employer Archives - The National Law Forum

“Captive Audience” Bans: Employers Should Be Aware of This Trend

As organized labor activity has been on the rise in recent years and stories about union-related matters have become regular news, labor relations questions have ever-increasingly become front-of-mind for employers. It is also not crazy to think that unions that have been considering an organizing effort will decide in the next couple of months to roll the dice now in anticipation that federal labor policy will (again) radically shift following the results of last week’s elections.

What has not garnered as much attention as the Starbucks and other prominent unionization efforts is the effort to strip from employers one of their most effective tools in countering union efforts to organize: mandatory employee meetings where employers can address and rebut the kinds of sweeping promises common to a union sales pitch.

In the midst of an organizing campaign, and particularly so in the days leading up to a union election, employers have long used meetings with employees as an opportunity to communicate their views on unionization and share their position on the upcoming vote. And for good reason — such meetings are one of the most effective tools to respond to promises unions make to employees and educate workers on the fact that unions have the legal right to make all sorts of promises about things they know they cannot guarantee, while employers are constrained by law from making almost any promises to employees.

These meetings are also very important mechanisms to share information that most unions prefer to avoid discussing — like mandatory dues, how long first contract negotiations can take, the potential for union decertification, and a union’s ability to call employees out on strike and punish them if employees will not toe the picket line. Much like with meetings to discuss other topics such as safety concerns or policy changes, employers often make attendance at such meetings mandatory and compensate employees for their time at such meetings because their attendance is a job expectation.

Given the effectiveness of such meetings, if you’re a cynic like me, then perhaps it does not surprise you that political forces favoring unions want to prevent employers from conducting them. In April 2022, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memo announcing that she intended to push the NLRB to make legal rulings finding that employer mandatory meetings covering union-related and labor relations matters violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Such rulings would be an explicit reversal of NLRB decisions dating back to 1948 taking the position that employers do not violate the NLRA by requiring employees to attend meetings where the employer shares its messages regarding unionization. However, notwithstanding the General Counsel’s request, the NLRB has yet to reverse these decisions, and last week’s presidential election results certainly suggest the policy pendulum at the NLRB is likely to soon swing in the other direction.

But the current political winds at the federal level will not stop all momentum to prevent employers from using employee meetings to combat against the lofty promises unions make and communicate information they want to make sure is available to employees. Several “blue” states — California, Hawaii, Illinois, Vermont, and Washington — have all passed laws in the last year making employer captive audience meetings illegal, joining Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, New York, and Oregon, which already had similar laws on the books. Alaska voters appear to have also adopted such a law in their state. If last week’s election results suggest anything, it may be that, in anticipation of a federal about-face in the organized labor arena, more states will try to take matters into their own hands and consider additional bans on these types of meetings.

The legality of such state laws is not without question. While Oregon’s law — the first of its kind and passed in 2010 — survived a legal preemption challenge, the argument remains that the NLRA preempts such laws as an impermissible intrusion on federal labor policy and employer rights preserved by federal law. With the reshaping of the federal courts in recent years, we can reasonably expect someone will attempt another NLRA preemption challenge, hoping to land before a federal judge or court more likely to be sympathetic to the argument. There is also a compelling argument that such state laws infringe employer First Amendment rights, particularly given that they target a particular speaker and a particular message, while not banning mandatory meetings to discuss things like safety or company updates. Such state action is therefore not content- or viewpoint-neutral, as required by most types of First Amendment analysis. To that end, the Illinois Policy Institute is making this First Amendment argument in a lawsuit it recently filed asking a federal court in Chicago to block the Illinois Worker Freedom of Speech Act from going into effect on January 1, 2025. How the Chicago federal court rules in that case may have wide-ranging implications for the other states’ statutes and the future of efforts to ban captive audience meetings.

As labor relations policy is sure to continue evolving in the coming years, employers should stay aware for now of the developing captive audience landscape, particularly if they face union activity in a state with a current ban on employer meetings of the type described in this article. Employers in such states can still hold meetings to discuss their message regarding unionization and make attendance at them voluntary — and should absolutely do so if faced with a union campaign.

by: Christopher G. Ward of Foley & Lardner LLP

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The Spooky Consequences of Halloween Celebrations in the Workplace

There is no greater Halloween horror for employers than a workplace celebration that creates legal risks such as inappropriate costumes or safety hazards, among other issues. Thus, there are many considerations when planning an office celebration for this spooky holiday. If you are a manufacturer hosting an office Halloween party, consider following these three tricks to make the best out of your workplace treat.

