Tag: counsel fees

Counsel Fee Award When Contesting A Will

In general, the party tasked with defending a decedent’s Will during a Will contest, which is typically the executor, is entitled to the reimbursement of counsel fees that they incur in defending the Will on behalf of the Estate. At times, however, a party who has filed an action to contest a Last Will and Testament may also be entitled to an award of counsel fees provided there was a reasonable and legitimate basis to contest the decedent’s Last Will and Testament. In a recent appellate division case, the court affirmed an award of counsel fees to the contestant of a decedent’s Will for these very reasons.

In this matter, the defendant executor had been awarded counsel fees by the court, as the defendant was responsible for defending the decedent’s Last Will and Testament against the challenges levied by the plaintiff. In addition, the trial court also awarded counsel fees to the plaintiff, as it found that plaintiff’s challenge to the decedent’s Will was made in good faith and was reasonable. Moreover, the court found that plaintiff’s fees for which it sought reimbursement were fair and reasonable. In response, the defendant argued that the award of counsel fees was contrary to the applicable New Jersey court rules, and therefore, objected to the award. The appellate division reviewed the applicable rule of professional conduct, RPC 1.5(a), and concluded that the plaintiff had reasonable cause to contest the validity of the decedent’s Will, and moreover, that the fees the plaintiff sought were reasonable. As such, the appellate division concluded that the trial court correctly awarded counsel fees to the contestant of the decedent’s Will.

This appellate division decision reaffirmed a well-accepted standard as to an award of counsel fees in the context of probate litigation. When you are either taxed with defending a Last Will and Testament or intending to contest a Last Will and Testament, this factor should be considered when deciding whether settlement makes sense. Since there is no guarantee to either side that the counsel fees will be awarded, it is an issue that should be considered in the context of any settlement discussions before trial.

COPYRIGHT © 2021, STARK & STARK
Article by Paul W. Norris with Stark & Stark.
For more articles on estates and trusts, visit the NLR Family, Estates & Trusts section.

Professional Liability: Punishing Effect of Rule 11 in Keister v. PPL Corp.

professional liabilityFederal courts correct bad litigation behavior, eventually.

People take being sued personally, and lawsuits can take an emotional toll on defendants, whether as an individual or as a representative of an employer. Anger and frustration always lead to the same questions: Can we sanction them for lying? Can I get my fees (or my insurance deductible) back? Won’t the court do something?

Federal courts can and do sanction attorneys for lying, failing to investigate claims and “posturing” a case to get a settlement. But sanctions are reserved for the worst offenders, and it often takes multiple violations before attorneys’ fees, costs or other monetary fines are imposed.

A Case in Point

In Keister v. PPL Corp., U.S. District Court Judge Matthew W. Brann of the Middle District of Pennsylvania directed Attorney X to pay opposing counsel’s fees and costs in excess of $103,000.

What did Attorney X, a solo practitioner in a rural Pennsylvania county, do to potentially warrant more than $100,000 in sanctions? In a 55-page Opinion (which supplemented a 48-page summary judgment opinion), the court explained that  Attorney X:

  • Engaged in “litigious necromancy” by “conjuring” facts to support the age discrimination claim of his client, Ernest Keister, a 34-year employee of PPL and a union member, who worked in a unique position (i.e., his job could not be compared with others) and who was neither fired nor replaced by a younger worker.

  • Proceeded with the claim, in the absence of any evidence that Keister’s age was a factor in (1) his employer’s 2011 denial of a request to reevaluate his job title, duties, salary and management role or (2) the union’s decision not to support moving Keister’s position from the collective bargaining unit.

  • Alleged that Keister faced “ongoing” discrimination in order to avoid dismissal of his client’s lawsuit, despite the complete absence of evidence that anyone insulted or otherwise mistreated Keister.

  • Intentionally asserted claims that were directly contradicted by Keister’s testimony, failed to comply with local motion practice by failing to admit undisputed facts, and submitted documents that were “calculated” to confuse the court and opposing counsel.

  • Failed to investigate the facts and observe procedural requirements, including following the union’s grievance process and filing the federal action within the applicable limitations period (as established by the EEOC’s denial of a claim filed by Attorney X).

  • Amended the complaint for the sole purpose of forcing a mediation to settle a valueless case.

  • Engaged in this conduct after receiving two (non-monetary) Rule 11 sanctions in other cases as well as a public reprimand by the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board.

Judge Brann repeatedly stated that Rule 11 sanctions are not a “general fee-shifting device” and are not available merely because one side was successful. Sanctions were imposed because Attorney X “is simply not getting the message,” despite prior federal court and state bar disciplinary reprimands. The court held that the “least severe sanctions adequate to serve the purpose” of punishing Attorney X’s conduct and deterring it in the future was to award all costs and fees to the defendants.

Summary

The Keister ruling suggests that a Rule 11 motion should only be filed when it can be proven that opposing counsel did not have the facts to back up a client’s claims and made an effort to hide the absence of a factual dispute. However, even when such proof can be found, federal courts will first award non-monetary sanctions for an attorney’s first and even second offense, as happened here with Attorney X.

When facing a litigation opponent who lies to the court, it is best to prove the lie, document it, and then decide the most appropriate way to bring it to the attention of opposing counsel and, if appropriate, the court or disciplinary authorities. The work might not yield monetary sanctions in the first instance, but the federal courts may not act to stop abusive litigators until presented with multiple examples of bad conduct.

In the short run, it may seem more cost-effective to ignore an opponent’s abusive actions because a judicial reprimand does not return money to the client. But in the long run, the federal courts will not protect a client from future bad acts or additional lawsuits until an attorney’s repeated pattern of deception is established.

ARTICLE BY William F. McDevitt of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

© 2016 Wilson Elser