Tag: employers

Privacy Rights in a Remote Work World: Can My Employer Monitor My Activity?

The rise in remote work has brought with it a rise in employee monitoring.  Between 2019 and 2021, the percentage of employees working primarily from home tripled.  As “productivity paranoia” crept in, employers steadily adopted employee surveillance technologies.  This has raised questions about the legal and ethical implications of enhanced monitoring, in some cases prompting proposed legislation or the expanded use of laws already on the books.

Employee monitoring is nothing new.  Employers have long used supervisors and timeclock programs, among other systems, to monitor employee activity.  What is new, however, is the proliferation of sophisticated monitoring technologies—as well as the expanding number and variety of companies that are employing them.

 While surveillance was once largely confined to lower-wage industries, white-collar employers are increasingly using surveillance technologies to track their employees’ activity and productivity.  Since the COVID-19 pandemic started in March 2020, one in three medium-to-large companies has adopted some form of employee monitoring, with the total fraction of employers using surveillance technologies closer to two in three.  Workers who are now subject to monitoring technologies include doctors, lawyers, academics, and even hospice chaplains.  Employee monitoring technologies can track a range of information, including:

  • Internet use (e.g., which websites and apps an employee has visited and for how long);

  • How long a computer sits idle;

  • How many keystrokes an employee types per hour;

  • Emails that are sent or received from a work or personal email address (if the employee is logged into a personal account on a work computer);

  • Screenshots of a computer’s display; and

  • Webcam photos of the employee throughout the day.

These new technologies, coupled with the shift to remote work, have blurred the line between the professional and the personal, the public and the private.  In the face of increased monitoring, this blog explores federal and state privacy regulations and protections for employees.

What are the legal limitations on employee monitoring?

 There are two primary sources of restrictions on employee monitoring: (1) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.; and (2) common-law protections against invasions of privacy.  The ECPA is the only federal law that regulates the monitoring of electronic communications in the workplace.  It extends the Federal Wiretap Act’s prohibition on the unauthorized interception of communications, which was initially limited to oral and wire communications, to cover electronic communications like email.  As relevant here, the ECPA contains two major exceptions.  The first exception, known as the business purpose exception, allows employers to monitor employee communications if they can show that there is a legitimate business purpose for doing so.  The second exception, known as the consent exception, permits employers to monitor employee communications so long as they have consent to do so.  Notably, this exception is not limited to business communications, allowing employers to monitor employees’ personal communications if they have the requisite consent.  Together, the business purpose and consent exceptions significantly limit the force of the ECPA, such that, standing alone, it permits most forms of employee monitoring.

In addition to the ECPA’s limited protections from surveillance, however, some states have adopted additional protections of employee privacy.  Several state constitutions, including those of California, South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, guarantee citizens a right to privacy.  While these provisions do not directly regulate employers’ activity, they may bolster employees’ claims to an expectation of privacy.  Other states have enacted legislation that limits an employer’s ability to monitor employees’ social media accounts.  Virginia, for example, prohibits employers from requiring employees to disclose their social media usernames or passwords.  And a few states have enacted laws to bolster employees’ access to their data.  For example, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), which comes into full effect on January 1, 2023, and replaces the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will provide employees with the right to access, delete, or opt-out of the sale of their personal information, including data collected through employee monitoring programs.  Employees will also have the right to know where, when, and how employers are using their data.  The CPRA’s protections are limited, however.  Employers will still be able to use surveillance technologies, and to make employment decisions based on the data these technologies gather.

Finally, several states require employers to provide notice to employees before monitoring or intercepting electronic communications.  New York recently adopted a law,  Senate Bill (SB) S2628, that requires all private-sector employers to provide notice of any electronic monitoring to employees (1) upon hiring, via written or electronic employee acknowledgment; and (2) in general, in a “conspicuous place” in the workplace viewable to all employees.  The new law is aimed at the forms of monitoring that have proliferated since the shift to remote work, and covers surveillance technologies that target the activities or communications of individual employees.  Delaware and Connecticut also have privacy laws that predate SB S2628.  Delaware requires notice to employees upon hire that they will be monitored, but does not require notice within the workplace.  Meanwhile, Connecticut requires notice of monitoring to be conspicuously displayed in the workplace but does not require written notice to employees upon hire.  Accordingly, in many states, employee privacy protections exceed the minimum standard of the ECPA, though they still are not robust.

How does employee monitoring intersect with other legal rights?

Other legal protections further limit employee monitoring.