1. Provide Guidance on Expectations

First and foremost, manufacturers should be transparent about expectations surrounding employee participation including costumes. With regard to costumes, when crafting guidance, manufacturers should consider both civility as well as safety, especially if the employees will be permitted to wear their costumes during the workday. For example, employees should understand what costumes or outfits do and do not meet manufacturing floor safety guidelines. Employees should also be expressly reminded that costumes must conform to all employer policies including anti-harassment, discrimination and respect policies and that costumes, outfits or accessories that violate such policies will not be tolerated.

This election year in particular, some employees may don political costumes. The free speech rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution do not apply to employees working for private manufacturers. Thus, private manufacturers can generally establish rules that, for example, prohibit costumes that support (or criticize) a political candidate or party. That said, manufacturers should be aware that several states have laws regulating when employers can lawfully discipline employees for political activity; further, there are state and federal laws that may be implicated with regard to employees expressing political views. If manufacturers are considering disciplining an employee for a political costume, they should first consult with legal counsel.

2. Prioritize Safety

There are more safety hazards at workplace Halloween parties than the cavity causing candy. This is especially true if the celebration is being held on the manufacturer’s shop floor. Manufacturers should ensure that all of the decorations in the workplace comply with the fire and safety codes set forth by local governments and by OSHA. Manufacturers should also avoid activities that inherently involve risks and could result in workplace injuries, such as pumpkin carving contests.

Lastly, manufacturers should carefully consider whether to serve alcohol. If the celebration is being held on the shop floor, it is highly recommended that alcohol is not served, especially if heavy machinery is accessible. For celebrations held elsewhere, manufactures should consider taking steps to ensure alcohol is consumed in moderation and is not central to the party, and follow best practices for serving alcohol; when considering tips for limiting alcohol consumption or its impact on employees, employers should consider only serving beer and wine, serving a meal (as compared to light appetizers), limiting the amount of alcohol served by, for example, using a drink ticket system, using bartenders to serve alcohol, serving non-alcoholic options; among other practices. In some circumstances, manufacturers may be legally responsible for the conduct of their intoxicated employees.

3. Make it Optional

Workplace celebrations are a great way to boost employee morale and help foster employee relationships. That said, these celebrations should generally be optional. Manufacturers should keep in mind that employees may not want to attend a Halloween party for various reasons, including, for example, their religious practices and beliefs; therefore, ensuring that the party is optional may support all employees including those that do and do not celebrate Halloween.

If attendance is mandatory, there may be implications from a workers’ compensation perspective if there are any injuries or illnesses. Further, manufacturers should pay the employees for their time pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and applicable state laws regardless of whether the celebration was held outside of normal working-hours. Requiring non-exempt employees to attend unpaid celebrations can expose the manufacturer to wage and hour claims in the future.

by: Abby M. Warren, Madison C. Picard of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more news on Workplace Halloween Party Considerations, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

(Employee) Therapy Anyone?

The recent WSJ article about employer-provided in-office therapy sessions raises some good points about destigmatizing mental health in the workplace and promoting overall wellness generally. But the article also reminds us about the risks of blurring lines between an employee’s personal and professional life and the potential dangers inherent in the spillover of confidential (personal, medical, and other information) in the workplace. I have written previously about the beneficial role performance evaluations may have as “talk therapy” in an employee’s career based upon the learning that comes with balanced feedback. But it seems to me that true talk therapy – undertaken by a licensed and trained professional in an appropriate diagnostic setting – does not belong in the workplace.

The article features an employer who provides an annual benefit of a dozen free on-site therapy sessions to its employees. While it is commendable to care about the whole employee, providing on-site therapy touches upon a few somewhat sensitive employment topics. The first concerns confidentiality of health information, which includes an employee’s decision to seek (or even not seek) medical treatment. The employer in the article was reported to have taken steps to provide a separate location for the therapy sessions so employees did not encounter each other during on-site therapy visits, as well as other privacy preservation measures. But the simple fact is that confidentiality is hard to guarantee for on-site employment activities. And even though GenX employees (and the generation of workers who follow them) do think differently about mental health and wellness than the generations preceding them, there is a real risk that an employee’s use of this benefit will become the topic of what used to be known as water cooler – now Slack – talk.

