Tag: employee retirement income security act

IRS Issues FAQs Regarding Long-Term Part-Time Employees in 403(b) Plans

The IRS recently issued Notice 2024-73, which provides much-needed guidance on long-term, part-time (“LTPT”) employees in ERISA-governed 403(b) retirement plans. Following passage of the SECURE 2.0 Act, an employee is generally considered a LTPT employee if he or she works at least 500 hours per year for two consecutive years.

Among other items, the Notice sets forth the IRS position on the following key issues on which the benefits community has been seeking clarification:

  • A part-time employee who qualifies as a LTPT employee must have the right to make elective deferrals to an ERISA 403(b) plan (unless some other statutory exemption applies), notwithstanding the Tax Code’s permitted exclusion for employees who normally work less than 20 hours per week.
  • An ERISA 403(b) plan may continue to exclude from the plan part-time employees who do not qualify as LTPT employees, notwithstanding the “consistency requirement,” which generally prevents a plan from excluding some part-time employees and not others.
  • An ERISA 403(b) plan is not required to provide the right to make elective deferrals to certain student employees, even if they qualify as LTPT employees. This is because the student employee exclusion is based on an employee classification (a student performing the service), rather than an amount of service (not an hours-based exclusion).

The guidance in the Notice is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2024. Importantly, the Notice also provides that a previously promulgated proposed regulation relating to the handling of LTPT employees in 401(k) plans, once finalized, will apply no earlier than plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2026 (i.e., a two-year extension).

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For more on Long-Term Part-Time Employees, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g., Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

Article By:

Neal S Schelberg
Aaron Feuer
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP.

Private Equity Fund Is Not a “Trade or Business” Under ERISA

An article, Private Equity Fund Is Not a “Trade or Business” Under ERISA, written by Stanley F. Lechner of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP was recently featured in The National Law Review:

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District court decision refutes 2007 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation opinion letter and could provide potential clarity to private equity firms and private equity funds in determining how to structure their investments.

In a significant ruling that directly refutes a controversial 2007 opinion by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) Appeals Board, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held in Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund that a private equity fund is not a “trade or business” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and therefore is not jointly and severally liable for millions of dollars in pension withdrawal liability incurred by a portfolio company in which the private equity fund had a substantial investment.[1] This ruling, if followed by other courts, will provide considerable clarity and relief to private equity funds that carefully structure their portfolios.

The Sun Capital Case

In Sun Capital, two private equity funds (Sun Fund III and Sun Fund IV) invested in a manufacturing company in 2006 through an affiliated subsidiary and obtained a 30% and 70% ownership interest, respectively, in the company. Two years after their investment, the company withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan in which it had participated and filed for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The pension fund assessed the company with withdrawal liability under section 4203 of ERISA in the amount of $4.5 million. In addition, the pension fund asserted that the two private equity funds were a joint venture or partnership under common control with the bankrupt company and thus were jointly and severally liable for the company’s withdrawal liability.

In response to the pension fund’s assessment, the private equity funds filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Massachusetts, seeking a declaratory judgment that, among other things, they were not an “employer” under section 4001(b)(1) of ERISA that could be liable for the bankrupt company’s pension withdrawal liability because they were neither (1) a “trade or business” nor (2) under “common control” with the bankrupt company.

Summary Judgment for the Private Equity Funds

After receiving cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the private equity funds’ motion for summary judgment. In a lengthy and detailed written opinion, the court made three significant rulings.

First, the court held that the private equity funds were passive investors and not “trades or businesses” under common control with the bankrupt company and thus were not jointly and severally liable for the company’s withdrawal liability. In so holding, the court rejected a 2007 opinion letter of the PBGC Appeals Board, which had held that a private equity fund that owned a 96% interest in a company was a trade or business and was jointly and severally liable for unfunded employee benefit liabilities when the company’s single-employer pension plan terminated.

