Trouble In Paradise: Florida Court Rules That Selling Bitcoin Is Money Transmission

The growing popularity of virtual currency over the last several years has raised a host of legislative and regulatory issues. A key question is whether and how a state’s money transmitter law applies to activities involving virtual currency. Many states have answered this – albeit in a non-uniform way – through legislation or regulation, including regulatory guidance documents. For instance, Georgia and Wyoming have amended their money transmitter statutes to include or exclude virtual currencies explicitly. In other states, such as Texas and Tennessee, the state’s primary financial regulator has issued formal guidance. In New York, the Department of Financial Services issued an entirely separate regulation for virtual currencies. Still, in others, neither the legislature nor the relevant regulator has provided any insight into how the state’s money transmitter law may apply.

In most states, the judicial branch has not yet weighed in on the question. But Florida is an exception. On January 30, 2019, in State v. Espinoza, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal interpreted the state’s money transmission law broadly and held that selling bitcoin directly to another person is covered under the law. [1] The decision will have broad implications for the virtual currency industry in Florida.

BACKGROUND: MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT AND MICHELL ESPINOZA

In December 2013, the Miami Beach Police Department (“MBPD”) perused an Internet website that provided a directory of buyers and sellers of bitcoin. In an undercover capacity, an MBPD agent contacted one of the users, Michell Espinoza. Shortly thereafter, the agent arranged to meet and purchase bitcoin from Espinoza in exchange for cash. The MBPD agent who purchased the bitcoin implied that he would use the bitcoin to fund illicit activities. One month later, the MBPD made a second purchase from Espinoza, telling him that the bitcoin would be used to purchase stolen credit card numbers. After a third and fourth transaction, the MBPD arrested Espinoza. The State of Florida charged him with two counts of money laundering and one count of engaging in the business of a money transmitter without a license. Espinoza moved to dismiss the charges, arguing, among other things, that Florida’s money transmitter law does not apply to bitcoin. The trial court agreed and dismissed all counts against Espinoza.

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION: SELLING BITCOIN CONSTITUTES MONEY TRANSMISSION

Florida appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling. The court started its analysis noting that the state’s money transmitter law requires anyone engaging in a “money services business” to be licensed. [2] A “money services business” is defined as “any person . . . who acts as a payment instrument seller, . . . or money transmitter.” [3] The court held that bitcoin is regulated by Florida’s money transmitter law, and, as a result, Espinoza was both “acting as a payment instrument seller” and “engaging in the business of a money transmitter.”

Under the Florida statute, a “payment instrument seller” is an entity that sells a “payment instrument.” [4] The phrase “payment instrument” is defined to include a variety of instruments, including “payment of money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.” [5] The phrase “monetary value,” in turn, is defined as “a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency.” [6] The court interpreted these definitions – which it described as “plain and unambiguous” – to conclude bitcoin falls under the definition of “payment instrument.” To reach that conclusion, it reasoned that bitcoin, which is redeemable for currency, is a medium of exchange, which falls under the definition of “monetary value.” Therefore, it falls under the definition of “payment instrument.” [7] To purportedly bolster its point, the court noted that several businesses in the Miami area accepted bitcoin as a form of payment. It also pointed to a final order from the Florida Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”) in which OFR granted Coinbase a money transmitter license. The court noted that Coinbase provides a service “where a Coinbase user sends fiat currency to another Coinbase user to buy bitcoins.” “Like the Coinbase user,” the court reasoned, the MBPD detective “paid cash to Espinoza to buy bitcoins.”

The court also concluded Espinoza was acting as a money transmitter. Under the Florida statute, a money transmitter is an entity that “receives currency, monetary value, or payment instruments for the purpose of transmitting the same by any means….” [8] Espinoza argued he fell outside this definition because he did not receive payment for the bitcoin for the purpose of transmitting the same to a third party. The court disagreed. It held that the law does not require the presence of a third party because the definition of money transmitter does not mention a third party, either expressly or implicitly. [9] It also disagreed with the trial court and Espinoza’s “bilateral limitation,” which would require Espinoza to have both received and transmitted the same form of currency, monetary value, or payment instrument. According to the court, Espinoza fell within the ambit of the law because he received fiat for the purpose of transmitting bitcoin. It explained that the phrase “the same” in the definition of “money transmission” modifies the list of payment methods, and the use of “or” in that list of payment methods – “currency, monetary value, or payment instrument” – means that “any of the three qualifies interchangeably on either side of the transaction.”

