted, businesses and property owners have already seen local environmental agencies scrutinize possible sources of PFAS pollution much more closely than ever before, which has resulted in unexpected costs. Beyond drinking water, though, the EPA PFAS Roadmap shows the EPA’s desire to take regulatory action well beyond just drinking water, and companies absolutely must begin preparing now for regulatory actions that will have significant financial impacts down the road.

Article By John Gardella of CMBG3 Law

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©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Signals Move Away from Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies

KEY TAKEAWAYS

In a unanimous decision on June 15, 2022, the Court in American Hospital Association v. Becerra[2] examined a Medicare reimbursement formula reduction that affected certain hospitals. While rejecting the DHHS agency interpretation of the reimbursement statute, the Court made no mention of Chevron deference even though the parties extensively briefed this doctrine. Instead, the Court focused solely on the relevant language of the statute. In particular, the Court held that the “text and structure” of the statute demonstrated that the Medicare reimbursement cut was not consistent with the statute.

In a 5-4 decision a few weeks later, the Court in Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation[3] again made no mention of Chevron deference even though the majority noted that the underlying statute’s “ordinary meaning … [did] not exactly leap off the page.” Despite its initial conclusion that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language was unclear, the Court continued its recent pattern of (a) choosing to not apply Chevron deference directly and (b) instead performing textural and structural analysis of its own. Based on this statutory analysis, the Court in Empire Health concluded that the statute was “surprisingly clear” if read as technical provisions for specialists and that the language of the statute supported the agency’s implementing regulation.

Finally, in West Virginia v. EPA,[4] the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision again refused to give any deference to the EPA’s interpretation of a Clean Air Act provision which the EPA claimed as the statutory basis to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by power plants. The Court concluded that the EPA had violated the “Major Questions” Doctrine when the EPA used this provision to regulate carbon emissions. Under the “Major Questions” Doctrine, an agency cannot make decisions of vast economic and political significance without Congress expressly giving the agency the power to do so. Since the EPA’s effort to regulate greenhouse gases by making industry-wide changes was a decision of “vast economic and political significance,” the Court concluded that the EPA lacked the authority to do so in light of the overall nature and structure of the statute. Thus, even though there was some textual support for the EPA’s position, the Court again refused to defer to the agency and its interpretation of a statute.

Read together, these three decisions show an increased skepticism by the Court of agency interpretations of statutes and signal that going forward, the federal courts will more closely scrutinize administrative agency decisions in general. Businesses that have, to date, relied on an administrative agency interpretation may need to reassess their reliance if the interpretation relies on a broad or strained reading of a statute. Conversely, businesses currently restrained by agency interpretations which were shown deference by courts may now have an opening to challenge those interpretations.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[2] Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022).

[3] Becerra v. Empire Health Found., for Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 142 S. Ct. 2354 (2022).

[4] W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).

Article By Andrew T. Blum, Matthew J. Greenberg, and Larry J. Saylor of Miller Canfield

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© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees with HHS Payment Methodology for Disproportionate Share Hospitals

The fight about how Medicare compensates disproportionate share hospitals (“DSH”) is one of the longest-running reimbursement disputes of recent years, and it has generated copious work for judges around the country.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court settled one piece of the conflict:  the counting of “Medicare-entitled” patients in the Medicare fraction of the “disproportionate-patient percentage.”  Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 597 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op.).  The Supreme Court concluded that the proper calculation, under the statute, counts “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits[,]’ . . . regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments” for certain services.  Id. (slip op., at 18) (emphasis added).

DSH payments are made to hospitals with a large low-income patient mix.  “The mark-up reflects that low-income individuals are often more expensive to treat than higher income ones, even for the same medical conditions.”  Id. (slip op., at 3).  The federal government thus gives hospitals a financial boost for treating a “disproportionate share” of the indigent population.

The DHS payment depends on a hospital’s “disproportionate-patient percentage,” which is basically the sum of two fractions: the Medicare fraction, which reflects what portion of the Medicare patients were low-income; and the Medicaid fraction, which reflects what portion of the non-Medicare patients were on Medicaid.  Historically, HHS calculated the Medicare fraction by including only patients actually receiving certain Medicare benefits for their care.  In 2004, however, HHS changed course and issued a new rule.  It counted, in the Medicare fraction, all patients who were eligible for Medicare benefits generally (essentially, over 65 or disabled), even if particular benefits were not actually being paid.  For most providers, that change resulted in a pay cut.

