Tag: Eleventh Circuit

Is It the End of the False Claims Act As We Know It? District Court Rules Qui Tam Provisions Unconstitutional

In a first-of-its-kind ruling on 30 September 2024, Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle of the US District Court for the Middle District of Florida held in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Med. Assocs., LLC that the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) are unconstitutional. No. 19-cv-01236, 2024 WL 4349242, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2024). Specifically, Judge Mizelle found that qui tam relators in FCA actions qualify as executive branch “Officers” who are not properly appointed, thereby violating the Appointments Clause of Article II of the US Constitution.

The holding adopts Appointments Clause arguments that have been gaining traction in recent Supreme Court opinions. It also addresses some of the “serious constitutional questions” that Justice Clarence Thomas had raised regarding the FCA’s qui tam provisions in his dissent in the Supreme Court’s June 2023 decision in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 449 (2024) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Notably, Judge Mizelle’s decision in Zafirov is contrary to a number of other decisions post-Polansky that rejected similar constitutional arguments.

The decision is sure to be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and it remains to be seen whether Judge Mizelle’s rationale will withstand appellate scrutiny. In any event, for the time being, the defense bar has a new tool in its arsenal to seek dismissal of qui tam FCA actions. Moreover, if the decision stands, it will have broad ramifications on the FCA, which has provided for qui tam actions (a form of “whistleblower” activity) since the FCA’s enactment in 1863. Cases filed by qui tam relators have comprised the largest portion of overall FCA recoveries for years, accounting for 87% of FCA recoveries in the most recent fiscal year. For additional data on qui tam cases, see our firms’ recent white paper here.

Summary of the Decision

In 2019, the relator, a board-certified family care physician, filed a qui tam FCA action against her employer and several other providers, as well as Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs). The relator alleged that the providers acted in concert with the MAOs to artificially increase the risk adjustment scores of Medicare Advantage enrollees, in turn increasing the defendants’ capitated payments from the government.

After a lengthy procedural history involving multiple rounds of motions to dismiss, in February 2024, the defendants sought judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the FCA’s qui tam provisions violate the Appointments, Vesting, and Take Care Clauses of Article II of the US Constitution. The defendants also argued that historical practice does not cure the qui tam provisions’ constitutional defects. The United States intervened solely to defend the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions, with several amici curiae also filing briefs.

The court did not reach the Vesting and Take Care Clause arguments but agreed with defendants that the qui tam provisions violate the Appointments Clause. Analyzing that question, the court first found that qui tam relators are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) relators exercise significant authority by possessing civil enforcement authority on behalf of the United States; and (2) relators occupy a “continuing position” established by law given that the FCA prescribes their statutory duties, powers, and compensation and the position is analogous to other temporary officials that wield core executive power, such as bank receivers and special prosecutors. Second, the court found that Article II of the US Constitution contains no qui tam exception, rejecting arguments that historical practice confirms the qui tam provisions’ constitutionality. The court stated that “[w]hen the Constitution is clear, no amount of countervailing history overcomes what the States ratified.” Third, the court found that because a relator is an Officer, the relator must be appointed by the president, the head of an executive department, or a court. Because relators are self-appointed by initiating their own FCA actions, the court held that the qui tam provisions violate the Appointments Clause and dismissed the action.

Key Takeaways

  • Although noteworthy, Zafirov is an outlier among the multiple decisions pre- and post-Polansky that have addressed the qui tam provisions’ constitutionality. The case is also expected to be appealed by both the relator and the United States to the Eleventh Circuit. Of note, the Eleventh Circuit is currently considering an appeal of a separate Appointments Clause ruling that found a special counsel was improperly appointed in United States v. Trump.
  • This issue could also make its way to the Supreme Court. In addition to Justice Thomas’ comments noted above, Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett (in a concurrence in Polansky) acknowledged that “[t]here are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II” and suggested that the Court consider those arguments in an “appropriate case.” Time will tell whether Zafirov is that case.
  • The anti-whistleblower holding in Zafirov stands in sharp contrast to other recent notable developments that encourage whistleblower activity, including the US Department of Justice’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program and similar initiatives, as well as recent US Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.
  • Despite the expected appeals, the success in Zafirov raises important issues for FCA defendants and the defense bar to evaluate, and the decision may open the door to similar arguments in other FCA qui tam actions. For one, it remains to be seen what impact Zafirov should have where a defendant is considering settling in a nonintervened case and whether a conditional settlement that preserves the right to appeal the constitutional issue is appropriate. Other courts may also draw different lines, including if and how the government’s decision to intervene impacts the constitutional analysis. These will all be important issues for affected companies and FCA practitioners to consider and keep an eye on.