A fundamental difference between the legal reasoning of the court in the Sun Capital case compared to the reasoning of the PBGC in the 2007 opinion is the extent to which the actions of the private equity funds’ general partners were attributed to the private equity fund. In the PBGC opinion, the Appeals Board concluded that the private equity fund was not a “passive investor” because its agent, the fund’s general partner, was actively involved in the business activity of the company in which it invested and exercised control over the management of the company. In contrast, the court in Sun Capital stated that the PBGC Appeals Board “misunderstood the law of agency” and “incorrectly attributed the activity of the general partner to the investment fund.”[2]

Second, in responding to what the court described as a “creative” but unpersuasive argument by the pension fund, the court concluded that the private equity funds did not incur partnership liability due to the fact that they were both members in the affiliated Delaware limited liability company (LLC) that the funds created to serve as the fund’s investment vehicle in purchasing the manufacturing company. Applying Delaware state law, the court stated that the private equity funds, as members of an LLC, were not personally liable for the liabilities of the LLC. Therefore, the court concluded that, even if the LLC bore any responsibility for the bankrupt company’s withdrawal liability, the private equity funds were not jointly and severally liable for such liability.

Third, the court held that, even though each of the private equity funds limited its investment in the manufacturing company to less than 80% (i.e., 30% for Fund III and 70% for Fund IV) in part to “minimize their exposure to potential future withdrawal liability,” this did not subject the private equity funds to withdrawal liability under the “evade or avoid” provisions of section 4212(c) of ERISA.[3] Under section 4212(c) of ERISA, withdrawal liability could be incurred by an entity that engages in a transaction if “a principal purpose of [the] transaction is to evade or avoid liability” from a multiemployer pension plan. In so ruling, the court stated that the private equity funds had legitimate business reasons for limiting their investments to under 80% each and that it was not clear to the court that Congress intended the “evade or avoid” provisions of ERISA to apply to outside investors such as private equity funds.

Legal Context for the Court’s Ruling

Due to the distressed condition of many single-employer and multiemployer pension plans, the PBGC and many multiemployer pension plans are pursuing claims against solvent entities to satisfy unfunded benefit liabilities. For example, if a company files for bankruptcy and terminates its defined benefit pension plan, the PBGC generally will take over the plan and may file claims against the company’s corporate parents, affiliates, or investment funds that had a controlling interest in the company, or the PBGC will pursue claims against alleged alter egos, successor employers, or others for the unfunded benefit liabilities of the plan that the bankrupt company cannot satisfy.

Similarly, if a company contributes to a multiemployer pension plan and, for whatever reason, withdraws from the plan, the withdrawing company will be assessed “withdrawal liability” if the plan has unfunded vested benefits. In general, withdrawal liability consists of the employer’s pro rata share of any unfunded vested benefit liability of the multiemployer pension plan. If the withdrawing company is financially unable to pay the assessed withdrawal liability, the multiemployer plan may file claims against solvent entities pursuant to various legal theories, such as controlled group liability or successor liability, or may challenge transactions that have a principal purpose of “evading or avoiding” withdrawal liability.

Under ERISA, liability for unfunded or underfunded employee benefit plans is not limited to the employer that sponsors a single-employer plan and is not limited to the employer that contributes to a multiemployer pension plan. Instead, ERISA liability extends to all members of the employer’s “controlled group.” Members of an employer’s controlled group generally include those “trades or businesses” that are under “common control” with the employer. In parent-subsidiary controlled groups, for example, the parent company must own at least 80% of the subsidiary to be part of the controlled group. Under ERISA, being part of an employer’s controlled group is significant because all members of the controlled group are jointly and severally liable for the employee benefit liabilities that the company owes to an ERISA-covered plan.