The new rule sparked several lawsuits.  Hospitals challenged HHS’s policy based on the authorizing statutory language.  These hospitals essentially argued in favor of the old methodology.  Appeals led to a circuit split, with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits agreeing with HHS, and the Ninth Circuit ruling that HHS had misread the statute.

The Supreme Court has now resolved the issue.  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, sided with HHS.  The majority concluded that, based on the statutory language, “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits’ are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.”  Id. (slip op., at 18).  The majority also explained that if “entitlement to benefits” bore the meaning suggested by the hospital, “Medicare beneficiaries would lose important rights and protections . . . [and a] patient could lose his ability to enroll in other Medicare programs whenever he lacked a right to [certain] payments for hospital care.”  Id. (slip op., at 11).

Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Alito.  The dissent argued that those lacking certain Medicare coverage should be excluded from HHS’s formula, based on “the most fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: Read the statute.”  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).  According to the dissent, the majority’s ruling will also restrict hospitals’ ability to provide care to underprivileged communities.  “HHS’s misreading of the statute has significant real-world effects: It financially harms hospitals that serve low-income patients, thereby hamstringing those hospitals’ ability to provide needed care to low-income communities.”  Id. (slip op., at 4).

There was one point of agreement among the majority and dissenting justices: the complexity of the statutory language for DSH payments.  Echoing the thoughts often held by healthcare advisors, Justice Kagan found the statutory formula to be “a mouthful” and “a lot to digest.”  Id. (majority opinion) (slip op., at 4).  And in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh called the statute “mind-numbingly complex,” and resorted to an interpretation that he found “straightforward and commonsensical”: that patients cannot be “simultaneously entitled and disentitled” to Medicare benefits.  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 3).

Article By Jeffrey DeBeer and Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

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© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

CMS Reduces COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate Surveys and Rescinds Surveyor Vaccination Requirements

In two recent memoranda, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made changes to previously issued survey guidance related to COVID-19 vaccination issues.

In QSO-22-17-ALL, CMS modified the frequency by which State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations will survey for compliance with the federal staff vaccine mandate applicable to health care providers and suppliers (discussed in a prior post).  Noting that 95% of providers and suppliers surveyed have been found in substantial compliance with the rule, CMS is eliminating the previous requirement that State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations survey for compliance with the vaccine mandate during every survey.  Review of compliance with vaccine mandate is still required, however, during initial surveys, recertification surveys, and in response to specific complaint allegations that allege non-compliance with the staff vaccination requirement.  This means that a State Agency or Accreditation Organization is not required to review compliance with the staff vaccination requirement during, for example, a validation survey or a complaint survey unrelated to compliance with the staff vaccination requirement.  A State Agency or Accreditation Organization may still choose to expand any survey to include review of vaccine mandate compliance; however, the new guidance should result in a reduction in survey frequency of this issue for providers and suppliers.

In QSO-22-18-ALL, CMS rescinded, in its entirety, the previously issued QSO-22-10-ALL memorandum, which had mandated that surveyors of State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations be vaccinated for COVID-19.  However, CMS noted that the State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations were responsible for compliance and prohibited providers and suppliers from asking surveyors for proof of vaccination.  While CMS is now encouraging vaccination of surveyors performing federal oversight surveys, the mandate for vaccination is no longer in effect.

Article By Allen R. Killworth of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

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©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Health Care Providers on Alert: Two Hospitals Penalized for Continuous Noncompliance with the Hospital Price Transparency Rule

We previously discussed the requirements of the Hospital Price Transparency Rule (“Rule”) on health care providers and health plans, as well as CMS’s proposal to increase penalties for a hospital’s failure to comply with the Rule.  About a year and a half after the Rule became effective, CMS has now imposed its first set of civil monetary penalties (“CMPs”) on Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee, which have been fined $883,180 and $214,320, respectively.

The Rule requires, in part, hospitals to make public a machine-readable file containing a list of all standard charges for all items and services, such as, e.g., supplies, room and board, and use of the facility, among other items.  See 45 C.F.R. § 180.40(a); id. at § 180.20.  The Rule also requires hospitals to display shoppable services in a consumer-friendly manner.  See id. at § 180.60(d)(2); id. at § 180.60(b).  The goal of these specific requirements, in addition to those set forth in the remainder of the Rule, is to provide consumers with sufficient information about the charges for certain items and services by requiring health care providers and health plans to be publicly transparent about such charges.