Our Firm’s FCA lawyers will continue to closely monitor these developments.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more on the False Claims Act, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of FCRA Claims Since Alleged Inaccurate Information Was Not Objectively and Readily Verifiable

In Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations Inc., No. 22-11014, No. 22-11734, 2024 WL 1759143 (11th Cir. 2024), which was a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit” or “Court”) held that the purchasers of a timeshare did not have actionable FCRA claims since the alleged inaccurate information reported to one of the consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) was not objectively and readily verifiable. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two decisions issued by United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (“District Court”) granting of summary judgment in favor of the timeshare company in the respective cases.

Summary of Facts and Background

Two consumers, Mark Mayer (“Mayer”) and Tanethia Holden (“Holden”), entered into two separate purchase agreements with Holiday Inn Club Vacations Incorporated (“Holiday”) to acquire timeshare interests in Cape Canaveral and Las Vegas, respectively. Holiday is a timeshare company that allows customers to purchase one or more of its vacation properties in weekly increments that can be used annually during the designated period. As part of the transaction, Holiday’s customers typically elect to finance their timeshare purchases through Holiday, which results in the execution of a promissory note and mortgage.

  1. Mayer’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On September 15, 2014, Mayer entered into his purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a title and closing provision stating the transaction would not close until Mayer made the first three monthly payments, and Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name. The purchase agreement also included a purchaser’s default provision stating that upon Mayer’s default or breach of any of the terms or conditions of the agreement, all sums paid by Mayer would be retained by Holiday as liquidated damages and the parties to the purchase agreement would be relieved from all obligations thereunder. Further, the purchase agreement provided that any payments made under a related promissory note prior to the closing would be subject to the purchaser’s default provision. On the same day, Mayer executed a promissory note to finance his timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months. On July 13, 2015, Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name, and he proceeded to tender timely monthly payments until May 2017. As a result of Mayer’s failure to tender subsequent payments, Holiday reported Mayer’s delinquency to the CRA.

Approximately two years later, Mayer obtained a copy of his credit report and discovered Holiday had reported a past-due balance. Thereafter, Mayer sent multiple letters to the CRA disputing the debt, as he believed the purchase agreement was terminated under the purchaser’s default provision. Each dispute was communicated to Holiday, who in turn certified that the information was accurately reported. Mayer sued Holiday for an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA based on the furnishing of inaccurate information and failure to “fully and properly re-investigate” the disputes. Holiday eventually moved for partial summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District Court reasoned that the underlying issue of whether the default provision excused Mayer’s obligation to keep paying was a legal dispute rather than a factual inaccuracy and, in turn, made Mayer’s claim not actionable under the FCRA. Mayer timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

  1. Holden’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On June 25, 2016, Holden entered into her purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a nearly identical title and closing provision to that of Mayer’s purchase agreement. Additionally, Holden’s purchase agreement incorporated a similar purchaser’s default provision. Similarly, Holden executed a promissory note to finance her timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months, and entered into a mortgage to secure the payments under the note. After making her third payment, Holden defaulted and hired an attorney to cancel the purchase agreement pursuant to the closing and title provision and purchaser’s default provision. However, Holiday disputed the purchase agreement was canceled and, on June 19, 2017, recorded a timeshare deed in Holden’s name. More importantly, Holiday reported Holden’s delinquent debt to the CRA.