As additional support for its position, the court distinguished a final order entered into by OFR: In re Petition for Declaratory Statement Moon, Inc. According to the court’s description, Moon sought to establish a bitcoin kiosk program under which a Moon customer would pay fiat to a licensed money services business in exchange for a PIN, and the customer would then enter the PIN into a Moon kiosk, which would initiate a transfer of bitcoins to the user from a Moon bitcoin address. Once the PIN was redeemed, the licensed entity would pay Moon. OFR determined Moon did not a license. The court distinguished the Moon order because “Moon merely facilitated the transfer of bitcoins through the use of a licensed money services business,” whereas “[h]ere, no licensed money services business was utilized in the exchange of U.S. dollars for bitcoins that occurred between Espinoza and” the MBPD agent.

COUNTERPOINTS TO THE COURT’S OPINION

Several state legislatures or regulators have amended or interpreted their money transmitter laws to apply to virtual currency, but those actions do not take the form of a judicial opinion. Here, the Third District Court provided its specific reasoning for reaching its conclusions. It remains to be seen whether Espinoza will seek review from the Florida Supreme Court, but there are at least a few points in the court’s opinion that warrant further review and analysis.

First, Espinoza did not receive money for the purpose of transmitting it. He received it in exchange for selling bitcoin; he received it for the purpose of possessing it. The court rejected Espinoza’s attempt to impose a third-party requirement, but the most natural reading of the phrase “transmitting” would require Espinoza to send onward whatever value he received. Merriam-Webster defines “transmit” as “to send or convey from one person or place to another.” By using the words “receive” and “transmit,” the Florida law focuses on the act of sending money to another person and excludes the act of selling money or monetary value. If simply selling property were sufficient to trigger the money transmitter law, the statute would likely sweep far more broadly than intended. Here, Espinoza was acting as a merchant selling goods. This would not constitute money transmission under any reasonable reading of the law. Indeed, some states (and FinCEN) have recognized that a party selling its own inventory of virtual currency in a two-party transaction is not a money transmitter.

Second, the court’s conclusion is further undercut by considering the Moon proceeding the court discusses. The opinion notes “the PIN provided by the licensed money services business to Moon’s customers provided a mechanism by which the exchange of U.S. dollars for bitcoins could be identifiable.” The PIN could arguably be classified as a payment instrument because it is an “other instrument” or “monetary value.” If transmission to a third party is not required, as the court holds, then Moon should have needed a license when it received the PIN and then transmitted bitcoins back to the user that was redeeming the PIN. But that wasn’t the conclusion OFR reached.

Third, the court’s interpretation of how OFR would treat Espinoza’s actions is questionable. In 2014, OFR issued a consumer alert stating that “[v]irtual currency and the organizations using them are not regulated by the OFR.” [10] In addition, in January 2018, OFR released another consumer alert regarding cryptocurrency, stating that “[cryptocurrencies] are subject to little or no regulation,” which further indicates OFR does not interpret the money transmission law to cover cryptocurrencies. [11] The court does not acknowledge these statements. Although the court focuses on an OFR order regarding Coinbase, that order granted Coinbase a license and listed a variety of activities in which Coinbase was engaged or planned to engage. The order does not specify what specific activity was licensable, but it is likely that a license was granted because of the receipt and transmission of fiat currency.

CONCLUSION

If Espinoza appeals, the case could go to the Florida Supreme Court, where the virtual currency industry will receive a more definitive answer. In the meantime, virtual currency businesses should be aware that the Florida Attorney General’s Office interprets the state’s money transmitter act to regulate bilateral sales of virtual currency for fiat currency and is willing to prosecute at least certain cases of unauthorized sales. As of now, Florida’s Third District Court agrees. How the Espinoza case concludes and whether and how the Florida legislature responds will be important to the virtual currency industry.

NOTES

[1] — So. 3d –, 2019 WL 361893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

[2] FLA. STAT. § 560.125.

[3] Id. § 560.103(22).

[4] Id. § 560.103(30).

[5] Id. § 560.103(29) (emphasis added).

