Tag: ERISA

IRS Issues FAQs Regarding Long-Term Part-Time Employees in 403(b) Plans

The IRS recently issued Notice 2024-73, which provides much-needed guidance on long-term, part-time (“LTPT”) employees in ERISA-governed 403(b) retirement plans. Following passage of the SECURE 2.0 Act, an employee is generally considered a LTPT employee if he or she works at least 500 hours per year for two consecutive years.

Among other items, the Notice sets forth the IRS position on the following key issues on which the benefits community has been seeking clarification:

  • A part-time employee who qualifies as a LTPT employee must have the right to make elective deferrals to an ERISA 403(b) plan (unless some other statutory exemption applies), notwithstanding the Tax Code’s permitted exclusion for employees who normally work less than 20 hours per week.
  • An ERISA 403(b) plan may continue to exclude from the plan part-time employees who do not qualify as LTPT employees, notwithstanding the “consistency requirement,” which generally prevents a plan from excluding some part-time employees and not others.
  • An ERISA 403(b) plan is not required to provide the right to make elective deferrals to certain student employees, even if they qualify as LTPT employees. This is because the student employee exclusion is based on an employee classification (a student performing the service), rather than an amount of service (not an hours-based exclusion).

The guidance in the Notice is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2024. Importantly, the Notice also provides that a previously promulgated proposed regulation relating to the handling of LTPT employees in 401(k) plans, once finalized, will apply no earlier than plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2026 (i.e., a two-year extension).

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For more on Long-Term Part-Time Employees, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

The New Retirement Security Rule: Updated Fiduciary Definition Under ERISA

On April 23, 2024, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) promulgated a final rule, titled the “Retirement Security Rule” (the “Final Rule”), updating the definition of an “investment advice fiduciary” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”). In addition, the DOL issued final amendments to several prohibited transaction class exemptions (“PTEs”) available to investment advice fiduciaries, which together with the Final Rule seek to effectuate the DOL’s goal of requiring honest investment advice from investment advice fiduciaries to retirement investors. The updated fiduciary definition under the Final Rule and the amended PTEs will become effective on September 23, 2024, with a one-year phase-in period for certain conditions of the amended PTEs.

Fiduciary Definition

The framework for determining whether a person is an investment advice fiduciary has historically required that investment advice be provided to a retirement investor on a regular basis and pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding that such advice will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions.

Under the Final Rule, a person will be an investment advice fiduciary for purposes of ERISA if (1) they make a recommendation of any securities transaction or other investment transaction or any investment strategy to a retirement investor for a fee or other compensation (direct or indirect), and (2) such recommendation arises in either one of the following contexts:

  • The person either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate) makes professional investment recommendations to investors on a regular basis as part of their business, and the recommendation is made under circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable investor in like circumstances that the recommendation:
    • is based on review of the retirement investor’s particular needs or individual circumstances,
    • reflects the application of professional or expert judgment to the retirement investor’s particular needs or individual circumstances, and
    • may be relied on by the retirement investor as intended to advance the retirement investor’s best interest; or
  • the person represents or acknowledges that they are acting as a fiduciary under ERISA with respect to the recommendation.

For purposes of the Final Rule, a “retirement investor” is defined as a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, IRA owner or beneficiary, or IRA fiduciary. “Recommendations” means recommendations as to:

  • the advisability of acquiring, holding, disposing of, or exchanging securities or other investment property, investment strategy, or how securities or other investment property should be invested following a rollover, transfer, or distribution from a plan or IRA;
  • the management of securities or other investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of other persons to provide investment advice or investment management services, selection of investment account arrangements, or voting of proxies appurtenant to securities; or
  • rollovers, transfers, or distributions of assets from a plan or IRA, including recommendations as to whether to engage in the transaction, the amount, the form and the destination of such a rollover, transfer or distribution.

Significant Changes

The investment advice fiduciary standard in the Final Rule has become narrower than initially anticipated:

  • The DOL clarified that with respect to a person who becomes an investment advice fiduciary due to their representing or acknowledging that they are acting as a fiduciary under ERISA with respect to a recommendation, fiduciary status would apply only with respect to that recommendation and not with respect to every future interaction with the same retirement investor regardless of the circumstances.
  • The Final Rule includes a paragraph specifically confirming that sales pitches and investment education can be provided without triggering ERISA fiduciary status. A key component of this consideration is whether a sales pitch is individualized to a retirement investor’s particular needs and circumstances.

Amendment to Exemption for Transactions Involving Investment Advice (PTE 2020-02)

PTE 2020-02 generally permits parties providing fiduciary investment advice to retirement investors to receive reasonable compensation in exchange for their services, which would otherwise be prohibited in the absence of an exemption. The final amendment to PTE 2020-02 broadens the exemption to cover additional transactions and revises certain conditions, including conditions relating to disclosure, recordkeeping, and ineligibility.

