Tag: EEOC

Recent Scrutiny of English-Only Workplace Rules Comes into Focus During National Hispanic Heritage Month

National Hispanic Heritage Month is celebrated each year from September 15 to October 15 in recognition of the contributions of Hispanic and Latino people to the history, culture, and economy of the United States. During this time, several Latin American countries celebrate their independence days. Employers can also use this month as a reminder to remain compliant with anti-discrimination and anti-harassment laws.

Quick Hits

  • National Hispanic Heritage Month starts on September 15 and ends on October 15 each year in the United States.
  • Hispanic workers constitute approximately 19 percent of the U.S. labor force, or approximately 32 million people, and that proportion continues to rise. Foreign-born workers, of which Hispanics account for 47.6 percent, make up 18.6 percent of the U.S. civilian workforce.
  • The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reports that in 2023 just nineteen lawsuits alleging race or national origin discrimination cost employers $4.9 million.

Recent EEOC Cases

Employers usually have anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies to protect Hispanic/Latino employees and applicants from employment discrimination. However, protections from discrimination based on national origin—particularly, workplace policies prohibiting language discrimination—sometimes are overlooked by employers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on national origin, and the EEOC considers an individual’s primary language “often an essential national origin characteristic.” (See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).)

This means employers generally may not mandate that employees or applicants speak English. While employers may require English in certain employment situations, such as when speaking only English is needed to ensure safe and efficient communication for specific tasks, an English-only rule must be justified by business necessity and put in place for nondiscriminatory reasons. These situations will typically be specified, limited, and communicated to all employees in a language they understand. Recent cases show how this aspect of Title VII is being enforced.

On June 26, 2024, the EEOC announced a settlement with a housekeeping company that allegedly required its employees in California to speak only English at all times. As a result, the employer agreed to pay monetary damages to the complainant—a Spanish-speaking housekeeper who worked in a nursing home in Concord, California. Additionally, the employer agreed to provide training for its California employees and to revise its policies to clearly state that it would not restrict languages spoken by employees who didn’t perform patient care—and that employees had the right to speak their preferred languages in the workplace. The employer agreed to issue its policies in Spanish, English, and any other language spoken by 5 percent or more of the employer’s California workforce. The EEOC stressed that “[c]lient relations and customer preference do not justify discriminatory [English-only] policies.”

On March 29, 2023, the EEOC announced that a staffing firm based in Washington and Oregon had agreed to pay $276,000 to settle discrimination and retaliation claims. Allegedly, the employer had imposed a no-Spanish rule, which lacked adequate business justification, and then had fired five employees who opposed the rule and continued to speak Spanish in the workplace. The employer agreed to provide an anonymous complaint process for employees, update its policies to be in English and Spanish, perform its investigations promptly, and train its staff on the new anti-discrimination policies. The director of the EEOC’s Seattle field office warned employers that they “should think twice before imposing limitations on what languages are ‘allowed’ to be used at work.” She further warned that in the absence of “a legitimate business necessity, such policies [were] likely to discriminate against workers based on their national origin.”

A Growing Demographic

In 2023, there were 65.2 million Hispanic people in the United States, representing approximately 19.5 percent of the U.S. population. Hispanic workers make up 19 percent of the U.S. labor force, and those rates continue to grow, according to the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). By 2030, BLS projects Hispanic workers will constitute 21 percent of the U.S. labor force.

Looking Ahead

The EEOC is likely to scrutinize employers’ English-only rules and policies as potentially violative of Title VII, as national origin discrimination includes discrimination based on language, ancestry, place of origin, origin (ethnic) group, culture, and even accent. Employers may wish to review their hiring and onboarding policies and practices to ensure compliance with Title VII and avoid potential legal issues, as recent cases demonstrate the EEOC’s active enforcement of protections against national origin discrimination.

To mitigate the risk of costly litigation, employers may also want to consider implementing management training focused on ensuring managers understand that requiring English at all times may be considered discrimination on the basis of national origin.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Workplace Rules, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

EEOC Unveils Final Rule Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act PWFA

Go-To Guide:
  • Effective June 18, employers covered by the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) are required to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.
  • PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • A preliminary injunction was entered on June 17, which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for purely elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  • Covered employers should review the requirements of the PWFA to ensure that their workplace policies and procedures allow for the requisite accommodations under the Act and follow current challenges to accommodations regarding elective abortions under the law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) final rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect June 18, 2024, but not without legal challenge.

The final rule, covered in a previous GT Alert, requires employers to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. The rule includes an exception for employers if the requested accommodation would cause the business an undue hardship.

However, the requirement of a workplace accommodation for “purely elective abortions” has been enjoined from implementation and enforcement in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and against four Catholic organizations. On June 17, 2024, Judge David C. Joseph in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled that the EEOC overstepped its authority by requiring workplace accommodations for “purely elective abortions.”

The motions for preliminary injunction, filed by the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as four entities affiliated with the Catholic Church, sought injunctive relief to the extent that the PWFA requires employers to accommodate purely elective abortions of employees. The court rejected the EEOC argument “that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted [it] the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.”

Based on its analysis, the court entered a preliminary injunction which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and any agency thereof, any covered entity under the final rule with respect to all employees whose primary duty station is located in Louisiana or Mississippi, and the entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that sought the court’s involvement.1

What should employers know to ensure compliance with the PWFA, given the limited injunctive relief issued? Below is a summary of the law and considerations for implementing the rule, which is now effective.

Application

  • The PWFA applies to employees, which include applicants and former employees where relevant based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
  • The PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • The states of Louisiana and Mississippi; employers located in Louisiana and Mississippi and with employees whose primary duty station is located within the states; and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake Charles, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, and the Catholic University of America are not required to provide accommodations for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to the pregnancy.

What Is Considered a ‘Known Limitation’?

  • A limitation is “known” to a covered entity if the employee, or the employee’s representative, has communicated the limitation to the covered entity.
  • The physical or mental condition may be a modest or minor and/or episodic impediment or problem.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that had a need or a problem related to maintaining their health or the health of the pregnancy. “Pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes uncomplicated pregnancies, vaginal deliveries or cesarian sections, miscarriage, postpartum depression, edema, placenta previa, and lactation.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions who sought health care related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition itself.
  • There is possible overlap between the PWFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because in these situations, the qualified employee may be entitled to an accommodation under either statute, as the protections of both may apply.

