Understanding Post-Bankruptcy Liquidation Trusts

A main goal in bankruptcy is to get in and out as quickly as possible to minimize costs. It is often the case that even though a substantial portion of a debtor’s assets have been liquidated in bankruptcy, some valuable assets will remain that can provide additional sources of recovery to creditors. These assets may include smaller pieces of real estate, accounts receivable, joint venture ownership interests, and claims and causes of action, among others.

In a chapter 11 case, the debtor exits bankruptcy by confirming a plan and having the plan go effective. When a debtor has assets remaining but is otherwise ready to exit the bankruptcy case – for example, because it has closed a sale of a substantial portion of its assets – the plan typically provides for the formation of a liquidation trust on the plan effective date. All remaining assets are transferred to the trust for liquidation, and any proceeds are distributed to creditors, i.e., the trust beneficiaries, in accordance with the plan.

The liquidation trust is established and governed by the plan and a liquidation trust agreement. A liquidation trustee is appointed to administer the trust and is granted broad powers to, among other things, liquidate assets, investigate, prosecute, and settle causes of action, object to, resolve, and pay claims, and make distributions to trust beneficiaries.

Trust beneficiaries typically appoint members of a trust advisory or oversight committee who have consultation and approval rights over certain actions proposed to be taken by the liquidation trustee. For example, the trustee may need approval from the oversight committee to resolve claims or causes of action above a certain amount, or to liquidate certain high-value assets.

Who serves as liquidation trustee and how many representatives each trust beneficiary appoints to the oversight committee are typically negotiated in connection with the plan process. The liquidation trustee may have been a professional involved in the bankruptcy, or it may be an outsider with experience serving in such a role. The oversight committee members may be creditors themselves or may be appointed as representatives of the creditors. Trust assets are typically used to compensate the liquidation trustee for its services and reimburse it for its costs and expenses, including for its retained professionals, though oftentimes initial seed funding is also required. Trust oversight committee members may receive modest compensation, which is typically capped, but which may offer an incentive for a creditor or a creditor-appointee to serve.

The role of the trust oversight committee is an important one, as the assets transferred to the trust may provide additional valuable sources of recovery to creditors. Trust beneficiaries are often creditors from different classes under the plan, and therefore may have differing interests and be entitled to different treatment. For example, a secured creditor with a lien on a parcel of real estate may be the sole beneficiary from the sale of such real estate, and therefore has an interest in overseeing how the property is marketed and sold. Even when trust beneficiaries share a right to recover from the same assets, such as from the prosecution of causes of action, they may have differing views or interests as to the potential value of the claims, whether it makes sense to settle them, and overall strategy.

When all assets are liquidated, claims resolved, distributions made, and the estates are otherwise wound down, the trust will be dissolved. Often, this does not occur until years later.

Supreme Court Holds Life Insurance Proceeds Paid to Closely-Held Corporation to Fund Buy-Sell Agreement Increases Estate Tax on Deceased Shareholder’s Estate

In Connelly v. U.S., 144 S.Ct. 1406 (June 6, 2024), the United States Supreme Court upheld an estate tax deficiency of $889,914 in a decision that will impact many families and closely-held businesses. A Buy-Sell Agreement is often used to ensure that a closely-held company will remain within the family after the deaths of its owners or otherwise ensure the continuity of the business after an owner’s death. Many Buy-Sell Agreements, such as the one in Connelly, provide that upon the death of an owner, the surviving owner has the option to purchase the deceased owner’s interest in the company, and if the surviving owner declines, the company must redeem the deceased owner’s interest. To ensure that the company will have funds for the redemption, the company will often obtain life insurance for its owners. For years, planners thought it possible to structure such an arrangement so that life insurance proceeds would not increase the value of the company for estate tax purposes. However, in Connelly, the Court held that the life insurance proceeds paid to a corporation upon the death of a shareholder do increase the value of the corporation’s stock for estate tax purposes and that the corporation’s obligation under a Buy-Sell Agreement to redeem the deceased shareholder’s shares does not offset the life insurance proceeds. Under the Court’s decision, the type of entity does not appear to be relevant, and the holding will equally apply to partnerships and limited liability companies. Thus, if any Buy-Sell Agreement is structured as a redemption funded with entity-owned life insurance, the insurance proceeds may increase the value of the deceased business owner’s interest for estate tax purposes.

In Connelly, two brothers, Michael and Thomas Connelly, owned a business supply corporation. Michael owned 77.18% of the company, and Thomas owned 22.82% of the company. The brothers entered into a Buy-Sell Agreement as described above. The brothers ignored provisions under the agreement that required them to value the company annually and obtain an appraisal upon a shareholder’s death. After Michael’s death in 2013, Thomas and Michael’s son simply agreed to a redemption price of $3 million for Michael’s shares. The company used $3 million of life insurance proceeds to redeem Michael’s shares, and Thomas, as Michael’s executor, reported the value of Michael’s shares as $3 million on Michael’s estate tax return without completing an appraisal. Upon audit of the estate tax return, Thomas belatedly obtained an appraisal that determined the fair market value of 100% of the company at Michael’s death to be $3.86 million, excluding the life insurance proceeds. Based on the valuation of the company at $3.86 million, Thomas argued that the value of Michael’s ownership interest was $3 million ($3.86 million x 77.18%).