The amended PTE 2020-02 applies to covered transactions on or after September 23, 2024; however, there is a one-year phase-in period beginning on September 23, 2024. During this phase-in period, investment professionals may receive reasonable compensation if they comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards and the fiduciary acknowledgement requirement.

Required Disclosure and Fiduciary Acknowledgement

The amended PTE 2020-02 requires investment advisers to provide a written acknowledgement that the institution and the investment professional are providing fiduciary advice and are fiduciaries under ERISA. Furthermore, the amended PTE 2020-02 requires investment advisers to make certain additional disclosures regarding fees, scope of services, and conflicts of interest.

Impartial Conduct Standard

The amended PTE 2020-02 replaces the “best interest standard” for determining impartial conduct with the “Care Obligation” and the “Loyalty Obligation,” which, according to the DOL, are more consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation Best Interest. Under the Care Obligation, advice must reflect the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the retirement investor. Under the Loyalty Obligation, the investment professional must not place the financial or other interests of the professional, their affiliate or related entity, or other party ahead of the interests of the retirement investor or subordinate the retirement investor’s interests to those of the professional, their affiliate, or related entity.

Policies and Procedures

Each investment adviser must establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure that the investment adviser and its investment professionals comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards and other exemption conditions. The policies must mitigate conflict of interests.

Specifically, investment advisers may not use quotas, appraisals, bonuses, special awards, differential compensation, or other similar actions in a manner that is intended, or that a reasonable person would conclude are likely, to result in recommendations that do not meet the Care Obligation or Loyalty Obligation. The investment adviser must provide their complete policies and procedures to the DOL within 30 days of a request.

Additionally, the investment adviser must continue to conduct a retrospective review at least annually that is reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of and achieve compliance with the conditions of this exemption. The investment adviser must maintain records demonstrating compliance with PTE 2020-02 for a period of six years after the covered transaction.

Penalties

The amended PTE 2020-02 broadens the disqualification provisions to include convictions of certain affiliated entities and foreign convictions. Previously, an investment adviser or an investment professional was ineligible only upon a conviction for “crimes arising out of such person’s provision of investment advice” to retirement investors. Under the amended PTE 2020-02, however, a relevant conviction or final judgment that occurs on or after September 23, 2024, with respect to an entity in the same controlled group as an investment adviser would result in such investment adviser’s becoming ineligible to rely on PTE 2020-02 for a 10-year period.

The DOL’s Retirement Security Rule has broad implications for financial institutions, including investment advisers.

COPYRIGHT © 2024, STARK & STARK
For more on the Retirement Security Rule, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit, Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

Read on below for coverage of recent law firm news from McDermott Will & Emery.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit

McDermott Will & Emery’s Andrew C. Liazos, Michael B. Kimberly and Charlie Seidell recently filed an amicus brief in the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). McDermott filed the brief in response to a US Department of Labor (DOL) amicus brief that advanced a novel interpretation of its regulations which, if adopted through litigation, would change longstanding procedures for benefit determinations under self-funded medical plans sponsored by large employers. The amicus brief focuses on key arguments against the DOL’s attempted regulatory reinterpretation, including that:

  • DOL may not rewrite its regulations outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking;
  • DOL’s interpretation of its own regulations is inconsistent with the plain text of the regulations;
  • There are good policy reasons underlying differential treatment of healthcare and disability benefits determinations; and
  • DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in its amicus brief is not entitled to deference under the Supreme Court decision in Kisor.

Read ERIC’s amicus brief here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

ERIC Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

McDermott Will & Emery’s Michael B. Kimberly, Sarah P. Hogarth and Andrew C. Liazos, are co-counsel on a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). The petition calls for review of ERIC’s legal challenge to the City of Seattle’s hotel healthcare “play or pay” ordinance. The ordinance mandates hospitality employers make specified monthly healthcare expenditures for their covered local employees if their healthcare plans do not meet certain requirements. The petition demonstrates that Seattle’s ordinance is a clear attempt to control the benefits provided under medical plans in violation of the preemption provision under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA). This case is of significant national importance. Several other cities have proposed making similar changes, and complying with these types of ordinances will substantially constrain the ability of employers to control the terms of their medical plans on a uniform basis. ERIC’s petition is joined by several trade associations, including the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Benefits Council and the Retail Industry Leaders Association.

Read ERIC’s petition for writ of certiorari here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

 

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For more legal industry news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

 

District Court Declines to Dismiss 401(k) Fee Litigation Case in First Decision Post-Hughes

In the first decision since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hughes v. Northwestern Univ., No. 19-1401, 595 U.S. ___ (U.S. Jan. 24, 2022) (discussed further here), a Georgia federal district court held in favor of plaintiffs and declined to dismiss allegations that defendant’s 401(k) plan included costly and underperforming funds and charged excessive recordkeeping fees. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence by: (1) offering retail share class mutual funds despite the availability of identical lower-cost institutional share classes of these same funds; (2) including actively managed mutual funds which were more expensive than available passively managed funds; (3) selecting and maintaining underperforming funds; and (4) overpaying for recordkeeping services.

