Tag: Civil Rights Law

A Quick Reminder Regarding Complaints in the Workplace

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Last year we reported on a landmark EEOC decision where the Agency concluded that discrimination against transgender individuals is actionable under Title VII. In that case, the EEOC held that Title VII prohibits an employer from taking adverse action based on the fact an employee/applicant fails to “adhere” to gender-based expectations or norms. It remains to be seen whether courts will agree with the EEOC’s position, but the decision appears to suggest that the argument may be viable in some jurisdictions.

There’s another angle to this issue, though: Can an employer be held liable for Title VII retaliation stemming from a complaint alleging transgender harassment? The biggest hurdle a Plaintiff will face in this context is whether the complaint amounts to “protected activity” under Title VII. Generally speaking, an employee can establish that she engaged in “protected activity” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim by demonstrating a “reasonable belief” that a violation of the statute occurred. This is true regardless of whether the underlying conduct amounts to actionable discrimination and/or harassment. A clever Plaintiffs’ attorney could conceivably point to the EEOC’s decision and argue that his or her client held a “reasonable belief” that a complaint regarding transgender-based harassment was protected activity under Title VII (and the adverse employment action was somehow linked to that complaint).

Bottom line: Even a “routine” complaint of unfair treatment can form the basis of a retaliation claim down the line. That being said, employers must be certain to thoroughly investigate all workplace complaints, regardless of how petty they may seem.

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The IRS/Treasury Department Announcement & Estate Planning Ruling Re: Same-Sex Marriage

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On August 29, 2013, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS“) issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The ruling establishes that the IRS will recognize same-sex marriages for all federal tax purposes regardless of where the couple lives, as long as the couple was married in a jurisdiction that recognizes such marriages. So, for example, if a couple was married in Connecticut (a recognizing state), but now live in Kentucky (a non-recognizing state), they will receive the same federal tax treatment as heterosexual couples residing in Kentucky. The ruling clarifies that a “state of celebration” approach will be used versus a “state of residence” rule. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew says the decision “[a]ssures legally married same-sex couples that they can move freely throughout the country knowing that their federal filing status will not change.” It is important to note that, according to the ruling, “marriage” does not include a registered domestic partnership, civil union or other similar arrangement. The ruling applies to all federal tax provisions where marriage is a factor, including: filing status, estate tax exemptions, personal and dependency exemptions, the standard marriage deduction, IRA contributions, earned income tax credits and employee benefits.

The ruling came on the heels of the Supreme Court’s June 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor and is meant to address some of the confusion that Windsor left in its wake. As background, before Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA“), marital status for federal income tax purposes was defined by state law. Section 3 of DOMA banned same-sex couples from being recognized as “spouses” for all federal law purposes. Windsor ruled Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional; however, the decision did not require states to recognize same-sex marriages. Thus, since June, state and federal agencies have been wondering how to deal with same-sex marriages in non-recognizing states. With the Revenue Ruling, much-needed guidance has arrived.

From the estate planning perspective, there are now several more options that same-sex couples can use to their advantage. First, same-sex spouses are now eligible for the marital deduction, which means that they may transfer as much as they want to their spouse (in life and in death) without incurring federal estate or gift tax, provided that the recipient spouse is a U.S. citizen.

Another benefit is the use of “gift-splitting.” Any individual can give up to $14,000 each year to as many people as they choose without incurring gift tax. Heterosexual spouses, and now same-sex spouses, can combine their $14,000 to jointly give $28,000 to individuals tax-free.

Same-sex spouses will also now get to take advantage of an estate planning tool known as “portability.” Portability allows a widow or widower to use any unused estate tax exclusions (capped at $5.25 million for 2013) of their spouse who died in addition to their own. The unused exclusion must be transferred to the surviving spouse and an estate tax return must be filed (by the executor) within nine months of the spouse’s death, even if no tax is due.

The ruling also has a myriad of other implications for taxes and employee benefits that should be carefully considered by same-sex couples. There are still lingering questions about how other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, will address benefits post-Windsor.