Connelly rejects the position of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Blount v. Comm’r., 428 F. 3d 1338 (CA11 2005), that the life insurance proceeds paid to a company are offset by the company’s contractual obligation to redeem a deceased owner’s interest. Rather than allowing an offset for the redemption obligation, the Court focused on the value of the company before and after the redemption. If the entire company was worth $3.86 million, as claimed in Connelly, the value of Michael’s 77.18% would be $3 million and the value of Thomas’ 22.82% would be $860,000. The Court reasoned that upon redemption of Michael’s shares, Michael’s estate would receive $3 million, leaving Thomas with 100% ownership of a company worth $860,000. However, Thomas’ argument meant that post-redemption, 100% of the company that Thomas owned was worth $3.86 million. The Court refused to accept that a company which pays out $3 million to redeem shares was worth the same overall amount before and after the redemption. The Court found that the company’s value should be increased from $3.86 to $6.86 million, accounting for the insurance proceeds, increasing the value of Michael’s ownership from $3 to approximately $5.3 million ($6.86 million × 77.18%). The net result was an additional estate tax of $889,914.

Although the implications of Connelly are wide, there are limitations to the Court’s decision. Connelly will have little impact on a business owner whose estate is well under the estate tax exemption, which is currently $13.61 million for each individual and scheduled to be decreased by 50% in 2026. In addition, the Court did not address the application of Section 2703 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides in relevant part that the value of a deceased owner’s interest in a business may be established by a Buy-Sell Agreement if certain requirements are met. Perhaps the Court did not review Section 2703 because the shareholders did not follow the valuation terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement and arbitrarily determined the redemption price instead. But because Section 2703 was not addressed in Connelly, it may yet be possible to avoid its impact with a properly structured and adhered to, Buy-Sell Agreement.

The Court also explicitly stated in a footnote that the holding does not mean that a redemption obligation can never decrease a corporation’s value. The Court implies that if a company is required to sell an operating asset to redeem shares, the redemption obligation might reduce the company’s value.

The Court acknowledged that a differently structured Buy-Sell Agreement can avoid the risk that insurance proceeds would increase the value of a deceased shareholder’s shares. Specifically, the Court referenced a “cross-purchase agreement” in which business owners, rather than the company, agree to purchase the others’ ownership upon death using proceeds from non-company owned policies. In addition to avoiding the Connelly result, a cross-purchase agreement provides an increased tax basis for the surviving owners who purchase a deceased owner’s interests. However, the more owners a business has, the more complicated a life insurance-funded cross-purchase will be. Other options to avoid the Connelly result may include a life insurance partnership or limited liability company or creatively structured split-dollar arrangements.

After Connelly, all business owners with Buy-Sell Agreements funded with entity-owned life insurance, or with other entity-owned insurance vehicles (split-dollar plans, key-person life insurance, etc.) should evaluate and consider restructuring their arrangements. In some cases, the restructuring of a Buy-Sell Agreement may require the transfer of life insurance policies which raises other tax issues, such as in-kind corporate distributions, S corporation elections, transfer-for-value rules, and incidents of ownership.

California Legislature Sends Governor Bill Prohibiting Employer ‘Captive Audience’ Meetings

On August 31, 2024, the California Legislature passed the California Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, Senate Bill (SB) No. 399. The bill heads to Governor Gavin Newsom, who has until September 30, 2024, to sign it. If he does so, the act will add new Labor Code Section 1137.

Quick Hits

  • California’s SB 399 would limit an employer’s ability to communicate with employees regarding political or religious matters during mandatory meetings.
  • The bill’s definition of “political matters” includes matters relating to union organizing.
  • The act provides employees with a private right of action that includes punitive damages.

If signed by the governor, SB 399 would limit an employer’s ability to communicate with employees regarding political or religious matters during mandatory meetings during working hours. Importantly, the legislation’s definition of “political matters” includes union organizing.

Prohibition against certain “captive audience meetings.” The California Senate Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement defined “captive audience meetings” as “mandatory meetings during work hours, organized by an employer where employees are paid for their time attending the meeting and are required to attend or face discipline.”

The legislation would prohibit employers from “subject[ing], or threaten[ing] to subject, an employee to discharge, discrimination, retaliation, or any other adverse action because the employee declines to attend an employer-sponsored meeting or affirmatively declines to participate in, receive, or listen to any communications with the employer or its agents or representatives, the purpose of which is to communicate the employer’s opinion about religious or political matters.” The act requires that employers pay any employee who works during the meeting but declines to attend it.

“Political matters” includes union-related issues. SB 399’s legislative history and text make clear that the legislature intended to prohibit employers from forcing employees to listen to employer communications during union organizing campaigns. The bill defines “political matters” to include “the decision to join or support any political party or political or labor organization.” (Emphasis added.)

Exemptions. SB 399 identifies entities and/or activities to which it would not apply. The legislation specifically excludes religious institutions or groups that are exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or California prohibitions against employment discrimination. It also would not apply to educational institutions that require students or instructors to attend lectures that include religious and/or political matters as part of coursework.

Additionally, employees would not be permitted to use SB 399 to escape from harassment or inclusiveness training. SB 399 expressly does not apply to “[a]n employer requiring employees to undergo training to comply with the employer’s legal obligations, including obligations under civil rights laws and occupational safety and health laws.” (Emphasis added.)

Agency enforcement. If enacted, SB 399 would authorize the California Labor Commissioner to enforce the law through its already-established citation process.

Penalty. An employer that violates the act would be subject to a $500 penalty per employee per violation.

Civil enforcement. Affected employees would be permitted to bring a civil action in lieu of administrative enforcement. The act would expressly authorize punitive damages.

If the governor signs SB 399, California would join a growing list of states attempting to ban “captive audience” meetings about religious and/or political matters. Other states with similar laws include Connecticut, Illinois (effective January 1, 2025), Maine, MinnesotaNew York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.

Even if Governor Newsom signs the bill into law, employer groups likely will seek to enjoin the act on the basis that it infringes on employers’ First Amendment right to express their viewpoints about unionization.