[6] Id. § 560.103(21).

[7] The court principally discusses whether bitcoin falls under Florida’s money transmitter law. In a few instances, it also references “virtual currency” generally, but it is not clear how broadly it was intending to apply its holding.

[8] Id. § 560.103(23).

[9] As a counterpoint, the court noted that the Financial Crime Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”) definition of money transmitter explicitly includes a third party requirement because it defines a money transmitter as someone that accepts value from one person and transmits value to “another location or person by any means….” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A).

[10] Consumer Alert: Update on Virtual Currency, Office of Financial Regulation, Sept. 17, 2014.

[11] Consumer Alert: Cryptocurrency, Office of Financial Regulation, Jan. 17, 2018.

 

Copyright 2019 K&L Gates

Compliance With Florida’s “Generator” Laws

Earlier this year, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed into law HB7099and SPB7028 (collectively referred to as the “Bills”), ratifying emergency rules that require nursing homes and assisted living facilities to acquire alternative power sources– such as generators- and fuel in preparation of the upcoming hurricane season. See Rule 59A-4.1265 and Rule 58A-5.036. These rules were enacted after 14 residents died from heat-related illnesses and complications during Hurricane Irma last year when a Florida nursing home lost power to its air conditioning units for three days.

The Bills went into effect on March 28, 2018, and required qualifying facilities to come into compliance by June 1, 2018, unless granted an extension by the Governor whereby compliance is expected by January 2019. Facilities that can show delays caused by necessary construction, delivery of ordered equipment, zoning, or other regulatory approval processes are eligible for an extension if the facility can provide residents an area that meets the ambient temperature requirements for 96 hours. Extensions are granted on a case-by-case basis, although so far a majority of Florida facilities have been granted an extension. Indeed, it appears that over 77% of nursing homes received an extension in the first week of June. Additionally, facilities located in an evacuation zone pursuant to Chapter 252, F.S., must either evacuate its residents prior to the arrival of any emergency event, or have an alternative power source and no less than 96 hours of fuel stored onsite at least within 24 hours of the issuance of a state of emergency. Failure to comply with any provision may result in the revocation or suspension of a facility’s license and/or the imposition of administrative fines.

Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facilities Must Develop Emergency Plans that Provide for Alternative Power Sources and Fuel Capable of Maintaining an Ambient Temperature of No Greater Than 81 Degrees Fahrenheit for At Least 96 Hours.

Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facilities must prepare a detailed plan (“Plan”) that provides for the acquisition and maintenance of alternative power sources- such as generators- and fuel. The Plan will supplement a facility’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and must be submitted to and approved by the requisite agency. While the Bills do not require facilities to maintain a specific type of power system or equipment; the alternative power sources utilized by a facility must be capable of maintaining an ambient temperature of no greater than 81 degrees Fahrenheit for at least 96 hours after the loss of primary electrical power. This temperature must be maintained in areas of sufficient size to shelter residents safely. Alternative power sources and fuel should be maintained in accordance with local zoning restrictions and the Florida Building Code.

Moreover, the Bills set forth additional requirements for nursing homes and assisted living facilities in evacuation zones, as well as for single campus and multistory facilities.

  • Facilities in Evacuation Zones – A facility in an evacuation zone pursuant to Chapter 252, F.S. must provide in their Plan for the maintenance of an alternative power source and fuel at all times when the facility is occupied but may utilize mobile generators to facilitate evacuation.
  • Single Campus – Single campus facilities under common ownership may share alternative power sources and fuel space if such resources are sufficient to maintain the ambient temperature required under the rules.
  •  Multistory Facilities – Multistory facilities, whose Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan comprises of moving residents to a higher floor during flood or surge events, must place their alternative power source and all additional equipment in a location protected from flooding or storm surge damage.

Fuel Storage Requirements Vary by Facility Size and Location.

The Bills require facilities to provide for storage of a certain amount of fuel based on their size and location. Assisted living facilities with 16 beds or less must store a minimum of 48 hours of fuel, while assisted living facilities with 17 beds or more a required to store a minimum of 72 hours of fuel. All nursing homes must store a minimum of 72 hours of fuel. Nursing homes and assisted living facilities located in a declared state of emergency area pursuant to Section 252.36, F.S., that may impact primary power delivery, must secure 96 hours of fuel; these facilities may utilize portable fuel storage containers for the remaining fuel necessary for 96 hours during the period of a declared state of emergency.

