Florida Minimum Wage To Increase Tomorrow

An important FYI posted today by Jay P. Lechner of Greenberg Traurig, LLP about the impending increase in minimum wage in Florida:

 

Florida’s minimum wage increases tomorrow to $7.31 per hour — a 6 cent increase. The minimum wage for tipped workers also goes up 6 cents, to $4.29 per hour. These increases are the result of a recent circuit court decision in Leon County ruling that the state’s method of calculating minimum wage was incorrect under the Florida Constitution.

The Florida Constitution and the Florida Minimum Wage Act require the state to annually “calculate an adjusted state Minimum Wage rate by increasing the state Minimum Wage by the rate of inflation for the twelve months prior to each September 1st using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban wage earners and clerical workers….” Neither the Constitution nor the Act specifically addresses deflation in the computation of the minimum wage. Yet, due to a slight cost of living decrease during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2009, the state lowered the state minimum wage rate in 2010 from $7.21 to $7.06, dropping it below the federal minimum wage. Then, in determining the 2011 rate, the state calculated an increase to $7.16 (still below the federal rate) based on a 1.4 percent cost of living increase during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2010.

The court found that the state’s method for calculating the state minimum wage rate was incorrect because, based on the constitutional language, the minimum wage cannot be decreased. Soon after the ruling, a Florida Senate bill intended to amend the Act consistent with the state’s approach was withdrawn from consideration.

When the federal and Florida minimum wage rates differ, Florida employers are required to pay the higher rate. Tomorrow’s increase raises the Florida minimum wage above the $7.25 federal minimum wage rate. Thus, employers currently paying federal minimum wage to eligible workers in Florida must adjust their pay practices accordingly.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

 

2nd Social Media Legal Risk and Strategy Conference Jul 19-21 SanFrancisco

The National Law Review would like you all to know about the upcoming 2nd Social Media Legal Risk and Strategy Conference:  Minimizing Legal Risk for Corporations Engaged in Social Media July 19-21 in San Francisco, CA.  

Key Conference Topics Include:

  • Insights and updates on the changing legal landscape for social media
  • Practical strategies to develop robust and compliant social media strategies
  • The role and involvement of legal in the social media initiatives
  • Overcoming the various legal risk from IP, Employment Law to Privacy when organizations engage in social media engagement
  • Analyzing emerging trends and potential legal risk in social media

Key Conference Features Include:

  • Pre-Conference Workshop A (July 19th): Uncovering Current and Emerging Social Media Trends and Applications To Forecast and Minimize Potential Legal Liabilities
  • Pre-Conference Workshop B (July 19th): Monitoring And Tracking Online Activities To Mitigate Legal Risk
  • For More information and to Register Please Click Here:

Attendees are eligible to receive up to 20 CLE credits!

 

Which Employers Will Be Responsible For Health Coverage In 2014?

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Abby Natelson  of  Greenberg Traurig, LLP – provides more details about which employers will be responsible for providing healthcare coverage in 2014:

The new health care law, otherwise known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), requires that, beginning after December 31, 2013, “applicable large employers” must provide affordable health coverage to their full-time employees.   Failure to do so may subject these employers to a shared responsibility payment, or an “assessable payment,” pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §4980H.

An “applicable large employer” is defined as “an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding calendar year.” A full-time employee with respect to a given month is defined as “an employee who is employed on average at least 30 hours of service per week.”

While these definitions may appear to be straightforward, the recent Notice issued by the Internal Revenue Service, together with the Department of Labor and the Department of Health and Human Services, indicates that the analysis is not so simple.

Notice 2011-36 was issued on May 2, 2011, seeking comments and providing suggested rules for interpreting and applying the meaning of “full-time employees” for purposes of IRC §4980H.

Notably, the Notice provides rules for determining whether an employer has “50 full-time employees,” which includes full-time equivalents. This means that, on a monthly basis, an employer must take the following steps to determine whether 50 full-time employees are employed:

1)                  Determine the number “full-time” employees. 
This group includes seasonal employees and all employees of a controlled group, an affiliated group, and a predecessor employer. This group does not include leased employees.

2)                  Determine the “full-time equivalents.”
This number is determined by aggregating the number of hours of service for all employees determined not to have a full-time status for the month, and then dividing these hours by 120.

At the end of a calendar year, the employer must add together the 12 monthly calculations, and divide the sum by 12 to get the average monthly full-time employees for the prior year. If the final number is 50 or more, the employer is an “applicable large employer.” 

For example, if a business employs 40 full-time employees with 40 hours of service per week and 20 part-time employees with an average of 20 hours of service per week, the employer will still be considered an “applicable large employer.”   This is because each month, the employer will have to add approximately 13.3 “full-time equivalents” (approximately 80 hours worked per month by each part-time employee, multiplied by 20 part-time employees, divided by 120) to the 40 full-time employees, bringing the total “full-time employees” for purposes of health coverage obligations to 53.3. As this example demonstrates, an employer that relies on part-time employees may still be subject to the shared responsibility provisions of the PPACA.