What Is an ‘Undue Hardship’?

  • An employer or covered entity does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation if it causes an undue hardship, meaning significant difficulty or expense, to the employer.

The PWFA Prohibits the Following Conduct by Covered Employers

  • Failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an employee or applicant, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship;
  • Requiring an employee to accept an accommodation other than a reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process;
  • Denying a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on the person’s need for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Requiring an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working;
  • Punishing or retaliating against an employee or applicant for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation under the PWFA, reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA, or participating in a PWFA proceeding (such as an investigation); and/or
  • Coercing individuals who are exercising their rights or helping others exercise their rights under the PWFA.

Non-Exhaustive List Of Examples of ‘Reasonable Accommodations’

  • Additional, longer, or more flexible breaks to drink water, eat, rest, or use the restroom;
  • Changing food or drink policies to allow for a water bottle or food;
  • Changing equipment, devices, or workstations, such as providing a stool to sit on, or a way to do work while standing;
  • Changing a uniform or dress code or providing safety equipment that fits;
  • Changing a work schedule, such as having shorter hours, part-time work, or a later start time;
  • Telework;
  • Temporary reassignment;
  • Temporary suspension of one or more essential functions of a job;
  • Leave for health care appointments;
  • Light duty or help with lifting or other manual labor; or
  • Leave to recover from childbirth or other medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Employer Training

  • Employers should consider training supervisors on how to respond to requests for accommodation.
  • Unlike requests for accommodation under the ADA, an accommodation pursuant to the PWFA may include a temporary suspension of essential job functions for qualified individuals (barring undue hardship to the employer).
  • Employees do not need to use specific words to request an accommodation to begin the interactive process.
  • Employers may not require that the employee seeking an accommodation be examined by a health care provider selected by the employer.
1 Further efforts to enjoin the implementation of the Rule were thwarted when the U.S. District Court for the District of Arkansas denied a motion for injunctive relief filed by a group of Republican state attorneys general on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule.
©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Payday: Terminated Employee Awarded $78,000 in EEOC Settlement

Employees returning to work following a hospitalization or illness can present legally nuanced issues, particularly if an employer is considering terminating an employee in close proximity to such a leave. A recent case settled by a company with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) highlights some of the legal risks that can come into play.

According to an EEOC press release: “The EEOC charged in [a lawsuit] that, in February 2022, [a company] fired a long-tenured receptionist, despite having recognized the 78-year-old employee as one of its employees of the year in January 2022. The receptionist’s termination came shortly after a brief hospitalization. The EEOC alleged that upon the receptionist’s return to work, [the company’s] general manager asked her how long she planned to continue to work, whether she needed to work, and whether she would prefer to spend her time traveling and seeing family instead of working.

Although the receptionist expressed her desire to continue working, and despite having never previously raised substantial performance concerns to the receptionist, the general manager told the receptionist that [the company] had lost confidence in her ability to work, citing her recent hospitalization. The receptionist was fired the next day and replaced by substantially younger employees.”

The EEOC alleged that these actions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), noting the alleged statements about “losing confidence” in the employee due to a hospitalization could be viewed as disability discrimination (the ADA defines “disability” very broadly), and the fact the employee was over the age of 40 (i.e., in the protected age group) and replaced with a younger employee could give rise to an inference of age discrimination under the ADEA.

The company elected to settle the allegations. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to pay $78,000 to the terminated employee. In addition, it entered into a two-year consent decree that also requires it to “revise its ADEA and ADA policies, post a notice in the workplace informing employees of the settlement, and train all employees and supervisors on their rights and responsibilities under both the ADEA and the ADA. Moreover, the company agreed to provide the EEOC with periodic reports regarding any future complaints of age or disability discrimination including a description of each employee’s allegations and the company’s response.”

Accordingly, this case serves as an important reminder that employee terminations should be carefully evaluated with respect to legal risks under various employment laws. Vetting such risks on the front end may mitigate pain on the back end.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

EEOC Publishes Long-Awaited Final Guidance on Workplace Harassment

On April 29, 2024, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued the final version of new workplace harassment guidance for employers, formally updating the EEOC’s position on the legal standards and employer liability under federal antidiscrimination laws for the first time in more than two decades.

Quick Hits

  • The EEOC issued a final version of new guidance for employers clarifying its positions on the applications of federal laws prohibiting harassment and retaliation.
  • The new guidance is the first update to the EEOC’s workplace harassment guidance since 1999 and incorporates several new developments in the law and modern workforces.
  • Key to the new guidance is that it recognizes unlawful harassment against LGBTQ+ individuals and addresses workplace protections for “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” including “lactation.”
  • The new guidance took immediate effect upon issuance.

The new guidance, “Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace,” clarifies the EEOC’s position on several key issues following its receipt of nearly 40,000 comments in response to its proposed guidance published on October 2, 2023.

“The EEOC’s updated guidance on harassment is a comprehensive resource that brings together best practices for preventing and remedying harassment and clarifies recent developments in the law,” EEOC Chair Charlotte Burrows said in a statement released with the new guidance.

In that regard, the final guidance aligns with the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia—wherein the prohibition under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against gender discrimination was held to include claims predicated on sexual orientation and gender identification—and recognizes potentially unlawful workplace harassment against LGBTQ+ individuals. The final guidance also addresses another key area of focus, that is, workplace protections for “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” including “lactation” in accordance with the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act), and the EEOC’s final guidance on the PWFA issued on April 15, 2024.

While claims of harassment represented more than a third of all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC between fiscal years 2016 and 2023, the Commission has not updated its guidance on harassment since 1999. The final guidance consolidates and replaces the EEOC’s five guidance documents issued from 1987 through 1999.

Significant for employers, the final guidance provides more than seventy hypothetical examples of potential unlawful harassment, including examples reflective of today’s modern workforce with both hybrid and remote workers and widespread use of electronic communication and social media.

Covered Harassment

The EEOC made several key updates to what it considers covered harassment under Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination laws.

Race and Color

The new guidance expands the EEOC’s explanation on potential harassment based on “color” under Title VII, separating it out into its own section that was not included in the proposed guidance. The guidance states that while discrimination based on color is “sometimes related to harassment based on race or national origin, color-based harassment due to an individual’s pigmentation, complexion, or skin shade or tone is independently covered by Title VII.”