First, in at least some jurisdictions, employees who access personal emails on their work computer, or conduct other business that would be protected under attorney-client privilege, maintain their right to privacy for those communications.  In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div. 2009), the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, considered a case in which an employee had accessed her personal email account on her employer’s computer and exchanged emails from that account with her attorney regarding a possible employment case against her employer.  The employer, who had installed an employee monitoring program, was able to access and read the employee’s emails.  The Court held that the employee still had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that sending and receiving emails on a company-issued laptop did not waive the attorney-client privilege.  The Court thus required the employer to turn over all emails between the employee and her attorney that were in its possession and directed the employer to delete all of these emails from its hard drives.  Moving forward, the Court instructed that, while “an employer may trespass to some degree into an employee’s privacy when buttressed by a legitimate business interest,” such a business interest held “little force . . . when offered as the basis for an intrusion into communications otherwise shielded by the attorney-client privilege.”  Stengart, 408 N.J. Super. at 74.

Second, employee monitoring can run afoul of protections related to union and other concerted activity.  The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently announced a plan to curtail workplace surveillance technologies.  Existing law prohibits employers from using surveillance technologies to monitor or record union activity, such as by recording employees engaged in picketing, or otherwise interfering with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity.  The General Counsel’s plan outlines a new, formal framework for analyzing whether employee monitoring interferes with union or concerted activity.  Under this framework, an employer presumptively violates Section 7 or Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) where their “surveillance and management practices, viewed as a whole, would tend to interfere with or prevent a reasonable employee from engaging in” protected activities.  Examples of technologies that are presumptively violative include key loggers, webcam photos, and audio recordings.

Do I have a claim against my employer?

While federal and state restrictions on employee monitoring are limited, you may have a legal claim against your employer if its monitoring is overly intrusive or it mishandles your personal data.  First, an invasion-of-privacy claim, for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, could exist if your employer monitors your activity in a way that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, such as by accessing your work laptop’s webcam or internal microphone and listening in on private affairs in your home.  Second, you may have a claim against your employer for violating its legal duty to protect your personal information if data it collects in the course of monitoring your work activity is compromised.  In Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2018), employees at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and UPMC McKeesport (collectively, UPMC) filed a class-action complaint alleging that UPMC breached its legal duty of reasonable care when it failed to protect employees’ data, which was stolen from UPMC computers.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs, holding that employers have an affirmative duty to protect the personal information of their employees.  Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding was grounded in tort principles that are recognized by many states (i.e., duty of care and negligence), it may pave a path for future cases in other jurisdictions.  Third, if any medical information is accessed and improperly used by your employer, you may have a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which requires that employers keep all employee medical information confidential and separate from all other personnel information.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)-(C), (4)(B)-(C).

Conclusion

Employees are monitored more consistently and in more ways than ever before. By and large, employee monitoring is legal.  Employers can monitor your keystrokes, emails, and internet activity, among other metrics.  While federal regulation of employee monitoring is limited, some states offer additional protections of employee privacy.  Most notably, employers are increasingly required to inform employees that their activity will be monitored.  Moreover, other legal rights, such as the right to engage in concerted activity and to have your medical information kept confidential, provide checks on employee surveillance.  As employee monitoring becomes more commonplace, restrictions on surveillance technologies and avenues for legal recourse may also grow.

Article By Bonnie Henry of Katz Banks Kumin LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

Employment Tip of the Month – December 2022

Q:  As an employer, am I legally required to allow employees to bring marijuana to an office holiday party?

A:  No.  While adult recreational use of marijuana is now legal in 21 states and the District of Columbia, the use of marijuana remains illegal under federal law and employers with drug-free and smoke-free workplace policies can prohibit marijuana consumption in the workplace and during employer-sponsored events. Employers who wish to prohibit use of recreational marijuana at the office holiday party should remind employees of the policies and ensure that they understand the policies apply at all employer-sponsored events – even if the event is held after work hours and off company premises.

Laws surrounding the recreational use of marijuana differ from one state to another and evolve quickly.  Before taking adverse action against an employee for marijuana use, an employer should consult the specific laws governing their jurisdiction.

Article By Laura Stutz of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

For more labor and employment law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Wilson Elser

Five States Put Abortion Questions on the Ballot; Health Care and Other Employers Should Stay Tuned

In the wake of the landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, we have been closely monitoring legal developments across the country. In addition to well publicized “trigger laws” that were effectuated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s order, states have taken up a variety of legislative actions in response to the ruling, which placed authority for the regulation of abortion with the states.

On Election Day, five states will have voters consider various proposals in light of Dobbs and its directive that abortion law belongs with the people. Here is a run-down of abortion-related ballot initiatives that will be put to a popular vote on November 8, 2022.