The Notice provides for an exception in the case of seasonal workers. This seasonal employees exception applies where an employer’s workforce exceeds 50 full-time employees for 120 days or less during a calendar year and the employees in excess of 50 were employed during those days as seasonal employees. In this case, the employer is not considered an “applicable large employer.”

Employers “not in existence during an entire preceding calendar year,” are not exempt from assessment payment liability pursuant to the Notice, and will be considered an applicable large employer if the employer reasonably expects to employ an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the current calendar year.

The Notice also indicates the intent of the IRS, DOL, and HHS to allow employers to measure 130 hours of service per month to determine full-time status, rather than 30 hours of service per week. Further, the Notice includes a safe harbor for determining an employee’s full time status for future months based on the employee’s status as a full-time employee in prior months, which is intended to make administration of this rule for full-time employees easier.

In short, the proposed guidance set forth in Notice 2011-36 expands upon the inclusive definition of “full-time employees” set forth by the PPACA and reinforces the continuous burden imposed on employers to evaluate the “full-time” status of each of their employees.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

NLRB A 'Twitter Over Employers' Social Media Policies

Recently posed at the National Law Review by Laura M. Lawless Robertson of Greenberg Traurig, LLP – updates of the National Labor Relation Board’s (NLRB’s) recent recent scrutiny of  employer’s social media policies for compliance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA):  

The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) recent scrutiny of social media policies for compliance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has alarmed many employers – including non-union employers. Two recent developments in this area add fuel to an already heated debate over employer actions based on employees’ use of social media.

The first case is Lee Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Arizona Daily Star. The Daily Star newspaper did not have a social media policy, but urged its reporters to use social media, including Twitter, to disseminate information to the public. After deciding that its crime/public safety reporter had gone too far with his unprofessional, sexually inappropriate, and pro-violence tweets, including one in which he called the reporters on a local television station “stupid,” the newspaper’s managing editor admonished him to refrain from engaging in any further social media postings. The reporter was later terminated, after which he filed a charge with the NLRB, contending that his termination violated the NLRA.

The NLRB General Counsel’s Office acknowledged that, “in warning the Charging Party to cease his inappropriate tweets, and then discharging him for continuing to post inappropriate tweets, the Employer made statements that could be interpreted to prohibit activities protected by Section 7 [of the NLRA],” but nevertheless concluded that the newspaper terminated him for violating workplace policies and disregarding its repeated warnings to cease his unprofessional tweets. The General Counsel’s Office concluded that “it would not effectuate the purposes and policies of the [NLRA] to issue a complaint where the statements were directed to a single employee who was lawfully discharged,” and recommended dismissal of the charge.

If employers presumed, based on the Arizona Daily Star outcome, that the NLRB had backed down from its aggressive stance regarding employers’ social media policies, they would be mistaken. On May 9, 2011, the NLRB issued a complaint alleging that Hispanics United of Buffalo, a nonprofit social service agency, unlawfully discharged five employees who complained about their working conditions on their Facebook accounts. After one employee questioned how hard the staff worked to help the agency’s clients, several employees chimed in on her Facebook status, defending their job performance and blaming workload and staffing issues for any unmet client needs. After learning about the posts, Hispanics United fired all of the employees who participated in the flame war. The NLRB issued a complaint, alleging that the Facebook dialogue was protected concerted activity under the NLRA – a discussion among coworkers about the terms and conditions of their employment and undertaken for mutual aid and protection. The case is set for a hearing before an administrative law judge on June 22, 2011, absent settlement (which seems to be the trend in these sort of cases).

These two cases illustrate that employers may discipline employees for social media misconduct, such as disclosing confidential and proprietary information, engaging in “textual harassment,” or libeling competitors, but must scrupulously avoid instituting or enforcing social media policies that impinge on employees’ rights to discuss the terms and conditions of their employment, e.g., wages and working conditions. One thing is for certain…we haven’t heard the last of this topic from the NLRB.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Illinois Civil Union Law Requires Employer Action

Posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Thomas G. Hancuch and Jessica L. Winski of Vedder Price P.C. a great overview of the implications for employers in Illinois of the law recognizing civil unions which will be in effect June 1st:

The recently enacted Illinois law recognizing civil unions has implications for all Illinois employers.  The law becomes effective June 1, 2011.  Before that date, employers should review and update their policies and employee benefit programs that may be affected by the law.  This is true for both employers that provide domestic partner benefits and those that do not.

The Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act ( the “Civil Union Act”) allows same-sex and opposite-sex couples to enter into a new form of legal relationship called a “civil union.”  Under the Act, persons entering into a civil union are entitled to the same legal protections, benefits, obligations and responsibilities as spouses under Illinois law.  The law provides a process for establishing a civil union and for dissolving one.