Plaintiff’s Attorney Spencer Sheehan Sanctioned

    • Spencer Sheehan is a Plaintiff’s attorney who has filed hundreds of class action lawsuits against food companies for allegedly deceptive labeling and marketing. A small percentage of these lawsuits survive the motion to dismiss stage, let alone succeed on the merits. Indeed, many of his losses are suffered many times over as he has a practice of refiling essentially identical lawsuits in different jurisdictions, even after unfavorable rulings.
    • His practices have increasingly drawn the ire of the courts, and this summer a United States District Court in Florida issued an order sanctioning him and making him responsible for attorney’s fees in the case.
    • Specifically, the Court applied Florida fee shifting statutes, one mandatory and one discretionary, to hold Plaintiff and Sheehan responsible for the legal fees. However, the Court went further and sanctioned Sheehan for bad faith conduct. The Court noted Sheehan’s practice of re-filing failed lawsuits in other jurisdictions after “collect[ing] consumer plaintiffs through social media advertising.” Particularly troublesome to the Court was the contention that Sheehan was not an attorney of record for the Plaintiff even when his name appeared on the pleadings. The Court found that this was part of a broader practice of flagrantly violating court rules and that Sheehan had not been admitted pro hac vice to any of the twelve cases in which he is involved that are currently pending in the same district.
    • Briefing in case continues as the Court decides on the final monetary award and whether or not to hold the local Florida counsel jointly responsible.

As the Season Changes, Don’t Fall Behind: 4 Key Employment Law Trends

As the seasons change, so do manufacturers’ priorities. Fall is typically one of the busiest hiring periods of the calendar year, so many manufacturers are likely bracing themselves for this challenge. That said, there were several significant labor and employment updates this spring and summer of which manufacturers should be aware; below are four key trends that may require action to ensure compliance.

1. Worker Classification – Independent Contractor Versus Employees

Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final rule regarding employee and independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rule, which took effect March 11, 2024, adheres to a “totality of the circumstances” approach and involves consideration of six factors. Manufacturers who rely on independent contractors to perform work and provide services should consider reviewing those relationships to ensure they are adequately characterized as independent contractors rather than employees.

2. Salary Threshold for Exempt Employees Increasing

This past spring, the U.S. DOL issued a final rule that included raising in the federal minimum salary threshold for exempt employees. Previously, the salary threshold for executive, administrative, and professional employees was $684 per week (or $35,568 per year). Effective July 1, 2024, however, the salary threshold became $844 per week ($43,888 per year), and on January 1, 2025, it will once again rise to $1,128 per week ($58,656 per year). The final rule also states that the threshold will increase on July 1, 2027, and every three years thereafter. Manufacturers should review these thresholds, as well as any state or local thresholds that may exist to ensure compliance and prepare for the January 1, 2025, increase.

3. Pay Transparency Laws

Pay transparency laws, including those requiring employers to provide the pay range to applicants, candidates, and employees or to include it in job postings, continue to be passed in states nationwide. On July 31, 2024, Massachusetts passed a law requiring employers to include a “pay range” in all job postings, including those posted by third parties, such as recruiters. Massachusetts joins several other states, including Washington, DC, which passed a similar law that recently took effect on June 30, 2024; Maryland, which passed a law taking effect on October 1, 2024; laws in Minnesota and Illinois that both take effect on January 1, 2025; and a Vermont law will take effect on July 1, 2025. Notably, the Massachusetts law also contains pay data reporting requirements for employers that are subjected to annual federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) report requirements, which includes many manufacturers. Specifically, covered manufacturers must submit an annual report of pay data categorized by race, ethnicity, sex, and job category to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, with the first report due no later than February 1, 2025. Manufacturers might consider reviewing the pay transparency and pay data reporting laws in the states in where they employ employees or engage in recruiting.

4. Paid Sick Leave Laws

While paid sick leave has been trending for a number of years, there have been significant developments in recent months. In Connecticut, the sick leave law was recently expanded significantly, and now nearly all private employees are entitled to such leave. New York has also recently become the first state in the nation to enact paid prenatal leave benefits for pregnant workers. Specifically, effective January 1, 2025, pregnant workers will be entitled to up to 20 hours of paid leave in a 52-week period to attend prenatal medical appointments and procedures. This leave is not accrued; rather, it must be immediately available to employees, and it is in addition to the paid sick and safe leave to which employees are already entitled. Manufacturers who are multi-state employers should consider engaging in a comprehensive review of their PTO and sick leave policies to ensure compliance with these recent advancements.

SEC Enforcement Takes Broad View of Anti-Whistleblower Rule in Latest Action Targeting Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealer

On 4 September 2024, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it settled charges against affiliated investment-advisers and a broker-dealer over the use of restrictive language in confidentiality agreements, in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The firms agreed to pay a combined $240,000 in civil penalties to settle the charges. The enforcement action is the latest in the SEC’s ongoing focus on confidentiality provisions in release agreements; an emphasis that has increasingly focused on investment advisers and broker-dealers.

Rule 21F-17(a) prohibits companies from impeding an individual’s ability to communicate with the SEC regarding possible violations of the US securities laws. The SEC has read the Rule broadly and objected to what it views as restrictive language in the confidentiality provisions of a variety of agreements. In January 2024, for example, the SEC announced a $18 million civil penalty against a dual registered investment adviser and broker-dealer based on a confidentiality provision in release agreements with retail clients that the SEC interpreted as not permitting affirmative reporting.

The agreements at issue in today’s settlement similarly included language the SEC viewed as limiting an individuals’ ability to report. The SEC viewed these agreements as permitting a response to a Commission inquiry only if the “inquiry [was] not resulting from or attributable to any actions taken by [client].” The SEC also took issue with language that it viewed as requiring clients to certify both they had not made previous reports and that they would refrain from future reporting.