The guidance provides an example of potential color-based harassment where a supervisor harasses Black employees with “darker complexions” and not Black employees with “lighter skin tones,” even though they are all of the same race or national origin.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, or Related Medical Conditions

The guidance states that harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “can include issues such as lactation; using or not using contraception; or deciding to have, or not to have, an abortion,” if that harassment “is linked to a targeted individual’s sex.” The new guidance adds multiple hypothetical examples of such harassment not included in the proposed guidance, including a situation where employees make negative comments about a pregnant employee who is allowed to “telework up to three days per week and utilize flexible scheduling” as an accommodation for “pregnancy-related morning sickness.” Another example highlighted a situation where negative comments are directed toward a female worker who expresses milk in the lactation room at work and other inappropriate behavior, namely a male worker knocking on the door of the lactation room and feigning intent to enter the room.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The new guidance explains the EEOC’s view that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of unlawful sex-based discrimination under Title VII, including epithets, physical assault, “outing” (meaning disclosing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity without permission), or other harassing conduct toward individuals because they do “not present in a manner that would stereotypically be associated with that person’s sex.”

Further, the guidance identifies as potential harassment the “repeated and intentional use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s known gender identity (misgendering); or the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.” Importantly, the final guidance requires some intentional or knowing behavior, that is “repeated and intentional” misgendering based on an individual’s “known” gender identity. (Emphasis added.)

Genetic Information

The new guidance further clarifies the EEOC’s understanding of unlawful harassment under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) as applying to “harassment based on an individual’s, or an individual’s family member’s, genetic test or on the basis of an individual’s family medical history.” For instance, the guidance states that such harassment could include harassing an employee “because the employee’s mother recently experienced a severe case of norovirus, which resulted in overnight hospitalization.”

Retaliatory Harassment

The final guidance includes a new section that addresses the concept of “retaliatory harassment.” The guidance clarifies the EEOC’s position that “retaliatory harassing conduct” may still be challenged as unlawful retaliation “even if it is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment by creating a hostile work environment.” The EEOC explained that the legal standards for hostile work environment and retaliation are different as the anti-retaliation provisions proscribe a broader range of behaviors, namely, “anything that might deter a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.”

Intraclass and Intersectional Harassment

The guidance includes examples of “intraclass” harassment where the harasser is in the same protected category as the individual being harassed. One hypothetical involves a fifty-two-year-old supervisor making derogatory comments toward a sixty-five-year-old employee as an example of harassment based on age, even though both individuals are over the age of forty. “Intersectional” harassment refers to situations where individuals are targeted based on their membership in more than one protected category. In one example, the hypothetical raises a situation where a male manager made comments to a female worker about her having a “hot flash” and being menopausal. The EEOC explained that such targeting based on “stereotypes about older women is covered as both age and sex discrimination.”

Reporting Procedures, Complaint Process, and Training

The proposed guidance outlined the “minimum” features of an effective anti-harassment policy, the “minimum” features for an effective complaint process, and the “minimum” features for effective anti-harassment training. The final guidance eliminates the “minimum” language, but the features of each are substantively the same otherwise.

As it concerns remedial measures, the Commission removed language from the proposed guidance that seemingly recognized the “fewer options” available to employers when faced with instances of harassment perpetrated by nonemployees, harassment toward employees working at client locations as is common for temporary staffing agencies, or harassment arising from off-duty conduct. In its place, the final guidance simply provides that employers have an “arsenal of incentives and sanctions” available to them to address harassment, but those options “may vary depending on who engages in the conduct and where it occurs, among other considerations.”

Next Steps

While the final guidance is likely to face legal challenges in the courts, employers may want to review their workplace policies and practices, particularly in light of potential liability for discrimination or harassment against LGBTQ+ employees. Additionally, employers may want to note differing state or local laws and state or local agency guidance that differ from Title VII and other federal laws enforced by the EEOC.

In addition to the new guidance, the EEOC published a “Summary of Key Provisions” document and a fact sheet for small businesses, with more information for employers.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Workplace Harassment, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Final Regulations Released

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the text of the final regulations and interpretative guidance implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) on April 15, 2024. The final regulations are expected to be formally published in the April 19, 2024, Federal Register and will be effective 60 days later.

The EEOC received more than 100,000 public comments, including comments from Jackson Lewis, in response to the Commission’s notice of the proposed regulations issued on Aug. 11, 2023. Although largely unchanged from the proposed regulations, the final regulations provide important clarifications and insights into how the EEOC will enforce the law. Discussed below are some key points employers need to know about the final regulations.

Key PWFA Requirements

The PWFA, which went into effect on June 27, 2023, requires employers with at least 15 employees and other covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s or applicant’s known limitations related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.

Qualified Employee

Under the PWFA, an employee has two ways to establish they are a “qualified employee”:

  1. Like under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), “an employee or applicant who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position” is qualified.
  2. If an employee (or applicant) cannot perform all essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation, the employee can be qualified for accommodations under the PWFA if: (a) the inability to perform an essential job function is for a temporary period; (b) the essential job function(s) could be performed in the near future; and (c) the inability to perform the essential function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. The Act, however, does not define “temporary” or “in the near future.” Several commentors raised concerns about the EEOC’s definition of these terms in the proposed regulations.

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations state that “temporary” means “lasting for a limited time, not permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the final regulations state that assessing whether all essential job functions can be performed in the near future depends on the circumstances:

  • For a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is generally defined as 40 weeks from the start of the temporary suspension of an essential function.
  • For conditions other than a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is not defined as any particular length of time. However, the preamble to the final regulations explains that an employee who needs indefinite leave cannot perform essential job functions “in the near future.”

The final regulations explain that employers should consider whether an employee will be able to perform the essential functions “in the near future” each time an employee asks for an accommodation that requires suspension of an essential job function.

Ultimately, whether an employee is “qualified” involves a fact-sensitive evaluation whether the temporary suspension of essential job functions can be reasonably accommodated by the employer. This is significantly different from the ADA reasonable accommodation obligation and may involve, as the final regulations state, removing essential job functions and other arrangements including, but not limited to, requiring the employee perform the remaining job functions and other functions assigned by the employer, temporarily transferring the employee to another job or assigning the employee to light or modified duty, or allowing the employee to participate in an employer’s light or modified duty program.