The Civil Union Act also contains a reciprocity provision under which Illinois will recognize as a civil union any same-sex marriage, civil union or other substantially similar legal relationship (other than a common law marriage) that was legally entered into in another jurisdiction.  Currently, five states (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont) and the District of Columbia, as well as a number of foreign countries (including Canada) permit same-sex couples to marry.  Other states (including Oregon, Nevada, New Jersey and Washington) have laws similar to the new Illinois Civil Union Act recognizing civil unions or domestic partnerships.  Still other states (including Colorado, Maine, Maryland and Wisconsin) accord more limited legal recognition to such relationships.

Complicating matters, the federal Defense of Marriage Act provides that, for purposes of federal law,  “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  So, while civil union partners generally are to be treated the same as spouses under Illinois law once the Civil Union Act becomes effective later this year, it appears that they will not have the same rights or status as spouses under federal law.

Of course, employers operating in Illinois are subject to both Illinois and federal law.  Certain programs maintained by private-sector employers, such as bereavement leave, are governed exclusively by state law; others, such as retirement plans and flexible spending accounts, exclusively by federal law; and still others, such as insured health benefits plans (but not self-insured plans), by both federal and state law.  Unfortunately, this creates significant complexity for employers.

Illinois employers that currently offer domestic partner benefits should review their domestic partner benefit program in light of the Civil Union Act.  For example, the definition of “domestic partner” in the domestic partner benefits policy and the applicable benefit program documents and leave of absence and other policies may need to be revised to specifically encompass civil union partners.  In addition, consideration should be given to whether an affidavit attesting to the existence of a domestic partnership will continue to be regarded as sufficient, or if Illinois employees should be required to formalize the relationship as a civil union in order to receive domestic partner benefits.

Illinois employers that do not offer domestic partner benefits will need to review their benefit plans and leave of absence and other human resources policies that involve spouses of employees to determine the impact of the Civil Union Act.  For example, an employer with medical or dental insurance funded through a group insurance policy issued in Illinois will find that civil union partners will be eligible for coverage on the same terms as spouses beginning June 1, 2011, even though the employer may not want to provide such benefits.

© 2011 Vedder Price P.C.

Wage and Hour Headaches for Employers: The Department of Labor Has an App for That

Posted this week at the National Law Review  by Mitchell W. QuickBrian P. Paul and Steven A. Nigh of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP – details for employers about the Department of Labor’s (DOL) new App to track wages and work hours….

The U.S. Department of Labor Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) recently released a free application (“app”) for iPhone and iPod Touch that allows employees to track their wages and work hours. The “Timesheet” app allows employees to enter their hourly rate and hours worked for multiple employers. The app also lets employees record time spent on meal breaks and “other” breaks. Time can be recorded manually or by using the app’s embedded stopwatch. Timesheet calculates employee pay, including overtime, and lets employees export Timesheet data via e-mail in Microsoft Excel format. While the current version calculates pay based on an hourly rate, WHD is exploring the possibility of adding functions for commission pay, shift differentials and other methods of compensation in future versions, along with Android- and Blackberry-compatibility. The app currently is available in both English and Spanish.

Timesheet presents a number of challenges to employers. WHD perceives the app as an enforcement aid that contains potentially “invaluable” information about alleged hours worked. Timesheet also encourages employees to file claims by giving them contact information for both local and national wage and hour agencies.  Furthermore, employee complaints about pay for alleged “off-the-clock” work—such as voluntarily checking work e-mails when at home—may increase as such time can be easily recorded. Employees might also record any work issues raised during break time, raising the specter of employers having to treat that time as compensable “hours worked.” Finally, employees improperly classified as exempt and for whom the employer kept no time records would now have “documentation” to support their damage claims.

Fortunately, employers can take steps to protect themselves:

  • Keep accurate records. This obvious best practice has only become more important now that some employees may keep records of their own.
  • Require non-exempt employees to sign off on company time sheets. This will help ensure both sides agree on the number of hours worked, and can help wage and hour disagreements surface—and get resolved—sooner rather than later.
  • Audit exempt employees to make sure they are exempt. This is particularly true for employees for whom the company has limited time records
  • Update employee handbooks. Make sure employees know that they cannot falsify any company records, including time records. Also consider establishing a complaint process for employees to use when they are told not to report work time.
  • Do not retaliate against employees who keep their own time records. Retaliation claims are on the rise, and Timesheet is another possible pitfall for employers.

“Timesheet” should serve as a reminder of the importance of maintaining complete, accurate wage and hour records.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Additional Information on this is also available here:

Department of State Releases June 2011 Visa Bulletin

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Morgan Lewis –  details on the June 2011 Visa Bulletin:

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its June 2011 Visa Bulletin.The Visa Bulletin sets out per country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their status to that of permanent resident, or to obtain approval of an immigrant visa application at an American embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the June 2011 Bulletin Say?