The Order makes clear that the SEC is aggressively enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), interpreting carveouts in confidentiality provisions narrowly and focusing instead on a client’s “reasonable impression” after reviewing the agreement. Firms should take a second look at the confidentiality provisions in their agreements, using the SEC’s strict standard, to ensure that they measure up.

EPA Delays TSCA PFAS Reporting Deadlines

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) just issued a direct final rule amending reporting deadlines for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).

As described in our prior client alert, EPA finalized a rule last fall that requires entities that manufacture (including import) or have manufactured PFAS in any year since January 1, 2011 to submit a one-time comprehensive report regarding PFAS uses, production volumes, byproducts, disposal, exposures, and environmental or health effects.

Since EPA is still developing its reporting application to collect this data, and it will not be fully functional by November 2024, EPA has bumped back the start of the data submission period from November 12, 2024 to July 11, 2025.

The data submission period now ends on January 11, 2026, except for article importers that are also considered small manufacturers. Their submission period will end on July 11, 2026.

EPA is not proposing any changes to the scope of reporting under TSCA.

Don’t Let the Power Go Sour – Pitfalls of Powers of Appointment

Powers of appointment are among the most versatile tools in estate planning. They are often underutilized due to a lack of understanding of their benefits and limitations. At their core, a power of appointment allows an individual, designated by a legal instrument (the “donee” or receiver of the power of appointment), to determine who will receive certain property or interests in the future. The donor, who creates this power, retains flexibility in managing and distributing their estate.

However, caution is necessary when structuring powers of appointment, particularly in the context of the marital deduction. Improperly crafted powers can inadvertently invalidate the marital deduction, leading to significant estate tax consequences. For instance, if a power of appointment does not allow the donee (often the surviving spouse) to appoint property to themselves or their estate, the property may fail to qualify for the marital deduction. This is typically the case with a special (or limited) power of appointment. In contrast, a properly structured general power of appointment can ensure that the property qualifies for the marital deduction, deferring estate taxes until the surviving spouse’s death

Clarification – Donor and Donee Examples

A wealthy individual, the donor of the power of appointment, sets up a trust for their children. The trust includes a special power of appointment allowing the spouse (the donee) to distribute the trust’s assets among their children or grandchildren after the donor’s death. The spouse can decide which child receives what portion of the assets, giving flexibility to address changing family dynamics. This type of power is often chosen to retain control within the family while protecting the assets from the spouse’s creditors and excluding the assets from the spouse’s taxable estate.

A woman (the donor) creates a will that gives her husband (the donee) a general power of appointment over certain assets. This power allows the husband to decide who will inherit those assets upon his death, including the ability to appoint them to himself, his estate, or creditors. This flexibility can be particularly useful in managing taxes and ensuring the estate is distributed according to the most current family needs. However, because the assets are included in the husband’s estate for tax purposes, this power may also increase the taxable estate, potentially leading to higher estate taxes.

Types of Powers of Appointment

Powers of appointment are classified into several categories:

  1. Imperative vs. Non-Imperative Powers: Imperative powers must be exercised by the donee, while non-imperative powers are optional.
  2. Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Powers: Exclusive powers allow the donee to exclude certain eligible appointees, while non-exclusive powers require the donee to allocate some property to each appointee.
  3. General vs. Nongeneral (Special) Powers: General powers allow the donee to appoint property to themselves, their estate, or their creditors. In contrast, nongeneral powers restrict the donee from appointing property to these entities.
  4. Presently Exercisable vs. Postponed Powers: Presently exercisable powers can be used immediately, while postponed powers can only be exercised at a future date, often upon the donee’s death.

When to use General vs. Limited Powers of Appointment

General Power of Appointment: Best used in Marital Trusts (QTIP) or Revocable Trusts when flexibility, step-up in basis, and marital deduction eligibility are the primary goals, even though the assets will be included in the donee’s taxable estate.

Limited (Special) Power of Appointment: Best used in Irrevocable Trusts, Dynasty Trusts, Bypass Trusts, and Generation-Skipping Trusts where asset protection, tax minimization, control over distribution, and maintaining favorable tax treatment are the main objectives.

Estate Planning Goal/Consideration General Power of Appointment Limited (Special) Power of Appointment
Asset Protection Not recommended. Assets are exposed to the donee’s creditors. Recommended. Assets are protected from the donee’s creditors.
Typical Trusts  Rarely used in asset protection trusts.  Common in Irrevocable TrustsDynasty Trusts, and Spendthrift Trusts.
Inclusion in Donee’s Taxable Estate Recommended when a step-up in basis is desired. Not recommended. Assets are generally excluded from the donee’s taxable estate.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (QTIP) for step-up in basis. Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts (ILITs)Generation-Skipping Trusts.
Eligibility for Marital Deduction Recommended. Ensures property qualifies for the marital deduction, deferring estate taxes. Not recommended. May disqualify property from the marital deduction.
Typical Trusts QTIP TrustsMarital Trusts.  Not typically used in marital deduction trusts.
Control over Ultimate Distribution Provides flexibility but less control over final asset distribution. Recommended. Allows the donor to set clear boundaries on asset distribution.
Typical Trusts Marital TrustsFamily Trusts. Family TrustsBypass TrustsGeneration-Skipping Trusts.
Minimizing Estate Taxes for Donee Not recommended. Assets are included in the donee’s taxable estate. Recommended. Helps reduce the size of the donee’s taxable estate.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (when step-up is more beneficial). Bypass TrustsGeneration-Skipping Trusts.
Avoiding Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (GSTT) Not recommended. May trigger GSTT if assets are transferred to skip generations. Recommended. Allows for strategic distribution to avoid GSTT.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (with no intent to skip generations). Generation-Skipping TrustsDynasty Trusts.
Flexibility for Changing Family Needs Recommended if flexibility to appoint to any individual or entity is desired. Provides some flexibility within the confines set by the donor.
Typical Trusts Revocable TrustsMarital Trusts. Irrevocable TrustsFamily Trusts.
Retaining Favorable Tax Treatment in Trusts Not recommended. Could disrupt the trust’s tax status. Recommended. Helps maintain the trust’s favorable tax status, particularly for pre-existing trusts.
Typical Trusts  Rarely used in older trusts with favorable status. Grandfathered TrustsIrrevocable Trusts.
When to Use in Marital Trusts (QTIP) Recommended if the intent is to qualify for the marital deduction. Not recommended for QTIP trusts as it may disqualify the trust.
Typical Trusts QTIP TrustsMarital Trusts. Bypass TrustsFamily Trusts (outside of QTIP).