Accommodations Only Required for Individual With Limitation

The EEOC explains that the regulations do not require employers to provide accommodations to an employee when an employee’s partner, spouse, or family member — not the employee themselves — has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. For clarity, the EEOC revised the final regulations’ definition of “limited” to state the limitation must be the specific employee.

Known Limitations

Employers are only obligated under the PWFA to accommodate an individual’s “known limitation.”

A “limitation” is defined as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, of the specific employee in question.” The condition may be “modest, minor, and/or episodic, and does not need to meet the definition of “disability” under the ADA.

It becomes “known” to the employer when the employee or the employee’s representative has communicated the limitation to the employer. An employee’s representative may include a family member, friend, healthcare provider, union representative, or other representative.

The limitation may be communicated to a supervisor, a manager, someone who has supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s tasks (or the equivalent in the case of an applicant), human resources personnel, or other appropriate official or by following the steps in the employer’s policy to request an accommodation.

This communication need not be in any specific format and may also be oral.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, Related Medical Conditions

Although the EEOC acknowledged receiving many comments on the scope of the proposed definition of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,” it made no substantive changes to the definition in the final regulations.

“Pregnancy” and “childbirth” are still defined as including current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential or intended pregnancy (which can include infertility, fertility treatments and the use of contraception), labor, and childbirth (including vaginal and cesarean delivery).

The term “related medical conditions” continues to be defined as conditions that are “related to, are affected by, or arise out of pregnancy or childbirth.” The regulations provide the following non-exhaustive list of examples: termination of pregnancy, including by miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion; lactation and conditions related to lactation; menstruation; postpartum depression, anxiety or psychosis; vaginal bleeding; preeclampsia; pelvic prolapse; preterm labor; ectopic pregnancy; gestational diabetes; cesarean or perineal wound infection; maternal cardiometabolic disease; endometriosis; changes in hormone levels; and many other conditions.

The final regulations also reference related medical conditions that are not unique to pregnancy or childbirth, such as chronic migraine headaches, nausea or vomiting, high blood pressure, incontinence, carpal tunnel syndrome, and many other medical conditions. These conditions are covered by the PWFA only if the condition relates to pregnancy or childbirth or are exacerbated by pregnancy or childbirth, although the ADA or other civil rights statutes may apply.

Documentation

The final PWFA regulations continue to provide for a “reasonableness” standard in evaluating the circumstances under which an employer may request documentation from an employee. The final regulations, however, modify the definition of “reasonable documentation.” An employer may only request the “minimum documentation” necessary to confirm the employee has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a limitation) and describe the adjustment or change at work due to the limitation.

In addition to stating when an employer can ask for documentation, the PWFA regulations add a paragraph regarding an employee’s self-confirmation of their pregnancy status. It provides that an employer must accept as sufficient an employee’s self-confirmation when: (1) the pregnancy is obvious; or (2) an employee seeks one of the “predictable assessment” accommodation requests set forth in the regulations (discussed below).

The final PWFA regulations make clear the circumstances where it is not reasonable to seek supporting documentation. These circumstances include when: (1) the limitation and adjustment or change needed is obvious and the employee provides self-confirmation; (2) the employer has sufficient information to determine whether the employee has a qualifying limitation and needs an adjustment or change due to the limitation; (3) when the employee is pregnant a “predictable assessment”; (4) the reasonable accommodation relates to a time and/or place to pump or to nurse during work hours, and the employee provides self-confirmation; or (5) the requested accommodation is available to employees without known limitations under the PWFA pursuant to a policy or practice without submitting supporting documentation.

Importantly, the same prohibitions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations as well as the protection of medical information enforced under the ADA apply with equal force to documentation collected under the PWFA. Employers should ensure they continue to limit inquiries to only those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Employers should also treat all documentation relating to a PWFA accommodation request like they treat ADA documentation — maintain it confidentially and separate from an employee’s personnel file.

Reasonable Accommodations

The PFWA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, which the final regulations define to be generally consistently with the ADA except for temporarily excusing or eliminating the performance of an essential job function. Otherwise, the rule provides that a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the qualified employee’s needs to remove a work-related barrier and provide an employee with equal employment opportunity to benefit from all privileges of employment.

The final regulations include examples of requests that may be reasonable. These include schedule changes due to morning sickness or to treat medical issues following delivery, adjustments to accommodate restrictions for lifting or requests for light duty, time and/or space to pump or nurse during work hours, or time off to recover from childbirth.

Lactation Accommodations

The EEOC’s final regulations require reasonable accommodation for lactation beyond what may be required under the Providing Urgent Maternal Protection for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act). The PUMP Act generally requires reasonable break time and space shielded from view and free from intrusion for a nursing mother to express breast milk. The final PWFA regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of accommodations relating to lactation, including space for pumping that is in reasonable proximity to a sink, running water, and refrigeration for storing milk.

The final regulations add nursing during working hours (as distinct from pumping) to the list of potentially reasonable accommodations. In the comments explaining this addition, the EEOC cautioned that accommodations for nursing mothers during work hours address situations where the employee and child are in close proximity in the normal course of business, such as where the employee works from home or where the employer offers on-site daycare. The EEOC stated this is not intended to create a right to proximity to nurse because of an employee’s preference.

Predictable Assessments

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations recognize four “predictable assessments” that will not impose an undue hardship in “virtually all cases”:

  1. Allowing an employee to carry or keep water near to enable them to drink;
  2. Permitting an employee to take additional restroom breaks as needed;
  3. Allowing an employee whose work requires standing to sit and whose work requires sitting to stand as needed; and
  4. Allowing an employee to take breaks to eat and drink as needed.