EB-1: All EB-1 categories remain current.

EB-2: Priority dates remain current for foreign nationals in the EB-2 category from all countries except China and India.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for Indian and Chinese nationals are as follows:

China: October 15, 2006 (forward movement of 10 weeks)

India: October 15, 2006 (forward movement of 14 weeks)

EB-3: There is continued backlog in the EB-3 category. 

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: May 15, 2004 (forward movement of four weeks)

India: April 22, 2002 (forward movement of one week)

Mexico: December 22, 2004 (forward movement of 14 weeks)

Philippines: September 15, 2005 (forward movement of three weeks)

Rest of the World: September 15, 2005 (forward movement of three weeks)

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward, or remain static and unchanged. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning, and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the June 2011 Visa Bulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website at http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5452.html.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Bill Allowing More Offshore Drilling Introduced to Congress

Posted today at the National Law Review by Sabrina Mizrachi of Greenberg Traurig, LLP – news on the Infrastructure Jobs and Energy Independence Act introduced in Congress yesterday……

The Infrastructure Jobs and Energy Independence Act was introduced on May 12, 2011, and seeks to allow more offshore drilling in order to reduce U.S. reliance on imported fuels and create jobs. The bill was introduced by a bipartisan group of four congressmen, Democrats Jim Costa of California and Tim Walz of Minnesota in collaboration with Pennsylvania Republicans Tim Murphy and Bill Shuster.

The bill contains no new taxes or increase of existing taxes, and would allow drillers to reach natural-gas reservoirs that could fuel industry in the U.S. for 63 years and the U.S. oil industry for 80 years, and also create 1.2 million jobs per year.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Comprehensive Summary of the Final Regulations to the ADA Amendments Act

This week’s guest blogger at the National Law Review is Jeffrey S. Nowak of  Franczek Radelet P.C..  Jeffrey provides a very comprehensive overview of the final regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA):   

On March 25, 2011, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published final regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), a statute that now greatly expands the number of employees and applicants who will be considered “disabled.”  The final regulations fundamentally change the manner in which an employer must treat and manage employees with medical conditions in the workplace, since it now will be much easier for individuals to establish that they are disabled.  This Comprehensive Summary provides an overview of some of the key provisions in the final ADAAA regulations to help employers better understand the key changes in the law and adopt strategies to minimize liability.

Background

As originally enacted, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) defines an individual with a disability as a person who has a physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” one or more “major life activities.”  Individuals may also be covered under the ADA if they have a “record of” a disability or are “regarded as” disabled.  Since the ADA took effect, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have construed the definition of disability in a relatively narrow fashion.  On September 25, 2008, President Bush signed the ADAAA into law.  Although the ADAAA retains the same definition of “disability” under the original Act, it makes sweeping changes to the manner in which these terms are to be construed.

In short, the ADAAA and its final regulations now shift the focus of virtually every situation that implicates the ADA.  Before the amendments, the interpretation of the ADA largely focused on whether an individual was substantially limited in a major life activity and, therefore, disabled under the ADA.  Under the ADAAA’s broader construction, the focus is not directed toward the actual definition of disability, but rather on discrimination and reasonable accommodation.  Given the ADA’s new statutory framework and new regulations that stretch the statute even further, employers should be prepared now more than ever before to respond to accommodation requests, make accommodations where necessary, and take precautions to avoid discriminatory decisions involving employees and applicants with medical conditions.

A copy of the final regulations can be found here.  The EEOC also has issued a guidance sheet and a fact sheet to aid employers in understanding the final regulations.

The final regulations address key issues, which are covered in this executive summary.

  • Will certain impairments always be considered “disabilities”?
  • What constitutes a “major life activity?”
  • What does it mean to be “substantially limited” in a major life activity?
  • To what extent are temporary or episodic impairments considered disabilities?
  • How do “mitigating measures” affect the analysis of whether an individual is disabled?
  • What does it mean for an employee to be “regarded as” disabled?

Broad Construction of the Definition of “Disability”

Taking its lead from the ADAAA, the final regulations provide that the definition of “disability” should be “broadly” construed “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.”  (The message from Congress and the EEOC to employers could not be any clearer: Stop focusing on whether an individual is disabled and focus instead on reasonable accommodation.)  Although the final regulations track the definition of “disability,” a term which remained intact, the regulations clarify that there is a shift in focus to whether employers have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination occurred, as opposed to whether an individual meets the definition of a “disability.”