Emily Budicin, a 2018 Summer Associate in the firm’s Washington, DC office, contributed significantly to the preparation of this post.

 

©2018 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Litigation After Devastation: The Legal Storm Surge

Bridges crumbling in Texas. Houses turned to toothpicks in the USVIs. Newly-formed rivers ravaging the streets in South Florida. The devastating destruction from the recent hurricanes that have pummeled the U.S. has uprooted many peoples’ homes and lives, but we have only begun to feel the impact of the surge.

Massive relief efforts have begun, national fundraising, news coverage, responsive legislation, and building codes to name a few. A litigation surge is swelling as well. We have seen several types of cases and class actions churn from a hurricane’s aftermath. Here are some of the types of cases, coverage issues, and expert needs you may see after the storm.

Property Damage and Meteorological Causation

Insurance companies insuring the Southern United States are bracing for the waves of claims that will soon be flooding in. Just as it was following Hurricanes Katrina, Ivan, and Sandy, the hotly-debated issue of whether the damage was caused by wind or water will be the likely focus. While most homeowner insurance policies will cover water damage that was caused by a roof or window that was compromised by wind and allowed water intrusion, most do not cover water that rises from the ground level and enters the home. Experts will be relied upon to determine how water got into a structure, even when it is entirely obliterated.

Insurance companies and attorneys will be looking for experts in meteorology, often with advanced degrees and testifying experience, who can opine on the types of weather conditions that might have existed at a given time in a given place (i.e., Key West when Hurricane Irma struck). The experts could come from academia or environmental institutes and societies. They will be asked to review various data points and speak on weather conditions at a particular time and place to support causation for insurance coverage. Structural engineers will also be needed, preferably with experience in standard insurance practices, procedures, and protocols in evaluating damage caused by hurricanes. They will need to have an understanding of insurance claims handling and will be asked to review various reports and data, some from other engineers, discussing damage caused to structures by the hurricane and opine as to whether or not the reports and data are accurate.

Structural Failures and Faulty Design/Construction

While many large, concrete commercial buildings and bridges are designed to withstand 150+ mph winds and flooding,  they can still be left severely damaged after a storm blows through. Structural failure of buildings, roofs, bridges, and roadways that were expected to withstand hurricane winds will lead to litigation over damage caused by the failure. Structural engineers with expertise in the types of structures at issue, likely licensed engineers, will be needed to examine damage patterns through photos, video, or via a post-storm on-scene inspection. They will also need to use meteorological wind information to determine the cause of the failure and the quality of the design or construction.

Class Actions for Coverage Determinations

Often, the core issues in insurance-related storm damage cases are similar across a wide span of policyholders. These cases will vary depending on the coverage matter at issue, but the most sought-after experts will be familiar with insurance claims standards, protocols, and policy interpretation. Construction experts may also be needed to opine on the necessity and extent of certain repairs required after a storm. Also, standard practices and interactions between contractors and insurance companies during the re-build process will come into question. Class actions may be filed as well, simply as placeholders to toll certain claims-filing deadlines or allow broader bad faith discovery against insurance companies who refuse to pay mass claims.

Litigation Over Price-Gouging

One of the worst scenarios to follow a storm is wide-scale price-gouging and scamming by companies trying to capitalize on the desperation and vulnerability of storm victims. Before the storm, many people preparing for power outages or evacuation will see unfair spikes in essentials such as water and gas. After the storm, shady contractors and tree-removers often flood in, lie about their licensing and credentials, and charge exorbitant fees while performing shoddy, haphazard work, or no work at all. Many states, including Florida, have made it a crime for any service provider to offer or sell essential commodities for an amount that “grossly exceeds the average price” during the thirty days following a declaration of emergency. In the days before Hurricane Irma’s approach, many reported price-gouging for essentials such as water, ice, batteries, and gas when thousands of Floridians were stocking up or evacuating. Class actions alleging price-gouging will likely occur following the storm. Experts in standard industry pricing, manufacture costs, and storm clean-up and repair may be called in to opine on the “average price” of certain essential commodities and post-storm services.