Despite stating the predictable assessments above will not “in virtually all cases” impose an undue hardship, the EEOC clarified this does not mean such requests are reasonable per se. The EEOC recognized that in certain industries, these predictable assessments may cause an undue hardship. Accordingly, employers may still conduct an individualized assessment of a predictable assessment accommodation request. However, the final regulations make clear that any such individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

Many individuals and organizations that submitted comments on the proposed regulations suggested the addition of other types of predictable assessment accommodations, including dress code modifications, minor workstation modifications, proximity to a restroom, permitting eating and drinking at a workstation, rest breaks, and personal protective equipment. Although noting agreement with the commenters and stating that employers should be able to provide such requests with “little difficulty,” the EEOC declined to expand the list of predictable assessments beyond the four originally listed that in “virtually all cases” will be considered reasonable and will not pose an undue hardship. In response to comments objecting to predictable assessments based on different challenges by industry, the EEOC guidance recognizes that an employer in certain industries may assert an accommodation request otherwise deemed to be a predictable assessment causes the employer an undue hardship and may deny the request.

Undue Hardship

The EEOC adopted the same standard for undue hardship in the final regulations as was in the proposed regulations. When an employee can perform all their essential job functions, the EEOC stated that undue hardship has the same meaning as under the ADA and generally means significant difficulty or expense for the employer’s operation. If an employee cannot perform all essential functions and the accommodation is temporary suspension of an essential job function, the employer needs to consider the ADA definition of undue hardship and the following relevant factors: (1) the length of time the employee or applicant will be unable to perform the essential function(s); (2) whether there is work for the employee to accomplish by allowing the employee to perform all the other functions of the job, transferring the employee to a different position, or otherwise; (3) the nature of the essential function, including its frequency; (4) whether the covered entity has temporarily suspended the performance of essential job functions for other employees in similar positions; (5) whether there are other employees, temporary employees, or third parties who can perform or be temporarily hired to perform the essential function(s); and (6) whether the essential function(s) can be postponed or remain unperformed for any length of time and for how long.

EEOC Interpretative Guidance

The EEOC’s final regulations include an appendix entitled “Appendix A to Part 1636—Interpretative Guidance on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act” (Interpretative Guidance). The Interpretative Guidance, which becomes part of the final regulations, has the same force and effect as the final regulations.

The Interpretative Guidance addresses the major provisions of the PWFA and its regulations and explains the main concepts pertaining to an employer’s legal requirements under the PWFA to make reasonable accommodations for known limitations (physical or mental conditions related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions). It represents the EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA and, as stated in comments to the final regulations, the EEOC will be guided by the Interpretive Guidance when enforcing the PWFA. The Interpretative Guidance includes many examples and other practical guidance illustrating common workplace scenarios and how the PWFA applies.

Remedies, Enforcement

The final regulations’ remedies and enforcement are the same as proposed. Remedies under the PWFA mirror those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and include injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Employers that demonstrate good faith efforts to work with employees to identify and make reasonable accommodations have an affirmative defense to money damages.

PWFA’s Relationship to Other Federal, State, Local Laws

The final regulations provide that the PWFA does not invalidate or limit the powers, remedies, or procedures available under any federal, state, or local law that provides greater or equal protection for individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. About 40 states and cities have laws protecting employees and applicants from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Accordingly, employers should evaluate whether state and/or local law may provide greater rights and obligations than the PWFA. To the extent such laws provide greater obligations, the PWFA final regulations require employers to comply with both the PWFA and analogous state and local law.

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For more news on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

EEOC Takes Action to Address Mental Health Discrimination in the Workplace

Employers must take notice that the United State Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is cracking down on companies that discriminate against workers because they have a mental health condition. Mental health conditions, such as major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, substantially limit brain function. The EEOC determined these disorders constitute disabilities under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The EEOC has significantly increased charges against employers for alleged ADA violations premised upon mental health issues.

In September, the EEOC released its Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP). A review of the SEP reveals that the EEOC will focus on harassment, retaliation, job segregation, labor trafficking, discriminatory pay, disparate working conditions, and other policies and practices that impact particularly vulnerable workers and persons from underserved communities, including workers with mental health related disabilities.

Hence, employers must be extremely careful when dealing with employees or prospective employees who suffer from mental health conditions.

Under the ADA and other nondiscrimination laws, employers must provide “reasonable accommodations” to qualified employees with disabilities. These accommodations are adjustments to the workplace that allow these employees to perform their job duties. These accommodations are usually not costly and can be beneficial in allowing employees to return to work, avoiding productivity losses, and promoting the recruitment and retention of qualified employees.

However, not all employees with mental health conditions require accommodations to perform their job duties. For those who do, accommodations should be individualized and developed with the input of the employee. Below is a list of examples of accommodations that have helped employees with mental health conditions to better perform their job duties. These are not all possible accommodations but provide a starting point to help employers promote an inclusive and supportive work environment. These include:

  • Flexible workplace arrangements
  • Scheduling adjustments
  • Sick leave or flexible use of vacation time
  • Individualized breaks
  • Modification of non-essential job duties
  • Additional training or support
  • Positive reinforcement and flexible supervision
  • Accommodations to the work environment, equipment, and technology
  • Regular meetings between employees and supervisors to discuss workplace issues.

It is important for all employees to be aware of their rights and provide relevant training to co-workers and supervisors. Effective implementation of these accommodations will help create a more inclusive work environment and benefit both employees and employers.

COPYRIGHT © 2023, STARK & STARK
For more news on Mental Health Discrimination in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

EEOC Issues Long-Awaited Guidance on Harassment in the Modern Workplace

On September 29, 2023, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued long-awaited enforcement guidance on workplace harassment. The “Proposed Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace,” published in the Federal Register on October 2, 2023, advises employers on handling new workplace realties, including LGBTQ rights, online misconduct, abortion, and a number of different types of harassment.

This new guidance is the first voted document the EEOC has issued on harassment since its “Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors” in 1999.

The EEOC’s new guidance responds to the changing workplace landscape and salient issues confronting employers as a result of the #MeToo movement, the COVID-19 pandemic, the overturning of Roe v. Wade, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County that sex discrimination includes bias on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.

LGBTQ Harassment

Consistent with its long-standing position amplified by the Bostock v. Clayton County decision, the EEOC guidance emphasizes that sex discrimination includes sexual orientation and gender identity.

For example, the guidance discusses misgendering as a type of actionable harassment, stating that refusing to use a name or pronoun “consistent with the individual’s gender identity” may constitute harassment. According to the EEOC, another potential form of sex-based harassment is refusing to allow an employee to use a bathroom that matches their gender identity.