The other employment risk on-site therapy poses is the potential use of information that is disclosed during a therapy session. Ethical, licensing and medical rules govern what a therapist must and must not do with information learned about a patient, but what about information the therapist learns about an employer? This is particularly a concern if the information source and content is confirmed by several different employees and might be information that merits action (such as information suggesting that a manager is engaging in harassing or other actionable or illegal conduct). There is a reason employers follow guidelines when reports or complaints are made concerning such conduct. It is unclear how those guidelines should be followed if the contents of a therapy session are supposed to remain confidential, for good legal, therapeutic and ethical reasons.

It seems to me a far better approach for employers wishing to explore this benefit is to provide employees with a set amount of money (perhaps as part of a tax-advantaged benefit plan ) that the employee is encouraged to use at the employee’s discretion as part of well-being program designed to support all aspects of health (mental, physical and even financial fitness). That way therapy can be encouraged and supported, but kept separate in all other respects from the workplace. Therapy for all may be an excellent idea, but conducting it outside the confines of the workplace seems like a better one.

For more news on Employer Provided Therapy, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Michigan Employers Take Note: New Ruling Impacts Paid Leave and Minimum Wage

Today, July 31, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court released a highly anticipated opinion in the case of Mothering Justice v. Nessel. This case assessed the constitutionality of the Michigan Legislature’s 2018 “adopt-and-amend” strategy under which the Legislature adopted, and then immediately changed, two ballot proposals that would otherwise have been included on the November 2018 ballot for decision by Michigan voters. The ballot proposals pertained to Michigan minimum wage and paid sick leave requirements, and were originally entitled the Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA) and Improved Workforce Opportunity and Wage Act (IWOWA). The Legislature’s “adopt-and-amend” action had narrowed the original ballot proposal language, and resulted instead in the enactment of the Michigan Paid Medical Leave Act (PMLA) and current minimum wage provisions in effect since early 2019.

After years of legal challenge, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a 2023 decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, and ruled that the “adopt-and-amend” approach utilized by the Michigan Legislature violated the Michigan Constitution. The Court determined both of the ballot initiatives as originally adopted by the Legislature should be reinstated in lieu of current, amended versions. In the interests of justice and equity, the Court ordered the reinstatement to occur, but only after a time period the same as that which employers would have been provided to prepare for the new laws absent their improper amendment.

Therefore, significant new legal requirements will become effective February 21, 2025. These include:

The paid leave ballot proposal as initially adopted by the Legislature in 2018, in the form of the ESTA, is reinstated effective February 21, 2025, in place of the PMLA. All covered employers must amend existing paid leave policies or implement new leave policies as applicable that comply with the ESTA by February 21, 2025. Key elements of the ESTA include:
- All Michigan employers, except for the U.S. government, are covered.
- All employees of a covered employer, rather than only certain categories of employees as provided under the PMLA, are covered.
- Covered employers must accrue sick time for covered employees, at a rate of at least one hour of earned sick time for every 30 hours worked.
- Employers with 10 or more employees, as defined by the ESTA, must allow employees to use up to 72 hours of paid earned sick time per year.
- Employers with fewer than 10 employees, as defined by the ESTA, must provide up to 40 hours of earned paid sick time, and are permitted to provide remaining earned sick leave up to the required 72 hours per year on an unpaid basis, rather than paid.
- Employers may not prohibit the carryover or cap the accrual of unused earned sick time.
- Employers may limit the use of earned sick time in any year to 72 hours.
The minimum wage ballot proposal as originally adopted by the Legislature in 2018, in the form of the IWOWA, is also effective February 21, 2025, subject to a phase in of certain requirements that remains to be determined at this time. The IWOWA will replace the narrower amendments that previously were enacted and took effect in 2019. Key provisions effective February 21, 2025, include:
- The state minimum wage rate will be $10.00 plus the state treasurer’s inflation adjustment, which has yet to be calculated and released.
- Future increases will be calculated annually based on inflation as specified in the IWOWA.
- The existing “tip credit” provisions employers of tipped employees currently utilize to calculate whether they have been paid minimum wage will be phased out over a period of years and eliminated entirely by February 21, 2029.
- Employees will have expanded rights as to how they are compensated for overtime work, including “comp time” as an alternative to customary payment of overtime wages.