In the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, we are gearing up for the incumbent waves of litigation and expert requests we anticipate will follow. What types of cases, class actions, and expert needs are you expecting?

This post was written by Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved. © Copyright 2002-2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

P3 Legislation in Florida – Public Private Partnerships

On September 24-25, Miami-Dade County held a P3 Institute entitled “The P3 Pipeline: A Forum for the Private Sector.” Among the topics discussed at the Institute was a measure currently before the Florida Legislature that, if enacted, will make the P3 procurement process easier for all parties involved.

Two bills, House Bill 97 and House Bill 95, have advanced to House committees and are moving through the legislative process. HB 97, known as “Public Records and Public Meetings,” is currently in the State Affairs Committee. HB 95, a companion bill known simply as “Public-Private Partnerships,” is in the Appropriations Committee. Approval by all required legislative committees is a necessary step before these bills can be introduced in the 2016 legislative session.

If it passes, HB 97 would exempt unsolicited P3 proposals by responsible public entities from public records and public meeting requirements for a specified time period. HB 95, a corollary bill, revises provisions regarding responsible public entities and unsolicited proposals for qualified projects. In doing so, HB 95 expands the list of entities authorized to conduct P3s to include state universities, special districts, school districts (rather than school boards), and institutions included in the state college system.

On a related note, the bills’ sponsor, Representative Greg Staube (R-Sarasota), has stated that several state legislators (without naming the legislators specifically) are discussing the possibility of a centralized state office that could offer Public Private Partnership procurement expertise to Florida counties. The office could be housed in an existing state agency, like the Department of Management Services or Enterprise Florida, to save money.

Article By Albert E. Dotson, Jr. & Leah Aaronson of Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

© 2015 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

EEOC Sues Florida and Michigan Companies for Transgender Discrimination

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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has just filed suit against two companies for alleged discrimination against transgendered employees. The suits were filed separately in Florida and Michigan, against Lakeland Eye Clinic and G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., respectively. In both cases, employees alleged that they were fired after they disclosed they were undergoing gender transitions.

Title VII does not specifically protect against transgendered persons. In 2012, however, in Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012), the EEOC ruled that employment discrimination against employees because they are transgender, because of gender identity, and/or because they have transitioned (or intend to transition) is discrimination based on sex, and thus violates Title VII.

The EEOC identified “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions” as one of their top enforcement priorities in its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan. Thus, these suits should not be surprising. Earlier this year, President Obama also issued an Executive Order prohibiting federal contractors from discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender workers.

In light of the recent emphasis on the protection of these individuals, employers should take extra precautions to ensure that no discriminatory practices are in force in the workplace. Further, all adverse employment decisions should be properly documented and managers and supervisors should be properly trained about what to do should a discrimination-related issue arises.

© 2014 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC. All rights reserved.
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Miami Building Permits: Use of Phased Permits on the Rise

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As cranes tower over Miami in the post-recession development upswing, developers are once again using phased permits to expedite construction while awaiting approval for building permits. Section 105.13 of the Florida Building Code authorizes the issuance and use of phased permits throughout the state at the discretion of building officials. Developers in Miami and Miami Beach are actively using this option. In the cities of Miami and Miami Beach, approval from the Department of Environmental Resources Management as well as an agreement/verification from Water and Sewer is now needed to receive a phased permit. This is a new element that was not originally required. Applicants should be prepared to provide this documentation as part of their phased permit application.

cranes Given the fact that the phased permit is a permit that is issued pending (not in lieu of) an official building permit, the holder of the phased permit proceeds at his or her own risk when beginning construction upon receipt of the phased permit. Thus, applicants are required to execute a Hold Harmless letter/form reflecting that they understand the risk and relieve the municipality of all liability resulting from or in connection with the phased permit. Applications proceed with the understanding that it is possible that in order to receive the official building permit, portions or all of the construction that has been completed under the phased permit would need to be modified or removed. Applicants must cautiously weigh the risks when deciding to begin major construction using a phased permit.

As development rebounds in South Florida, the use of phased permitting is allowing projects to stay on course and meet proposed construction deadlines. By allowing construction to proceed via phased permits, developers do not have to be handicapped by the delays that may arise from complicated and bureaucratic permitting processes and can sooner capitalize on the market demand for their projects.