Further, religious accommodations for employees with sincerely held religious beliefs do not include allowing an employee with such accommodations to create a hostile work environment for an LGBTQ co-worker. In other words, the obligation to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs does not extend to religious beliefs that infringe on another employee’s protected category.

Online Harassment

The EEOC guidance also addresses remote work, teleconferencing, and social media issues that have grown out of the way employees work coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic. The guidance emphasizes that conduct within a virtual work environment can contribute to a hostile work environment.

Going a step further, the EEOC also notes that employers may be liable for harassment occurring online, even if only over employees’ private social media accounts. If put on notice of the conduct, the employer may need to take remedial steps or disciplinary action against the offending employee for their non-workplace and non-worktime conduct.

Harassment Based on Reproductive Decision-Making

The draft guidance notes that sex-based harassment includes mistreatment based on an employee’s pregnancy and reproductive decisions, such as decisions about contraception or abortion. This is consistent with the EEOC’s longtime stance that terminating a pregnancy constitutes a pregnancy-related condition protected under the law.

The EEOC’s proposed guidance, which remains open for public comment until November 1, 2023, covers a number of other topics. Given the comprehensive guidance and constantly changing landscape of the modern workplace, employers are strongly encouraged to seek advice of counsel to ensure compliant policies and practices. Employers’ harassment policies in particular should be carefully reviewed in light of this guidance, including policies on religion, race, and national origin, in addition to sexual harassment policies.

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Copyright © 2023, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more articles on employment law, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

How The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling On College Affirmative Action Programs May Impact Private Employers

The U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College decided that the race-based admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (the “Schools”) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court answered the question for publicly funded schools, it is an open question whether, and how, the Court’s decision will impact affirmative action and diversity programs for private employers, as discussed in more detail below.

Overview

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Among other things, the clause protects people regardless of their race. A limited exception that permits race-based action by the government is permissible if such action can survive a rigorous standard known as “strict scrutiny.” Under that standard, race-based conduct is permissible only if the government can establish a “compelling government interest” and the race-based action is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that established interest.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs failed strict scrutiny. In support of their race-based admissions programs, the Schools asserted the following educational goals as their compelling interests:

  • Training future leaders in the public and private sectors/preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.
  • Preparing graduates to adapt to an increasingly pluralistic society/broadening and refining understanding.
  • Better educating students through diversity/enhancing appreciation, respect, and empathy, cross-racial understanding, and breaking down stereotypes/promoting the robust exchange of ideas.
  • Producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks/fostering innovating and problem solving.
  • Preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.

The Court noted that although these goals were laudable, they were too amorphous to pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard. The Court recognized that a court would have no way to know whether leaders have been adequately trained; whether the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, or whether, and in what quantity, racial diversity leads to the development of new knowledge. In other words, the Court took issue with the fact that the asserted interests could not be measured in any meaningful, quantifiable way.

In addition, the Court found there was no meaningful connection between the Schools’ use of race in the admissions process and the claimed benefits. For example, the Court noted that while diversity may further the asserted interests, the Schools failed to establish that racial diversity would. The Court took particular issue with what it viewed as the overbroad and arbitrary nature of the Schools’ race considerations as they were underinclusive (for example, failing to distinguish between South Asians or East Asians, or define what Hispanic means, or account at all for Middle Eastern applicants). The Court reasoned that the overbroad, arbitrary, and underinclusive racial distinctions employed by the Schools undermine the Schools’ asserted interests—essentially noting that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs sought to “check the diversity box” rather than obtain a truly diverse (racially or otherwise) student body.

In addition to the School’s programs’ failure to survive strict scrutiny, the Court also recognized that the Schools’ race-based admissions processes promoted stereotyping, negatively impacted nonminority applicants, and, contrary to Court precedent, did not have a durational limit or any cognizable way in which to adopt a durational limit.

Supreme Court Precedent

The Court’s decision rested largely on two prior cases addressing race-based admission programs in higher education: Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As a guiding principle, the Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars admissions programs that use race as a stereotype or a negative.

In Bakke, while rejecting other asserted interests, the Court explained that obtaining the educational benefits associated with having a racially diverse student body was “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,” provided that certain guardrails were in place. This is despite the Court’s recognition that racial preferences cause serious problems of justice. The Court said that race only could operate as “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file” and the weight afforded to race must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.”

In Grutter, the Court decided “student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions,” provided that sufficient limitations were in place—notably, that under no circumstances would race-based admissions decisions continue indefinitely. The Court cautioned that, because the use of race was a deviation from the norm of equal treatment, race-based admissions programs must not result in “illegitimate . . . stereotyping,” must not “unduly harm nonminority applicants,” and must be “limited in time.”

The Court’s Additional Considerations

Of critical importance to the Court’s ruling was the fact that neither School’s race-based admissions program had an articulable end point. The Court noted that the Schools’ arguments to overcome the lack of a definite end point were, essentially, “trust us, we’ll know when we’re there.” Yet such arguments, the Court held, were insufficiently persuasive to offset the pernicious nature of racial classifications. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined the majority opinion, took additional issue with the Schools’ “trust us” arguments in separate concurrences, noting (1) their view of the Schools’ histories of harmful racial discrimination, and (2) that courts are not to defer to the morality of alleged discriminators.

Additionally, the Court took issue with the logical necessity that, in any instance when a limited number of positions are available, a race-based “plus factor” for applicants of a certain race is a negative for applicants who do not belong to the favored race. “How else but ‘negative’ can race be described if, in its absence, members of some racial groups would be admitted in greater numbers than they otherwise would have been?” In this, the Court recognized that equal protection is not achieved through the imposition of inequalities.

Impact on Private Employers

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have no direct legal impact on private employers. The Court based its decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the Schools under Title VI, which does not intrinsically apply to private companies; it is Title VII and analogous state and local laws that apply to private employers (not Title VI) and prohibit private employers from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of race (and other protected characteristics). In employment, the law has always prohibited any consideration of race in decision-making, such as who to hire or who to promote, except in extremely narrow and limited situations but, even then, quotas and set-asides are strictly prohibited.