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Treasury Department Recognizes All Legal Marriages for Tax Purposes

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On August 29, 2013, the Treasury Department issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17, Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-38, which states that same-sex couple legally married in jurisdictions that recognize their marriage will be treated as married for ALL federal tax purposes. As a result, legally married same-sex couples are treated the same as legally married opposite-sex couples for federal tax purposes if the state of ceremony of their marriage recognizes same-sex marriage even if their state of residence does not recognize same-sex marriage.

This Ruling has significant impact for legally married same-sex couples and their tax advisors. However, it does not impact state law rules regarding the definition of marriage and may complicate income tax filings for same-sex couples legally married but living in a state that does not yet recognize their marriage, like Wisconsin and Illinois.

Background Leading Up to the Ruling

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted by President Clinton in 1996. Section Two of DOMA says states do not have to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. Section Three of DOMA defined marriage for all federal purposes as only between one man and one woman.

On June 26, 2013, in Windsor v. United States (Windsor), the United States Supreme Court held that Section Three of DOMA was unconstitutional. Therefore, any same-sex married couple that lives in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage is to be treated the same for all purposes as any other married couple, and thereby are entitled to all of the 1,138 rights and privileges under federal law that are granted to married persons, which includes federal tax law.

Section Two of DOMA was unaffected by Windsor. Therefore, a same-sex couple that marries in one of the thirteen states that recognizes same-sex marriage who then moves to one of the thirty-seven states that does not recognize same-sex marriage would not be treated as married if the state of residence determines whether a couples is considered married, as opposed to the state of ceremony determining if a couple is married.

Absent guidance from the Treasury Department, a same-sex couple legally married in a recognition jurisdiction who then move to a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage, would most likely not be treated as married for federal tax law purposes. This is because the majority of federal tax laws are determined by a couple’s state of residence, not the state of ceremony of their marriage.

State of Ceremony Versus State of Residence

Consider the following examples to illustrate Windsor and this Ruling:

Britney and Jason are married in a drive-through chapel by an Elvis impersonator in Las Vegas and then go home to California. Their opposite-sex marriage is recognized for federal tax law purposes in California (and all other states) because California recognizes legal Nevada marriages. Sadly, Britney and Jason’s marriage only lasted 55 hours.

Mitchell and Cam are a same-sex couple married in New York (New York being a state of ceremony that recognizes same-sex marriage) and move back to Milwaukee (Wisconsin being a state of residence that does not recognize same-sex marriage). Prior to the Revenue Ruling, Mitchell and Cam are not married for federal law purposes, even though their marriage would be recognized if they stayed in New York. This is because Article Two of DOMA says that Wisconsin does not have to recognize New York marriages.

After the Revenue Ruling, with an effective date after September 16, 2013, Mitchell and Cam in Wisconsin will be treated as married for federal tax law purposes just like Britney and Jason in California. Mitchell and Cam will be able to utilize all federal tax laws Britney and Jason would be able to utilize (if Britney and Jason had respected the sanctity of their marriage).

Federal Tax Impact of Ruling

As a result of the Revenue Ruling, regardless of a couple’s state of residence, if they are married in a state that legally recognizes their marriage, the couple will be entitled to the following federal tax law benefits (among others): filing status as married filing jointly, claiming personal and dependency exemptions, taking the standard deduction, employee benefits, contributing to an IRA, spousal rollovers of IRA’s, unlimited marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes, gift tax splitting, and estate tax exemption portability.

The Revenue Ruling does not apply to registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or similar formal relationships recognized under state law that are not considered “marriage” under state law.

Legally married same-sex couples must file their 2013 income tax returns as either “married filing jointly” or “married filing separately.” They may also, but are not required to, file amended returns for open years (generally 2010, 211, and 2012) to be treated as married for federal tax law purposes.

Also, if an employee purchased health insurance coverage from their employer on an after-tax basis for their same-sex spouse, they may now treat the amounts paid for that coverage as pre-tax and excludable from their income, and file amended returns for a refund for open years. Further, if their employer paid Medicare and Social Security tax on those taxable benefits to the employee, the employer may file for a refund for both the employee and employer portions of those overpayments for open years.