The above will be applicable absent further judicial, legislative, or voter-driven constitutional action that prescribes a different course. As to judicial action, opportunities for appeal or rehearing of a state Supreme Court decision are limited and discretionary. As to voter-driven constitutional action, such as a referendum, the timing of the Court’s decision may well not permit for such action to be included on the 2024 ballot, even if sufficient support for such action were shown.

In terms of any legislative action to amend, such action could only occur in a future legislative session, meaning January 2025 or later. As to the level of support required, because the ballot proposals were adopted by the Legislature rather than approved by a majority of Michigan voters in an election process, the normal requirements will apply. Had the ballot proposals been approved by a majority of Michigan voters in the election, a 75% supermajority of both houses of the Legislature would have been required for any amendment passage.

by: Luis E. Avila, Maureen Rouse-Ayoub, Stephanie R. Setterington, Elizabeth Wells Skaggs, Hannah A. Cone, and Ashleigh E. Draft of Varnum LLP

For more news on Michigan Employment Laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment law section.

Opposing Decisions – Does the FTC Have the Authority to Ban Non-Compete Clauses?

In April, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated a new rule banning non-competes (the Rule); the FTC adopted the Rule to prohibit employers from entering into or enforcing non-compete clauses with workers and senior executives. Several lawsuits were quickly filed challenging the rules. Separate parties filed in Texas (in which cases were consolidated), and ATS Tree Services, LLC, filed an action in Pennsylvania.

On July 23, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a ruling denying ATS Tree Services’ motion for a stay and a preliminary injunction against the Rule. ATS Tree Services, LLC v FTC, No: 2:24-cv-01743-KBH, at p.18 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2024). The Court held that ATS had not demonstrated the irreparable harm necessary to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction and also held that ATS failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its action.

The ruling is diametrically opposed to the July 3, 2024, ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which preliminarily enjoined the Rule and postponed its effective date in Ryan, LLC v. U.S., No. 3:24-CV-00986-E, 2024 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2024). However, the district court declined to issue a universal injunction, making its ruling applicable only to the Ryan plaintiffs.

The Decisions

In ATS Tree Services, the court first held that nonrecoverable costs of compliance do not rise to the level of irreparable harm, in that “monetary loss and business expenses alone are insufficient bases for injunctive relief.” ATS Tree Services at p.18. Additionally, the court held that the claimed loss of contractual benefits was too speculative. Id. 20-21.

Even though the court found that ATS failed to establish irreparable harm, it added an analysis of ATS’s likelihood of success on the merits, spending the majority of its decision assessing (just as the Ryan Court had) whether “[s]ection 6(g) empowers the FTC with the authority to make substantive rules related to unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, or whether the rulemaking authority therein is limited to procedural rules relating to adjudications of unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.” ATS Tree Services, at p.8. Notably, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024) to “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Id. at 25. In doing so, the Court harmonized sections 5 and 6 of the FTC Act, concluding:

When taken in the context of the goal of the Act and the FTC’s purpose, the Court finds it clear that the FTC is empowered to make both procedural and substantive rules as is necessary to prevent unfair methods of competition. Thus, the Court rejects ATS’s argument that it should read the word “procedural” but not the word “substantive” into the statutory text defining the FTC’s rulemaking authority. This argument is inherently inconsistent and therefore untenable. Id. at 26.

This was directly contrary to the Ryan decision where the court found under section 6(g) that the FTC lacks the authority to create substantive rules because the Act is only a “housekeeping statute” that allows the FTC to promulgate general “rules of agency organization procedure or practice,” not “substantive rules.” Ryan at *15 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310 (1979)).

The court in ATS Tree Services went on to address the FTC’s mandate to “prevent prohibited ‘unfair methods of competition’” under section 5, thereby acknowledging Congress’s terms were “intended to act prophylactically to stop ‘incipient’ threats of unfair methods of competition, not solely responsively through adjudications, as courts interpreting the statute have confirmed.” ATS Tree Services, at p. 28. In addition, the court found that the FTC’s rulemaking authority had been confirmed by other circuit courts. Finally, in the rest of the decision, the Court disposed of the other alternative challenges made by ATS. This was contrary to the Ryan decision, where the Texas court had held that the FTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, because the Rule was “unreasonably broad without a reasonable explanation” and did not sufficiently address alternatives to issuing the Rule.

