DOJ Archives - The National Law Forum

DOJ Begins Its Own DEI Enforcement Efforts

Wednesday evening, February 5, 2025, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a series of memos to various divisions of the Department of Justice (DOJ). One memo asserted that the DOJ will take action to enforce President Trump’s efforts to eliminate illegal diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, as outlined in Executive Order 14173 (“Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity”).

This memo, titled “Ending Illegal DEI And DEIA Discrimination And Preferences,” tasks the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division with investigating, eliminating, and penalizing illegal DEI “preferences, mandates, policies, programs, and activities in the private sector and in educational institutions that receive federal funds.” By March 1, 2025, the Civil Rights Division and the Office of Legal Policy are to submit a report containing recommendations to “encourage the private sector to end illegal discrimination and preferences” related to DEI. That report is also supposed to identify the most “egregious and discriminatory DEI and DEIA practitioners in each sector of concern.” One big takeaway from this memo is the implication that some private companies may face criminal penalties for DEI initiatives.

Bondi also directs the DOJ to work with the Department of Education to eliminate DEI programs at universities, based on the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023).

Notably, the memo itself does not purport to prohibit educational, cultural, or historical observances that “celebrate diversity, recognize historical contributions, and promote awareness without engaging in exclusion or discrimination.” Examples of these types of observances include Black History Month and International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

This new effort from the DOJ will likely face legal scrutiny in the coming weeks, as federal courts have routinely upheld private employers’ First Amendment right to promote DEI. Employers should stay up to date with the rapidly evolving DEI landscape and consult with legal counsel as they evaluate their practices and initiatives for compliance with federal non-discrimination laws.

DOJ Announces Modest Increase in FCA Recoveries, Fueled Largely by Whistleblower Lawsuits

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently announced a modest increase in monetary recoveries for 2024 from investigations and lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), which is the Government’s primary tool for combating fraud, waste, and abuse. In fiscal year 2024, the DOJ recovered over $2.9 billion from FCA settlements and judgments, marking a 5% increase over 2023’s total and the highest amount in three years. Recoveries were fueled largely by qui tam lawsuits previously filed by whistleblowers, which contributed to $2.4 billion of the $2.9 billion recovered. The number of qui tams filed last year was also the highest ever in a single year at 979 cases. While health care fraud continues to be the primary source of enforcement activity, the rise in lawsuits stemmed from non-health care related cases. This underscores the Government’s and private citizens’ intensified enforcement efforts through FCA investigations and litigation in both the health care sector and beyond.

FCA Recoveries by the Numbers

While the nearly $3 billion recovered last year resulted from a record-breaking number of 566 settlements and judgments, last year’s haul remains well below peak year recoveries, such as 2014’s $6.2 billion and 2021’s $5.7 billion. The following chart illustrates the FCA recoveries by fiscal year, showcasing monetary trends over the past decade.

Key Enforcement Areas

In announcing 2024’s recoveries, the Government highlighted several key enforcement areas, such as:

The opioid epidemic. The Government continues to pursue health care industry participants that allegedly contributed to the opioid crisis, focusing primarily on schemes to market opioids and schemes to prescribe or dispense medically unnecessary or illegitimate opioid prescriptions.
Medicare Advantage Program (Medicare Part C). As the Medicare Advantage Program is the largest component of Medicare in terms of reimbursement and beneficiaries impacted, the Government stressed this remains a critical area of importance for FCA enforcement.
COVID-19 related fraud. Given the historic levels of government funding provided as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government also continues to pursue cases involving improper payment under the Paycheck Protection Program as well as false claims for COVID-19 testing and treatment. Close to half of 2024’s settlements and judgments resolved allegations related to COVID-19.
Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law violations. Cases premised on alleged violations of the AKS and Stark Law remain a driving force in FCA litigation for health care providers. In the last several years, there seems to be renewed interest in Stark Law enforcement, in particular.
Medically unnecessary services. The provision of medically unnecessary health care services also remains a widely-used theory of FCA liability, despite this being a historically challenging enforcement area often involving disputes over subjective clinical decisions.

Back to the Antitrust Basics: FTC and DOJ Call for Case-by-Case Enforcement With the Withdrawal of Longstanding Competitor Collaboration Antitrust Guidelines

With the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) withdrawing yet another set of antitrust compliance guidelines last month, companies that collaborate with their competitors — whether directly or through a trade association — are left without any official agency guidance regarding safe harbors, other than the murkier background of a century of antitrust cases. However, the forthcoming change in presidential administrations might provide increased clarity.