Continuing Issues in Non-Recognition States

As of August 30, 2013, the District of Columbia and thirteen states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) recognize same-sex marriage. Therefore, clients who get married in those states or have employees who get married in those states, but subsequently reside in a non-recognition state, need to be aware of the new federal tax law benefits and obligations.

Even though married same-sex couples may now file as “married filing jointly” for federal income tax purposes, states like Wisconsin and Illinois that do not recognize same-sex marriage would still require those couples to either file as single or as married filing separately on their federal returns. This is because most state income tax forms use federal income tax amounts as the starting point for preparing the state return, and most state returns require the federal return to be attached to the state return. Without further guidance from state tax authorities, this could complicate income tax filings for same-sex married couples in non-recognition states.

Estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax laws now treat all legally married same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples, but, like opposite-sex couples, the Revenue Ruling does not mitigate the need for same-sex married couples to prepare estate plans. Many property law issues are driven by whether someone is classified as a “spouse” under state law, including who inherits under intestacy and other survivorship rights, all of which can be controlled by a will or trust in non-recognition states (like Wisconsin and Illinois). Finally, some states (like Illinois) have state estate and gift tax exemptions that are lower than the current federal estate and gift tax exemptions, which requires careful estate tax planning for all married couples, be they opposite-sex or same-sex.

The impact of Windsor and how same-sex couples are recognized for federal and state laws is a fast changing arena, and additional federal and state guidance will be required.

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Unpaid Internships – Opportunity or Liability for Businesses?

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Unpaid internships have long been viewed by students, recent graduates and industry newcomers as a chance to gain experience that might help them select or launch a career, and to some, a chance to eventually land a paying job.  Employers can capitalize on this to teach their trade or profession and find new talent; but, they should not use interns just to cut labor costs.

The United States Department of Labor and many states use six criteria to determine whether internships in for-profit company operations can lawfully be unpaid: 1) the internship must be similar to training given in an educational institution; 2) regular paid workers are not displaced; 3) the intern works under close observation; 4) the employer derives no immediate advantage from intern activities; 5) there is no guaranty of employment upon internship completion; and 6) it is clear up front that there is no expectation of payment.  The overarching theme is that unpaid internships must be educational and predominantly for the benefit of the intern, not the employer.

Some employers have no idea the criteria exist and unwittingly expose themselves to expensive single-plaintiff, class action and regulator’s claims to reclassify interns as employees and to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime pay, interest, multiple penalties and attorneys fees.  [For more on this see our post on Unpaid Interns Deemed Employees Under the FLSA].  Add to that, there are potential employer and decision maker risks for failure to withhold income and employment taxes.

“Warning bell” examples of internship programs that may be subject to reclassification include, use of unpaid internships to simply minimize labor costs or merely as an extended job interview to see if interns can make the cut later for a paid job; no real, supervised education and training, beyond what the intern might happen to observe; and a predominance of work assigned to interns that paid employees would normally do to generate or support the business.  Likewise, interns whose work is primarily running errands, answering phones, filing, organizing documents, data entry, scanning or coping images, or cleaning – even though they arguably have good exposure to work going on around them – tend to look like they are merely doing what paid support staff employees ought to be doing.

By contrast, if the intern is closely supervised and taught learning objectives that can be applied to multiple different employers, with occasional support staff type work incidental to the learning, with no guaranty of employment, and a writing that specifies a limited duration of an internship without pay, odds are better that intern can lawfully be unpaid.  As a practical matter, if a school or college will give the intern course credit, the odds of legal compliance increase.

A safe path to avoid classification risks is to pay interns at least minimum wage and for any overtime worked, afford meal and rest breaks, and manage their work assignments to reduce overtime needed.   Depending on employer policies and applicable laws, an intern who is part-time or a short-term temporary employee may not be eligible for certain employee benefits.

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Virtual Communications with Real Consequences: Terminations for Social Media Posts Continue to Draw the Attention of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

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In the late autumn of 2012, an otherwise innocuous private Facebook discussion amongst employees of Skinsmart Dermatology (Skinsmart) suddenly devolved into an expletive-laced tirade. At one point during the conversation an employee boasted that she told her supervisor to “back the freak off,” called her employer “full of sh**,” and dared Skinsmart to “fire” her and “[m]ake [her] day.”