Table 1. General Overview of the suse of General and Limited(Special) Powers of Appointment in differnt estate plang contexts.

Exercising Powers of Appointment

The exercise of powers of appointment involves several considerations:

  • Class of Appointees: The group eligible to receive the property, which can range from specific individuals to broad categories like “descendants.”
  • Manner and Methods of Exercise: Powers can be exercised through various methods, including specific or blanket clauses. The intention to exercise must be clear and comply with any conditions set by the donor.
  • Capacity to Exercise: The donee must have the legal capacity to exercise the power, similar to the capacity required for property disposition.

Tax Implications

The tax consequences of powers of appointment are significant and complex. Please refer also to Table 1.

  1. Estate and Gift Tax: A general power of appointment can result in the inclusion of property in the donee’s estate, subjecting it to estate tax. The exercise or release of a general power is treated as a gift for tax purposes.
  2. Generation-Skipping Transfer (GST) Tax: Exercising a power of appointment can trigger GST tax if it involves skipping generations, though careful planning can mitigate this.
  3. Income Tax: Under Section 678 of the Internal Revenue Code, the exercise of a general power can result in the donee being treated as the owner of the trust for income tax purposes.

Planning Opportunities

Powers of appointment offer various strategic benefits in estate planning:

  • Flexibility: They allow the donee to adapt the distribution of property based on changing circumstances, providing tailored solutions for beneficiaries.
  • Extending Trust Terms: Powers can be used to extend the duration of a trust, potentially postponing tax consequences and providing long-term asset protection.
  • Generation Jumping: Powers can be used to skip generations, reducing the impact of GST tax by directly benefiting more remote descendants.

Selected Case Law and IRS Private Letter Rulings

The following cases and Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) illustrate the application and interpretation of powers of appointment, particularly general powers of appointment, in the context of federal estate tax law. Specifically, the cases address the tax implications of these powers concerning the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code and whether certain powers of appointment qualify as general powers under Section 2041. Additionally, the cases and rulings explore the implications of trust reformation, particularly how state court modifications of trust instruments may or may not be recognized for federal tax purposes and how these reforms affect the classification and taxability of powers of appointment.

Estate of Kraus v. C.I.R, 875 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1989)

Issue

The primary issue in Estate of Kraus v. Commissioner is whether the reformation of a trust by a lower Illinois state court, which corrected a scrivener’s error that omitted a general power of appointment necessary for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code, should be recognized by the federal Tax Court for estate tax purposes.

Rule

Federal courts, including the Tax Court, are not bound by decisions of lower state courts when interpreting state law for federal tax purposes. According to the precedent established in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, only a state’s highest court can issue rulings on state law that are binding on federal courts. Federal courts are required to give “proper regard” to lower state court rulings but are not obligated to follow them if they conflict with federal tax law principles.

Application

In this case, Arthur S. Kraus amended his insurance trust in 1977, inadvertently converting a general power of appointment into a special power due to a scrivener’s error. This error prevented the estate from qualifying for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code. After Kraus’s death, the estate sought reformation of the trust in an Illinois state court, which granted the reformation, restoring the general power of appointment.

The estate argued that the reformed trust should be recognized by the Tax Court to allow the marital deduction. However, the Tax Court ruled that the state court’s reformation was not binding for federal tax purposes and determined that the trust, as amended in 1977, did not qualify for the marital deduction. The Tax Court found that the estate had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the omission of the general power of appointment was a mistake warranting reformation under Illinois law.

Furthermore, the Tax Court noted that the decedent, Arthur S. Kraus, was aware of the language necessary to include a general power of appointment, and the amended trust explicitly created a special power instead. This finding was based on the court’s review of stipulated facts, the testimony of attorney Rotman (who drafted the trust amendment), and the original and amended trust documents.

The estate later discovered new evidence that corroborated the claim of a scrivener’s error. The Tax Court initially denied the estate’s motion for reconsideration based on this newly discovered evidence. However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the newly discovered evidence was material and likely to change the outcome of the case. The appellate court ruled that the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to uphold the deficiency assessment, agreeing that the original reformation by the state court was not binding for federal tax purposes. However, the appellate court reversed the Tax Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration, holding that the newly discovered evidence should be admitted and that the case should be reconsidered in light of this evidence. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings.

This case illustrates the principle that federal tax courts are not bound by lower state court decisions regarding the reformation of legal instruments when determining federal tax liabilities. It emphasizes the importance of a state’s highest court in issuing binding interpretations of state law for federal purposes.

LTR 9303022 IRS Private Letter Ruling

Issue:

In this case, the issue is whether the reformation of a will by a state court, which retroactively removes a general power of appointment granted to certain beneficiaries, should be treated as a release of that power under Sections 2041 and 2514 of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby subjecting the property to estate and gift taxes.