The DOJ and FTC in 2023 had earlier withdrawn the decades-old safe harbors for information sharing among competitors, which many companies and associations relied on to tailor their data analytics. Our alert regarding that withdrawal is available here.

The agencies followed up by jointly announcing on December 11, 2024, their withdrawal of the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (Collaboration Guidelines). The FTC announced the withdrawal of the 24-year-old Collaboration Guidelines following a narrow 3-2 party-line vote. The three Democratic commissioners supported withdrawal, while the two Republican commissioners opposed it.

The Guidelines Are Gone

The Collaboration Guidelines provided detailed guidance about US federal antitrust enforcers’ advice to companies for antitrust compliance when collaborating with competitors. According to the FTC’s press release, the 2000 Collaboration Guidelines “no longer provide reliable guidance about how enforcers assess the legality of collaborations involving competitors.” Instead, the DOJ and FTC encourage businesses thinking about partnering with competitors to “review the relevant statutes and caselaw to assess whether a collaboration would violate the law.”

The Dissents May Portend a Trump Administration Action Item

The FTC’s Republican Commissioners Melissa Holyoak and Andrew Ferguson, who likely will be the next FTC chairperson, strongly criticized the withdrawal of the Collaboration Guidelines, arguing in their dissents that the decision was terribly timed and will leave companies without clear guidance:

Improper Timing

They both argued that it was inappropriate for the Commission to make this decision during the lame-duck presidential period, “a mere 40 days before the country inaugurates a new President,” “further compounding today’s poor policy decision.”
Commissioner Ferguson’s dissent indicated that although the FTC seeks to promote “transparency and predictability,” now is not the time to “withdraw existing guidance or to push through revised or new guidance.” Instead, the time left for the Biden-Harris Commission should be reserved to “facilitate an orderly transition.”
Commissioner Holyoak’s dissent conveyed her opposition to the Commission’s decision, stating “The Majority had four years to address its concerns with the Collaboration Guidelines — now is not the time.”

Unclear Guidance

Commissioner Holyoak further expressed her opposition to the withdrawal, stating that the withdrawal announcement happened “without providing any replacement guidance, or even intimating plans for future replacement.” She contended that withdrawal of the Collaboration Guidelines leaves “businesses grasping in the dark.”
Commissioner Ferguson stated the Commission should “revisit its nonbinding guidance to ensure that it properly informs the public of the Commission’s enforcement position” which may become evident with the next Administration.

In response to Commissioners Ferguson and Holyoak, Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya, writing for the majority, wrote that the FTC is “not on vacation,” emphasizing that “[t]he American people expect their government to keep working for them even in periods of transition.” Commissioner Bedoya further asserted that he looks forward to working with the incoming Trump Administration with “evolving jurisprudence on competitor collaborations and issue new guidance for the business community.”

What Is Next?

For now, companies should no longer rely on the Collaboration Guidelines and instead must look for guidance in the underlying caselaw that the DOJ and FTC’s guidelines were based upon.

Yet, given the anticipated appointment of Commissioner Ferguson as the next FTC chairperson and his dissenting comments, the incoming Trump Administration might seize the opportunity to revisit the Collaboration Guidelines.

Barring that change in position, as Commissioner Melissa Holyoak indicated, companies will need “antitrust lawyers on speed dial” to obtain specific guidance to navigate case-by-case situations and evaluate the nuances of each project’s antitrust compliance.

OIG Releases Special Fraud Alert About Suspect Payments in Marketing Arrangements Related to Medicare Advantage and Providers

On December 11, 2024, the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“OIG”) issued a special fraud alert warning about certain marketing schemes that involve questionable payments and referrals between Medicare Advantage (“MA”) health plans, health care professionals, and third-party marketers (e.g., agents and brokers) and that can mislead MA enrollees into choosing specific health plans or providers that may not be in the MA enrollees’ best interests or meet their needs (“MA Marketing Alert”). As we have previously advised, special fraud alerts are few and far between—OIG has only issued six in the past 20 years. The importance of the MA Marketing Alert, like its predecessors, should not be taken for granted because it may be instructive as to subsequent enforcement action taken by OIG and/or the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).

