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Federal District Court Issues Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act

In Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., a federal district court judge issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), finding that the CTA likely exceeds Congress’s powers. Therefore, at present, a reporting company is not obligated to comply with the CTA and the government is enjoined from enforcing the CTA’s reporting requirements. As expected, on December 5, 2024, the government entered a notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction and may still seek a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. If a stay is granted by the Court of Appeals, the reporting obligations would once again be in effect. The Court of Appeals could also decide to keep the preliminary injunction in place while an appeal is pending.

At this time, companies are not required to file Beneficial Ownership Information (“BOI”) reports, although they are free to do so should they choose. Indeed, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued guidance after the entry of the notice of appeal, stating as much: “In light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.” (available at https://www.fincen.gov/boi.)

At present, it is unknown how long companies would be given to file if the preliminary injunction is stayed, modified or the law is ultimately upheld. However, FinCEN’s statement suggests that a reasonable extension of time for filing can be expected, though that is not a certainty. Of course, if the CTA is ultimately struck down, no filing would be required.

The Fifth Circuit Confirms the DOL’s Authority to Use Salary Basis Test for FLSA Overtime Exemptions

On September 11, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mayfield v. U.S. Department of Labor confirmed that the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has the authority to use a salary basis to define its white-collar overtime exemptions. This is a significant win for the DOL as it is presently defending its latest increase to the minimum salary thresholds for executive, administrative, and professional exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), also known as the FLSA’s “white-collar exemptions,” in litigation pending in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas.

The Mayfield Decision

In Mayfield, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit provided that the DOL has the authority to “define and delimit” an exemption from overtime pay under the FLSA. In so ruling, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit initiated by a Texas fast-food operator, Robert Mayfield, who claimed Congress never authorized the DOL to use salaries as a test for whether workers have managerial duties.

The Court rejected Mayfield’s argument. In response, the Fifth Circuit wrote that “[d]istinctions based on salary level are… consistent with the FLSA’s broader structure, which sets out a series of salary protections for workers that common sense indicates are unnecessary for highly paid employees.” Upon issuing the Mayfield decision, the Fifth Circuit joined the four other federal appeals courts that have considered this issue previously (including the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit).

2024 DOL Rule

The 2024 DOL rule effectively focused on three main points. First, it raised the minimum weekly salary to qualify for the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions from $684 per week to $844 per week (equivalent to a $43,888 annual salary) on July 1, 2024. Second, it called for another increase of the minimum weekly salary to $1,128 per week (equivalent of a $58,656 annual salary) on January 1, 2025. Third, under the 2024 DOL rule, the above salary threshold would increase every three years based on recent wage data.

As mentioned above, the Mayfield decision comes at a time when the DOL is defending its recent 2024 rule increasing the salary thresholds for white-collar exemptions in both the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas. Indeed, the Mayfield decision’s timing could not have come at a more opportune time for the DOL because it supplies these Texas federal judges with new direction from the Fifth Circuit to consider when making their rulings.

What Does This Mean for Employers?

The Mayfield decision bolsters the DOL in its bid to set and increase the minimum salary requirements for its white-collar overtime exemptions, which will certainly pose challenges for employers in creating compliant employee compensation structures. In short, if the 2024 DOL rule goes into effect, employers will have to substantially raise their employees’ salaries to ensure they remain properly exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

by: Derek A. McKee of Polsinelli PC

For more news on Overtime Exemption Litigation, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Dependent Work Permits – Is the U.S. Catching Up with Other Immigration Destinations?

There are many ways in which the U.S. immigration system is lagging behind those of other countries. We still put physical visas in passports – something Australia stopped doing nearly 10 years ago when they converted to a purely electronic visa system. Our immigration system is predominantly paper-based, with limited options for electronic filings, an area where other countries have fully embraced modern solutions. We also lag behind in other areas including processing times, expedite options, digital nomad immigration pathways, and having an immigration system responsive to changing economic needs for workers in specific occupations and sectors.

For a long time, the U.S. also lagged behind other countries when it came to supporting the immigration of dual-career couples, but that has changed over the last 10 years. This evolution was recently reinforced by the decision in Save Jobs USA v. DHS.