A Constitutional Amendment for California

On the ballot in California is Proposition 1: Constitutional Right to Reproductive Freedom, which would amend the state Constitution at Article I, Section 1.1, to provide that the state cannot “deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives.” Any amendment to the California Constitution requires a simple majority of voters. If the amendment is passed, changes take effect the fifth day after the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election.

Should Proposition 1 pass, it would add express protection for reproductive freedom, including decisions about abortion and contraception, to the state constitution, under its existing guaranteed right to privacy. If the proposition does not pass, it will not affect the status quo of reproductive rights in California: while current protections for abortion and other reproductive medical care would not be constitutionally guaranteed, they would remain in place under state law.

California currently has strong protections for the right to abortion, generally only prohibiting abortion at viability. Since the Dobbs decision earlier this year, California has promoted access to abortion, including launching abortion.ca.gov, a website dedicated towards providing information on reproductive health care services to people both inside and outside of California. Recently, in late September, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a package of 12 bills of abortion protections, aimed towards improving access to abortion and protecting patients and clinicians who undergo or provide them.

With the backdrop of an already-strong California legal reproductive health network, consistent polling indicates the ballot measure is expected to pass by a wide margin. Passage of the proposition will likely signal and establish the state as a refuge for individuals from more restrictive states seeking abortions.

Michigan May Modify its Constitution, Too

Michigan will also turn to its voters to decide whether its state constitution should be amended to include protections for abortion. The Michigan proposal, referred to as “Proposal 3 of 2022 – ‘Reproductive Freedom for All’ Petition,” seeks to protect the right to an abortion with a constitutional amendment that declares a right to reproductive freedom. The petition sets forth proposed language for a new section of the Michigan Constitution, stating, in part, that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care.”

Proposal 3 would take effect 45 days following the ballot initiative if approved by the majority of voters. It would (1) establish new individual rights to reproductive freedom, to broadly include the right to make and carry out all decisions relating to pregnancy; (2) permit state regulation of abortion in limited circumstances; (3) forbid discrimination in enforcement of reproductive rights; (4) prohibit adverse action by the state with respect to “potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes;” and (5) invalidate state laws that conflict with the Constitution as amended by Proposal 3.

If Proposal 3 is not passed and the state constitution remains as is, the future of the right to an abortion in Michigan will be unclear. Michigan has a pre-Roe ban that, if enforced, would prohibit abortion in nearly all situations and make abortions in non-life saving circumstances potentially prosecuted as manslaughter. However, a Michigan Court of Claims judge granted a permanent injunction in Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s suit to block local prosecutors from enforcing the ban. The ban is subject to an ongoing lawsuit.

Given the uncertainty of the ballot initiative’s outcome, Michigan employers should closely monitor the results of the November 8, 2022 vote.

Vermont’s Vote

In Vermont, abortion remains legal after Dobbs under state law. However, on November 8, 2022, voters will have the opportunity to further protect abortion rights through a ballot initiative. This initiative, referred to as Proposal 5, asks registered Vermont voters whether they are in favor of amending the state’s constitution to add the following language: “That an individual’s right to personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Passage would guarantee the right to access and obtain an abortion as well as other reproductive care, and prohibit government infringement of reproductive rights absent a compelling state interest, which would need to be achieved through the least restrictive means.

Should Proposal 5 pass, the resulting constitutional amendment is not expected to significantly alter the legal landscape of abortion in Vermont, which currently has strong protection for the right to abortion. If approved, the amendment will become part of Vermont’s constitution on November 22, 2022.

In Contrast, Kentucky Seeks to Constitutionally Exclude Abortion Rights

Kentuckians will cast their votes deciding whether to amend the state’s constitution to explicitly provide that the state constitution offers no protection for a right to abortion. The proposal further clarifies that there is no constitutional right to use public funds for abortion. “Constitutional Amendment 2” poses the following question to voters: “Are you in favor of amending the Constitution of Kentucky by creating a new Section of the Constitution to be numbered Section 26A to state as follows: ‘To protect human life, nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion?’”

If the majority of votes are affirmative, a new section will be added to Kentucky’s constitution. This does not constitute an outright abortion ban, but rather prohibits courts from finding an implicit right to an abortion within the state’s constitution. Kentucky laws restricting abortion, including those triggered by Dobbs, are among the most restrictive in the nation. Approval of Constitutional Amendment 2 would not alter these laws or their existing narrow exceptions, which permit the procedure only when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.