Based on CMS’s CMP letters, dated June 7, 2022, Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee were non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.  The chronology of events is important to understand how CMS ended up issuing its CMP letters.

Northside Hospital Atlanta

For Northside Hospital Atlanta:

  • CMS documented the hospital’s non-compliance since March 24, 2021.
  • CMS issued a Warning Letter, dated April 19, 2021, to the hospital and provided it the opportunity to respond and to provide supporting documentation to CMS.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On September 2, 2021, CMS reviewed the hospital’s website and determined that the non-compliance persisted.
  • On September 30, 2021, CMS issued a Request for Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to the hospital, stating that it was non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.
  • On November 15, 2021, in response to the Request for CAP, the hospital stated that patients could request specific price estimate quotes by calling or emailing Northside Hospital Atlanta, which CMS determined was insufficient in response to its Request for CAP and to comply with the Rule.
  • On December 20, 2021, CMS requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On January 11, 2022, CMS conducted a technical assistance call with the hospital, during which the hospital confirmed that it was non-compliant with the Rule and explained that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.
  • On January 24, 2022, CMS, again, requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.

Based on the foregoing, CMS imposed an $883,180 CMP on Northside Hospital Atlanta, calculated as follows, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90:

  • $36,300
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 121 days.
    • 121 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (September 2, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

 plus

  • $846,880
    • $10 per bed per day times 536 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Northside Hospital Atlanta has until 60 calendar days from the date of CMS’s CMP letter to pay.  Until the hospital notifies CMS that all non-compliance has been corrected, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Northside Hospital Cherokee

For similar reasons as Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was fined $214,320.  CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant since April 16, 2021, and notified the hospital by Warning Letter, dated May 18, 2021.  CMS reviewed the hospital’s website on September 9, 2021, and issued a Request for CAP on October 27, 2021—to which the hospital did not respond.  Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS held a technical assistance call on January 11, 2022, during which Northside Hospital Cherokee notified CMS that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.  CMS requested a Request for CAP on January 24, 2022—to which the hospital did not respond.

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was penalized $214,320, calculated as follows:

  • $34,200
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 114 days.
    • 114 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (September 9, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

plus

  • $180,120
    • $10 per bed per day times 114 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee continues to be non-compliant and, thus, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Takeaways

These fines reflect CMS’s willingness to take material enforcement action where the Rule’s regulatory requirements are largely ignored and CMS’s subsequent efforts to obtain compliance are rejected.  Non-compliance carries heavy fines that are calculated, in part, by the number of days of non-compliance and by bed count.  Health care providers should take notice and ensure that they are compliant or, at least, making efforts towards compliance with the Rule’s requirements.  Critically, CMS will not accept a refusal to comply, as reflected in CMS’s responses to Northside Hospital Atlanta’s and Northside Hospital Cherokee’s refusals to submit CAPs.  As noted in CMS’s CMP letters to these providers, CMS is scanning websites and subsequently notifying providers that appear to be non-compliant with the Rule—which are ignored at the provider’s peril.

Article By Edward S. Kornreich and Matthew J. Westbrook of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Privacy Tip #335 – Health Care Sector Continues to Be Hit with Ransomware

According to the 2022 State of Ransomware Report issued recently by Sophos, it surveyed 5,600 IT professionals from 31 countries, including professionals in the health care sector. Those professionals in the health care sector shared that 66 percent of them had experienced a ransomware attack in 2021, which was an increase of 69 percent over 2020. This was the largest increase of all sectors surveyed.

If you look at the Office for Civil Rights data breach portal, you will see that a vast majority of breaches reported by health care providers and business associates are related to “Hacking/IT incident.” This confirms that the health care sector continues to be attacked by threat actors seeking to steal protected health information of patients.

If you are a patient who receives a breach notification letter from a health care provider or business associate, the letter will provide guidance on how to protect yourself following a data breach and may offer some protection guidance, including credit monitoring or fraud resolution. Such a letter has been sent to patients to comply with the breach notification requirements of HIPAA and state law. Part of those requirements includes that the patients be provided mitigation steps following the breach to protect themselves from fraud. Avail yourself of these protections in the event your information is compromised. Take the time to sign up for the mitigation offered. It is clear that these attacks will not subside any time soon.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Medicare Advantage: OIG Report Finds Improper Denials

On April 27,2022, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG), Office of Evaluations and Inspections, issued a report on the performance of Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) in approving care and payment consistently with Medicare coverage rules. In its review, OIG found that 13% of MAO denials of prior authorization requests should have been approved and that 18% of payment requests from providers were improperly denied. OIG also made a number of recommendations to the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with respect to its oversight of MAOs.