Notably, none of the other participants in the Facebook chat directly responded to the employee’s comments. One of those participants, however, reported the employee’s remarks to Skinsmart, who promptly fired her after concluding that it was “obvious” she did not want to continue working there.

Following her termination, the employee filed an Unfair Labor Practice Charge (ULP) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) claiming that Skinsmart fired her in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA prohibits an employer from interfering with or restraining an employee’s right to engage in “protected concerted activities.”

As background, “protected” activities include discussing wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. “Concerted” activities include: (1) when an individual employee seeks to “initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”; (2) where an individual employee brings “truly group complaints” to management’s attention; and (3) where employees discuss “shared concerns” among themselves prior to any specific plan to engage in group action.

After analyzing the evidence, the NLRB’s Division of Advice recommended dismissal of the employee’s ULP Charge. First, it found the terminated employee’s Facebook comments were “an individual’s gripe” rather than an expression of “shared concerns” over working conditions among employees. Second, it found there was no evidence that the terminated employee’s coworkers viewed her remarks as an assertion of shared concerns regarding employment conditions. Consequently, the Division of Advice concluded that the employee did not participate in concerted activity, and therefore Skinsmart did not illegally fire her in response to her Facebook comments.

Significantly, before recommending dismissal of the ULP Charge, the Division of Advice also considered whether the terminated employee’s comments constituted “inherently concerted” activity that deserved protection under the NLRA.[1] While the Division of Advice ultimately ruled that they were not, its consideration of “inherently concerted” activity suggests that it will continue to interpret “protected concerted activity” as broadly as it can.

Under the “inherently concerted” analysis, an employee’s expressions may be considered protected concerted activity if those expressions involve “subjects of such mutual workplace concern” like wages, schedules, and job security, even if there was no contemplation of group action. Because the employee’s posts did not relate to any of those mutual workplace concerns, the Division of Advice concluded, the employee did not engage in “inherently concerted” activity.

In light of Skinsmart, before taking any adverse action against an employee for inappropriate social media communications, an employer should scrutinize the employee’s comments to determine whether they constitute an individual gripe or protected concerted activity. Because the NLRB has targeted “Facebook firings” as infringing on employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity, we recommend that employers undertake this analysis with the benefit of counsel to minimize their exposure to a ULP Charge or other legal action.

[1] The term, “inherently concerted,” arose out of an earlier NLRB decision in 2012. See Hoodview Vending Co., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (2012).

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A Bad Smoke Break: Stringent Documentation of Work Rules Defends Against Unemployment Claims

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A recent Missouri case demonstrates the importance of documentation when defending against unwarranted unemployment claims. The case also underlines the need for the reforms passed by the Missouri General Assembly and pending signature by Gov. Jay Nixon.

cigarettes

Facts

James Sullivan worked as a part-time cook for nearly a year and a half at Landry’s Seafood House. One day, he disappeared during dinner service and was found 20 minutes later smoking and talking on his cell phone in the parking lot. He was fired and filed a claim for unemployment benefits. In Missouri, when employees are terminated for work-related misconduct, they can be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. However, a deputy at the Missouri Division of Employment Security initially determined that Sullivan was eligible for benefits. The restaurant appealed that determination to the Division Appeals Tribunal.

Appeals Tribunal Finds Willful Misconduct

During the hearing, which Sullivan failed to attend, Landry’s Seafood House offered the testimony of a senior kitchen manager. The manager said the restaurant had policies prohibiting employees from smoking at work or leaving their work area without a supervisor’s permission. Landry’s posted signs on its doors to remind employees of the rule and had discussed the policy with employees at shift meetings. Further, Landry’s provided employees with a copy of its policies. Sullivan had signed an acknowledgment of receipt when hired. Sullivan had been counseled for violating the rules in the past and had complied with the policies on several occasions by asking for permission to leave his workstation and clocking out before going outside to smoke a cigarette.

After the hearing, the Appeals Tribunal reversed the determination and found in favor of Landry’s. Sullivan was to be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he was discharged for work-related misconduct. Sullivan appealed.