Since 2015, H-4 dependent spouses have been eligible for employment authorization documents (EADs) if they meet certain criteria, including being eligible for a green card but for a long wait due to annual and per-country limitations on green card approvals; criteria most H-4 spouses do not meet until they have been in the US for several years. The plaintiff in Save Jobs USA challenged this extension of work authorization as an unlawful use of the executive power of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On August 2, 2024, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that this was a lawful use of DHS’s power. Absent an appeal to the Supreme Court, this ends the uncertainty over H-4 EADs. This ruling, combined with a USCIS announcement in April 2024 that extended H-4 EADs for up to 540 days for those waiting for their EADs to be renewed, means that nearly 100,000 H-4 spouses can now pursue careers without fearing unexpected gaps in work authorization.

In addition, since 2021, the US has not required EADs for certain E and L spouses. Although this is not widely known (our team often gets asked about it), starting in November 2021, U.S. immigration agencies began issuing documents that allowed these spouses to work based only on their I-94 entry document, without requiring a separate EAD application. This eliminated lengthy delays and gaps in work authorization that inhibited the ability of dual-career couples to continue their dual pursuits following a relocation to the U.S. With these developments, the US is slowly aligning with other similar economies around the world that allow dependent spouses to work automatically.

There is still more progress that can be made. Currently, the Permits Foundation, an advocacy group focused on “enabling dual careers in the global workplace” characterizes 35 countries as allowing spouses or partners to work freely. The U.S. is included on that list, but the foundation notes that spouses are only allowed to work in certain categories and that work authorizations are often subject to long delays. In the U.S., access to work authorization is not available to all types of dependents. H-4 spouses are excluded until their H-1B spouse reaches a certain point in the green card process (something that takes about 4 years for many, amounting to a major career gap for a trailing spouse). Spouses of J-1 visa holders still need to apply separately for an EAD. Spouses of F-1 student visa holders are not allowed to work, even during the one to three years of post-graduation work authorization granted to international graduates of U.S. universities. We also do not grant any immigration status to unmarried partners. Although many other countries including Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, and Australia, provide an immigration path for non-married partners, there is no option for that when an unmarried couple wants to relocate together to the US (resulting in some interesting conversations and sometimes resulting in the complete cancellation of a proposed relocation). Overall, expanding work authorization to married (and even unmarried) partners of the workers already employed in the US in various non-immigrant categories could be a boon to the labor market. Our team is often asked how they can find new sources of skilled an unskilled workers to fill open positions. Expanding this avenue of work authorization would enable this latent talent pool, many of whom are already here in the US, to enter the US workforce.

Bottom line, if you are an accompanying spouse in one of the limited categories of dependents who do not need separate employment authorization (E or L), rejoice. You are probably be able to work in the US without needing anything more than the entry document issued when you arrive. If you are not one of those lucky ones, review your options with immigration counsel, and hope the U.S. continues to catch up with other immigration destinations.

Road to Victory Just Got a Little Easier for Whistleblowers

In 2017, a federal jury found whistleblower Trevor Murray was wrongfully terminated after he refused “to change his research on commercial mortgage-backed securities.” He won over $900,000. On appeal in 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned Murray’s award, finding whistleblowers who bring a retaliation claim against their employer under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) must prove their employer acted with “retaliatory intent.”

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in, issuing a unanimous decision in Trevor Murray v. UBS Securities LLC, et al. The justices found that the Second Circuit was wrong. That is, “when it comes to a plaintiff’s burden of proof on intent under SOX, they only need to show that their protected activity contributed to an unfavorable personnel action, such as a firing.” Once the plaintiff does this, the Supreme Court found the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that “it would have taken the same adverse action regardless of the employee’s protected activity.” The justices found the law is intended ”to be plaintiff-friendly.”

In light of this development, employers should continue to be diligent in documenting the reasons that lead to an employee’s termination. This is especially true if that employee may be found to have engaged in a protected activity, cloaking them with certain whistleblower protections.

In siding with whistleblower Trevor Murray, the justices rejected UBS’ position that a separate finding of retaliatory intent is required for whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or SOX, which governs corporate financial reporting and recordkeeping.

“My Lawyer Made Me Do It” is Not an Absolute Defense to Bankruptcy Court Sanctions

Last year, we offered a lesson and a moral from a North Carolina district court decision reversing a $115,000 sanctions order by a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

The lesson from the case was that the bankruptcy court cannot sanction a creditor if there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct is lawful.

The moral was that a creditor can avoid the time, expense, and risk associated with litigating contempt and sanctions issues by taking basic steps to ensure that confirmed Chapter 11 plans are clear and precise. The moral is even more glaring now because a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the parties continue to fight in court over the easily-avoidable sanctions order. The decision also clarifies when and why a bankruptcy court can sanction a creditor.