In response, Holden’s attorney sent three dispute letters to Holiday, which resulted in Holiday investigating the dispute and determining the reporting was accurate since Holden was still obligated under the note. Eventually, Holden sued Holiday for various violations of Florida State law and the FCRA. Holden claimed Holiday reported inaccurate information to the CRA, failed to conduct an appropriate investigation, and failed to correct the inaccuracies. The parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment, which ended with the District Court granting Holiday’s motion and denying Holden’s motion. Specifically, the District Court held that Holden’s FCRA claim failed because contract disputes regarding whether Holden still owed the underlying debt are legal disputes and not factual inaccuracies. Holden timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

As the Eleventh Circuit reiterated in Holden, when a furnisher is notified of a consumer’s dispute, the furnisher must undertake the following three actions: (1) conduct an investigation surrounding the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information provided by the CRA; and (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA. When a furnisher determines an item of information disputed by a consumer is incomplete, inaccurate, or cannot be verified, the furnisher is required to modify, delete, or permanently block reporting of the disputed information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Additionally, any disputed information that a furnisher determines is inaccurate or incomplete must be reported to all other CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). Despite the foregoing, consumers have no private right of action against furnishers merely for reporting inaccurate information to the CRAs. The only private right of action a consumer may assert against a furnisher is for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation upon receiving notice of a dispute from a CRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1)).

To successfully prove an FCRA claim, the consumer must demonstrate the following: (1) the consumer identified inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher provided to the CRA; and (2) the ensuing investigation was unreasonable based on some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish the reported information was inaccurate or incomplete.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

In affirming the District Court’s decisions granting summary judgment and dismissing the FCRA claims, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that whether the alleged inaccuracy was factual or legal was “beside the point. Instead, what matters is whether the alleged inaccuracy was objectively and readily verifiable.” Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., 981 F. 3d 1246, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2020), which defined “accuracy” as “freedom from mistake or error.” The Eleventh Circuit continued by reiterating that “when evaluating whether a report is accurate under the [FCRA], we look to the objectively reasonable interpretations of the report.” As such, “a report must be factually incorrect, objectively likely to mislead its intended user, or both to violate the maximal accuracy standards of the [FCRA].”

Based on this standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged inaccurate information on which Mayer and Holden based their FCRA claims was not objectively and readily verifiable since the information stemmed from contractual disputes without simple answers. As such, the Eleventh Circuit found that Holiday took appropriate action upon receiving Mayer and Holden’s disputes by assessing the issues and determining whether the respective debts were due and/or collectible, which thereby satisfied its obligation under the FCRA. While Mayer and Holden argued to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the resolutions of these contract disputes were not straightforward applications of the law to facts. In support of its decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited to the fact that Florida State courts have reviewed similar timeshare purchase agreements and reached conflicting conclusions about whether the default provisions excused a consumer’s obligation to pay the underlying debt.

Conclusion

Holden is a limited victory for furnishers, as the Eleventh Circuit declined to impose a bright-line rule that only purely factual or transcription errors are actionable under the FCRA and held a court must determine whether the alleged inaccurate information is “objectively and readily verifiable.” Accordingly, there are situations when furnishers are required by the FCRA to accurately report information derived from the readily verifiable and straightforward application of the law to facts. One example of such a situation is misreporting the clear effect of a bankruptcy discharge order on certain types of debt. Thus, furnishers should revisit their investigation and verification procedures so they do not run afoul of the FCRA. Furnishers should also continue to monitor for developing case law as other circuit courts confront these issues.

© 2024 Blank Rome LLP
For more news on Fair Credit Reporting Act Litigation, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

U.S. Corporate Transparency Act: CTA is Declared Unconstitutional in U.S. District Court Case

The Corporate Transparency Act has been declared unconstitutional. On March 1, 2024, U.S. District Court Judge Liles C. Burke issued a 53-page opinion[1] granting summary judgment for the National Small Business Association and held that the Corporate Transparency Act “exceeds the Constitution’s limits on the legislative branch and lacks a sufficient nexus to any enumerated power to be a necessary or proper means of achieving Congress’ policy goals.”