Key Takeaways

The two courts have issued opinions with conflicting analyses. While Texas has issued a preliminary injunction specific to the Ryan plaintiffs, the court did indicate it intends to make a final determination on the merits by August 30, 2024, prior to the Rule’s effective date. The Ryan Court will have the opportunity to vacate the Rule in its entirety as unlawful and issue a permanent injunction, with the scope of the relief ordered yet to be decided. This new ruling sets up the potential for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and possibly seek direct relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

*This post was co-authored by Lily Denslow, legal intern at Robinson+Cole. Lily is not admitted to practice law.

Michigan Supreme Court Expands Employer Exposure to Public Policy Retaliation Claims

In Michigan, various state employment laws prohibit employers from retaliating against employees. But can an employee pursue a public policy retaliation claim against the employer in addition to a statutory retaliation claim?

On July 22, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that anti-retaliation provisions in two important workplace safety laws—the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) and Michigan’s Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MIOSHA”)—do not preclude a plaintiff from also asserting a violation of public policy in court. Stegall v. Resource Technology Corp (Case No. 165450, decided July 22, 2024).

Cleveland Stegall, an IT specialist working at FCA through the staffing agency Resource Technology, complained internally about asbestos insulation issues at the assembly plant and threatened to file complaints with the government. He was subsequently terminated. Stegall sued both entities for wrongful discharge under OSHA and MIOSHA’s anti-retaliation provisions, as well as termination in violation of public policy.

At-will employees generally may be terminated for any reason (or no reason at all). But one exception to this rule is that certain terminations violate public policy and therefore create an actionable legal claim. This includes firings for “failure or refusal to violate a law” or exercising a right conferred by the Michigan Legislature.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Stegall’s public policy claim because they concluded that the OSHA and MIOSHA laws already forbid retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the remedies under OSHA and MIOSHA are insufficient, pointing to the truncated 30-day period to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, the discretion granted to the respective investigating agency, and the employee’s lack of control over what occurs after a complaint has been filed. See 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(2) and MCL 408.1065(2).

What does this case mean for employers? The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision provides another avenue for employees to pursue retaliation claims, particularly where the employee raises workplace safety concerns. It is unclear, however, whether courts will extend this ruling and allow employees to pursue public policy wrongful discharge claims if the employee is also seeking relief under another anti-retaliation statute.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Cracks Down on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has now joined the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in taking a stand against broad non-disclosure provisions in employment agreements.

Last week, the CFTC announced a settlement with Trafigura Trading LLC, in which the company agreed to pay a $55 million penalty, in part because it required employees to sign agreements that impeded voluntary communications with the CFTC.

In its decision, the CFTC specifically found:

Between July 31, 2017 and 2020, Trafigura required its employees to sign employment agreements, and requested that former employees sign separation agreements, with broad non-disclosure provisions that prohibited the sharing of Trafigura’s confidential information with third parties. These nondisclosure provisions did not contain carve-out language expressly permitting communications with law enforcement or regulators like the Commission.

The CFTC concluded that such non-disclosure provisions violate Regulation 165.19(b), 17 C.F.R. § 165.19(b) (2023), implementing Section 23(h)-(j) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)–(j), even without any additional actions impeding communications.

As a result of this finding, among others involving misappropriation of material nonpublic information and manipulative conduct, the CFTC not only levied a significant fine on Trafigura, but imposed a host of conditions and undertakings with which Trafigura was required to comply. Relevant here, the CFTC required that Trafigura modify its non-disclosure provisions to include language making clear that “no term in any such Agreement should be understood to limit or prevent the filing of a complaint with; or voluntary, lawful communication with; or disclosure of information to any federal, state, or local governmental regulatory or law enforcement agency.”

Director of the Whistleblower Office Brian Young commented, “This is the first CFTC action charging a company under regulations designed to prevent interference with whistleblower communications. This groundbreaking action demonstrates the CFTC’s commitment to protecting potential whistleblowers and puts the market on notice that the CFTC will not tolerate contractual arrangements that could impede communication by potential witnesses.”