Private Investment Funds as “Trades or Businesses”

Historically, private investment funds were not considered to be part of an employer’s controlled group because they were not considered to be a “trade or business.” Past rulings generally have supported the conclusion that a passive investment, such as through a private equity fund, is not a trade or business and therefore cannot be considered part of a controlled group.[4]

In 2007, however, the Appeals Board of the PBGC issued a contrary opinion, concluding a private equity fund that invested in a company that eventually failed was a “trade or business” and therefore was jointly and severally liable for the unfunded employee benefit liabilities of the company’s defined benefit pension plan, which was terminated by the PBGC. Although the 2007 PBGC opinion letter was disputed by many practitioners, it was endorsed by at least one court.[5]

The Palladium Capital Case

In Palladium Capital, a related group of companies participated in two multiemployer pension plans. The companies became insolvent, filed for bankruptcy, withdrew from the multiemployer pension plans, and were assessed more than $13 million in withdrawal liability. Unable to collect the withdrawal liability from the defunct companies, the pension plans initiated litigation against three private equity limited partnerships and a private equity firm that acted as an advisor to the limited partnerships. The three limited partnerships collectively owned more than 80% of the unrestricted shares of the defunct companies, although no single limited partnership owned more than 57%.

Based on the specific facts of the case, and relying in part on the PBGC’s 2007 opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Among other things, the court stated that there were material facts in dispute over whether the three limited partnerships acted as a joint venture or partnership regarding their portfolio investments, whether the limited partnerships were passive investors or “investment plus” investors that actively and regularly exerted power and control over the financial and managerial activities of the portfolio companies, and whether the limited partnerships and their financial advisor were alter egos of the companies and jointly liable for the assessed withdrawal liability. Because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding each of these issues, the court denied each party’s motion for summary judgment.

Significance of the Sun Capital Decision

In concluding that a private equity fund is not a “trade or business,” the Sun Capital decision directly refutes the 2007 PBGC opinion letter and its reasoning. If the Sun Capital decision is followed by other courts, it will provide welcome clarity to private equity firms and private equity funds in determining how to structure their investments. Among other things, both private equity funds and defined benefit pension plans would benefit from knowing whether or under what circumstances a fund’s passive investment in a portfolio company can constitute a “trade or business” thus subjecting the private equity fund to potential controlled group liability. Similarly, both private equity firms and private equity funds need to know whether a court will attribute to the private equity fund the actions of a general partner or financial or management advisors in determining whether the investment fund is sufficiently and actively involved in the operations and management of a portfolio company to be considered a “trade or business.”

The Sun Capital decision was rendered, as noted above, against a backdrop in which the PBGC and underfunded pension plans are becoming more aggressive in pursuing new theories of liability against various solvent entities to collect substantial sums that are owed to the employee benefit plans by insolvent and bankrupt companies. Until the law becomes more developed and clear regarding the various theories of liability that are now being asserted against private equity funds investing in portfolio companies that are exposed to substantial employee benefits liability, it would be prudent for private equity firms and investment funds to do the following:

  • Structure carefully their operations and investment vehicles.
  • Be cautious in determining whether any particular fund should acquire a controlling interest in a portfolio company that faces substantial unfunded pension liability.
  • Ensure that the private equity fund is a passive investor and does not exercise “investment plus” power and influence over the operations and management of its portfolio companies.
  • Conduct thorough due diligence into the potential employee benefits liability of a portfolio company, including “hidden” liabilities, such as withdrawal liability, that generally do not appear on corporate balance sheets and financial statements.
  • Be aware of the risks in structuring a transaction in which an important objective is to elude withdrawal liability.

Similarly, until the law becomes more developed and clear, multiemployer pension plans may wish to devote particular attention to the nature and structure of both strategic and financial owners of the businesses that contribute to their plans and should weigh and balance the risks to which they are exposed by different ownership approaches.

[1]. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, No. 10-10921-DPW, 2012 WL 5197117 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2012), available here.

[2]. Sun Capital, slip op. at 17.

[3]. Id. at 29-30.

[4]. See e.g., Whipple v. Comm’r., 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963).

[5]. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity Partners, LLC (Palladium Capital), 722 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

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