Tag: First Amendment

What’s in a Name Anyway? Trademark Basics for Community Associations

This article explores the essentials of trademark rights, their relevance for community associations, and the balance between protecting these trademarks versus respecting the free speech of homeowners.

I. What is a Trademark?

A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, design, or any combination thereof that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods or services of one party from the goods or services of another.

  1. Common Law Trademark Rights

    Common law trademarks arise from the exclusive, continuous use of a mark in commerce. It is not necessary to have a registration to use or protect these designations. However, rights in a common law (or unregistered) trademark are generally limited to the geographic area where the mark has been used. Trademark ownership is perpetual if the owner continues to use the trademark to identify its goods or services.

  2. Registered Trademark Rights

    Registered trademarks provide broader protection. There are two levels of trademark registration: state and federal.

    State registration provides protection within the boundaries of the state where the trademark is registered. This is a simpler and less costly process compared to federal registration, making it suitable for businesses that operate primarily within one state. For North Carolina, state trademark registration is done through the North Carolina Secretary of State.

    Federal registration, managed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), offers nationwide protection and several advantages, such as a legal presumption of ownership and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods/services listed in the registration.

II. Can a Community Association Have a Federally Registered Trademark?

Yes, a community association can register a trademark to protect its name, logo, or other identifying symbols for use in connection with the community association services offered.

  1. What is the Process?

    The process of registering a trademark involves several steps:

  2. Search: Conduct a trademark search to assess if the mark is available for registration.
  3. Application: File an application with USPTO, including a description of the mark, the goods/services it will cover, the dates of first use, and examples of such use.
  4. Examination: The office examines the application to ensure it complies with all legal requirements. If there are any issues, the applicant will receive an initial refusal (called an “Office Action”). There is a three-month window to respond or file a three-month extension to respond. If a Final Office Action is issued, the applicant has the option to request reconsideration and/or file to appeal the Examiner’s decision.
  5. Publication: If approved, the mark is published in the Official Gazette, allowing others to oppose the registration.
  6. Registration: If no opposition is filed, the mark is registered, and the owner receives a certificate of registration.
  7. How Time-Consuming is it?

The federal registration process typically takes about a year from filing, but the process can be longer if there are complications or opposition. State registrations are usually quicker, often taking a few months, but the resulting protection is limited to the state.

  1. What are the Benefits?

Trademarks offer several benefits to community associations. For example, the owner of a registered trademark has the exclusive right to use the mark in commerce. Therefore, the community association can prevent other community associations from using a confusingly similar mark and misleading prospective residents as to source, affiliation, or endorsement as a result. For further example, registered trademarks are listed in the USPTO database. A subsequent application for a similar mark for the same or related services will be blocked by the community association’s registration. Finally, the use of the registration symbol (“®”) acts as increased deterrence against other associations from using similar trademarks.

  1. What Does it Protect?

A registered trademark protects the association’s name, logo, and other branding elements from being used by others in a way that could cause confusion. It helps maintain the association’s reputation and ensures that its identity remains distinct.

  1. What Does it Not Protect?

Trademarks do not protect against every type of use. Notably, they do not protect against non-commercial commentary or criticism, which falls under fair use and is safeguarded by the First Amendment. This means that while trademarks prevent individuals or entities from misusing the trademark, they cannot stop individuals from expressing opinions or criticisms.

III. How does a Community Association Enforce its Trademark?

Enforcing a trademark involves monitoring its use and taking action against unauthorized usage.

  1. Monitoring: Keep an eye on how the trademark is used in the marketplace.
  2. Cease and Desist Letters: If unauthorized use is detected, a cease and desist letter can be sent to the infringing party to resolve the matter without litigation.
  3. Litigation: If the cease-and-desist letter is ignored, litigation may be necessary to

When it comes to property owners using the trademark of a community association, the line between trademark infringement and nominative fair use can be tangled. Property owners using the trademark to offer competitive services or confuse residents into thinking that their use is sponsored by the community association are examples of infringement. Only the community association can use its trademark to offer community association services. Only the community association can market the community to prospective residents. Finally, the community association must monitor and enforce against any uses of the trademark that could tarnish its valuable reputation.