Rule:

According to Sections 2041(a)(2) and 2514(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, the exercise or release of a general power of appointment is considered a transfer of property and may result in the inclusion of that property in the gross estate of the individual holding the power. See, however, above. Per Estate of Bosch v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is not bound by decisions of lower state courts unless those decisions are consistent with the rulings of the state’s highest court.

Application:

In this case, the Husband and Wife created testamentary trusts that inadvertently granted their Son and Daughter 1 general powers of appointment over their respective trusts, allowing them to invade the trust principal for purposes not limited by an ascertainable standard. This mistake occurred due to an oversight by the law firm drafting the wills, as it failed to include a provision that would restrict the exercise of discretionary powers by beneficiaries who are also trustees.

After the Wife’s death, the Husband petitioned the probate court to reform the trusts to retroactively limit the exercise of the discretionary powers to an independent trustee, thereby preventing the Son and Daughter 1 from holding general powers of appointment. The probate court issued a conditional order to this effect.

The IRS examined whether this reformation constituted a “release” of a general power of appointment, which would trigger estate and gift tax consequences under Sections 2041 and 2514. The IRS concluded that the reformation did not constitute a release because the intent of the Husband and Wife was clearly to prevent their children from holding such powers. The IRS reasoned that, in a bona fide adversarial proceeding, the highest state court would likely deny the Son and Daughter 1 the general powers of appointment before they could become exercisable.

Therefore, the reformation by the lower court would not be considered a release of a general power of appointment under Section 2514, and the trust property would not be included in the taxable estates of the Son or Daughter 1 under Section 2041. Additionally, the reformation did not alter the trust’s status as irrevocable before September 25, 1985, for the generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.

Conclusion:

The IRS ruled that the reformation of the will to limit the discretionary powers of the Son and Daughter 1 did not constitute a release of a general power of appointment. Consequently, the reformation would not cause the inclusion of the trust property in the taxable estates of the Son or Daughter 1, nor would it impact the treatment of the trusts for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. This ruling was based on the specific facts and applicable law at the time of the request and would not be retroactively applied if there were material fact or law changes.

LTR 9516051 IRS Private Letter Ruling

Issue:

Does the power held by the trustee of a testamentary trust, which allows the trustee to distribute principal to herself as a beneficiary, constitute a general power of appointment under Section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code?

Rule:

Under Section 2041(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, the value of any property over which the decedent has a general power of appointment is included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. A general power of appointment is defined under Section 2041(b)(1) as a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, the decedent’s estate, creditors, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate. However, if the power is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent, it is not considered a general power of appointment.

Application:

In this case, the decedent was the trustee of a trust created by her deceased spouse’s will, with the power to distribute principal to herself as the beneficiary if, in her sole discretion, it was deemed “requisite or desirable.” This power would generally constitute a general power of appointment under Section 2041, as it allows the trustee to distribute principal to herself without restriction.

However, North Carolina General Statute 32-34(b) imposes limitations on a fiduciary’s power to exercise such discretion. Specifically, the statute prohibits a trustee from exercising a power in favor of themselves, their estate, their creditors, or the creditors of their estate unless the trust document explicitly overrides this limitation. Since the trust document in this case did not override the statute, the decedent, as trustee, did not have a general power of appointment under North Carolina law.

The IRS recognizes that state law governs the creation of legal rights and interests in property, including the scope of powers of appointment. Consequently, under North Carolina law and similar IRS precedents (Rev. Rul. 76-502 and Rev. Proc. 94-44), the decedent’s power as trustee did not qualify as a general power of appointment for federal estate tax purposes.

Conclusion:

The power held by the decedent as trustee of her spouse’s testamentary trust does not constitute a general power of appointment for purposes of Section 2041. Therefore, the value of the trust property is not included in the decedent’s gross estate for estate tax purposes under Section 2041.

Leahy Guiney v. United States of America 425 F.2d 145

Issue:

Does the language in Item Second of Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will grant his widow a “general power of appointment” sufficient to qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code?

Rule:

Under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, a marital deduction is allowed if the surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest in the property and has a general power of appointment over the property. A general power of appointment is defined under Section 2041(b)(1) as a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, the decedent’s estate, creditors, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate. The interpretation of whether a power qualifies as a general power of appointment is determined according to the applicable state law.

Application:

In this case, Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will included language that explicitly stated his intention to grant his widow a “general power of appointment” over the trust assets to ensure that one-half of his estate qualified for the marital deduction. The key issue was whether this language effectively granted the widow the power to appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate, as required by Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code.

The IRS Commissioner initially denied the marital deduction, arguing that under Maryland law, the language used in the will did not grant the widow a general power of appointment that would allow her to appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate. The District Court upheld the Commissioner’s decision, relying on prior Maryland case law that had narrowly construed similar language as not granting a general power of appointment.

However, upon appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered more recent developments in Maryland law, particularly the decision in Frank v. Frank and the prior decision in Leser v. Burnet by the same court. The appellate court recognized that Maryland courts had evolved to a more modern interpretation that allowed for a general power of appointment when the testator’s intent to grant such power was clear. The court found that the language in Mr. Leahy’s will, which explicitly referred to the “general power of appointment” and the marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code, was more precise and explicit than the language in previous cases where the power had been found lacking.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the language used in Mr. Leahy’s will was sufficient to grant his widow a general power of appointment that met the requirements of Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby qualifying the estate for the marital deduction.

Conclusion:

The language in Item Second of Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will effectively granted his widow a general power of appointment over the trust principal, sufficient to meet the requirements for the marital deduction under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the taxpayer.