An advisory from the Kentucky Attorney General provides further color on the ramifications of the amendment, noting that Amendment 2 does not ban abortion, but rather ensures that elected officials of Kentucky’s General Assembly, and not courts, would regulate abortion. The Advisory also explains that implementation of Amendment 2 would not amend other provisions in the state’s constitution.

Montana’s Ballot – NOT a Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Abortion is currently legal in Montana, as a 1999 Supreme Court ruling held that the state constitution protects abortion under its right-of-privacy provision. However, in 2021, a number of restrictive abortion laws were enacted, including a law that prohibits abortions after 20 weeks. These laws are under legal challenge by abortion providers and are temporarily enjoined pending litigation.

Meanwhile, on the ballot for November 8 is a referendum on LR-131, also known as the Born Alive Infant Protection Act. The Act proposes a new statute that would classify any infant born alive as “a legal person” and require the provision of “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to such person. This would include all infants born alive from an induced labor, C-section, or attempted abortion. The Act also includes a provision mandating providers, employees, and volunteers to report a failure to comply to law enforcement, and sets forth criminal penalties. Violation of this law would be a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison or a fine of up to $50,000. The proposed law is aimed at health care workers, and does not impose liability on parents or other parties.

Health care providers have raised concerns that the broad language of the bill could lead to unintended consequences, particularly for OB/GYN practitioners. Health care providers would be required to take “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to keep any infant alive, but these terms are not defined in the bill. Health care workers that could be held liable include doctors, nurses, and “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service of procedure.”

If approved by the Montana electorate, the law would take effect on January 1, 2023. Hospitals and other health care providers would need to reexamine their operating procedures to comply with the bill, should it pass, including compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

Keeping Up With The Changes

We continue to track litigation, legislative developments, and the entirety of the post-Dobbs legal landscape as it continues to shift. Our 50-state survey and other resources provide employers, health care providers, life sciences stakeholders, and others impacted by these rapidly changing circumstances with in-depth analysis and monthly updates. Election Day results will be another element of this evolving story.

Article By Susan Gross Sholinsky, Amy K. Dow, and Catherine Kang of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

An Updated Federal Overtime Rule: When’s It Coming?

Twice a year (in the spring and the fall), each federal agency publishes a “Regulatory Agenda” that discloses the proposal and final rules it has recently issued, together with those that it plans to issue.  Back in the fall of 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division noted in the agenda that it was reviewing the regulations for exemption of executive, administrative, and professional (“EAP”) employees from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime requirements codified in 29 C.F.R. Part 541.

One of the “primary goals” of the planned rulemaking is to update the minimum salary level requirement for employees who, by virtue of their duties, would qualify for an EAP exemption under section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA.  You may recall that in May 2016, the Obama DOL issued a new overtime rule, to take effect on December 1 of that year, that would have—among other things—required the DOL to update (i.e., increase) the salary threshold for EAP exemptions every three years.  In November 2019, before it could take effect, a federal judge in Texas enjoined the new overtime rule on a nationwide basis, declaring it “unlawful.”

In September 2019, the Trump DOL issued a new overtime rule, which took effect on January 1, 2020, raising the weekly minimum salary for EAP exemptions from $455 per week ($23,660 per year) to $684 per week ($35,568 per year).  The increase was the first in 15 years, but nowhere near the boost the Obama administration tried to roll out in 2016 (to $913 per week, or $47,476 per year).

Cut to the Biden administration.  The DOL noted in the fall 2021 Regulatory Agenda that “[r]egular updates [to the minimum salary for EAP exemption] promote greater stability, avoid disruptive salary level increases that can result from lengthy gaps between updates and provide appropriate wage protection.”  The agency listed a timetable for issuance of a proposed overtime rule update (a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, or NPRM) as April 4, 2022.  Seven months later, we’ve seen no proposed rule.

If and when issued, the public will have the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.  (Back in 2016, the Obama DOL received more than 293,000 comments to its proposed overtime rule.)  Stay tuned.

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

State Voting Leave Requirements: A Refresher in Preparation for the 2022 Midterm Elections

Millions of workers across the United States will be headed to the polls on Tuesday, November 8, 2022, for the midterm elections. With control of Congress up for grabs for the final two years of President Joe Biden’s first term, several close Senate races, five states considering ballot measures to legalize recreational marijuana, and 36 states holding elections for governor, this midterm election is one of the most highly-anticipated in decades. Early voting numbers in some states already suggest there could be record turnout.

Despite the proliferation of early and mail-in voting, increased interest in this election could drive more employees to request time off from work to vote. Most states require employers to provide at least unpaid leave from work when polls are not open for a reasonable amount of time outside of employees’ work hours. Here is an overview of voting leave requirements across the United States to help employers prepare for Election Day.