Certain impairments “virtually always” covered

Further illustrating the point, in spite of the ADAAA’s (and the final regulations’) rejection of the notion of a “per se” disability, the final regulations take the extraordinary step of listing certain impairments that “will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity.”  The EEOC suggests that these assessments should be “particularly simple and straightforward” (tellingly, the title of the subsection is “Predictable Assessments”).  These impairments include:

  • Deafness
  • Blindness
  • Intellectual disability (formerly known as mental retardation)
  • Partially or completely missing limbs
  • Mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair
  • Autism
  • Cancer
  • Cerebral palsy
  • Diabetes
  • Epilepsy
  • HIV or AIDS
  • Multiple sclerosis
  • Muscular dystrophy
  • Major depression
  • Bipolar disorder
  • Post-traumatic stress disorder
  • Obsessive compulsive disorder
  • Schizophrenia

This list includes many conditions that often were not substantially limiting impairments under the pre-ADAAA.  Nevertheless, the list tends to undermine the EEOC’s long-held position that an “individualized assessment” should be conducted to determine whether an impairment is indeed a disability.

Notably, the final regulations removed a section from the proposed regulations that listed certain impairments that “may be disabling for some individuals but not for others,” such as asthma, back/leg impairment, carpal tunnel syndrome, high blood pressure, psychiatric impairment (less severe than major depression) and learning disability.  In light of the expansive sweep of the final regulations, however, plaintiffs with impairments like these, as well as others, likely will not face a difficult task in convincing a court that they are disabled.

Less Demanding Standard for “Substantially Limits”?

To be disabled, one must have an impairment that “substantially limits” a major life activity.  Under the pre-ADAAA, employers often questioned the extent to which an impairment must “substantially limit” before an individual is considered disabled.  Unfortunately for employers, the EEOC declined to quantify the term “substantially limits” in the final ADAAA regulations, explaining that “a new definition would…lead to greater focus and intensity of attention on the threshold issue of coverage than intended by Congress.”  As such, the final regulations offer employers little concrete guidance in identifying the threshold at which an impairment qualifies as “substantially limiting,” aside from the presumption that it must be a lower threshold than previously adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decisions leading up to passage of the ADAAA.

Instead, the regulations provide “nine rules of construction” to be applied in determining whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity.  Most of the rules come directly from the language of the ADAAA, but several have been added by the EEOC:

  1. “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.  ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”
  2. The determination of whether an impairment is “substantially limiting” should be made by comparing the ability of an individual to the general population.  The impairment does not need to “prevent, or significantly or severely restrict” the performance of a major life activity in order to be substantially limiting.
  3. In all ADA cases, the focus should be on whether the employer has complied with its statutory obligations, since the “threshold issue” of substantially limits should not require extensive analysis.
  4. “The determination requires an ‘individualized assessment,’ but the assessment should be done by requiring “a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.”
  5. Comparing an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the general population should not generally require scientific, medical or statistical analysis.
  6. The determination should be made without regard to the “ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” other than ordinary contact lenses and eyeglasses.
  7. “An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”
  8. An impairment need not limit more than one major life activity.
  9. The effects of an impairment lasting or expecting to last fewer than six months can be “substantially limiting.”

The Effect of Condition, Manner and Duration

Commenting further on the “substantially limits” prong, the final regulations explain that, to determine whether an individual is “substantially limited” in a major life activity, it may be useful to consider the condition under or the manner in which an individual performs a major life activity; the duration of time it takes the individual to the activity as compared to most people in the general population; and the difficulty, effort, pain or amount of time required to perform the activity.

For example, under the new regulations, it does not matter whether an individual with a learning disability can read and write like the majority of people in the general population.  The regulations focus instead on how difficult it was for the individual to reach the level of literacy, (i.e., how long it took and the conditions which the individual had to overcome).  As a result, an individual may be substantially limited in a major life activity even if he or she can perform the activity at the same level as the general population, if it took more time, effort or work to become proficient compared to most people in the general population.

The Interpretation of “Major Life Activities” is Expanded Further

To be disabled under the law, one must have a physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” one or more “major life activities”.  When determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, according to the final regulations and EEOC’s interpretive guidance provide, the process should “not demand extensive analysis” and “usually will not require scientific, medical or statistical analysis.”

Notably, the final regulations expand an already “non-exhaustive” list of what may be deemed major life activities to include eating, sleeping, standing, lifting, bending, reading, concentrating, thinking and communicating.  The final regulations also include additional examples of major life activities, such as sitting, reaching and interacting with others.  When determining other examples of major life activities, the final regulations expressly reject the pre-ADAAA interpretation that the activity must be of “central importance to daily life,” a rule which expressly rejects the Supreme Court’s ruling in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams.  In effect, an activity no longer is required to be of “central importance.”

In a significant departure from the past, the ADAAA and final regulations expand the definition of “major life activities” to include the “operation of major bodily functions,” such as the immune system and normal cell growth, and neurological, bowel, bladder, circulatory and reproductive functions.  The final regulations list several additional functions, such as cardiovascular, lymphatic and musculoskeletal, and specify that the operation of a major bodily function includes the operation of an individual organ within the body (such as the liver or heart).  The appendix to the final regulations provides several examples of impairments that affect major bodily functions, e.g., cancer affects normal cell growth; diabetes affects functions of the pancreas and endocrine system; and rheumatoid arthritis affects musculoskeletal functions.