In the MA space, historical enforcement actions taken by both OIG, under their administrative authorities, and DOJ, under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), have related to alleged MA risk adjustment payment inflation schemes. See, e.g., DaVita, Sutter Health, Beaver Medical, Martin’s Point, and Cigna. While allegations of this nature continue to be a focus area (e.g., in OIG’s work plans), a light is also now being shone on inappropriate marketing schemes that could violate the Federal anti-kickback statute (“AKS”). And, based on historical empirical data connecting DOJ’s enforcement actions taken subsequent to OIG’s issuance of special fraud alerts, that light may broaden and brighten.

For example, in July 2022, OIG issued a special fraud alert about arrangements involving telemedicine companies. In a footnote, OIG provided three enforcement actions resolved under the FCA as examples of allegedly problematic arrangements. After providing the footnote examples, OIG described bullet-pointed “Suspect Characteristics” that tracked the allegedly inappropriate characteristics of the footnote examples. Since the alert’s issuance, DOJ has recovered millions under the FCA and also criminally charged and convicted many individuals and entities for allegedly submitting or causing the submission of more than $3.1 billion (in 2023 and 2024 pursuant to DOJ’s nationwide takedowns) in allegedly fraudulent Medicare claims resulting from telemedicine schemes.

While the MA Marketing Alert provides footnotes of only two enforcement actions resolved under the FCA as examples of allegedly problematic arrangements, the bullet point list of “Suspect Characteristics” is broader than and reaches beyond the footnote examples. This may signal OIG’s awareness of and current investigations into allegedly inappropriate arrangements relating to “Suspect Characteristics” that have yet to be settled or resolved.

It is possible that there may be forthcoming enforcement actions in these areas. And they may follow the same trend of enforcement actions taken by DOJ relating to telemedicine schemes after OIG’s July 2022 special fraud alert. We also note that the MA Marketing Alert aligns with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ recently finalized regulatory updates relating to MA health plan marketing arrangements with agents, brokers, and Third-Party Marketing Organizations, which will be effective January 1, 2025, and prohibit such parties from creating direct or indirect incentives “that would reasonably be expected to inhibit an agent or broker’s ability to objectively assess and recommend which plan best fits the health care needs of a beneficiary.” Proskauer’s Health Care Group will continue to monitor these developments in and provide updates about these areas of scrutiny and enforcement.

Revisions to HSR Form Released

On October 7, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), with the concurrence of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), released its long-awaited final rule related to the revision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification form (the “Final Rule”).

The Final Rule will be effective 90 days after its publication in the Federal Register. The FTC and DOJ state that the revisions are intended to close the perceived gaps in current information provided in the HSR process, such as the disclosure of entities and individuals within the acquiring person; identification of potential labor market effects; identification of acquisitions that create a risk of foreclosure; identification of actions that may involve innovation effects, future market entry, or nascent competitive threats; and disclosure of roll-up or serial acquisition strategies.

The Final Rule dictates the use of two separate forms: one for the acquiring entity and one for the entity to be acquired. Each party will have to designate a “deal team lead” whose files must be searched for 4(c) and 4(d) documents, even if the deal team lead is not an officer or director. In addition, the acquiring entity must provide details not previously requested, including an organization chart, a list of officers and directors, a description of the ownership structure of the entity, and information on the transaction rationale.

While the information requested in the Final Rule is more limited than what was included in the original proposed rule, there are substantial changes that parties should expect to add significant time and cost to the filing process.

Unitary Executive Theory Surfaces in Court: District Court Rules Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act Unconstitutional

On September 30, 2024, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled that filing claims on behalf of the government under qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) is unconstitutional in United States of America ex rel. Clarissa Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, et al. The ruling, made by Judge Kathryn Mizelle, a 33-year-old Trump-appointee, declares that False Claims Act whistleblowers undermine executive power by filing qui tam lawsuits.

The Zafirov decision follows a recent dissent by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas in which he questioned the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions. It also follows a political movement pushing the Unitary Executive Theory in the United States judicial courts.

This controversial decision mischaracterizes the qui tam provisions of the FCA and will likely be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Should the ruling stand, however, it and other similar challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions will cripple what has been America’s number 1 anti-fraud law. Since the False Claims Act was modernized in 1986, qui tam whistleblower cases have allowed the government to recover more than $52 billion from fraudsters, over $5 billion of which came in cases where the government chose not to intervene.