Yet, while enforcing trademark rights is important, it is crucial to consider the potential backlash from property owners and the broader community. Even if there is a legitimate claim, aggressive enforcement actions may jeopardize community trust and invite public criticism. Such efforts, especially against gripe sites, can lead to stronger reactions and widespread publication of enforcement efforts online, further damaging the reputation. Put another way, a community association attempting to protect its reputation must consider if its enforcement efforts do the opposite.

Sometimes, directing energy elsewhere and addressing concerns through dialogue and engagement can be more effective and less costly than legal battles.

IV. Value Proposition for Community Association

Trademark rights are crucial for protecting the identity and reputation of a community association. They help prevent confusion among property owners and prospective residents by ensuring that the association’s name and symbols remain distinct. However, while trademarks are valuable tools for community associations to deter unauthorized use, they cannot be used to silence opinions or criticisms. Understanding this balance is essential for effectively managing and enforcing trademark rights in a manner that respects both legal protections and fundamental freedoms of the property owners.

© 2024 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Trademarks, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section

Office Politics: The Basics for Private Employers

In case you haven’t noticed the yard signs popping up like mushrooms, the constant barrage of television and radio advertisements, or the unsolicited text messages from unknown numbers, we are in the homestretch of election season. For those employers with questions on how to handle political speech in the workplace, especially during the last few days before (and hopefully not much beyond) Election Day, here is a refresher on the basics for private employers.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents the government from enacting laws to prohibit the free exercise of speech and assembly, among other liberties. It does not apply to private employers. Where there is no state action involved, there is no unfettered right to free speech in a private place of employment. Quite simply, a private employer can enact rules to keep political expression from its workplace. Some employers prohibit political speech in the workplace to avoid potential disruptions to business operations, customer relations, or employee morale.

If an employer adopts a policy concerning political expression and messaging, it must do so fairly and consistently, and it should be inclusive and consistent to avoid the perception of favoritism or discrimination. In other words, if an employer requires Meghan to remove her Kamala button, it should also direct Dennis not to wear his Trump t-shirt. Remote workers are still “in the workplace” when they participate in virtual meetings, so there are no separate rules for them.

When enacting rules about political expression and messaging in the workplace, private employers should of course remain aware of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which applies to both union and non-union settings, and among other things protects employees’ ability to engage in concerted activity or to discuss the terms and conditions of their employment. Therefore, private employers must be mindful of a potential nexus or overlap between employees’ political speech and discussion of working conditions. Under the NLRA, for instance, employees may distribute information during non-working time about a candidate’s stance on a particular issue that may also constitute a complaint about the employees’ working conditions.

© Copyright Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C.
For more on Political Speech, visit the NLR Constitutional Law section.

Navigating Politics in the Workplace

In this election year, employees inevitably will engage in discussions of the impactful and divisive political issues that are at the forefront of our national discourse. Employers must be aware of the ways in which political discussions in the workplace have intensified and be prepared to navigate the legal and other challenges posed by these interactions. This checklist provides employers with an overview of key topics to consider when addressing issues related to political speech in the workplace.

1. First Amendment Protection. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it generally applies only to governmental action. Private employers generally have latitude to restrict political speech in the workplace unless it implicates other legal protections.

2. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 of the NLRA protects non-supervisory employees in the private sector, regardless of whether they are members of a union. Employers generally cannot restrict covered employees’ discussions related to the terms and conditions of their employment, i.e., “protected concerted activity.” Political speech that also falls under NLRA protection must be considered carefully.

3. Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policies. Political speech may implicate discrimination or harassment concerns when it includes topics related to protected categories or characteristics, e.g., race, gender, religion. Employers should have robust anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies that cover these issues.