Work as a “major life activity”

The regulations also breathe new life into the “major life activity” of working.  Under the pre- ADAAA, a plaintiff’s claim that he or she was substantially limited in the major life activity of work almost always was dismissed by the court, largely because the employee was unable to show that the impairment substantially limited the employee’s ability to perform a “broad range” of jobs.  The final regulations maintain this requirement but lower the employee’s burden, claiming that this previous standard was “overly strict.”  Under the new regulations, if an individual’s job requires heavy lifting but the employee cannot lift heavy items and cannot perform the job or other jobs that require heavy lifting, then the employee is substantially limited in performing the class of jobs that require heavy lifting.  Is this shift in the rule all for naught?  As the final regulations point out, an impairment that substantially limits working will in most situations also substantially limit another major life activity.

Other Significant Regulatory Changes

Nearly All “Mitigating Measures” Are No Longer Considered

Under prior Supreme Court and federal appellate court precedent, employers were allowed to consider “mitigating measures” in determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity under the ADA.  For example, if an individual used a hearing aid or cochlear implant due to a hearing impairment, it typically was not considered a disability because the individual was not substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing.  Because of the mitigating measure (i.e., the hearing aid), they could hear perfectly well.  Under the new regulations, however, employers are no longer allowed to consider such measures.  As a result, employers will be required to analyze each individual’s impairment in its unmitigated state.  Thus, the individual with a hearing aid would likely be substantially limited in hearing because we are obligated now to consider them without the use of a hearing aid.

The final regulations do provide one important exception: employers are permitted to consider the ameliorative effects of using ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.  The term “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses” is defined as lenses that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or to eliminate refractive error.  For example, an individual with severe myopia whose visual acuity is fully corrected is not substantially limited in seeing because the ameliorative effect of the lenses must be considered.  Similarly, eyeglasses or contact lenses that are the wrong or outdated prescription may nevertheless be “ordinary” if there is evidence that a proper prescription would fully correct visual acuity or eliminate refractive error.

What is also important to note is that both the ameliorative and non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, as well as the individual’s use or non-use of such measures (e.g., taking or refusing to take medication, even though prescribed by a physician) can be considered when determining whether the employee is a “qualified” individual with a disability or whether the employee poses a direct threat to safety; however, it will not affect whether the individual meets the definition of being disabled.

Temporary and Episodic Impairments May Constitute disabilities

Under the final regulations, short-term impairments and chronic impairments with short-term symptoms may be considered disabilities.  In the past, many courts declined to extend ADA coverage to individuals whose impairments were substantially limiting for only a short or limited period of time.  The new regulations reject this reasoning and prescribe that the duration of an impairment or symptom should not be dispositive in determining whether an individual is disabled.

Temporary and Short-Term Impairments

Clearly, one of the most significant changes to the final regulations is the EEOC’s decision to reject the long-held view that temporary impairments are not substantially limiting.  The EEOC previously took the position that the duration or expected duration of an impairment should be considered in determining whether the impairment is disabling.  That no longer appears to be the case.  The final regulations ambiguously state that “an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting.” (Emphasis added).  When this language was first proposed, many commenters expressed that the new language would create confusion as to how long an employer’s impairment must last or be expected to last in order to impose ADA obligations on the employer.  (Further complicating matters, the regulations state that an employee who is regarded as having a “transitory and minor” impairment that is expected to heal shortly is not considered disabled.  Thus, it is conceivable that individual with a temporary impairment, such as a broken hand, may be disabled because the impairment substantially limits a major life activity, but may not be “regarded as” disabled for purposes of the Act.)

In response to these concerns, the EEOC opined that specifying a durational minimum for a disability would impose a more stringent standard than what Congress required.  In fact, the final regulations go even further than the proposed regulations on this point.  In the proposed rules, the EEOC identified a category of temporary non-chronic impairments that usually would not be considered a disability—for example, the common cold, seasonal influenza, a sprained joint, minor and non-chronic gastrointestinal disorders, a broken bone expected to heal completely, appendicitis and seasonal allergies.  The EEOC deleted this category in the final regulations, explaining that the provision caused confusion and was too limiting.

The EEOC’s position on the issue of temporary impairments is debatable.  It is not clear that Congress intended to extend ADA coverage to short-lived impairments.  Moreover, it is still likely that certain impairments of short duration which are expected to heal quickly, such as a common cold or a sprained ankle, will not be considered disabilities.  However, the regulations make clear that employers must consider all impairments, even short term ones, on a case-by-case basis.