We have long reported on the SEC’s targeting of employment agreements. With the CFTC following suit, employers should expect additional agencies to scrutinize language in employment agreements, separation agreements and other employment-related documents, such as employee handbooks and Codes of Conduct. To minimize such scrutiny and exposure employers should take action to modify non-disclosure and other provisions such as non-disparagement and confidentiality clauses that might have the purpose or effect of impeding agency communications. Such modifications must include carve-out language clarifying that nothing precludes current and former employees from communicating in any way with a government agency, such as the CFTC or the SEC. It is more important than ever for employers to work with counsel to conduct a comprehensive review of their policies, practices, and agreements for language that such agencies may find problematic.

Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

A Closer Look at the FTC’s Final Non-Compete Rule

On April 23, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued its Final Non-Compete Agreement Rule (Final Rule), banning non-compete agreements between employers and their workers. The Final Rule will go into effect 120 days after being published in the Federal Register. This Final Rule will impact most US businesses, specifically those that utilize non-compete agreements to protect their trade secrets, confidential business information, goodwill, and other important intangible assets.

The Final Rule prohibits employers from entering or attempting to enter into a non-compete agreement with “workers” (employees and independent contractors). Employers are also prohibited from even representing that a worker is subject to such a clause. The Final Rule provides that it is an unfair method of competition for employers to enter into non-compete agreements with workers and is therefore a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

There are few exceptions under the Final Rule. For senior executives, existing non-compete agreements can remain in force. However, employers are barred from entering or attempting to enter into a non-compete agreement with a senior executive after the effective date of the Final Rule. The Final Rule defines “senior executive” as a worker who is both (1) earning more than $151,164 annually and (2) in a “policy-making position” for the business. For workers who are not senior executives, existing non-competes are not enforceable after the effective date. If not invalidated all together, the Final Rule will likely have extensive litigation related to “policy-making position.” According to the current commentary on the Final Rule, the FTC will likely take the position that “senior executive” is a very limited definition.

Further, the Final Rule does not apply to non-competes entered into pursuant to a “bona fide sale of a business entity, of the person’s ownership interest in [a] business entity, or of all or substantially all of a business entity’s operating assets.” As a result, parties entering into transactions can continue to use non-compete agreements in the sale of a business. But transactional lawyers should note that any non-compete in a subsequent employment agreement with a seller will likely be subject to the Final Rule. The Final Rule also does not prohibit employers from enforcing non-compete clauses where the cause of action related to the non-compete clause occurred prior to the effective date of the Final Rule.

The Final Rule also states that agreements that “penalize” or “function to prevent” an employee from working for a competitor are banned and unlawful. For example, a non-disclosure agreement may be viewed as a non-compete when it is so broad that it functions to prevent workers from seeking or accepting other work or starting a business after they leave their job. Similarly, non-solicitation agreements may also be banned under the new rule “where they function to prevent a worker from seeking or accepting other work or starting a business after their employment ends.” The commentary makes clear that the enforceability and legality of these types of agreements will need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.

Under the Final Rule, employers are required to provide clear and conspicuous notice to workers who are subject to a prohibited non-compete. This notice must be sent in an individualized communication (text message, hand delivery, mailed to last known address, etc.) and indicate that the worker’s non-compete clause will not be enforced.

The Final Rule has already been challenged in at least two lawsuits, both filed in the state of Texas. The US Chamber of Commerce filed suit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the enactment of the Final Rule. A second suit, filed by Ryan, LLC, a tax services firm, was filed in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Both suits raise similar arguments: (1) the FTC lacks authority to enact the rule due to the major questions doctrine; (2) the Final Rule is inconsistent with the FTC Act; (3) the retroactive nature of the Final Rule exceeds the FTC’s authority and raises Fifth Amendment concerns; and (4) the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious. The US Chamber of Commerce has also filed a motion to stay the effective date of the Final Rule pending resolution of the lawsuit.

The very nature of how business entities protect their intangible assets is at risk, and the Final Rule will change the contractual dynamic of the employer-employee relationship.