Special Issues for Fiduciaries and Creditors

Fiduciaries and creditors have specific considerations when dealing with powers of appointment:

  • Creditor Rights: Generally, property subject to a nongeneral power is protected from the donee’s creditors. However, property under a general power may be vulnerable, depending on the circumstances.
  • Fiduciary Responsibilities: Fiduciaries must carefully manage and exercise powers of appointment, balancing the donor’s intentions with the donee’s interests and tax implications.

Powers of Appointment and Decanting

Decanting, the process of transferring assets from one trust to another, can be facilitated through powers of appointment. This allows for the modification of trust terms, potentially reducing tax burdens and enhancing the trust’s effectiveness.

Conclusion

Powers of appointment are powerful and flexible tools in estate planning, offering both opportunities and potential pitfalls. When structured properly, they can achieve various planning goals, such as securing the marital deduction, ensuring flexibility in asset distribution, and protecting assets from creditors. However, the complexity surrounding the different types of powers—general versus limited—requires careful consideration and precise drafting to avoid unintended tax consequences. The discussed cases and rulings highlight the critical importance of understanding how powers of appointment are treated under both federal tax law and state law, particularly in the context of trust reformation. As illustrated, the reformation of trusts by state courts may not always be recognized for federal tax purposes, emphasizing the need for estate planners to carefully navigate these issues to ensure that the donor’s intentions are fulfilled and tax benefits are preserved. In summary, while powers of appointment are versatile tools, their effective use in estate planning necessitates a thorough understanding of their implications, meticulous drafting, and, where necessary, appropriate legal reformations.

Further Reading

Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Kim Kamin & Jeffrey M. Bergman, Estate Planning’s Most Powerful Tool: Powers of Appointment Refreshed, Redefined, and Reexaminedhttps://perma.cc/AQ6W-PH72.

Legal and Privacy Considerations When Using Internet Tools for Targeted Marketing

Businesses often rely on targeted marketing methods to reach their relevant audiences. Instead of paying for, say, a television commercial to be viewed by people across all segments of society with varied purchasing interests and budgets, a business can use tools provided by social media platforms and other internet services to target those people most likely to be interested in its ads. These tools may make targeted advertising easy, but businesses must be careful when using them – along with their ease of use comes a risk of running afoul of legal rules and regulations.

Two ways that businesses target audiences are working with influencers who have large followings in relevant segments of the public (which may implicate false or misleading advertising issues) and using third-party “cookies” to track users’ browsing history (which may implicate privacy and data protection issues). Most popular social media platforms offer tools to facilitate the use of these targeting methods. These tools are likely indispensable for some businesses, and despite their risks, they can be deployed safely once the risks are understood.

Some Platform-Provided Targeted Marketing Tools May Implicate Privacy Issues
Google recently announced1 that it will not be deprecating third-party cookies, a reversal from its previous plan to phase out these cookies. “Cookies” are small pieces of code that track users’ activity online. “First-party” cookies often are necessary for the website to function properly. “Third-party” cookies are shared across websites and companies, essentially tracking users’ browsing behaviors to help advertisers target their relevant audiences.

In early 2020, Google announced2 that it would phase out third-party cookies, which are associated with privacy concerns because they track individual web-browsing activity and then share that data with other parties. Google’s 2020 announcement was a response to these concerns.

Fast forward about four and a half years, and Google reversed course. During that time, Google had introduced alternatives to third-party cookies, and companies had developed their own, often extensive, proprietary databases3 of information about their customers. However, none of these methods satisfied the advertising industry. Google then made the decision to keep third-party cookies. To address privacy concerns, Google said it would “introduce a new experience in Chrome that lets people make an informed choice that applies across their web browsing, and they’d be able to adjust that choice at any time.”4

Many large platforms in addition to Google offer targeted advertising services via the use of third-party cookies. Can businesses use these services without any legal ramifications? Does the possibility for consumers to opt out mean that a user cannot be liable for privacy concerns if it relies on third-party cookies? The relevant cases have held that individual businesses still must be careful despite any opt-out and other built-in tools offered by these platforms.

Two recent cases from the Southern District of New York5 held that individual businesses that used “Meta Pixels” to track consumers may be liable for violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). 19 U.S.C. § 2710. Facebook defines a Meta Pixel6 as a “piece of code … that allows you to … make sure your ads are shown to the right people … drive more sales, [and] measure the results of your ads.” In other words, a Meta Pixel is essentially a cookie provided by Meta/Facebook that helps businesses target ads to relevant audiences.

As demonstrated by those two recent cases, businesses cannot rely on a platform’s program to ensure their ad targeting efforts do not violate the law. These violations may expose companies to enormous damages – VPPA cases often are brought as class actions and even a single violation may carry damages in excess of $2,500.

In those New York cases, the consumers had not consented to sharing information, but, even if they had, the consent may not suffice. Internet contracts, often included in a website’s Terms of Service, are notoriously difficult to enforce. For example, in one of those S.D.N.Y. cases, the court found that the arbitration clause to which subscribers had agreed was not effective to force arbitration in lieu of litigation for this matter. In addition, the type of consent and the information that websites need to provide before sharing information can be extensive and complicated, as recently reportedby my colleagues.

Another issue that companies may encounter when relying on widespread cookie offerings is whether the mode (as opposed to the content) of data transfer complies with all relevant privacy laws. For example, the Swedish Data Protection Agency recently found8 that a company had violated the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) because the method of transfer of data was not compliant. In that case, some of the consumers had consented, but some were never asked for consent.