Purpose and Method of the Study

OIG undertook the study to assess whether MAOs are appropriately providing access to medically necessary services and making payment to providers consistently with Medicare coverage rules. Since CMS pays MAOs principally by capitation, MAOs have a potential incentive to increase their profits by denying access to care of beneficiaries or by denying payments to providers. CMS’s annual audits of MAOs have indicated some persistent problems related to inappropriate denials of service and payment. As enrollment in Medicare Advantage continues to grow, OIG viewed it as important to ensure that medically necessary care is provided and that providers are paid appropriately.

OIG conducted the review by randomly selecting 250 denials of prior authorization requests and 250 payment request denials by 15 of the largest MAOs during a week in June of 2019. OIG had coding experts review the cases and had physician reviewers examine the medical records. Based on these reviews, OIG estimated the rates at which MAOs issued denials of services or payment that met Medicare coverage rules and MAO billing rules. OIG also examined the reasons for the inappropriate denials and the types of services involved.

Standards

MAOs must cover items and services included in fee-for-service Medicare, and may also elect to include additional items and services. MAOs are required to follow Medicare coverage rules that define what items and services are covered and under what circumstances. As the OIG states in the Report, MAOs “may not impose limitations – such as waiting periods or exclusions from coverage due to pre-existing conditions — that are not present in original Medicare.” In following Medicare coverage rules, MAOs are permitted to use additional denial criteria that were not developed by Medicare when they are deciding to authorize or pay for a service, provided the clinical criteria are “no more restrictive than original Medicare national and local coverage policies.” MAOs may also have their own billing and payment procedures, provided all providers are paid accurately, timely, and with an audit trial.

MAOs utilize prior authorization requests before care is furnished to manage care and payment requests from providers to approve payment for services provided. Beneficiaries and providers may appeal such decisions, and beneficiaries and providers are successful in many of the appeals (for a one-time period, as many as 75% of the appeals were granted).

Findings

Prior Authorization Denials

In the study, OIG found that 13% of prior authorization denials were for services that met Medicare coverage rules, thus delaying or denying care that likely should have been approved. MAOs made many of the denials by applying MAO clinical criteria that are not part of Medicare coverage rules. As an example, a follow-up MRI was denied for a beneficiary who had an adrenal lesion that was 1.5 cm in size, because the MAO required the beneficiary to wait one year for such lesions that are under 2 cm in size. OIG’s experts found such a requirement was not contained in Medicare coverage rules and was therefore inappropriate. Rather, the MRI was medically necessary to determine if the lesion was malignant.

OIG also found instances where MAOs requested further documentation that led to a denial of care when it was not furnished, as such additional documentation was not required to determine medical necessity. OIG’s reviewers found that either sufficient clinical information was in the medical record to authorize the care or the documentation requested was already contained in the medical record.

Payment Denials

OIG found in the study that 18% of payment denials fully met Medicare coverage rules and MAO payment policies. As a result of these denials, payment was delayed or precluded for services that should have been paid.

OIG found that common reasons for these inappropriate payment denials were human error in conducting manual reviews (for example, the reviewer not recognizing that a skilled nursing facility (SNF) was an in-network provider), and inaccurate programming.

OIG also found that advanced imaging services (including MRIs and CT scans), stays in post-acute facilities (including SNFs and inpatient rehabilitation facilities), and injections were the services that were most prominent in the inappropriate denials that should have been authorized for care and payment in accordance with Medicare coverage rules.

OIG Recommendations

Based on the study, OIG recommended that:

  • CMS should issue new guidance on both the appropriate and inappropriate use of MAO clinical criteria that are not contained in Medicare coverage rules. In particular, OIG recommended that CMS should more clearly define what it means when it states that MAO clinical criteria may not be “more restrictive” than Medicare coverage rules.

  • CMS should update its audit protocols to address issues identified in the report such as MAO use of clinical criteria and/or examine particular service types that led to more denials. OIG suggests CMS should consider enforcement actions for MAOs that demonstrate a pattern of inappropriate payment denials.

  • CMS should direct MAOs to identify and address the reasons that led to human errors.