Episodic Impairments

Under the ADAAA and the final regulations, an episodic impairment or impairment in remission is a disability if the impairment would substantially limit a major life activity when active.  This means that an individual with a serious chronic condition such as epilepsy or cancer could be considered disabled under the Act even if that person rarely or never experiences symptoms that would impact their employment.  The regulations provide specific examples of impairments that may be episodic in nature, including epilepsy, cancer, multiple sclerosis, hypertension, diabetes, asthma, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.

The Act’s express inclusion of episodic impairments presents some practical challenges for employers.  Many episodic impairments are unpredictable in their effects on the individual.  For example, an employee diagnosed with asthma may not experience an attack for several months.  However, the fact that an asthma attack could limit a major life activity may require the employer to provide a reasonable accommodation.  The same is true for progressive impairments, such as Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s Disease.  Many Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s patients do not experience any symptoms in the early stages of the disease.  Nevertheless, the fact that an individual could at some point in the future experience symptoms that would substantially limit a major life activity likely would render the person disabled even before the condition worsens and (practically speaking) substantially limits a major life activity.

“Regarded As” Individuals Need Only Prove Perception of an “Impairment”

Under the original ADA as interpreted by the courts, an individual was “regarded as” disabled only when the employer perceived the individual to have an impairment that “substantially limited” him or her in a major life activity.  Under the final regulations, the same individual seeking to bring a “regarded as” claim need not prove that the employer believed the individual to have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, but merely that the employer perceived the employee as having an “impairment,” and based an employment decision on that perception.

Under the ADAAA, an individual subjected to a prohibited action (e.g., failure to hire, denial of promotion, termination or harassment) because of an actual or perceived impairment will meet the “regarded as” definition of disability whether or not the impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity unless the impairment is both transitory and minor.  The ADAAA further clarifies that a person who is “regarded as” disabled is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation unless the person also fits within one of the other two prongs of the definition of “disability.”

Notably, the final regulations specify that the “regarded as” prong should be the primary means of establishing coverage in ADA cases that do not involve reasonable accommodation, and that consideration of coverage under the first and second prongs will generally not be necessary except in situations where an individual needs a reasonable accommodation.

The final regulations further clarify that establishing that an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” does not, by itself, establish liability.  Thus, even where an individual proves that an employer made a decision on the basis of an actual or perceived impairment, the employee must still show that he was “qualified” for the position in question in order to establish an ADA violation (i.e., he can perform the essential job functions of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation).   The employer may also utilize any otherwise available statutory defenses.  For example, an employer may still defend a decision to refuse to hire an applicant on the grounds that the individual would pose a “direct threat” to health and safety due to the nature of his impairment.

The proposed regulations originally identified several concrete examples of “transitory and minor” impairments that would not be sufficient to meet the “regarded as” prong of the statute, such as a broken bone that is expected to heal normally or a sprained wrist that was expected to heal in three weeks.  Unfortunately, these concrete examples were omitted from in the final regulations, leaving employers without clear guidance as to what constitutes a “transitory and minor” impairment.  Instead the appendix to the final regulations stress only that the inquiry as to whether an impairment is “transitory and minor” is an objective standard and provides these examples:

For example, an employer who terminates an employee whom it believes has bipolar disorder cannot take advantage of this exception by asserting that it believed the employee’s impairment was transitory and minor, since bipolar disorder is not objectively transitory and minor.  At the same time, an employer that terminated an employee with an objectively ‘‘transitory and minor’’ hand wound, mistakenly believing it to be symptomatic of HIV infection, will nevertheless have ‘‘regarded’’ the employee as an individual with a disability, since the covered entity took a prohibited employment action based on a perceived impairment (HIV infection) that is not ‘‘transitory and minor.’’

Notably, the final regulations give no example of an impairment that EEOC would find to be “transitory and minor” under this standard.

What about an employee’s symptoms?

In a nod to employers, the final regulations do not include a provision contained in the proposed regulations providing that actions taken because of an impairment’s symptoms (or because of the use of mitigating measures) constitute actions taken because of an impairment under the “regarded as” prong.  Employer commentary pointed out that this proposed standard could create liability for an employer when, for example, disciplining an employee for violating a workplace rule, even where the violation resulted from a symptom of an underlying impairment of which the employer was unaware.  This would have resulted in a clear departure from the EEOC’s existing policy guidance and court decisions, which recognize, among other things, that an employer may discipline an employee for job related misconduct resulting from a disability if the rule or expectation at issue is job related and consistent with business necessity.  EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, EEOC Notice No.  915.002 Mar. 25, 1997 http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.  The preamble to the Final Regulations states that this prior Guidance remains in effect, at least for now.

How Do Employers Respond to the New Regulations?

One might ask whether any employee is considered disabled under these new regulations.  Clearly, the ADAAA and its final regulations change how employers respond to and manage employees with medical conditions and who request accommodations in the workplace.  At a minimum, we suggest employers take the following approach to the “new” ADA.