4. State Laws Protecting Political Speech. State laws may protect employees’ political activity, expression or affiliation. These laws include prohibitions against initimdation, threats, or adverse actions based on employee voting, political activities, or candidate endorsements. Employers must assess their policies and practices in each state where they have employees because the scope of these laws varies by jurisdiction.

5. Respectful Workplace and Other Policies. Employers should consider adopting policies that promote respectful behavior and prevent political discussions from escalating into conflicts. Employers also should consider dress code and other workplace policies concerning political attire or messages, and ensure consistent, content-neutral enforcement of those policies. When reports of potential policy violations are made, employers should respond promptly.

6. Train Employees. Employees should receive regular training on company policies and their rights, including the boundaries of political speech in the workplace.

Employers should tailor their policies to address political speech while respecting employees’ rights and maintaining a positive work environment. Each workplace is unique, however, and issues often require context and fact-specific solutions with the assistance of counsel.

2024 Goulston & Storrs PC.
For more news on Navigating Political Discussions in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on Religious-based Discrimination Defenses, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

U.S. Corporate Transparency Act: CTA is Declared Unconstitutional in U.S. District Court Case

The Corporate Transparency Act has been declared unconstitutional. On March 1, 2024, U.S. District Court Judge Liles C. Burke issued a 53-page opinion[1] granting summary judgment for the National Small Business Association and held that the Corporate Transparency Act “exceeds the Constitution’s limits on the legislative branch and lacks a sufficient nexus to any enumerated power to be a necessary or proper means of achieving Congress’ policy goals.”

As a result, Judge Burke found the CTA to be unconstitutional because it exceeds the Constitution’s limits on Congress’ power, without even reaching a decision on whether it violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Court then permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the CTA against the named plaintiffs and ordered a further hearing on the award of costs of litigation.

While it is likely that this litigation will continue to play out in the federal court system, the initial victory has gone to small business and importantly that means that compliance with this now unconstitutional regulatory regime can be set aside for the current time being.

[1] Nat’l Small Bus. United v. Yellen, No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (N.D. Ala. 2022)

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more on the Corporate Transparency Act, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Employment Tip of the Month – February 2024

Q: Can my company treat employees adversely because of their personal political beliefs? If they wear a shirt of their favorite candidate? Or proselytize about their candidate?

A: The short answer: There exists no “First Amendment Right to freedom of expression” in a private workplace, and that extends to political expression. See Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019) (Only “State actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”)

So, yes, legally a private employer can refuse to hire Democrats or Republicans, and can fire an employee for wearing a shirt of their candidate or vocalizing a particular political position.

On the other hand, other laws can apply, such as the right to “concerted action” under the National Labor Relations Act. Overt adverse action also could be ripe for allegations of selective enforcement, such as “you only selectively enforce this rule against me because I am ___________”, where Title VII covers race, sex, religion, color and national origin; ADA covers disability; ADEA age, etc. Some political positions could easily bleed over into religious beliefs.

Even if legally permissible for a private employer to discriminate against holders of one particular political belief, from a practical management perspective, it cannot be recommended, and would be loaded with risk. Also, it could simply make for bad optics and make it harder to attract and retain the best talent.

Finally, this answer changes entirely for public employers and government employers, where employees do possess First Amendment rights, so long as, in general, they are speaking (1) as a private citizen, (2) about a matter of public concern, and (3) their speech does not interfere with the job. There are exceptions for high-ranking individuals, political appointees or someone trying to release classified information, though in many instances they would still be protected from retaliation.

© 2024 Wilson Elser
For more news on Political Expression in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Parody of Iconic Sneaker Isn’t Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Protection

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining use of a trademark and trade dress associated with an iconic sneaker design over a First Amendment artistic expression defense. Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc., Case No. 22-1006 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 2023) (per curiam). This case is the first time a federal appeals court has applied the Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in Jack Daniel’s v. VIP Products, which clarified when heightened First Amendment protections apply to expressive uses of another’s trademark and trade dress.