Factual Background

In 2009, the Beckharts filed Chapter 11. At the time, they were almost a year behind on a loan secured by the property at Kure Beach. The loan servicer objected to planning confirmation because it did not specify how post-petition mortgage payments would be applied to principal and interest. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan without clarifying the issue, but the servicer did not ask the court to reconsider its order, nor did it appeal.

The Beckharts paid for five years. Shellpoint acquired the loan from the original servicer and treated it as in default based on unpaid accrued arrearages. Periodically, Shellpoint sent default letters to the Beckharts, who disputed the default. Counsel for Shellpoint advised that the confirmation order had not changed the loan contract terms and that the loan remained in default. The matter escalated with the Beckharts filing complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Shellpoint commenced foreclosure, then represented to the Beckharts that it was ceasing foreclosure, but then posted a foreclosure hearing notice on the Beckharts’ door (allegedly due to error).

Litigation

In January 2020, the Beckharts moved the bankruptcy court to find Shellpoint in contempt and award them monetary sanctions. The court held a hearing in June and, in September 2020, found Shellpoint in contempt. The court tagged Shellpoint with $115,000 in sanctions for lost wages, “loss of a fresh start,” attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions for violation of a confirmed plan. The test for liability is based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision — Taggart v. Lorenzen. The Taggart test prohibits sanctions if there was an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.” There can be contempt for violating the discharge injunction only “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the plan and confirmation order did not state how much the debtors would owe on confirmation, did not say how the $23,000 in arrears would be paid, and did not set the amount of the first payment. Confusingly, the confirmation order also said that the original loan terms would remain in effect, except as modified. Finally, the district court pointed out that Shellpoint was repeatedly advised by counsel that their behavior was authorized, and reliance on the advice of outside counsel is a sufficient defense to civil sanctions. Based on all these facts, the district court found that Shellpoint acted in good faith and interpreted the confirmation order in a manner consistent with the contractual terms of the loan, and that was objectively reasonable.

Taggart was a Chapter 7 case involving a discharge violation, but the Fourth Circuit held that the “no fair ground of doubt” test applied broadly in bankruptcy – including in Chapter 11 cases.

But the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to reverse the bankruptcy court because the creditor had requested and received legal advice from outside counsel. The Fourth Circuit held that advice of counsel is not an absolute defense in civil contempt. The Court suggested that, under the Taggart test, advice of counsel “may still be considered in appropriate circumstances as a relevant factor” and “a party’s reliance on guidance from outside counsel may be instructive, at least in part, when determining whether that party’s belief that she was complying with the order was objectively unreasonable.”

The Fourth Circuit held that both lower courts had made mistakes and sent the case back to the bankruptcy court to “reconsider the contempt motion under the correct legal standard, including any additional fact-finding that may be necessary.”

Creditors can take some comfort in the “no fair ground of doubt” test, which is more forgiving than a strict liability standard. But creditors can’t blame their lawyer for perilous conduct and expect the court to exonerate them.

But the most important takeaway hasn’t changed: Creditors should insist on clear and specific plan terms. After over two years of litigation, Shellpoint remains in peril of sanctions. All of this could have been avoided had the loan servicer insisted the plan specify how the Beckharts’ payments would be applied to satisfy the arrearage.

Article By Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more bankruptcy legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Court of Appeals Rules That Oil and Gas Company Has Ongoing Obligation to Restore Property Despite General Release of Damages in Surface Use Agreement

On April 11, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued a significant decision in Zimmerview Dairy Farms, LLC v. Protégé Energy III LLC establishing that a general release of damages signed in connection with a pad site surface use agreement did not release the oil and gas company from its ongoing obligations to remediate and restore damage to a landowner’s property.

In the Zimmerview case, Plaintiff Zimmerview Dairy Farms (“ZDF”) signed a surface use agreement with Defendant Protégé Energy III LLC (“Protégé”) permitting Protégé to construct and operate a pad-site for Utica Shale wells on a portion of the ZDF farm. The agreement consisted of three documents: a recorded surface use agreement (favorable to Protégé); a confidential supplemental agreement (with terms favorable to ZDF); and a damage release under which ZDF released Protégé from the anticipated damages already paid for by Protégé. This three-document structure is typical, especially for pipelines easements, and one which many oil and gas companies insist on. Often, the damage release is explained by landmen as an unimportant formality and that the company is still going to fix the land as required under the unrecorded agreement. However, what a landman says, what an agreement says and what a company does can differ dramatically.