Read more about the procedures for phased permits in the City of Miami and the phased permits in the City of Miami Beach.

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Good News for Grove Isle Condo Owners – Miami

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Grove Isle condo owners, who have been in the middle of a battle over a proposed 18-story condo tower which will replace the low-rise Grove Isle Hotel & Spa, received some good news when the Third DCA overturned the dismissal of Grove Isle Association’s 2009 lawsuit against the owners and former and present managers of Grove Isle’s Club.

condoIn that lawsuit, the Association brought claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract, claiming, among other things, that the enjoyment of the Club’s amenities (a restaurant and lounge, private banquet room, health spa, swimming pool and tennis courts) was limited to private members of Fair Isle, and seeking an order prohibiting the defendants from allowing unauthorized members of the public to use the Club’s amenities.  The Association also maintained that it was unfair and unreasonable to require the condo owners to bear all the costs of maintenance, management and operation of Fair Isle’s facilities, amenities and common areas (including the bridge that spans Biscayne Bay and connects Miami with Grove Isle’s private island resort), even though these areas are also used by other Fair Isle guests.  Therefore, the Association sought to recover the value of its maintenance, management and operation payments over the years.

In overturning the trial court’s decision, the Third DCA held that the lawsuit was improperly dismissed based on a statute of limitations defense, where the trial court could not determine from the four-corners of the complaint the date in which the alleged causes of action accrued. Specifically, the Third DCA found that it could not affirmatively be determined from the face of the complaint when allegedly unauthorized members of the public began using the Club’s amenities or whether the payment of assessments dating back to 1979 related to the use of the Club’s amenities by certain unauthorized members of the public.  However, the Third DCA stated that the statute of limitations would bar plaintiff’s claims if the claims accrued before July 2004.

The Third DCA also emphasized the general policy of allowing a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint at least once, in an attempt to state a cause of action, unless it is clear that a plaintiff cannot in good faith allege a set of circumstances sufficient to state a cause of action, and found that the trial court’s dismissal of the Association’s first complaint with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

Now that the Association may move forward with its lawsuit, it is unclear what the Association’s course of action will be.  What is clear, however, is the interesting situation that the Grove Isle owners are now facing.  This lawsuit deals with the private versus public use of the Club’s facilities and the Association’s responsibility for the payment of total costs and expenses for maintaining, managing and operating the facilities and common areas.  Now with the proposal of replacing the hotel with a private condo tower, many of the condo owner’s concern should be ameliorated, as this proposal means that the private island would only be open to owners, renters and visitors, rather than members of the public who currently have access to the private island due to the amenities offered by the hotel and spa.

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Facebook Post Breaches Confidentiality Provision of Settlement Agreement

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A Florida appellate court has ruled that a teenaged daughter’s post on Facebookmentioning her father’s confidential settlement of an age discrimination claim breached a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement, barring the father from collecting an $80,000 settlement. Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, No. 3D13-1952 (Fla 3d DCA Feb. 26, 2014).

The plaintiff, Patrick Snay, was a headmaster of Gulliver, a private school in the Miami area. After his contract was not renewed, he sued for age discrimination. The parties reached a settlement pursuant to a written agreement, which included a detailed confidentiality provision. The provision stated in part:

13. Confidentiality . . . [T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement. . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiff’s portion of the Settlement Payments.

A couple of days after the agreement was signed, Snay’s daughter, who had recently been a student at Gulliver, posted the following on her Facebook page:

Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.

Snay’s daughter had about 1,200 Facebook friends, many of whom were current or former Gulliver students. Gulliver notified Snay of the breach and refused to tender the $80,000 to Snay under the terms of the settlement. (Snay’s attorneys received their portion). Snay moved to enforce the agreement. Limited discovery revealed that Snay and his wife notified their daughter “that the case was settled and they were happy with the result.” Snay denied ever discussing a trip to Europe. The district court held that Snay’s actions did not violate the terms of the agreement, but the appellate court reversed, noting that Snay was prohibited from “directly or indirectly” disclosing even the “existence” of the settlement.

The decision offers lessons for counsel, litigants, and parents. Counsel and litigants need to remember that these types of confidentiality provisions with disgorgement penalties are taken seriously by the courts and can be enforced. Parents need to remind their children to be mindful of what they post on social media, because it might have adult consequences.

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