MSCHF Product Studio is a Brooklyn-based art collective known for provocative works that critique consumer culture. It sells its works in limited releases during prescribed sales periods called “drops.” It promoted and sold a shoe called the “Wavy Baby,” which is a distorted, corrugated version of the iconic black-and-white Vans Old Skool sneaker. MSCHF claimed that the product was a commentary on consumerism in sneakerhead culture and that the Wavy Baby shoes were not meant to be worn but were instead “collectible work[s] of art.”

MSCHF promoted the shoes using the musician Tyga. Vans sent MSCHF a cease-and-desist letter and a week later filed a six-count complaint in federal court, including a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The following day, Vans filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to have the court enjoin the sale of the Wavy Baby shoes. Nevertheless, MSCHF proceeded with its pre-planned drop of the Wavy Baby sneakers and sold 4,306 pairs of the Wavy Baby in one hour.

About a week later, after oral argument on the temporary restraining order (TRO) motion, the district court granted Vans’s motion. The district court concluded that Vans would likely prevail in showing a likelihood of consumer confusion and rejected MSCHF’s contention that the Wavy Baby was entitled to special First Amendment protections because it was an artistic parody. MSCHF appealed.

The Second Circuit held the appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s Jack Daniel’s decision. In that case, Jack Daniel’s sued the maker of a squeaky dog toy that resembled the iconic whiskey bottle and used puns involving dog excrement in place of the actual language of the Jack Daniel’s label. In a unanimous decision, the Court clarified that special First Amendment protections (as used in the Rogers test for expressive works that incorporate another’s trademark) do not apply when a trademark is used as a source indicator—that is, “as a mark.”

The Second Circuit concluded that the Jack Daniel’s case “forecloses MSCHF’s argument that Wavy Baby’s parodic message merits higher First Amendment scrutiny” because, even though the product is a parody, the Rogers test does not apply if the mark is also used as a source identifier. The Second Circuit drew a direct parallel between Wavy Baby and the punning dog toy in the Jack Daniel’s case, noting that in both cases the infringing product evoked the protected trademark and trade dress of the target to benefit from the “good will” developed by the source brand. Hence, the Court held that the district court did not err in applying the traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis rather than the speech-protective Rogers test.

Practice Note: An alleged infringer of a trademark may claim that its product is artistic expression to trigger the heightened First Amendment protections offered by filters such as the Rogers test. However, after Jack Daniel’s, courts are more likely to regard such defenses with skepticism unless the allegedly infringing work falls into a more canonical category of artistic expression such as a film, television show, song or video game.

This article was authored by Karen Gover.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more news on First Amendment Trademark Protections, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Supreme Court to Consider First Amendment Protection for Parody Dog Toy

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to consider the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to commercial parody products that feature the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark(s). Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, Case No. 22-148 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 21, 2022) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are as follows:

  1. Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims.
  2. Whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

This is the second time Jack Daniel’s has filed a petition for certiorari in connection with this case. The Supreme Court first considered the matter in January 2021, following the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand the district court’s finding of trademark infringement, reverse the judgment on dilution and uphold the validity of Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress rights.

The case then returned to the district court, which granted summary judgment to VIP Products. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and then Jack Daniel’s filed its second petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court will seek to settle the long-standing split amongst the US Courts of Appeal regarding the proper analysis for parody in trademark infringement and dilution claims and the scope of protection afforded to it via the First Amendment.