Applying the ‘Unitary Executive’ Theory to Paint Whistleblowers as ‘Self-Selected Private Bounty Hunters’

Originally passed during the Civil War, the False Claims Act contains qui tam provisions enabling whistleblowers, also known as ‘relators’, to report government contracting fraud and work directly with government investigators. Once the whistleblower brings forward the suit, the government may intervene and continue to prosecute the litigation as the plaintiff. However, in the interest of accountability, the qui tam provision of the FCA permits the whistleblower to pursue a case even if the United States declines prosecution. Whistleblowers who file successful qui tam lawsuits are eligible to receive up to 30% of recovered damages.

The question of the constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions was notably raised in a dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in the 2023 Supreme Court case U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources. While Polansky discussed the issue of a relator pursuing a lawsuit after the government declines to intervene, Thomas raised a separate issue of constitutionality in his dissent. He stated that “there are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation.” In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, invited challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions, writing that “In my view, the Court should consider the competing arguments on the Article II issue in an appropriate case.”

Judge Mizelle, a former clerk of Justice Thomas, drew heavily upon Justice Thomas’ dissent in her decision. Echoing Thomas’ dissent in Polansky, JudgeMizelle concluded that the qui tam provision “directly defies the Appointments Clause by permitting unaccountable, unsworn, private actors to exercise core executive power [litigating on behalf of the government] with substantial consequences to members of the public.” The District Court thus agreed with the defendants that the FCA’s qui tam provisions indeed violates the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution.

The Zafirov ruling relies upon the ‘unitary executive theory,’ a constitutional law theory that states the President of the United States has sole authority over the executive branch and that power cannot be limited by Congress.

According to then-Assistant Attorney General William Barr’s 1989 Memo Constitutionality of the Qui TamProvision of the False Claims Act, which repeatedly cited by both the judgment and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce amicus brief, the move to enable private citizens to file on behalf of the government represents a breach of the separation of powers allowing “Congress to circumvent the Executive’s check.” Barr rebrands whistleblowers as “private bounty hunters” and claims that the 1986 amendments which reincorporated the FCA’s qui tam provisions was a tactic by Congress to override presidential powers. Barr maintains that “only a unitary executive” that is, “only the President” can “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

In a dissent in the 1988 Supreme Court case Morrison v Olsen, Justice Antonin Scalia interpreted the ‘Unitary Executive’ to have unchecked authority to appoint and remove executive officials, claiming that the firing of an independent counsel without cause falls within the limitless power of the President over the executive.

The Middle District of Florida ruling draws on Scalia’s rationale arguing that the right to pursue a qui tam case denies the President the executive authority of appointment of the relator. Under the FCA, however, whistleblowers are granted certain rights. For example, the executive must guarantee a whistleblower the “right to continue as a party” with or without the United States intervening and wait for the relator’s approval before settling the action.

The court agrees with the defendants’ argument that the FCA therefore “den[ies] the President necessary removal authority and sufficient supervisory control over [the relator].”

The court contends that the physician-turned-whistleblower Zafirov was “an improperly appointed officer” in violation of the Appointments Clause and the Take Care and Vest Clause of the Article. According to the ruling, by filing a qui tam against Medicare fraud, Zafirov was granted “core executive power” without any “proper appointment under the Constitution.”

A Mischaracterization of Qui Tam Whistleblowing

Judge Mizelle’s decision in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Fla. Med. Assocs. first mischaracterizes the FCA’s qui tam as a breach of presidential power instead of as a provision that strengthens checks and balances. Second, the court ignores case law outlining government prerogatives over relators such that they are not menacing to the core Executive powers.

The revived qui tam provision of 1986 was a legislative move to improve government accountability over fraud—neither expanding Congressional oversight nor the size of government—by mobilizing private citizens rather than public agents. The Florida court wrongfully elevates the status of a relator to an ‘officer’ responsible to the government. A citizen pursuing a claim on behalf of the government is not and does not pretend to be an extension of the Executive Office and, therefore not subject to administrative appointment procedure. Rather the relator is a private person, and the government is a third party to the case. The Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens majority opinion also written by Justice Scalia discussing whether relators have judicial standing under Article III, qualifies that the relator is on “partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” A ‘partial assignee’—to which only some rights are transferred—may “assert the injury suffered by the assignor” (the U.S.) so long as the harm done is sufficient. Scalia reiterates the ‘representational standing’ of relators and makes no remarks on its challenge to the Unitary Executive. Judge Mizelle’s reliance on Morrison v Olsen to claim that like an independent counsel, a relator should also qualify as an officer ignores the Stevens Supreme Court ruling distinguishing relators as a type of assignee.