In declining to dismiss plaintiffs’ investment management fee claims, the district court relied heavily on Hughes. The court expressed its view that Hughes “suggested” that a defined contribution plan participant may state a prudence claim by merely alleging that the plan offered higher priced retail class mutual funds instead of available identical lower-cost institutional class funds. The district court also rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed in part because the plan offered a variety of investment options that participants could select, including lower-cost passive investment options. The district court explained that Hughes rejected this exact argument in holding that a fiduciary’s decisions are not insulated merely by giving participants choice over their investments and that fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor plan investments.

The court declined to dismiss plaintiffs’ recordkeeping claims because plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the plan paid nearly double the fees charged by similarly sized plans and that defendant failed to monitor those costs. In regards to plaintiffs’ underperformance claims, the court held that the existence and extent of the alleged underperformance was better left for summary judgment given the parties’ differing views on the issue.

Proskauer’s Perspective

While plaintiffs seemingly scored a victory in the first decision since Hughes, the decision does not indicate that this will (or should be) the trend. First, the district court issued its decision one day after Hughes was decided without the benefit of additional briefing, which would have likely included briefing on the Supreme Court’s direction that district courts give “due regard” to the reasons why a fiduciary made the challenged decisions. Second, the district court appears to have, at a minimum, over-emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding as to the plausibility of mutual fund retail share class claims; the Supreme Court did not hold directly or in dicta that a plaintiff may survive dismissal merely by alleging the availability of identical lower-cost mutual fund share classes.

The case is Goodman v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13489 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2022).

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more articles about 401(k) plans, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Sign of Future Changes? DOL Proposes 18-Month Extension of Transition Period for Compliance With ERISA “Fiduciary Investment Advice” Rule

On August 9, the US Department of Labor (DOL) announced in a court filing that it has proposed an 18-month extension of the full implementation of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (the “BIC Exemption”) under the ERISA fiduciary investment advice rule. The Proposed Extension would also apply to the Principal Transaction Exemption and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (together with the BIC Exemption, the “Exemptions”). In April of this year, the DOL extended the effective date of the Rule until June 9 and limited the requirements of the Exemptions to only require compliance with the “impartial conduct standards” (ICS) through December 31 (the “Transition Period”). If the Proposed Extension is approved, full compliance with the Exemptions will not be required until July 1, 2019.

As described in our earlier advisory, “Compliance With the ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule for Private Investment Fund Managers and Sponsors and Managed Account Advisers: Beginning June 9, 2017,” compliance with the ICS generally requires that an investment advice fiduciary (1) act in the “best interest” of plan participants and IRA owners; (2) receive no more than “reasonable compensation” (as defined under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code); and (3) make no materially misleading statements about recommended transactions, fees, compensation and conflicts of interest.

The Proposed Extension was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the form of an amendment to each of the Exemptions.

This post was written by Henry Bregstein Wendy E. Cohen David Y. Dickstein Jack P. Governale Christian B. Hennion and Gary W. Howell of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more legal analysis visit the National Law Review.

HSAs and the ERISA Fiduciary Rule: What Employers Should Know

With the fate of health care reform—and its repeal and/or replacement—up for grabs in Washington, there is a health-related compliance item outside of health care reform that should be on employers’ radars: health savings accounts (HSAs) and the new Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary rule.

We have previously kept you apprised concerning the evolving saga of the ERISA fiduciary rule, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE), and other related exemptions in a series of posts. As you likely know, post-inauguration, this hotly-debated and controversial rule and its exemptions largely became effective June 9, 2017 (with a transition period extending through year-end).

At this stage, most employers and plan sponsors have engaged in dialogue with their retirement plan investment advisors and recordkeepers to understand what is being done to comply with the rule. However, employers offering HSAs, the custodial accounts that can be paired with high deductible health plans (HDHPs) to gain significant tax benefits, should not turn a blind eye to this rule.

Discussing the ERISA fiduciary rule in context of HSAs may seem surprising or bizarre given that HSAs are generally not plans governed by ERISA. These accounts are employee-owned (no “use it or lose it” applies) and not employer-sponsored. That said, the Department of Labor has taken the position that an HSA should be treated like an Individual Retirement Account for purposes of the ERISA fiduciary rule, given that its investment accounts may be used as savings accounts for retiree health care expenses. Depending upon the level of involvement an employer has with the HAS, including whether the employer offers or actively facilitates the provision of investment recommendations/advice on the HSA investments or receives a benefit (including revenue sharing) from an HSA vendor or investment, ERISA’s expanded fiduciary rule could come into effect.