Understanding the New FLSA Overtime Rule: What Employers Need to Know

Changes to overtime rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) announced on April 23, 2023 affect most U.S. employers. The Final Rule substantially increases the number of employees eligible for overtime pay. It is critical that employers understand the rule and its implications for their business.

Current FLSA Overtime Regulations: The Basics

The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime pay of at least 1.5 times an employee’s standard pay rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. However, “white collar” and “highly compensated” employees are exempt from this overtime pay requirement if they meet a three-part test:

Salary Basis Test – an employee must be paid a predetermined and fixed salary that is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of work performed.
Salary Level Test – the amount of salary paid must meet a minimum specified amount. (Spoiler Alert: The new rules change the salary level.)
Duties Test – the employee’s job duties must primarily involve executive, administrative, or professional duties.

THE WHITE COLLAR EXEMPTION

The white-collar exemption applies to employees who perform primarily executive, administrative, and professional tasks. Workers who perform these tasks are considered to have more autonomous, managerial, or specialized roles justifying exemption from overtime. Therefore, if an employee’s duties are executive, administrative, and professional, and they satisfy the salary basis and salary level tests in the FLSA, they are not entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.

HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES

A highly compensated employee (HCE) is someone who earns a high annual compensation (according to salary thresholds in the FLSA) and whose role includes one or more executive, administrative, or professional duties. The FLSA exempts “highly compensated employees” from the overtime pay requirement.

Key Changes to the FLSA Overtime Rules

The new rule increases the salary thresholds in the salary level test for highly compensated and white collar employees. As a result of the changes, less employees will be considered exempt and employers will be liable for significantly more overtime pay. Notably, the types of duties eligible for exemption are not impacted.

The new salary thresholds are introduced in two phases with the first increase becoming effective on July 1, 2024, and the second occurring on January 1, 2025. Importantly, the new rule also includes a mechanism for automatically updating these salary thresholds every three years based on current wage data. This means employers will need to stay vigilant for future increases.

THE NEW SALARY THRESHOLDS

In general, the minimum annual salary to qualify for the white collar exemption is increasing from $35,568 to $58,656 and the total annual compensation requirement for the highly compensated employee exemption is increased from $107,432 to $151,164. Here’s a detailed breakdown of the higher salary thresholds and their effective dates:

New FLSA Overtime Rule - The New Salary Thresholds

Why This Rule Matters: Essential Steps for Employers

This rule will have a significant impact on Pennsylvania employers, potentially reclassifying millions of currently exempt employees as non-exempt and eligible for overtime pay. Employers who fail to comply risk costly back pay, penalties, and lawsuits.

There are practical steps that employers can consider to ensure compliance with the new FLSA rule:

Review Current Employee Salaries, Hours, and Duties: Audit current salaries, hours, and job duties. This review will help identify which employees’ status may be affected by the new salary thresholds for exempt status under the FLSA.
Reclassify Employees as Non-Exempt as Necessary: Based on the review, determine which employees will need to be reclassified from exempt to non-exempt, or awarded a salary increase, to comply with the new rules. This reclassification will make them eligible for overtime pay, altering how their work hours are managed and compensated. It is advisable to consider an employee’s perception of this reclassification when taking this step.
Time Recording Policies and Processes: For employees who are reclassified as non-exempt, implement or update timekeeping procedures to accurately track hours worked. This may also require training employees on time-keeping systems. Effective and accurate time recording is essential for managing overtime and ensuring compliance.
Update Overtime Policies: Revise company overtime policies to reflect changes in employee classifications. Include clear procedures for overtime approval to manage overtime work more effectively and ensure it aligns with budget constraints and business needs.
Bonuses, Incentive Pay, Commissions: Evaluate how non-salary forms of compensation will factor into the new salary thresholds for exempt status. The FLSA determines how this compensation should be treated in determining total annual compensation, which could influence exemption status.
Remember Contractual Obligations: The FLSA is a federal law which applies to all U.S. employers. However, any additional salary commitments in an employment contract still legally bind the employer. These should not be ignored.

Despite the quickly approaching compliance date, we also anticipate legal challenges to this rule, which could delay or change the rules. For now, though, employers should proceed on that basis that the updated regulations will take effect on July 1, 2024. Preparing for this deadline ensures that employers will not be caught off guard and can avoid any potential legal and financial repercussions.

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