Mizelle also raises that relators seem to enjoy unbridled authority over the Executive by initiating a qui tam suit without government intervention. While Mizelle points to 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c) to demonstrate the unchecked power of the relator, she neglects the numerous limitations specified in § 3730 (c)(2), including the broad power of the government to dismiss the qui tam action after intervening notwithstanding any objections from the relator. She frames the government intervention as “the government’s ability to pursue a parallel action and to exert limited control [which] does not lessen a relator’s unchecked civil enforcement authority to initiate.” In truth, the statute and years of judicial history maintain the government’s absolute discretion over whether to intervene in or completely stop the case by dismissing the action.

Contrary to Judge Mizelle’s belief, relators are not free from potential government intervention even when independently pursuing the case. On the contrary, relators are not able to independently pursue any binding action on the government unimpeded by the government. While Zafirov independently pursued the claim for five years, the government could have intervened and then dismissed the claim at any time. If the government intervenes, underlined in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2), the government is empowered to settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding any objections from the relator and to restrict their participation in the course of the litigation. The fact that the government may choose not to intervene at one point does not divest them of their ability to intervene later and exercise significant authority over the relator.

Implications: Crippling the False Claims Act

Judge Mizelle’s decision seeks to end the historic success of the qui tam provision of the FCA by declaring the government’s most effective mechanism of detecting fraud as unconstitutional. While the decision does not invalidate the FCA nationally, this case could be the first step in a series of appeals that may elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.

The government’s largest obstacle to fighting white-collar crime such as fraud is detection. The diffuse and indirect nature of fraud requires those with insider knowledge to assist the government in pursuing corruption. In terms of the effectiveness of the qui tam provision, between 1987 and 2022, the Department of Justice Civil Fraud Division recovered $22.1 billion without the help of whistleblowers versus $50.3 billion with the help of whistleblower lawsuits. Since the 1986 amendments to the FCA, whistleblowers have been the direct source of approximately 70% of civil fraud recoveries by the federal government. From the Medicare billing fraud committed in Florida Medical Associates to Russian money laundering, the United States may lose its most effective tool to fight fraud fraud if the qui tam provisions of the FCA are ruled unconstitutional.

FTC Finalizes Major Rewrite of HSR Filing Requirements

Last week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted unanimously to issue a final rule that implements significant changes to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification form and accompanying instructions. While the final rule includes numerous modifications from the draft proposal that was announced in June 2023 (see our previous client alert), this still represents the most substantial change to the HSR filing requirements in decades, and will require parties to HSR-reportable transactions to gather and provide considerably more information and documents than under the current rules. The final rule will take effect 90 days after publication in the Federal Register (unless there is a successful court challenge in the interim).

Under the HSR Act, parties to certain mergers and acquisitions are required to submit premerger notification forms that disclose information about their proposed deal and business operations. The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) use this information to conduct a competitive impact assessment within the statutory HSR waiting period, which is typically 30 calendar days. According to the FTC’s press release accompanying the final rule, the new requirements are a necessary response “to changes in corporate structure and deal-making, as well as market realities in the ways businesses compete, that have created or exposed information gaps that prevent the agencies from conducting a thorough antitrust assessment of transactions subject to mandatory premerger review.”

Key Changes to HSR Filing Requirements

Some of the main changes will require the following:

A description of each party’s strategic rationales for the transaction, with cross-references to documents submitted with the HSR filings that support the stated rationales.
A new Overlap Narrative section that will require the buyer and target to identify and provide (i) a written description of current or planned products or services where they compete (or could compete) with each other, (ii) actual or projected revenues for each such product or service, (iii) a description of all categories of customers that purchase or use the product or service, and (iv) the top 10 customers for each customer category (e.g., retailer, distributor, broker, national account, local account, etc.).
A narrative describing supply relationships between the transaction parties or between the buyer and any other business that competes with the target, including the amount of revenue involved and the top 10 customers or suppliers.
In addition to requiring documents discussing the competitive aspects of the proposed transactions that were prepared by or for officers and directors (current Item 4(c)), filing persons must also submit (i) transaction-related documents prepared by or for a “supervisory deal team lead”, and (ii) ordinary course business plans and reports about overlapping products and services that were provided to the CEO or Board of Directors within a year prior to filing.
Acquiring persons must list all current and recent officers and directors (or in the case of unincorporated entities, individuals exercising similar functions) in cases where those individuals hold similar positions in entities that have overlapping operations with the target.
Identification of minority holders of additional entities related to the transaction parties, as well as more information about minority interest holders, including limited partners in partnerships where the limited partner has certain rights related to the board (or similar bodies) of the acquiring entity and its related parties, and in some cases, the target. (Currently, the HSR form only requires disclosure of the general partner.)
Additional information regarding certain prior acquisitions by both the buyer and the target. (Currently, only buyers must provide information regarding prior acquisitions.)
If an HSR filing is being made based on an executed letter of intent or term sheet rather than a definitive agreement, the filing must include a dated document containing sufficient details about the transaction.
Parties must submit the entirety of all agreements related to the transaction (not just the principal transaction agreement).
All foreign-language documents must be accompanied by English-language translations.
Filing parties must disclose economic subsidies received from certain foreign governments or entities of concern to the United States.
Information related to certain contracts with defense or intelligence agencies.
It is worth noting that a few particularly onerous or controversial proposals from the initial draft rule were not adopted, including the proposal to require collection and production of all drafts of responsive documents (rather than just final versions), as well as specific information about labor markets and each filing party’s workers.

Related Changes to the Merger Review Process

Significantly, the FTC announced that, following the final rule coming into full effect, it will lift its suspension on early termination of the waiting period for HSR filings involving transactions that clearly raise no competitive issues. According to the FTC, “[b]ecause the final rule will provide the agencies with additional information necessary to conduct antitrust assessments, the rule will help inform the processes and procedures used to grant early terminations.”

The FTC also stated that it is introducing a new online portal for market participants, stakeholders, and the general public to directly submit comments on proposed transactions that may be under review by the FTC (it is unclear if the DOJ will follow suit). According to its press release, the FTC “welcomes information on specific transactions and how they may affect competition from consumers, workers, suppliers, rivals, business partners, advocacy organizations, professional and trade associations, local, state, and federal elected officials, academics, and others.”

Practical Implications for Deals

The final rule issued by the FTC marks a sea change in the preparation of filings for HSR-reportable transactions. The new requirements will significantly increase the time, effort and cost of preparing all HSR filings, with the impact likely to be magnified for deals where the buyer and target are competitors or operate within the same supply chain. Transaction parties will need to account for this new reality in their deal timelines and budgets. Transaction agreements will need to allow for more time to file HSR, and it may be advantageous for some parties to begin filing preparations much earlier in the deal process. In addition, the new transaction agreement requirements mean that key terms of deals will need to be more fully fleshed out before parties can file HSR and start the 30-day clock.

Also, since filing parties will now have an affirmative obligation to disclose competitive overlaps as well as supplier-customer relationships, careful consideration will need to be given to how those are described, since statements made in the HSR filing could later be used against the parties in an in-depth investigation (if the reviewing agency issues a “Second Request”) or in litigation (if the agency challenges the deal). Moreover, for serial acquirors, descriptions of products and overlaps in one filing could have consequences for future HSR-reportable transactions.

Additionally, the new obligation on filers to provide customer and/or supplier information in the HSR filing may cause parties to re-evaluate their approach towards third party outreach regarding proposed transactions, given the possibility of earlier and more frequent FTC/DOJ calls to those customers and suppliers.

© 2024 Bracewell LLP

by: Daniel E. Hemli, Jacqueline R. Java of Bracewell LLP

For more on HSR, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade Regulation section.

The Murky Waters of Wash Trading Digital Assets – DOJ Charges 18 Individuals and Entities

The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts recently unsealed what it described as the “first-ever criminal charges against financial services firms for market manipulation and ‘wash trading’ in the cryptocurrency industry.” The SEC also filed parallel civil charges alleging violations of Securities for the same alleged schemes.

The government has charged eighteen individuals and companies, including four cryptocurrency market makers, with engaging in illegal market manipulation through “wash trading” digital assets. According to the DOJ and SEC filings, although these individuals purported to offer “market making services,” they were actually engaged in offering “market-manipulations-as-a-service” by engaging in artificial trading of digital assets to give the false appearance that there was an active (and heavily traded) market for those tokens.