States Without Specific Voting Time Off Requirements

Several states do not require employers to provide any specific leave to allow employees to vote. These include Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.

While not requiring leave, some of those states more generally protect employees’ rights to vote or participate in politics more generally. For instance, Florida and Mississippi prevent employers from discharging an employee for voting or based on how they voted. Similarly, in Idaho and Michigan, employers may not attempt to influence an employee’s vote by discharging or threatening to discharge an employee from employment.

Delaware and New Jersey prohibit employers from intimidating employees into how to vote or not to vote, and Pennsylvania prohibits employers from interfering with an employee’s right to vote. Louisiana requires that employers with 20 or more employees not make any rule that prohibits an employee from participating in politics. In North Dakota, employers are encouraged, but not required, to allow employees to take leave to vote in all elections when employees’ regular work schedules conflict with the time the polls are open.

Finally, Washington and Hawaii do not have specific voting leave laws, but both conduct elections by mail, eliminating the need to take leave to wait at the polls. Hawaii repealed a prior law providing for up to two hours of voting leave when it switched to vote-by-mail for all statewide elections with the 2020 primary election.

Voting Leave Laws Map

States With Unpaid Voting Leave Laws

Several states require employers to provide employees with some amount of unpaid leave to allow them to vote. Connecticut joined this list of states in June 2021, requiring employers to provide all employees with two hours of unpaid leave to vote in a covered election, though employees must provide the employer notice of the need to take the time off at least two days prior to the election. However, the law is set to sunset on June 30, 2024.

Arkansas and Ohio generally require employees to allow employees to take a reasonable amount of time off, unpaid, to vote on Election Day. In Alabama, employees are allowed to take up to one hour of leave to vote in primary and general elections if the polls are not open at least two hours before or one hour after an employee’s work shift.

In Georgia, employers must give employees “necessary” time off to vote when employees provide reasonable notice of the need for the leave, however, employers are not required to provide time off for employees who have at least two hours before or after their work shift when polls are open to vote. In Massachusetts, unpaid voting leave applies only to employees working in manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishments, and employers are not required to pay for this leave. Further, employees may only request leave for the first two hours after the polls are open.

Some states provide more than two hours of leave for employees to vote, though employers are not required to pay for it. In Wisconsin, employers must allow employees to take up to three consecutive hours of unpaid leave to vote. Employers may not deny a request for this leave, but may designate the specific time of the absence. Kentucky provides the most time for voting leave, requiring employers to allow employees to take unpaid leave for a reasonable time, but not less than four hours, to vote or apply for an absentee ballot. Still, employees must request leave in advance and specify the hours to be used.

States With Paid Voting Leave Laws

Employers in a number of states are required to provide paid time off for employees to vote, at least in circumstances where polls are not open outside of an employee’s regular work hours. Alaska requires employers to allow employees who do not have two consecutive nonworking hours while the polls are open to take off as much work time as necessary to vote “without loss of pay.” Similarly, in Texas, employers must allow employees to take paid time off to vote, unless the polls are not open for two consecutive hours outside of an employee’s working hours.

In Minnesota, employees must have “the time necessary” to go to their designated polling place and return to work on Election Day. In Nevada, employees may request “sufficient” leave time to vote on Election Day, which is determined by the distance of the polling place from the employee’s workplace (1 hour for up to 2 miles; 2 hours for greater than 2 and up to 10 miles; and 3 hours for more than 10 miles). Wyoming requires employers to provide for one hour of leave other than a meal break to vote in a general, primary, or special congressional election unless polls are open for at least three consecutive hours outside of an employee’s work shift.

Many states provide for up to two paid hours of leave for voting. These include: California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah. Iowa, in 2021, reduced the paid leave from three hours to two. On the other hand, D.C. joined the states providing for up to two hours of paid leave for voting in October 2020. The D.C. law further requires employers to post a “Time Off to Vote” notice in a conspicuous location in the workplace. In New York, employers must give employees two hours of paid leave if employees do not have at least four consecutive nonworking hours to vote while polls are open. New Mexico’s leave law includes elections for Native American nations, tribes, or pueblos.

A handful of states provide for up to three hours of paid leave to vote if necessary, including Arizona, Missouri, Tennessee, and West Virginia. These states require employees provide notice of the need for leave prior to Election Day.

Employers may want to prepare for employees to take the leave time afforded by these laws to vote in the November elections.

Article By Ashley Prickett Cuttino and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more election law and legislative news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Employers, It’s Time to Replace Your Mandatory EEOC Poster

On October 20, 2022, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released an updated version of its mandatory workplace poster that informs employees of their rights and protections.