Court of Appeals Sides with the Employer

The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the decision in Landry’s favor, finding there was substantial evidence to support it. The court noted that Sullivan was aware of the rules, had signed a written statement acknowledging receipt of the policies, and had been counseled on the rules. The supervisor’s testimony at the hearing established these facts and constituted substantial evidence that Landry’s terminated Sullivan for work-related misconduct. The court explained that Landry’s rule on breaks was also reasonable because a restaurant’s business depends on employees preparing food for its customers in a timely manner. Landry’s rule against smoking on the clock was reasonable because an employer has a right to expect employees to be engaged in meaningful work while being paid.

Bottom Line

At the time of this case, Missouri law defined misconduct as a “wanton and willful” act in order to disqualify a terminated employee from receiving unemployment benefits in Missouri. But as the first decision made by the deputy at the Missouri Division of Employment Security shows, that definition can lead to inconsistent rulings. Although the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the employer, it was a time-consuming and expensive undertaking to work through the appeals process to secure a decision that would seem obvious to most people.

During the 2013 Legislative Session, the Missouri Chamber championed legislation to change the definition of misconduct to provide more consistency in unemployment compensation cases. Sponsored by Rep. Will Kraus, a Republican from Lee’s Summit, SB 28 is currently pending signature by Gov. Jay Nixon. House Bill 611 contains similar language and also awaits signature. Proof that you properly communicated your work rules to employees and required them to acknowledge receipt of the rules is key when seeking to establish that an employee’s violation of the rules was intentional. Landry’s actions in this case protected the restaurant from having to pay unemployment benefits to a former employee who violated its well-publicized policies.

Published in the July 2013 issue of Missouri Business, the Magazine of the Missouri Chamber of Commerce and Industry

New York State Court of Appeals Backs Starbucks Policy on Tip-Pooling

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Starbucks shift supervisors can legally participate in tip-sharing with other store employees, but the coffee chain’s assistant managers have enough managerial responsibility to disqualify them from sharing in customer tips, according to the New York State Court of Appeals.

Starbucks’ policy provides for weekly distribution of gratuities to the company’s two lower ranking categories of employees, baristas and shift supervisors, but not to its two higher ranking categories of employees, assistant managers and store managers. In addressing questions certified by the Second Circuit regarding the validity this policy, the Court of Appeals concluded that since shift supervisors, like baristas, directly serve patrons, they remain tip-pool eligible even if their role also involves some supervisory responsibility. But assistant managers, because they are granted “meaningful authority” over subordinates, are not eligible to participate in the tip pool.

The decision provides guidance to the Second Circuit as it hears appeals of two suits, Barenboim et al. v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 10–4912–cv, and Winans et al. v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 11–3199–cv, each brought by a different putative class of Starbucks workers. The plaintiffs in Barenboimare Starbucks baristas who argue that only baristas, and not shift supervisors, are entitled to participate in tip-sharing. The Winans plaintiffs are assistant managers who claim that they should be allowed a share of the tips. In both cases, the Southern District of New York awarded summary judgment to Starbucks, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of New York Labor Law §196-d, which governs tip-pooling.

Shift Supervisors Are Not Company “Agents”

New York Labor Law §196-d prohibits an “employer or his agent or an officer or agent of any corporation, or any other person” from accepting or retaining any part of the gratuities received by an employee. It also states, “Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting the… sharing of tips by a waiter with a busboy or similar employee.”

According to the plaintiff baristas in Barenboim, Starbucks’ policy of including shift supervisors in the stores’ tip pools violates §196-d because the shift supervisors are company “agents” and therefore not permitted to “demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee.” Starbucks argues that shift supervisors are sufficiently analogous to waiters, busboys and similar employees, and should therefore be permitted to share in the gratuities pursuant to §196-d.

The Court of Appeals, in deciding that shift supervisors are entitled to share in the tip pool, deferred to the New York State Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) long-standing view that “employees who regularly provide direct service to patrons remain tip-pool eligible even if they exercise a limited degree of supervisory responsibility.” The Court compared the shift supervisors to restaurant captains who have some authority over wait staff, but are nonetheless eligible to participate in tip pools pursuant to the DOL’s Hospitality Industry Wage Order and DOL guidelines dating back to 1972.