In Zimmerview, Protégé proceeded to construct and operate its pad-site without adequately remediating, restoring and reseeding the areas disturbed during construction, including the slopes of the pad-site. Over several years, Protégé’s failure to remediate resulted in significant topsoil damage, invasive weed infestations and ongoing erosion, which rendered large portions of the ZDF farm unusable. Protégé refused to pay or fix the ZDF farm, claiming that the damage release signed by ZDF released Protégé from any obligation to remediate or pay for damages caused to the ZDF farm. When ZDF filed suit and won at trial, Protégé appealed.

On appeal, Protégé once again argued that ZDF had released Protégé from all damages resulting from construction and operation of the pad-site including damages from not remediating the ZDF farm. Despite the broad language of the release, however, the Court of Appeals rejected Protégé’s argument on the basis that the damage release, signed when the surface use agreement was executed, could not have been intended to release Protégé from damages that resulted from the ongoing obligations and requirements Protégé had just agreed to under the surface use agreement. Accordingly, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court judgment (and $800,000 verdict for damages) against Protégé. Given the common use (and abuse) of similar damage releases by both operators and pipeline companies, this decision is a welcome addition to Ohio caselaw and should assist (and hopefully encourage) Ohio landowners to insist on producers and pipeline companies meeting their construction and remediation obligations.

Article By J. Benjamin Fraifogl with Roetzel & Andress LPA.

For more articles about court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms $30 Million Libel Verdict Against Oberlin College

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in excess of $30,000,000 against Oberlin College, holding that Oberlin was responsible for libelous statements made during the course of a student protest. Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College, 2022 WL 970347 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2022). The court’s rationale, if followed elsewhere, could lead to significantly broader institutional and corporate liability for statements by students and employees.

The case arose out of an incident in which an employee of the Gibson Brothers Bakery and Food Mart accused a black student of shoplifting, and then pursued and held the student until police arrived. Over the next few days, large groups of student protestors gathered outside the bakery and among other things handed out a flyer describing the incident as an “assault,” and stating that the bakery had a “long account of racial profiling and discrimination.” The day following the incident, the student senate passed a resolution calling for a boycott. It likewise described the incident as an assault on the student and stated that the bakery had a “history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of students….” The resolution was emailed to the entire campus and posted on the senate bulletin board, where it remained for over a year. The court found the statements to be factually untrue, because the student pled guilty to the shoplifting charge and admitted racial profiling did not occur, and the College presented no evidence of any past racial profiling or instances of discrimination at the bakery.

The court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Oberlin participated in drafting the flyer or the student senate resolution. Instead, the court found Oberlin liable on the theory that one who republishes a libel, or who aids and abets the publication of a libelous statement, can be liable along with the original publisher. As to the flyer, the court cited the following as evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Oberlin had either republished or aided and abetted its publication:

Oberlin’s Dean of Students attended the protests as part of her job responsibilities;
the Dean of Students handed a copy of the flyer to a journalist who had not yet seen it and told students they could use a college copier to make more copies of the flyer;
the associate director of a multicultural resource center was seen carrying a large number of flyers, which he appeared to be distributing to others to redistribute to the public; and
the College provided a warming room with coffee and pizza at a site near the protests.

As to the student senate resolution, the court cited:

the senate was an approved organization;
the College created the senate’s authority to adopt and circulate the resolution;
the senate faculty moderator was the Dean of Students; and
despite having knowledge of the content of the resolution, neither the President nor the Dean of Students took any steps to require or encourage the student senate to revoke the resolution or to remove it from the bulletin board.

The court then held that despite the publicity the bakery received once the dispute arose, at the time of the protests and resolution the bakery and its owners were private persons, not public figures. Thus, the bakery only had to show that Oberlin had been negligent, rather than that it acted with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of the statements published.

Particularly in these polarized times, university administrators should be aware of and take steps to manage legal risks when external disputes become the subject of campus discussion and activism. Student organizations, faculty and administrators should be reminded that, to the extent they participate in protests or other public commentary outside their official roles, they should make clear they are acting for themselves and not the institution. Institutional responses to causes espoused by students or faculty need to be carefully vetted to assure that any factual assertions about third parties are accurate.

Article By Barry P. Kaltenbach and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Tag: court of appeals

Federal District Court Issues Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act

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