Employers must post this new version of the poster in their office spaces as soon as practicable.

The latest “Know Your Rights” flyer, which replaces the previous “EEO is Law” poster, must be displayed in all workplaces covered by the agency’s jurisdiction. This includes private sector businesses with 15 or more employees, as well as state and local government agencies, educational institutions, unions, and staffing agencies.

What’s Changed?

The new poster includes several updates from the older version. Some of the main changes are:

  • Clarification that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, or gender identity;
  • Identifies harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination;
  • Provides information about equal pay discrimination for federal contractors; and
  • Uses more straightforward language and formatting.

The poster also includes a QR code for employees with a smartphone or other compatible devices to quickly access the EEOC’s website on how to file a charge of employment discrimination.

What’s Remained the Same?

While the poster has been updated, some of the information included remains the same. The bulletin still outlines the types of discrimination that are prohibited by federal law, such as:

  • Race, color, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, religion,
  • Age (40 and older),
  • Equal pay,
  • Disability,
  • Genetic information (including family medical history or genetic tests or services), and includes
  • Retaliation for filing a charge, reasonably opposing discrimination, or participating in a discrimination lawsuit, investigation, or proceeding.

Actions Employers Should Take

Employers who fail to post the new Know Your Rights poster could face noncompliance penalties from the EEOC. Therefore, businesses must take the time to update their posters as soon as possible.

On October 25, 2022, the EEOC distributed an FAQ stating that employers should remove the old poster and display the new one “within a reasonable amount of time” but did not provide a specific deadline.

The agency recommends that employers post the new flyer in a conspicuous place where employees will see it, such as in a break room or near the time clock.  Covered employers should also consider posting an online notice on their website for remote or hybrid workers.

You can download a copy of the poster here.

Article By Emily G. Massey and Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court Set to Decide Whether NLRA Preempts State Law Claims for Property Damage Caused During Strikes

The U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming term will include review of whether the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) preempts state court lawsuits for property damage caused during strikes, which could have significant implications for employers and unions.

Factual Background

The case – Glacier Northwest Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 – began over five years ago when the Union in Washington State representing the Employer’s truck drivers went on strike.  The Union timed their strike to coincide with the scheduled delivery of ready-mix concrete, and at least 16 drivers left trucks that were full of mixed concrete, forcing the Employer to rush to empty the trucks before it hardened and caused damage.  The Employer was able to do so, but incurred considerable additional expenses and, because it dumped the concrete in order to avoid truck damage, lost its product.

Employer Brings State Law Suit for Property Damage

After the incident, the Employer sued the Union under Washington State law for intentional destruction of property.  The Union argued that the suit was preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (“Garmon”).  In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that, although the Act does not expressly preempt state law, it impliedly preempts claims based on conduct that is “arguably or actually protected by or prohibited by the Act.”  The Supreme Court held in Garmon that conduct is “arguably protected” when it is not “plainly contrary” to the Act or has not been rejected by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).

State Court Holdings

The Washington State trial court dismissed the Employer’s suit for property damage because strikes are protected by the Act.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that intentional destruction of property during a strike was not activity protected by the Act, and thus, not preempted under Garmon.

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Act impliedly preempts the state law tort claim because the intentional destruction of property that occurred incidental to a work stoppage was at least arguably protected, and the Board would be better-suited to make an ultimate determination on this legal issue.

Question Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court will now determine whether the National Labor Relations Act bars state law tort claims against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property in the course of a labor dispute.

Under Garmon, the Act does not preempt suits regarding unlawful conduct that is plainly contrary to the NLRA, and the Employer argues that the strike at issue here was plainly unprotected because of the intentional destruction of property.  In other words, the conduct is not even arguably protected by the Act such that the Act would preempt – it was, rather, plainly unprotected conduct, and thus, the proper subject of a lawsuit.  The Employer also cited the “local feeling” exception to Garmon, which creates an exception to preemption where the States may have a greater interest in acting, such as in the case of property damage or violence.

The Union argued in opposition to the Employer’s certiorari petition that the Employer merely challenged the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the conduct was arguably protected by the Act, and not its reasoning.  Moreover, whether or not the conduct was protected should be decided by the Board, which is better-suited to decide the matter.

Takeaway

Employers should gain much greater clarity into whether they can seek relief from such conduct via a damages lawsuit.  If the Court finds that such conduct is not preempted and may be litigated in state court, such a ruling could go far in protecting employers’ interests in contentious labor disputes and potentially shift the balance of power towards employers during these disputes.