As a result, Judge Burke found the CTA to be unconstitutional because it exceeds the Constitution’s limits on Congress’ power, without even reaching a decision on whether it violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Court then permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the CTA against the named plaintiffs and ordered a further hearing on the award of costs of litigation.

While it is likely that this litigation will continue to play out in the federal court system, the initial victory has gone to small business and importantly that means that compliance with this now unconstitutional regulatory regime can be set aside for the current time being.

[1] Nat’l Small Bus. United v. Yellen, No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (N.D. Ala. 2022)

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more on the Corporate Transparency Act, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Out with the Old? Not So Fast! A Quick Review of 2023 Highlights

2023 has brought many updates and changes to the legal landscape. Our blog posts have covered many of them, but you may not remember (or care to remember) them. Before moving on to 2024, let’s take a moment to review our top five blog posts from the year and the key takeaways from each.

VAX REQUIREMENT SACKED IN TN: MEDICARE PROVIDERS LOSE EXEMPTION FROM COVID-19 LAWS

Our most read blog of 2023 covered the federal COVID-19 vaccination requirement that applied to certain healthcare employers, which was lifted effective August 4, 2023. (Yes, in 2023 we were still talking about COVID-19). However, keep in mind that state laws may still apply. For example, Tennessee law generally prohibits employers from requiring employee vaccination, with an exception for entities subject to valid and enforceable Medicare or Medicaid requirements to the contrary (such as the federal vaccine requirement). However, now that the federal vaccine requirement is gone, there is no exception for these Medicare or Medicaid providers, and they are likely fully subject to Tennessee’s prohibition.

INTERPRETATION OF AN INTERPRETER REQUEST? 11TH CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON ACCOMMODATION OF DEAF EMPLOYEE

In this blog post, we covered a recent Eleventh Circuit case in which the court addressed ADA reasonable accommodation requests . The employee requested an accommodation, and the employer did not grant it—but the employee continued to work. Did the employee have a “failure to accommodate” claim? The Eleventh Circuit said yes, potentially. The court clarified that an employee still must suffer some harm—here, he needed to show that the failure to accommodate adversely impacted his hiring, firing, compensation, training, or other terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment. So, when you are considering an employee’s accommodation request, think about whether not granting it (or not providing any accommodation) could negatively impact the employee’s compensation, safety, training, or other aspects of the job. Always remember to engage in the interactive process with the employee to see if you can land on an agreeable accommodation.

POSTER ROLLERCOASTER: DOL CHANGES FLSA NOTICE REQUIRED AT WORKPLACES

If your business is subject to the FLSA (and almost everyone is), you probably know that you must provide an FLSA poster in your workplace. In this blog post, we reported that there is an updated FLSA “Employee Rights” poster that includes a “PUMP AT WORK” section, required under the Provide Urgent Material Protections (PUMP) for Nursing Mothers Act (more information on the PUMP Act here).

HOLIDAY ROAD! DOL WEIGHS IN ON TRACKING FMLA TIME AGAINST HOLIDAYS

In this now-timely blog post from June 2023, we discussed new guidance on tracking FMLA time during holidays. The DOL released Opinion Letter FMLA2023-2-A: Whether Holidays Count Against an Employee’s FMLA Leave Entitlement and Determination of the Amount of Leave. When employees take FMLA leave intermittently (e.g., an hour at a time, a reduced work schedule, etc.), their 12-week FMLA leave entitlement is reduced in proportion to the employee’s actual workweek. For example, if an employee who works 40 hours per week takes 8 hours of FMLA leave in a week, the employee has used one-fifth of a week of FMLA leave. However, if the same employee takes off 8 hours during a week that includes a holiday (and is therefore a 32-hour week), has the employee used one-fourth of a week of FMLA leave? Not surprisingly, the DOL said no. The one day off is still only one-fifth of a regular week. So, the employee has still only used one-fifth of a week of FMLA leave. Review the blog post for options to instead track leave by the hour, which could make things easier.