How this case came to the DOJ’s attention is as novel as the legal theory behind the charging documents. According to DOJ spokespeople, the investigation started with a tip from the SEC about one of the companies at issue. Further investigations into that company—along with the help of cooperating witnesses—led authorities to set up a sham crypto firm, NextFundAI, and create a token associated with the firm. Posing as NextFundAI, the government communicated with the defendants—market makers who allegedly offered to trade and manipulate the price of NextFundAI’s token by wash trading, or trading the token back-and-forth between crypto wallets they controlled.

While there may be rules against wash trading in traditional securities markets (see, e.g., 26 U.S. Code § 1091), the rules are as clear in the digital asset space. Indeed, the regulatory vacuum facing the digital asset industry makes it difficult for those in the industry to avoid eventual regulatory action, and what many have referred to as “regulation by enforcement.” This is particularly true where the technological realities of digital assets do not fit squarely within the existing legal framework. There may be disagreement about the purpose or intent behind a cryptocurrency transaction where one individual is transferring cryptocurrency between wallets that person or entity controls. But there may not be a misrepresentation or fraudulent act inherent in this type of transaction. Indeed, the transaction itself (including the wallet address of the sender and recipient) is likely immediately and accurately recorded on the public blockchain. So, according to the government, the “fraud” is the intent behind the trades – to manipulate the market by artificially generating trade volume to signal interest and activity in the token.

The government’s allegations are also interesting because in addition to the wire fraud charges (18 U.S.C. § 1343), which generally do not require proof that the digital asset at issue is a security, the government has charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit market manipulation (18 U.S.C. § 371), which requires the government to prove that the token at issue is a security. This charge is significant because it will require the DOJ to prove at trial that the tokens at issue are securities.

Although several individuals involved have already pleaded guilty, there are several defendants who appear to be testing the government’s novel theory in court. We anticipate that this will be the first of many similar investigations and enforcement actions in the digital asset space.

DOJ Announces Changes to Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs, Updates on Whistleblower Program

In an address this week to the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri of the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Criminal Division, highlighted several updates relevant to corporate compliance programs, including the DOJ’s new whistleblower programs and incentives.

Sufficient Compliance: Updated Areas to Consider

The Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (“ECCP”) is the compass by which the DOJ measures the efficacy of a corporation’s compliance program for potential credit or mitigation in the event an organization is potentially subject to prosecution.[1] Ms. Argentieri highlighted several key updates to the ECCP that the DOJ will now consider when evaluating whether a corporation’s compliance program is “effective” and thus deserving of credit and/or mitigation of criminal penalties.

These new factors include whether:

the resources and technology with which a company does business are applied to its compliance program, and whether its compliance program fully considers the risks of any technologies it utilizes (such as generative AI)[2];
the company had a culture of “speaking up” and protecting those who report on corporate misdeeds;
a company’s compliance department had access to adequate resources and data to perform its job effectively; and
a company learned from its past mistakes—and/or the mistakes of other companies.

Encouraging Self-Reporting: Presumptive Declination and Reduced Penalties

In her remarks, Ms. Argentieri stated that the previously announced Whistleblower Awards Program [3] had so far been successful in the eyes of the DOJ, but did not point to any specific case or outcome. Likely, it is too soon for the public to see the fruits of the program, given its nascent state and the time that usually elapses between the initiation of an investigation and its resolution. The DOJ appears to be stating, though, that it is receiving and following up on whistleblower reports already.

This new policy encouraging whistleblowing through financial incentives, however, was combined with an amendment to DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, which provides that there is a presumptive declination to prosecute should a company make a disclosure of wrongdoing within 120 days of receiving an internal report of alleged misconduct and before DOJ contacts the company regarding that matter. In short, DOJ is seeking to incentivize a “race to DOJ” to report potential misconduct – perhaps before the company can even confirm whether the allegation is credible.[4]

Organizations that opt to not take the early self-disclosure route can still reduce any criminal penalties they may face by up to half by fully cooperating with the DOJ in its investigation. Considerations DOJ will factor in when evaluating whether an organization “fully cooperates” include, among other things, how timely the cooperation was and if the company took appropriate remedial action (such as improving compliance programs and disciplining employees). The DOJ continues to emphasize the importance of clawing back compensation and/or reducing compensation and bonuses of wrong-doers (if not also terminating them).[5]

Tipping the Scales

In sum, these programs are clearly intended to materially alter the disclosure calculus of whether a company should disclose misconduct by putting quantifiable incentives on the side of timely disclosure and cooperation, namely declination. Combined with the DOJ’s updates to the ECCP, these programs attempt to bring clarity and consistency to the world of corporate criminal penalties (and possibly how to avoid them altogether). Companies are well-advised to review their existing compliance programs in light of these new incentives and guidance from the DOJ to ensure that they address the new factors enumerated by the DOJ, but also account for increased incentives for corporate whistleblowers.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also define what constitutes an “effective compliance and ethics program” for credit under the guidelines. U.S.S.G. §8B2.1.