Article By Michael J. Lebowich, Joshua S. Fox, and Thomas B. Fiascone of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

OSHA Expands Criteria for Severe Violator Enforcement Program

In an announcement that expands the criteria for entry into the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Severe Violator Enforcement Program, OSHA has signaled that it is making enforcement a priority and that employers with willful, repeat, and failure-to-abate violations will be subject to significant consequences.

Key Takeaways

  • On September 15, 2022, OSHA announced that it was expanding its criteria for entering employers into its Severe Violator Enforcement Program (“SVEP”). The updated SVEP directive is available here.
  • Previously, entry into the program was limited to cases involving fatalities, three or more hospitalizations, high-emphasis hazards, the potential release of a highly hazardous chemical, and enforcement actions classified as egregious.
  • Now, an employer can be entered into the program in cases involving two or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations, regardless of the hazard involved. They will continue to be subject to entry in the program in certain cases involving fatalities, three or more hospitalizations, and enforcement actions classified as egregious.
  • In light of this expansion, employers should review their compliance records and current health and safety practices and consider whether further actions are needed to mitigate enforcement risks.

Background

In 2010, OSHA created the Severe Violator Enforcement Program to “concentrate[] resources on inspecting employers who have demonstrated indifference to their OSH Act obligations by willful, repeated, or failure-to-abate violations.” Under the original SVEP, OSHA would designate employers as “severe violators” if they were involved in an enforcement action:

  • Involving a fatality in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving a catastrophe (three or more hospitalizations) in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving a high-emphasis hazard in which OSHA found two or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving the potential release of a highly hazardous chemical in which OSHA found three or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations; or
  • Classified by OSHA as “egregious.”

Employers entered into the SVEP were subject to consequences that included mandatory enhanced follow-up inspections, a nationwide inspection of related workplaces, negative publicity, enhanced settlement provisions, and the potential for federal court enforcement under Section 11(b) of the OSH Act.

Updated Criteria

Under the new criteria, employers will continue to be entered into the SVEP in enforcement actions involving a fatality or catastrophe in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate-violations and in enforcement actions classified as egregious.

In a departure from the original criteria, cases involving two or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations will also be entered into the SVEP, regardless of whether they are linked to a certain hazard or standard. As a result of this change, OSHA expects that more employers will be entered into the SVEP.

Other Key Changes

In addition to expanding the criteria for entry into the SVEP, OSHA made key changes regarding follow-up inspections and removal from the SVEP.

  • Follow-up OSHA inspections must occur within one year, but not longer than two years after the final order. Previously, there was no required timeframe for conducting follow-up inspections.
  • Eligibility for removal will begin three years after the date an employer completes abatement. Previously, that period began running on the final order date.
  • If an employer implements an enhanced settlement agreement that includes the use of a safety and health management system that follows OSHA’s Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs, the employer can be eligible for removal after two years.

Implications

These changes signify that OSHA is prioritizing enforcement and intends to impose significant consequences on employers that repeatedly and/or willfully violate OSHA requirements. Employers should review their compliance records and current health and safety practices and evaluate whether additional action is needed to mitigate the risk for willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations and entry into the SVEP.

Article By Jayni A. Lanham and Mark N. Duvall of Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Beveridge & Diamond PC

NLRB’s Proposed New Joint Employer Rule: What to Do Now to Manage the Risk

On September 7, 2022, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would, if adopted, make it much easier for the NLRB to find a company to be a “joint employer” of persons directly employed by its contractors, vendors, suppliers and franchisees. The consequences of a joint employer finding are significant and can lead to: liability for unfair practices committed by the direct employer; a duty to bargain with a union representing the direct employer’s employees; exposure to liability for one’s own conduct that fails to take into account the indirect employer relationship and spread of a union from the direct employer’s employees to the indirect employer.

Joint-employer theory creates far more risk for employers than related doctrines such as single employer or alter ego because, unlike those theories, joint employer status does not require any common ownership or corporate control. Two companies operating entirely at arm’s length can be found joint employers.

The major proposed change relates to the degree of influence that an indirect employer must have to justify a finding of single employer status. Under the current NLRB standard, the indirect employer must actually exercise “immediate and direct” control over key terms of employment, normally limited to wages, benefits, hours and termination.

The proposed rule relaxes that standard in three key ways. First, it eliminates the actually exercise requirement and states that possession of even unused authority can be sufficient.

Second, it does away with the immediate and direct requirement so that influence exercised by the indirect employer through the direct employer can be used to support a finding.