At a minimum, an employer who offers a HDHP and facilitates HSA contributions should consider whether its involvement could trigger ERISA fiduciary status. This undertaking could involve reviewing HSA vendor agreements and related practices touching investments. Even if it is determined that the employer is unlikely to be a fiduciary for its HSA plan, an employer may still benefit from implementing certain features of ERISA best practices to mitigate risk for their organization and employees during this transition time period.

For more legal analysis, go to the National Law Review.

This post was written by Carrie E. Byrnes and Jorge M. Leon of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP. 

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in Favor of “Church Plan” Defendants

Today, the Supreme Court handed a long-awaited victory to religiously affiliated organizations operating pension plans under ERISA’s “church plan” exemption. In a surprising 8-0 ruling, the Court agreed with the Defendants that the exemption applies to pension plans maintained by church affiliated organizations such as healthcare facilities, even if the plans were not established by a church. Justice Kagan authored the opinion, with a concurrence by Justice Sotomayor.  Justice Gorsuch, who was appointed after oral argument, did not participate in the decision.  The opinion reverses decisions in favor of Plaintiffs from three Appellate Circuits – the Third, Seventh, and Ninth.

For those of you not familiar with the issue, ERISA originally defined a “church plan” as “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church.”   Then, in 1980, Congress amended the exemption by adding the provision at the heart of the three consolidated cases.  The new section provides: “[a] plan established and maintained . . . by a church . . . includes a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.”  The parties agreed that under those provisions, a “church plan” need not be maintained by a church, but they differed as to whether a plan must still have been established by a church to qualify for the church-plan exemption.

The Defendants, Advocate Health Care Network, St. Peter’s Healthcare System, and Dignity Health, asserted that their pension plans are “church plans” exempt from ERISA’s strict reporting, disclosure, and funding obligations.  Although each of the plans at issue was established by the hospitals and not a church, each one of the hospitals had received confirmation from the IRS over the years that their plans were, in fact, exempt from ERISA, under the church plan exemption because of the entities’ religious affiliation.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the pension plans, argued that the church plan exemption was not intended to exempt pension plans of large healthcare systems where the plans were not established by a church.

Justice Kagan’s analysis began by acknowledging that the term “church plan” initially meant only “a plan established and maintained . . . by a church.” But the 1980 amendment, she found, expanded the original definition to “include” another type of plan—“a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.’”  She concluded that the use of the word “include” was not literal, “but tells readers that a different type of plan should receive the same treatment (i.e., an exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”

Thus, according to Justice Kagan, because Congress included within the category of plans “established and maintained by a church” plans “maintained by” principal-purpose organizations, those plans—and all those plans—are exempt from ERISA’s requirements. Although the DOL, PBGC, and IRS had all filed a brief supporting the Defendants’ position, Justice Kagan mentioned only briefly the agencies long-standing interpretation of the exemption, and did not engage in any “Chevron-Deference” analysis.  Some observers may find this surprising, because comments during oral argument suggested that some of the Justices harbored concerns regarding the hundreds of similar plans that had relied on administrative interpretations for thirty years.

In analyzing the legislative history, Justice Kagan aptly observed, that “[t]he legislative materials in these cases consist almost wholly of excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual lawmakers—the sort of stuff we have called `among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.’” Nonetheless, after reviewing the history, and as she forecasted by her questioning at oral argument (see our March 29, 2017 Blog, Supreme Court Hears “Church Plan” Erisa Class Action Cases), Justice Kagan rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the legislative history demonstrated an intent to keep the “establishment” requirement.  To do so “would have prevented some plans run by pension boards—the very entities the employees say Congress most wanted to benefit—from qualifying as `church plans’…. No argument the employees have offered here supports that goal-defying (much less that text-defying) statutory construction.”

In sum, Justice Kagan held that “[u]nder the best reading of the statute, a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization therefore qualifies as a `church plan,’ regardless of who established it.”

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence joining the Court’s opinion because she was “persuaded that it correctly interprets the relevant statutory text.” Although she agreed with the Court’s reading of the exemption, she was “troubled by the outcome of these cases.”  Her concern was based on the notion that “Church-affiliated organizations operate for-profit subsidiaries, employee thousands of people, earn billions of dollars in revenue, and compete with companies that have to comply with ERISA.”  This concern appears to be based on the view that some church-affiliated organizations effectively operate as secular, for-profit businesses.

Takeaways:

  • Although this decision is positive news for church plans, it may not be the end of the church plan litigation.  Numerous, large settlements have occurred before and since the Supreme Court took up the consolidated cases, and we expect some will still settle, albeit likely for lower numbers.
  • In addition, Plaintiffs could still push forward with the cases on the grounds that the entities maintaining the church plans are not “principal-purpose organizations” controlled by “a church.”

René E. Thorne and Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C..