CMS reviewed the OIG report and concurred with each of OIG’s recommendations. Those recommendations can affect future coverage decisions as well as utilization of prior authorization tools. AHIP, a national association of health care insurers, challenged the OIG’s sample size as inappropriate to support the agency’s conclusions, and defended prior authorization tools.

Takeaways

Given CMS’s concurrence with the report’s findings, we recommend that MAOs track these issues over the next several months in advance of CMS’s Final Rate Announcement for CY 2024.

MAOs should also be aware of potential False Claims Act (FCA) exposure in this area. FCA exposure can arise when a company seeks and receives payments despite being out of compliance with the basic terms for its participation. If an MAO knew it was denying claims that should be paid because they would be covered under traditional Medicare, but the MAO was still collecting full capitation, it is possible that a whistleblower or the government may pursue FCA liability. This risk warrants attention because whistleblowers can bring qui tam suits under the FCA, with resulting high costs for defense and potentially high penalties if a violation is proven (or settled to avoid further litigation). That said, an FCA suit based on this theory would raise serious questions, including whether any non-payment actually met the FCA’s “knowingly” standard (which includes reckless disregard), or whether any non-payment met the materiality threshold necessary to demonstrate a violation of the FCA.

Article By Alexis Finkelberg Bortniker, C. Frederick Geilfuss II, Matthew D. Krueger, Maureen F. Kwiecinski, and Kinal M. Patel at Foley & Lardner LLP

For more health law and managed care news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

HIPAA Enforcement Continues Under Right of Access Initiative

On March 28, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) announced the resolution of two additional cases as part of OCR’s HIPAA Right of Access Initiative.

The Right of Access Initiative was launched by OCR in 2019 “to support individuals’ right to timely access their health records at a reasonable cost under the HIPAA Privacy Rule” as explained by OCR. In the March 28 announcement, OCR indicated its continuing commitment to enforce compliance with the HIPAA Rules, including the “foundational” Right of Access provision. With the two most recent cases, there have now been 27 investigations and settlements under the Right of Access Initiative (see full chart below).

Nearly all of the investigations in the Right of Access Initiative involve a single individual unable to obtain a copy of some or all of their protected health information from a health care provider or to do so within the timeframe required or in accordance with fees permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. In some cases, additional issues found during the investigation, such as failure to have conducted a HIPAA risk assessment or lack of HIPAA policies, are part of the settlement.  In all cases, in addition to the monetary penalty, the settlement has included a Corrective Action Plan imposing various obligations, such as policy development, training, and mandatory reporting to OCR.

The Right of Access Initiative remains one of the most active areas of HIPAA enforcement. In its most recent Annual Report to Congress on HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rule Compliance, OCR noted that right of access was the third most common issue of complaints resolved. Moreover, the Right of Access Initiative coordinates with the ONC 2020-2025 Federal HIT Strategic Plan and the goal of “Providing patients and caregivers with more robust health information.” It is a core tenant of the Federal HIT Strategic Plan that access to health information will “better support person-centered care and patient empowerment.”

Article By Allen R. Killworth and Zeina Abu-Hijleh of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

HHS OIG Signs Off on Substance Use Recovery Incentive Program

On March 2, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) issued a new advisory opinion (“AO 22-04”) related to a program through which the Requestor would provide certain individuals access to digital contingency management (“CM”) and related tools to treat substance use disorders (“Program”).  The OIG advised that it would not impose administrative sanctions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) or the Beneficiary Inducements Civil Monetary Penalty Law (“CMPL”).

The Requestor, a digital health company, offers a Program that uses smartphone and smart debit card technology to implement CM for individuals with substance use disorders, addressing aspects of these disorders “in ways that conventional counseling and medications often cannot.” The Requestor makes this technology available to individuals who meet certain requirements through contracts with a variety of entities, such as health plans, addiction treatment providers, employee assistance programs, research institutions, and other treatment providers (“Customers”).

Individuals (‘Members”) are Customer- or self-referred, and are subject to a structured interview using the American Society of Addiction Medicine Continuum Triage tool before participation in the Program. The Requestor’s enrollment specialist, under the guidance of a licensed clinical supervisor, determines the type of services and frequency of recovery coaching using an evidence-based, automated algorithm. The Program technology establishes the schedule of expected target behavioral health events, objectively validates whether each expected event has occurred, and, if it has, promptly disburses the exact, protocol-specified incentive to the Member, using (where appropriate) a progressive reinforcement schedule.