Third, it expands, beyond the list enumerated in the current rule, the types of employment terms control of which will justify a finding of joint employer status. The Obama Board had adopted the currently proposed standard by an NLRB decision, Browning-Ferris Inds. 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). However, that decision was overturned by the Trump Board’s adoption of the current rule, 85 FR 11184, codified at 29 CFR 103.40, (Feb. 26, 2020). The proposed rule seeks to reinstate Browning-Ferrisas the governing law.

Because Browning-Ferrisand the NPRM endorse pre-1984 NLRB decisions regarding joint employer status, those decisions provide guidance for how the new rule may be enforced. The NLRB and courts frequently relied on what authority was given to the alleged indirect employer in its agreement with the contractor or vendor. Clauses that required or allowed the indirect employer to approve hirings, terminations or wage adjustments to contractor employees usually resulted in finding joint employer status. In addition, cost-plus arrangements, particularly those that were terminable on short notice were often found to support a joint employer finding. Finally, clauses allowing the indirect employer to set work schedules, production rates, or requiring contractor employees to abide by the indirect employer’s work rules and other policies governing conduct also were found supportive of joint employer status.

The proposed rule is still subject to comment and revision, but it is likely to be adopted without significant change. The comment and review period, which closes on November 21, 2022, provides a window in which savvy employers can assess the risks to their organization when the Rule goes into effect. A key step is to examine existing contractual relationships with vendors to identify and modify those terms that may potentially support joint employer status, or, if modification is untenable, to manage the risk through indemnity agreements with the vendor.

Article By Ahmad Chehab and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield
© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Unfashionably Late: Seventh Circuit Rejects Misappropriation Claim Premised On Prototype Created Eleven Years Prior

The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a former employee and his new employer on claims for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to a prototype of an actuator created eleven years prior, holding that the inference that the defendant used his knowledge of the prototype more than a decade later was “barely conceivable” and “exceptionally unreasonable.” REXA, Inc. v. Chester, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 2981167, at *6 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In 2002, Mark Chester, an engineer at Koso America, Inc. (“Koso”), participated in a project to create a new valve for a hydraulic actuator. An actuator is a component of a machine that produces motion. While the project was unsuccessful, it did produce an experimental prototype of another actuator. Koso shelved the experimental prototype due to the improbability of commercial success. The following year, Chester left Koso.

After more than a decade had passed since Chester worked on the 2002 project for Koso, Chester and his new employer, MEA Inc. (“MEA”), built a new actuator prototype, later known as the Hawk. Chester and MEA filed a related patent application, which was approved in part. REXA, Inc. (“REXA”), a company affiliated with Koso, brought suit against Chester and MEA for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), among other claims. REXA argued that Chester and MEA’s actuator incorporated and disclosed confidential designs contained within the prototype Koso developed in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chester and MEA. REXA appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the misappropriation claims. First, the Seventh Circuit agreed that REXA failed to identify a concrete trade secret, as the Court was unable to determine which aspects of the 2002 designs are known to the trade, and which are not. The Court explained that several aspects of the 2002 actuator prototype are widely known in the industry, which by definition, is not sufficiently secret to qualify for protection under the ITSA.

Second, the Seventh Circuit held that even if REXA had identified a trade secret, REXA had not established that defendants misappropriated trade secrets when MEA filed its patent application or developed the Hawk actuator. With respect to MEA’s patent application, the Court explained that REXA’s allegations “rest on a series of untenable inferences.” Id. Indeed, eleven years had passed since Chester worked on the actuator prototype, and it was undisputed that he never saw or took any documents with him when he left Koso. Additionally, REXA did not cite any case where a court “inferred” a misappropriation of trade secrets despite a lack of evidence that the defendant seized or possessed documents, nor could the Seventh Circuit find any such case. As such, the Court found the lack of evidence, coupled with the eleven-year gap, “renders the inferences that REXA asks us to draw exceptionally unreasonable.” Id.

Regarding the design of MEA’s Hawk actuator, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2002 prototype did not include features of the patent application that made the Hawk both a non-obvious improvement over prior art and commercially valuable. Thus, Chester and MEA could not have misappropriated trade secrets contained within the 2002 prototype.

REXA serves as an important reminder that trade secret claimants must identify with specificity the elements that distinguish the alleged trade secret from general knowledge in the field or public domain. Additionally, REXA confirms that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, courts are hesitant to draw inferences supporting misappropriation claims without any evidence the defendant seized or possessed documents from the plaintiff, particularly if a significant period of time passes before the alleged misappropriation occurs.

Article By Mikela T. Sutrina and Jenna G. Crawford of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.