  • The range of impairments that may substantially limit a major life activity has widened considerably.  Although not every impairment will constitute a disability, the analysis of whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity will not be the focus of a court’s inquiry.  In light of this change in emphasis, employers should not focus on whether an employee is actually “disabled;” rather, they should focus on insuring that they are in compliance with the statute.  Therefore, as an initial matter, employers should review and revise workplace reasonable accommodation policies to ensure employees are aware of the policies and to make clear the lines of communication as to accommodations in the workplace.  Similarly, employers should maintain processes for identifying, evaluating, documenting and providing reasonable accommodations as required.
  • Employers should be proactive about engaging in an interactive process with employees who have an impairment.  In doing so, they should identify which among their personnel will be responsible for addressing issues of accommodation, and actually engage in an interactive process when an individual makes a request for assistance in the workplace.  An employer’s best tactic in defending an ADA lawsuit is to demonstrate that it made good faith efforts to accommodate an employee, rather than questioning or challenging the employee’s medical condition.  Thus, the interactive process above must become the norm.
  • Review all job descriptions to ensure they specifically and accurately describe the essential functions of the job.  Notably, under the new definition of a “regarded as” disability, any decision that relies in whole or in part on any perceived or actual physical impairment will be subject to scrutiny under the ADAAA.  It is now more important than ever to insure that any physical or mental job requirements are truly necessary.Employers should insure that all anti-harassment policies explicitly prohibit harassment based on disability, or perceived or actual physical or mental impairments.  Potential liability for disability-related harassment claims has increased because offensive statements that relate in any way to a mental or physical impairment may give rise to liability, regardless of whether the alleged victim actually suffered from an impairment or was otherwise disabled.  For example, an employee who calls a co-worker “psycho” or “retarded” could potentially create an actionable hostile work environment under the ADA even if the co-worker has no mental health history and has an above-average IQ.
  • Properly and contemporaneously document employment decisions involving an employee who is an individual with a disability or has a record of a disability.
  • Analyze pre- and post-employment testing and screening (including language contained in employment applications) to ensure they are job-related and consistent with business necessity.
  • Train supervisors and managers as to the broad coverage of the ADAAA and their responsibilities under the new Act.  At a minimum, the focus of training should include: 1) how they identify requests for workplace modifications; and 2) who they partner with in Human Resources as to the “interactive process” regarding modifications.

© 2011, Franczek Radelet P.C. 


Privacy Protection and Data Breaches: HR Tip of the Month

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Trent S. Dickey , David H. Ganz, and Jill Turner Lever  of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.  – some important things for employers in New York and New Jersey to consider about identity theft of their employees’ information as well as their customers information:  

Identity theft is a major concern for employers who are routinely entrusted with private information of employees and customers, especially in the electronic age, where improper use of such data can have widespread ramifications.  According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), each year as many as 9 million Americans have their identities stolen. Is your company prepared to address a data breach?

Federal law and many state laws require employers to safeguard private information.  For instance, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires companies to take appropriate measures to dispose of sensitive information derived from consumer reports.  If a company becomes aware of a data breach, the FTC also instructs it to immediately report the breach to the local police department, the local office of the FBI, or the U.S. Secret Service, and then to provide notice to individuals whose information was compromised to allow those individuals to take steps to mitigate the misuse of their personal information.  Many state laws also require that notice be provided upon discovery of a breach.

New Jersey has enacted the Identity Theft Prevention Act (ITPA), which requires any business that lawfully collects and maintains computerized records to disclose to the New Jersey State Police and to any New Jersey customer (broadly defined to include an individual who provides personal information to a business, including employees) when that customer’s personal information was or may have been accessed by an unauthorized person.  In the case of a large scale breach, businesses are also required to report to consumer reporting agencies.  In addition, the ITPA regulates the use of social security numbers as identifiers, prohibits the display and usage of social security numbers on printed materials except where required by law, and requires the destruction of records containing personal information when no longer needed.

Similarly, the New York State Information Security Breach and Notification Act requires companies who own or license computerized data to provide prompt notification following the discovery of a breach to any New York resident whose private information was, or may have been, acquired without authorization. The New York State Social Security Number Protection Law regulates the handling of social security numbers and requires covered persons and entities to provide safeguards “necessary or appropriate” to preclude unauthorized access to social security account numbers and to protect the confidentiality of such numbers.

Employers must be prepared to continuously protect information.  Best practices dictate that employers prepare guidelines for safeguarding private information.


This Alert has been prepared by Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. for informational purposes only and does not constitute advertising or solicitation and should not be used or taken as legal advice. Those seeking legal advice should contact a member of the Firm or legal counsel licensed in their state. Transmission of this information is not intended to create, and receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Confidential information should not be sent to Sills Cummis & Gross without first communicating directly with a member of the Firm about establishing an attorney-client relationship.    

Copyright © 2011 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. All rights reserved.