While not directly applicable, it is highly likely that the Court’s decision will spawn new challenges to private employer diversity and inclusion programs, and the Court’s rationale will be referenced as an indicator of how the Court will view such programs under Title VII. Even before the Court’s decision, the legal landscape around an employer’s use of affirmative action plans to aid in making employment decisions was murky. Generally a private employer’s affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII in two scenarios: (1) if the plan is needed to remedy an employer’s past discrimination, and (2) if the plan is needed to prevent an employer from being found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact prohibitions (which operate to prohibit facially neutral policies that nevertheless disproportionately disadvantage certain groups).

Regarding the latter scenario, it is unlikely the Court’s ruling will have much if any impact. For an affirmative action plan to survive scrutiny on this basis, an employer must first prove a disparate impact case against itself: it must identify a specific policy, prove that such policy has a disparate impact on a certain group, and either show that the policy is not justified by business necessity or show that there is a viable alternative that both (a) accounts for the employer’s business necessity, and (b) has less of a disparate impact on the affected group. Then, the employer must prove how its affirmative action steps offset the disparate impact. There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that suggests an employer’s effort to remedy an ongoing Title VII violation would itself be a violation of Title VII.

However, there is language in the Court’s opinion that suggests an affirmative action plan implemented in the former scenario could be problematic, especially if it is not designed carefully. Indeed, a number of lower court decisions even before the Supreme Court’s recent ruling have struck down employer affirmative action programs. Permissible affirmative action programs are typically implemented to remedy past racial imbalances in an employer’s workforce overall, and are not tied to past discrimination against an identifiable employee or applicant. At the close of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion, it admonished Justice Sotomayor’s dissent wherein she proposed a world where schools consider race indirectly, through, for example, essays submitted alongside applications. The Court noted that such would nevertheless violate the Constitution, and clarified that admission decisions can rely on the content of application essays, but that such decisions must be based on an individual applicant’s character or experiences, and not based on the applicant’s race. Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, recognized that “[w]hatever their skin color, today’s youth simply are not responsible for instituting the segregation of the 20th century, and they do not shoulder the moral debts of their ancestors.” Accordingly, challenges to affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy past discrimination generally, by using race in its decision-making may find purchase in the Court’s closing sentiments and Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Although a standard less exacting then “strict scrutiny” is used to evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII, the sentiment expressed by Members of the Court could make the judiciary increasingly skeptical of affirmative action programs that resemble those used by the Schools. In any event, the possibility of being able to continue to use affirmative action plans in the strict sense to increase diversity in an employer’s workforce is likely little comfort to private employers, as few will want to prove a discrimination case against themselves to justify a diversity program.

Additionally, employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs may be the subject of challenges based on the Supreme Court’s skepticism of the benefits of “racial” diversity, as opposed to diversity on less-pernicious characteristics. For example, DEI programs that seek to increase racial diversity based on broad racial definitions may be subject to challenges because of their overbreadth or purportedly arbitrary nature. And DEI programs that highlight racial diversity, rather than, for example, diversity based on socio-economic, ideological, or experiential characteristics may suffer challenges to their legitimacy in reliance on the Supreme Court’s implication that there may be no identifiable tether between “racial” diversity and the purported benefits of diversity as a concept.

Of course, to the extent private employers with affirmative action plans have contracts with government entities and/or receive government funding, affirmative action plans under the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”), require targeted diversity recruiting efforts, aimed at increasing the diversity of applicant pools, although this also does not permit race (or other protected traits) to be used in decision-making.

Practical Tips For Employers

The Court’s decision applies to affirmative action programs in the college setting and applies an analysis under the Equal Protection Clause that does not directly apply to private employers. The decision also deals with very different scenarios where colleges and universities directly used race as a criteria for admissions. As noted, this has generally never been permitted in the employment context and, as a result, the rules of the road for implementing DEI programs have not changed, although they may evolve through future legal challenges in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. There are still countless ways that private employers can design and implement lawful DEI programs. Below are just a few examples employers may consider:

  • Reiterate D&I as a priority in meetings, conferences, and other communications.
  • Implement recruiting programs to diversify your talent pool.
  • Incentivize employees to refer diverse candidates for openings.
  • Support employee resource groups, mentoring programs, and leadership training.
  • Educate your managers and supervisors on unconscious bias.
  • Encourage diversity in suppliers and business partners.
  • Tie D&I efforts (not results) to managerial performance evaluations.
  • Under the privilege of working with counsel, monitor changes in workforce demographics and conduct pay audits.
  • Consider modifying the goal of DEI programs to seek diversity based on broader characteristics that do not involved protected classes, such as experiences, economic background, or worldview.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision is a landmark ruling that will alter the landscape of college and university admissions. And it will almost certainly spawn new challenges beyond the classroom and into the workplace.

However, the decision does not legally require private employers to make changes to their existing DEI programs if such practices comply with already-existing employment laws. Employers can still implement diversity and inclusion programs and promote diversity within their workplaces but, as has always been the case, employers should tread carefully in designing and implementing these programs. Employers would do well to engage counsel to review such programs and initiatives for possible concerns in light of the Court’s decision, as well as existing precedent in the employment context.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

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EEOC Announces Enforcement Priorities for 2023-2027

On Tuesday January 10, 2023, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) publicly released its Draft Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”) for fiscal years 2023-2027. The SEP describes the EEOC’s top enforcement priorities, making it critical information for employers around the country.

The Draft SEP sets out the EEOC’s six subject matter priorities for fiscal years 2023-2027:

  1. Eliminating Barriers in Recruitment and Hiring;

  2. Protecting Vulnerable Workers and Persons From Underserved Communities From Employment Discrimination;

  3. Addressing Emerging and Developing Issues;

  4. Enforcing Equal Pay Laws;

  5. Preserving Access to the Legal System; and

  6. Preventing Harassment Through Systemic Enforcement and Targeted Outreach.

With respect to the first category, “Eliminating Barriers in Recruitment and Hiring,” the Draft SEP states the EEOC will focus on “the use of automatic systems, including artificial intelligence or machine learning, to target advertisements, recruit applicants, or make or assist in hiring decisions where such systems intentionally exclude or adversely impact protected groups.” The Draft SEP also expressly emphasizes the “lack of diversity” in both the construction and tech industries, noting the EEOC’s priority will typically involve systemic cases, though claims by an individual or small group may qualify for enforcement focus if it raises a policy, practice, or pattern of discrimination. Employers should note the EEOC’s decision to focus on AI and the tech industry demonstrates a heightened priority on remedying and preventing discrimination from automated and electronic screening tools used in hiring practices and employment decisions.