For more Supreme Court and Litigation News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

U.S. Supreme Court Sides with Public High School Coach in Free Speech/Freedom of Religion Case

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling which will have wide-ranging effects on the ability of governmental entities to react to religious and other speech of public employees. In Kennedy v. Bremerton Schools, the Court ruled that a public high school could not discipline or disfavor a football coach for his practice of kneeling on the 50-yard line and praying at the conclusion of each game, eventually growing to include most of the football team and opposing players as well. The school district had attempted to accommodate the coach’s desire for prayer, but concerns mounted when one parent complained that her son felt compelled to participate despite being an atheist. The coach was eventually placed on administrative leave and not extended an offer to return to coaching the next school year. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the coach’s First Amendment challenges.

With a 6-3 majority, the Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court first found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court discounted the school district’s stated concerns that the coach’s practice could violate the Establishment Clause or interfere with students’ right of free exercise. The Court held that absent evidence of “direct” coercion the Establishment Clause was not implicated and then concluded that the coach’s position of authority over the players was insufficient to constitute direct coercion.  The Court distinguished earlier cases involving prayers at football games and civic meetings, by emphasizing that the speech for which the coach was disciplined was not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience. Additionally, students were not required or formally expected to participate.

With respect to the Free Speech issue, the Court concluded that the coach’s prayers were not unprotected “government speech,” and in doing so applied a restrictive view of what could be considered “government speech.”  The Court held that because the coach’s job duties did not include leading prayers, the fact that the speech occurred on the field immediately after the game was insufficient to transform it from private speech to government speech.  “To hold differently,” the Court stated, “would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court’s repeated promise that teachers do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”

The decision, together with Shurtleff v. Boston decided earlier this Term, suggests a sharp break with past Court jurisprudence on the balance between the dictates of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  Government entities should review their policies on religious activity on government property or by employees in connection with their positions in light of these two decisions.

Article By Ahmad Chehab, Scott R. Eldridge, and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield

For more civil rights legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Supreme Court Offers Clarification on Protection for Off Campus Speech: Implications for School Boards & First Amendment

On June 23, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Mahanoy Area School District violated the First Amendment rights of Brandi Levy, a high school student who went to Snapchat to voice her frustrations when she didn’t make the varsity school cheerleading team.

Ms. Levy posted on her personal Snapchat a few photos showing the middle finger, one with the caption, “F*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything,” and the other saying, “Love how me and [another student] get told we have another year of jv before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter to anyone else.” which was visible to about 250 people at the time, many of whom were fellow students.  Snapchat messages, by design are meant to go away not long after they are sent.

In this circumstance, at least one other student took a screenshot of the post(s) and shared it with her mother, who was also a coach, to express concern, the school district decided Ms. Levy violated school and team rules, and was ultimately suspended from the junior varsity cheer squad for the remainder of the year.

Ms. Levy and her parents sued Mahanoy School District (“School District”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stating that her suspension violated the First Amendment, and Mahanoy’s team and school rules were overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The School District argued that they were within their rights to suspend Ms. Levy because of the previous Supreme Court decision Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which ultimately held that school officials could regulate speech that would disrupt the work and discipline of the school.

Both the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Ms. Levy, and the Mahanoy School District filed a petition for certiorari, asking whether Tinker standard did or did not apply to this case.

The Supreme Court needed to decide whether the First Amendment prohibits public schools from regulating off-campus speech, and whether the Third Circuit correctly held that the school violated Ms. Levy’s first amendment rights. It was an 8 to 1 decision, with Justice Stephen Breyer drafting the majority opinion and Justice Clarence Thomas authoring the dissenting opinion.

The Supreme Court previously outlined three instances where a school may regulate student speech: (1) incident, lewd or vulgar speech uttered during a school assembly on school grounds, (2) speech uttered during a class trip that references illicit drug use, and (3) speech that others may perceive as bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school, such as in a school newspaper.

Ms. Levy’s words of criticism were outside of school hours and not on school property, and although they were vulgar, they were not threatening in nature, so the Supreme Court held the School District did not have the right to punish Ms. Levy and she was not outside of her First Amendment rights.

What are the Free Speech Implications?