Some Platform-Provided Targeted Marketing Tools May Implicate False or Misleading Advertising Issues
Another method that businesses use to target their advertising to relevant consumers is to hire social media influencers to endorse their products. These partnerships between brands and influencers can be beneficial to both parties and to the audiences who are guided toward the products they want. These partnerships are also subject to pitfalls, including reputational pitfalls (a controversial statement by the influencer may negatively impact the reputation of the brand) and legal pitfalls.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued guidelinesConcerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials” in advertising, and published a brochure for influencers, “Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers,”10 that tells influencers how they must apply the guidelines to avoid liability for false or misleading advertising when they endorse products. A key requirement is that influencers must “make it obvious” when they have a “material connection” with the brand. In other words, the influencer must disclose that it is being paid (or gains other, non-monetary benefits) to make the endorsement.

Many social media platforms make it easy to disclose a material connection between a brand and an influencer – a built-in function allows influencers to simply click a check mark to disclose the existence of a material connection with respect to a particular video endorsement. The platform then displays a hashtag or other notification along with the video that says “#sponsored” or something similar. However, influencers cannot rely on these built-in notifications. The FTC brochure clearly states: “Don’t assume that a platform’s disclosure tool is good enough, but consider using it in addition to your own, good disclosure.”

Brands that sponsor influencer endorsements may easily find themselves on the hook if the influencer does not properly disclose that the influencer and the brand are materially connected. In some cases, the contract between the brand and influencer may pass any risk to the brand. In others, the influencer may be judgement proof, or the brand is an easier target for enforcement. And, unsurprisingly, the FTC has sent warning letters11 threatening high penalties to brands for influencer violations.

The Platform-Provided Tools May Be Deployed Safely
Despite risks involved in some platform-provided tools for targeted marketing, these tools are very useful, and businesses should continue to take advantage of them. However, businesses cannot rely on these widely available and easy-to-use tools but must ensure that their own policies and compliance programs protect them from liability.

The same warning about widely available social media tools and lessons for a business to protect itself are also true about other activities online, such as using platforms’ built-in “reposting” function (which may implicate intellectual property infringement issues) and using out-of-the-box website builders (which may implicate issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act). A good first step for a business to ensure legal compliance online is to understand the risks. An attorney experienced in internet law, privacy law and social media law can help.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 https://privacysandbox.com/news/privacy-sandbox-update/

https://blog.chromium.org/2020/01/building-more-private-web-path-towards.html

3 Businesses should ensure that they protect these databases as trade secrets. See my recent Insights at https://www.wilsonelser.com/sarah-fink/publications/relying-on-noncompete-clauses-may-not-be-the-best-defense-of-proprietary-data-when-employees-depart and https://www.wilsonelser.com/sarah-fink/publications/a-practical-approach-to-preserving-proprietary-competitive-data-before-and-after-a-hack

4 https://privacysandbox.com/news/privacy-sandbox-update/

5 Aldana v. GamesStop, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29496 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2024); Collins v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36214 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2024)

6 https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142

7 https://www.wilsonelser.com/jana-s-farmer/publications/new-york-state-attorney-general-issues-guidance-on-privacy-controls-and-web-tracking-technologies

See, e.g., https://www.dataguidance.com/news/sweden-imy-fines-avanza-bank-sek-15m-unlawful-transfer

9 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-16/chapter-I/subchapter-B/part-255

10 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pd

11 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/warning-letter-american-bev.pdf
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/warning-letter-canadian-sugar.pdf

Arguing Internet Availability to Establish Copyright Infringement Is Bananas

In an unpublished opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision finding that a pro se Californian artist failed to establish that an Italian artist had reasonable opportunity to access the copyrighted work simply because it was available to view on the internet. Morford v. Cattelan, Case No. 23-12263 (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (Jordan, Pryor, Branch, JJ.) (per curiam).A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement may show factual copying by either direct or indirect evidence showing “that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities between the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work.” To do so, however, the copyright owner must establish a nexus between the work and the defendant’s alleged infringement. Mere access to a work disseminated in places or settings where the defendant may have come across it is not sufficient.

Joe Morford’s Banana and Orange and Maurizio Cattelan’s Comedian both “involve the application of duct tape to a banana against a flat surface” (see images below from the court decision’s appendix). Cattelan’s Comedian went viral and sold for more than $100,000 at Miami’s Art Basel. Morford claimed that Comedian was a copy. The district court found that Morford failed to show that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange and thus could not establish a copyright claim. Morford appealed.

Orange and Banana, Comedian

On appeal, Morford argued that because he could show striking similarity between Banana and Orange and Comedian, he was not required to proffer evidence of access to show copyright infringement. In the alternative, he argued that he could show substantial similarity and that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange as it was widely disseminated and readily discoverable online.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that in circuits adopting a widespread dissemination standard, that standard requires showing that the work enjoyed “considerable success or publicity.” Morford showed that Banana and Orange was available on his public Facebook page for almost 10 years and featured on his YouTube channel and in a blog post, with views in more than 25 countries. But Banana and Orange’s availability on the internet, without more, was “too speculative to find a nexus” between Cattelan and Morford to satisfy the factual copying prong of a copyright infringement claim, according to the Court.

The Eleventh Circuit also found that Morford failed to meet the high burden of demonstrating that the original work and accused infringement were so strikingly similar as to establish copying. Such similarity exists if the similarity in appearance between the two works “is so great that [it] precludes the possibility of coincidence, independent creation or common source,” but identical expression does not necessarily constitute infringement. In this analysis, a court addresses the “uniqueness or complexity of the protected work as it bears on the likelihood of copying.” Morford argued that he established striking similarity based on the “same two incongruous items being chosen, grouped, and presented in the same manner within both works.” Although the two incongruous items in both works were similar (i.e., a banana and duct tape), the Court decided that there were sufficient differences between Banana and Orange and Comedian to preclude a finding of striking similarity. Banana and Orange had both a banana and an orange held by duct tape, while Comedian only contained a banana.