On January 31, 2023, the EEOC held a public hearing titled “Navigating Employment Discrimination in AI and Automated Systems: A New Civil Rights Frontier” where higher education professors, nonprofit organization representatives, attorneys, and workforce consultants prepared statements regarding the EEOC’s new focus.

The Draft SEP includes specific details regarding the types of hiring practices and policies that the agency seeks to scrutinize. For example, the EEOC aims to prevent employers from isolating and separating workers in certain jobs or job duties based on membership in a protected class. The EEOC plans to achieve this goal by identifying vulnerable workers for more focused attention. In addition, the EEOC will scrutinize practices which limit access to work opportunities, such as (1) job postings which either exclude or discourage some protected groups from applying, and (2) denying training, internships, or apprenticeships based on protected status. The Draft SEP also prioritizes preventing employers from denying opportunities to move from temporary to permanent roles.

As for the second category, “Protecting Vulnerable Workers and Persons From Underserved Communities From Employment Discrimination,” the Draft SEP expands the ”vulnerable worker priority” to include categories of workers who, according to the EEOC, “may be unaware of their rights . . . or reluctant or unable to exercise their legally protected rights.” These categories include workers with intellectual and developmental disabilities, individuals with arrest or conviction records, LGBTQI+ individuals, pregnant workers, individuals with pregnancy-related medical conditions, temporary workers, older workers, individuals employed in low-wage jobs, and persons with limited literacy or English proficiency. The Draft SEP proposes that district EEOC offices and the agency’s federal sector program will identify vulnerable workers and underserved communities in their districts or within the federal sector for focused attention. Employers should be aware that the “vulnerable workers” focused on under this category may vary based on location.

The Draft SEP’s third category, “Addressing Emerging and Developing Issues,” includes a focus on (1) qualification standards and inflexible policies or practices that discriminate against individuals with disabilities, (2) protecting individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the newly enacted Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, (3) employment issues relating to backlash in response to local, national, or global events, and (4) “employment discrimination associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.” The priorities for the EEOC’s COVID-19-related enforcement in this category include:

  • pandemic related harassment, particularly against individuals of Asian descent;

  • unlawful denials of accommodations to individuals with disabilities;

  • unlawful medical inquiries, improper direct threat determinations, or other discrimination related to disabilities that arose during or were exacerbated by the pandemic; and

  • discrimination against persons who have an actual disability or are regarded as having a disability related to COVID–19, including individuals with long COVID, and pandemic-related caregiver discrimination based on a protected characteristic

With respect to the fourth category, “Enforcing Equal Pay Laws,” the Draft SEP sets out a focus on pay discrimination based on any protected category. The Draft SEP also states the EEOC may use “Commissioner Charges and directed investigations” to enforce equal pay. Notably, the EEOC has been hesitant to use Commissioner Charges in the past, as they comprise of less than 1% of annual charge volume since 2015. However, Commissioner Charges may become necessary to identify and remedy discrimination based on artificial intelligence or machine learning, as outlined in the first category.

The fifth and sixth categories remain largely unchanged from prior EEOC SEPs. The focus for the fifth category, preserving access to the legal system, will continue to identify and target (1) overly broad waivers, releases, non-disclosure and non-disparagement agreements; (2) improper mandatory arbitration provisions; (3) employers failure to keep proper records; and (4) improper retaliatory practices. As for the final category, the EEOC will continue to focus on promoting comprehensive anti-harassment programs and practices.

The EEOC will vote on a final version of the SEP following the public notice and comment period, which concludes on February 9, 2023.

Article By Dan Syed of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2023, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

U.S. Supreme Court Refuses Review of Case Involving Technical Issue With Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge

Refusing to weigh in on the impact of a plaintiff’s failure to verify her discrimination charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Supreme Court lets stand the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s failure to verify her charge barred her from filing a lawsuit. Mosby v. City of Byron, No. 21-10377, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10436 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022), cert. denied, No. 22-283 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022).

Background

Rachel Mosby served as the fire chief of Byron, Georgia, for 11 years. One month after she came out as transgender, the city fired her.

Mosby filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title VII states that charges filed “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This process is called “verification.” The parties did not dispute that Mosby did not properly verify her charge.

The City of Byron submitted a position statement with the EEOC on the merits of Mosby’s claim, but it did not raise the fact that Mosby failed to verify her charge. Mosby never amended her charge to meet the verification requirement.

After receiving a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC, Mosby sued the City of Byron. Before answering Mosby’s complaint, the City of Byron moved to dismiss because Mosby failed to verify her charge, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. After converting the City’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the district court held the failure to verify the charge barred Mosby’s Title VII and ADA claims.

Jurisdictional or Procedural?

Whether EEOC’s charge filing requirements are prerequisite to filing a lawsuit is jurisdictional or procedural remains in dispute. While procedural requirements can be waived or cured, jurisdictional requirements cannot. In 2019, the Supreme Court provided guidance in Fort Bend City v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, in which it held that a charge’s lack of verification does not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider in a subsequent federal lawsuit. Unlike a jurisdictional issue, the Court reasoned, the lack of verification can be waived or forfeited by the parties. Accordingly, the Court held that an employer forfeited the issue of verification when it failed to raise it promptly at the outset of litigation.

Eleventh Circuit’s Reasoning

In appealing the dismissal of her claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (which has jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, and Georgia), Mosby argued that Fort Bend required a finding that the City of Byron waived its verification defense because it did not raise the defense in its position statement submitted with the EEOC. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. In the Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit said, Fort Bend City did not raise the verification defense until four years and “an entire round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court” had passed. By contrast, the City of Byron raised the defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss before causing “a waste of adjudicatory resources.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that “a charge neither filed under oath or affirmation nor subsequently cured by amendment fails to satisfy the statutory requirement that an employee submit [her] charge to the Commission.” The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 2021, making these the only two circuits that have addressed the issue. See Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333.

Takeaway for Employers

An employer responding to a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC should evaluate whether the claimant properly verified the charge. If not, preserve the defense by raising it as soon as practicable at the EEOC charge stage and in any ensuing litigation.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris and Stephanie E. Satterfield of Jackson Lewis P.C.

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