While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ms. Levy in this case, the ruling does not necessarily protect all off-campus speech. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court said schools may regulate speech that disrupts the order of the school or infringes on others’ rights. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas said schools have the authority to regulate speech off-campus when it harms the school and threatens its faculty.

The Court said exceptions to the ruling in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. would be limited, and would have to be worked out in future cases. Justice Samuel Alito said in his concurring opinion that “the regulation of many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.”

According to previous precedent, students do not lose their First Amendment rights when they set foot on school grounds.

“I think this result is foreseeable insofar as the Court seemed unlikely during oral argument to adopt the Third Circuit’s broad view that schools can’t regulate off-campus speech at all, but they also seemed to think the school had overreached here,” said Gautam Hans, assistant clinical professor of law and director of the Stanton Foundation First Amendment Clinic at Vanderbilt University Law School in a statement to the National Law Review.

The Court outlined three facets that distinguish schools’ efforts to regulate off-campus speech. First, it’s the parents’ responsibility to regulate students’ speech off campus. Additionally, if a student is subjected to speech regulations on and off campus, then their speech is regulated 24 hours a day.

“That means courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in that kind of speech at all,” per Justice Breyer writing for the majority. Lastly, the Court said schools are America’s “nurseries of democracy,” and therefore have an interest in protecting students’ unpopular opinions.

“Justice Breyer’s adoption of a flexible standard for when schools can regulate speech off-campus demonstrates the real challenges for schools and the need to balance competing interests. I suspect this will get litigated a fair amount in the coming years as courts try to figure out what to do with the standard articulated here,” Professor Hans said.

The Court specifically pointed out that in this case, Ms. Levy’s Snapchats were sent outside of school hours on her own time and were not sent on school grounds. She also did not identify the school itself in the posts, and did not target any person in particular. Therefore, the school did not have the right to suspend her.

“Likewise, there is little to suggest a substantial interference in, or disruption of, the school’s efforts to maintain cohesion on the school cheerleading squad,” the Court said.

What are the Implications for School Boards & Administrators?

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s majority opinion for being too vague, and for its lack of guidance to schools on how to discipline students moving forward.

“Because the Supreme Court declined to set forth a uniform rule and give leeway to schools to regulate off-campus speech, the lower courts will further shape the landscape of First Amendment application to student speech,” per  Christine V. Hamiel, Chair of the School Law Section at von Briesen & Roper. “School boards and administration must be mindful that such further interpretation will continue to lay the foundation for what action a school may take with respect to student off-campus speech.”

Due to the ruling’s lack of uniformity, school administrators will have to think about the specific characteristics of off-campus speech when deciding whether or not to respond with disciplinary action.

“While acknowledging that there can be circumstances where off-campus speech may be regulated, it is clear from the decision that the characteristics of off-campus speech that differentiate it from speech at school or at a school function will make it more difficult to pass constitutional muster when dealing with off-campus speech,” per  Robert Burns, Chair of the School and Higher Education Team at Davis Kuelthau. “School administrators will have to analyze such issues carefully when contemplating responding to off-campus speech.”

Moving forward, schools will have to consider multiple factors of the impact of students’ speech when determining if and how to respond.

“The Supreme Court recognized that there can be circumstances where off-campus speech implicates the regulatory interests of schools,” Mr. Burns said.  “It concluded that the facts in Mahanoy did not rise to that level, but going forward school districts are in a position to respond to such speech if they conclude it is creating a substantial disruption of learning or threatening the protection of the school population.”

Should a school decide to take action against a student for off-campus speech, they must also determine the circumstances around the student’s speech.

“Schools must carefully consider each situation and the unique circumstances of each situation on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration three key features: the authority a school has over the off-campus student; the content of the speech at the time it is made (given that off-campus regulation opens the door to school regulation of all student speech); and a school’s responsibility in maintaining a free ‘marketplace of ideas,’” Ms. Hamiel said.

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ARTICLE BY Rachel Popa and Hanna Taylor of
The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC
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