OT ON THE QT? BAMA’S TAX EXEMPTION FOR OVERTIME

Alabama interestingly passed a law, effective January 1, 2024, that exempts employees’ overtime pay from the 5% Alabama income tax. In this blog post, we discussed the new exemption. It is an effort to incentivize hourly employees to work overtime, especially in light of recent staffing shortages and shift coverage issues. The bill currently places no cap on how much overtime pay is eligible for the exemption, but it allows the Legislature to extend and/or revise the exemption during the Spring 2025 regular session. If you have employees in Alabama, be sure to contact your payroll department or vendor to ensure compliance with this exemption.

As always, consult your legal counsel with any questions about these topics or other legal issues. See you in 2024!

© 2023 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more news on 2023 Legal Landscape Updates, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Needless Gamble: Eleventh Circuit Uses Exceedingly Broad Language to Address Narrow Issue of Arbitration in TCPA Text Suit

In Gamble v. New Eng. Auto Fin., Inc., No. 17-15343, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14608 (11th Cir. May 31, 2018) the Eleventh Circuit upheld denial of arbitration of a TCPA claim involving text messages offering a consumer a new auto finance contract. While the Eleventh Circuit used unnecessarily broad language–discussed below– the holding is actually quite narrow; calls made to offer a consumer a second finance agreement do not arise out of a first finance agreement for arbitration purposes. The panel’s decision to reach this narrow conclusion through the vehicle of broadly-worded analysis might mean trouble for defendants seeking to compel future TCPA cases to arbitration in the Eleventh Circuit, however.

The arbitration clause at issue  in Gamble required arbitration of any “claim, dispute or controversy whether preexisting, present or future, that in any way arises from or relates to this Agreement or the Motor Vehicle securing this Agreement.”  The contract also contained a separate provision with a separate signature line appearing below the signature line for the auto loan agreement relating to consent to receive texts.  This separate provision was not signed by Plaintiff.

Defendant apparently emphasized the unsigned text message consent provision as the crux of its legal position. By offering Plaintiff the right to opt-in to text messages in the contract–the argument goes–the resulting text messages must have arose out of that contract. That’s a terrible argument, of course, and the Eleventh Circuit made short work of it concluding roughly that “no agreement regarding text messages exists between the parties.”

Unfortunately the Court did not stop there–although it could have–and used unnecessarily broad language in passing on the dispute before it. For instance, the Court made the express finding that the Plaintiff’s claim “does not arise from any right implicated by the Loan Agreement nor from the parties contractual relationship.”  While that is undoubtedly true, the reason that is the case is because the texts at issue were unrelated to this contract and pitched a wholly different contract. Yet the Court’s failure to emphasize this critical fact makes it seem as if TCPA cases–which almost never arise from a right implicated in a loan agreement–are per se non-arbitrable.

Complicating matters further, the Court also emphasized, in seemingly gratuitous fashion, that TCPA claims arise “from post-agreement conduct that allegedly violates a separate, distinct federal law.”  Again, this is undoubtedly true, but that is not a predicate basis for denying arbitration–claims related to purported statutory violations are commonly compelled to arbitration, including by the Eleventh Circuit. See generally Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F. 3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2014). And texts often arise out of contracts–such as where a consumer goes into default under the terms of a loan agreement resulting in text messages from a servicer seeking to collect. The loose language in Gamble needlessly implies, therefore, that claims related to such text messages are not subject to arbitration merely because the underlying right being enforced is a federal statutory right, rather than a contractual right. That’s an unnecessary–if not dangerous–implication, and surely not one that comports with the Congressionally-mandated policy favoring arbitration.

It remains to be seen exactly what district courts in the Eleventh Circuit do with Gamble, but one thing is for sure– Gamble just made defense efforts to compel arbitration of TCPA cases there a whole lot less certain. Care to roll the dice?

 

Copyright © 2018 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Eric Troutman of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.