The Program is not limited to treatments or federally reimbursable services; it also includes, among other features, support groups, medication reminders, and appointment attendance verification. For those that do include federally reimbursable services, the Requestor advised that such services may be furnished by a Customer. Incentives from the Program are provided to Members via a “smart debit card.” The card includes “abuse and anti-relapse protections (e.g., it cannot be used at bars, liquor stores, casinos, or certain other locations nor can it be used to convert credit to cash at ATMs or gas stations)”, and allows the Requestor to monitor use. Incentives are capped at $200/month and $599/year; individual incentives are typically relatively small, at $1-$3.

The Requestor receives fees from Customers on either a flat monthly basis, per eligible, active Member, or a pay-for-performance model, in which Requestor is paid upon a Member achieving certain agreed-upon targets for abstinence. The Requestor certified that the aggregate fees are consistent with fair market value and do not vary based on the volume or value of business generated under federal health care programs. Instead, fees are based on the service configurations being purchased and the intensity of behavioral targets that are planned for each Member, as well as whether a member is low- or high-risk, and in or out of treatment.

OIG concluded that two stream of remuneration potentially implicate the AKS and CMPL.  First, Customers pay Requestor a fee to provide services, some of which could incentivize a Member to receive a federally billable service. Second, some of the fees Customers pay to Requestor get passed on to Members as CM Incentives for achieving certain behavioral health goals, some of which may involve services that could be billable to Federal health care programs (e.g., a counseling session) by a particular provider or supplier, which could be a Customer. OIG noted its longstanding concerns relating to the offer of incentives intended to induce beneficiaries to obtain federally reimbursable items and services, as such incentives could present significant risks of fraud and abuse.

The OIG concluded that the Program presents a minimal risk of fraud and abuse and declined to impose sanctions, providing four justifications –

  1. The Requestor certified that the Program is based in research, and provided evidence that CM is a “highly effective, cost-efficient treatment for individuals with substance use disorders.” Therefore, the OIG decided that, taken together with the other safeguards present in the Arrangement, the incentives in the Requestor’s Program serve as “part of a protocol-driven, evidence-based treatment program rather than an inducement to seek, or a reward for having sought, a particular federally reimbursable treatment.”
  2. The incentives offered through the Program have a relatively low value and a cap, and largely are unrelated to any federally payable services, especially as the Requestor is not enrolled in and does not bill to federal health care programs for Program services. Therefore, the OIG determined that the risk of the incentives “encouraging overutilization of federally reimbursable services is low.”
  3. The Requestor’s Customer base is not limited to entities that have an incentive to induce receipt of federally reimbursable services. While the OIG acknowledged that there may be instances where an incentive may be given for receiving a federally billable service, the fees do not vary based on volume or value of any federally reimbursable services, and the Customers do not have control of the Program. Therefore, the OIG determined that the risk is low an entity would become a Customer to “generate business or reward referrals.”
  4. Although the incentives loaded onto a smart debit card function as cash equivalents, the OIG found the safeguards included in the Arrangement sufficient to mitigate fraud and abuse concerns. The Requestor, which does not bill federal health care programs or have an incentive to induce overutilization, determines what services an individual needs and what incentives are attached. Additionally, the smart debit card has “anti-relapse protections”, which can signal possible need for intervention. Therefore, the OIG concluded that the remuneration in the form the smart debit card is sufficiently low risk.

AO 22-04 reflects HHS’s continued aims to increase flexibility around substance use disorder treatments.  Just two weeks before, HHS announced two grant programs, totaling $25.6 million, to expand access to medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder and prevent the misuse of prescription drugs. In a press release, HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra is quoted as saying, “At HHS we are committed to addressing the overdose crisis, and one of the ways we’re doing this is by expanding access to medication-assisted treatment and other effective, evidenced-based prevention and intervention strategies.” HHS’ “National Tour to Strengthen Mental Health” is intended to “hear directly from Americans across the country about the challenges they’re facing, and engage with local leaders to strength the mental health and crisis care in our communities”, focused on three aspects: mental health, suicide, and substance use. Further flexibilities should be anticipated in these areas as the Tour continues.

Anyone seeking treatment options for substance misuse should call SAMHSA’s National Helpline at 800-662-HELP (4357) or visit findtreatment.gov. If you or anyone you know is struggling with thoughts of suicide, please call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 800-273-TALK (8255), or text the Crisis Text Line (text HELLO to 741741).

Article By Christine M. Clements and Theresa E. Thompson of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.