[2] This is not the first time, and unlikely to be the last, where DOJ has emphasized the use of AI to enhance corporate compliance. See Lisa Monaco, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Remarks at the University of Oxford on the Promise and Peril of AI (Feb. 14, 2024).

[3] Under the Criminal Division’s whistleblower pilot program (and like those of other U.S. Attorney’s Offices who have thus far adopted similar programs), whistleblowers are financially rewarded—through criminal forfeiture orders—for bringing forward information on specific alleged violations, so long as that person first reports the misconduct to the company and DOJ has not already learned of it. The Criminal Division’s Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosure for Individuals also provide culpable individuals who report to receive non-prosecution agreements in exchange for reporting their own conduct and the conduct of the company.

[4] The “race to DOJ” incentivized by these programs may indeed alter the corporate disclosure calculus—by moving up the date for any disclosure in light of the threat that an employee or third-party, aware of any investigation, may choose to report the matter to DOJ. Likewise, it may also change the nature of the internal investigation in ways to limit knowledge of the investigation early-on, like limiting early interviews until documents and data can be reviewed and analyzed.

[5] Indeed, DOJ will permit companies to earn a dollar-for-dollar reduction of a criminal penalty for each dollar a company successfully claws back from a wrong-doer to further incentivize companies to seek to claw back compensation paid.

Former Acadia Employees Received Reward for Blowing the Whistle on Healthcare Fraud

The United States Department of Justice settled a False Claims Act qui tam whistleblower lawsuit against inpatient behavioral health facilities operator Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. Under the terms of the settlement, the operator paid almost $20 million to the United States and the States of Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Nevada. The relators, or whistleblowers, who filed suit in 2017, received a reward of 19% of the government’s recovery of misspent Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid funds. According to one of the Relators, Jamie Clark Thompson, a former Director of Nursing at Acadia’s Lakeview Behavioral Health facility, “I am passionate about advocating for improved and quality services for individuals living with mental illness. Unfortunately, our communities have seen the devastating impact when this vulnerable population receives inadequate care. I firmly believe that by continuously working to improve our mental health system, we can support recovery and well-being, benefiting our entire community. I hope that my actions have made a difference, and I know that properly allocating funds is crucial to supporting behavioral health services and those working tirelessly to improve them.”

Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid Fraud Allegations

According to the settlement agreement, the whistleblowers alleged Acadia and certain of its facilities submitted false claims to Medicare, TRICARE, and Medicaid. Specifically, the facilities allegedly admitted ineligible patients, provided services for longer than was medically necessary or did not provide treatment at all (but still billed the healthcare programs for it), did not provide sufficient care for those who needed acute care or individualized care plans, and hired the wrong people or failed to train their staff to “prevent assaults, elopements, suicides, and other harm resulting from staffing failures.”

Behavioral Health Facility Fraud

Behavioral healthcare facilities provide inpatient, outpatient, and residential care for adolescents, adults, and seniors for mental health conditions. As taxpayer-funded healthcare programs, Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE cover behavioral healthcare. Treating mentally ill Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE beneficiaries as cash cows, and either under-treating, over-treating, or not treating them at all both robs the individuals of the chance to recover, wastes taxpayer resources, and may even jeopardize their safety and well-being.

The Importance of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE Whistleblowers

Whistleblowers who report behavioral health facility fraud are not only protecting vulnerable patients but also making sure federally funded healthcare dollars are being spent to properly treat adolescent, adult and older patients with significant behavioral health conditions. Three employees at different Acadia facilities came forward, faced retaliation for speaking up, and are now being rewarded for helping to fight fraud and abuse and for their courage.

Read the Department of Justice’s Press Release

by: Tycko & Zavareei Whistleblower Practice Group of Tycko & Zavareei LLP

Tag: DOJ

DOJ Begins Its Own DEI Enforcement Efforts

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