“Meaningful Authority” Standard

In Winans, the Starbucks assistant store managers argue that they should be deemed similar to waiters and busboys under §196-d (and therefore eligible for tip-sharing) because they do not have full or final authority to terminate subordinates. The Court of Appeals disagreed: “[W]e believe that there comes a point at which the degree of managerial responsibility becomes so substantial that the individual can no longer fairly be characterized as an employee similar to general wait staff within the meaning of Labor Law §196-d.” That line is drawn, according to the decision, at “meaningful or significant authority or control over subordinates.”

Examples of meaningful authority, according to the decision, are the ability to discipline subordinates, the authority to hire and terminate employees, and input into the creation of employee work schedules. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim, authority to hire and fire is not the exclusive test for determining whether an employee is similar to wait staff for the purposes of §196-d.

Tip-Sharing Required?

In addition to the question of which employees are eligible for tip-sharing, the Second Circuit asked the Court of Appeals to consider whether an employer may deny tip pool distributions to an employee who is eligible to split tips under §196-d. The Court held that §196-d excludes certain employees from tip pools, but does not require employers to include all employees who are not legally barred from participating.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals decision provides specific guidance to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in connection with the two Starbucks cases pending on appeal, but it also provides helpful clarity to any employers with tip-sharing policies. In particular, the decision confirms that employees who regularly provide direct service to patrons may still participate in tip-sharing, but are not required to do so, even if they exercise a limited degree of supervisory responsibility. On the other hand, employees with meaningful authority over subordinates are not eligible to participate in tip-sharing. Employers should carefully review their tip-sharing policies in light of this guidance from the Court of Appeals.

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What Windsor Means for Same-Sex Married Couples Seeking U.S. Immigration Benefits

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On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor that Section 3 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional. This Section of DOMA prohibited the U.S. government from conferring any federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married in any jurisdiction in the world.

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What does the Windsor decision mean for same-sex couples seeking immigration benefits?

On the immigration front, DOMA has been the main obstacle prohibiting married same-sex couples from accessing any immigration benefits that would otherwise flow to a spouse. For example, a U.S. citizen may sponsor a spouse who is a foreign national for permanent residence, and that foreign national spouse is considered an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen and exempt from annual numerical limitations on immigrants. Before Windsor, this option of “immediate relative” sponsorship did not exist for same-sex couples. Same-sex spouses also were not able to qualify for derivative nonimmigrant visas, or to qualify as dependents in an employment-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status process. Windsor has permanently shifted this landscape, with same-sex married couples being recognized as married and therefore able to access immigration benefits, provided they can demonstrate eligibility under the law for the specific benefits sought.

What marriages are valid under Windsor?

Generally, if a couple’s marriage is valid where it is performed, it is valid for purposes of immigration law. If you and your foreign national spouse were married in one of the 12 U.S. states that recognize same-sex marriage or in a foreign country that recognizes same-sex marriage, such as Canada, your green card sponsorship and application process should be treated exactly like the application of a different-sex couple. In fact, Edie Windsor, the plaintiff in Windsor, married her wife in Canada. To determine the validity of the marriage, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) focuses on the place where the marriage took place, not the location where one or both spouses live. This same principle is applied by other agencies within the Department of Homeland Security as well as at U.S. Embassies and Consulates.

Recent Guidance from the Federal Government

We expect government agencies to implement the Windsor decision swiftly. This means that immediately we will see changes at the various federal agencies that process applications for immigration benefits and visas. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a statement following the Court’s decision. She directed USCIS “to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.” Recent Department of Homeland Security guidance is now clear that family-based immigrant visas will no longer “be automatically denied as a result of the same-sex nature of your marriage.” Following the Court’s decision, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the Department of State (DOS) will work with the Department of Justice and other agencies “to review all relevant statues as well as benefits administered” by DOS. We expect to see guidance from U.S. Consulates in the coming weeks.

Conclusion

Same-sex couples who are married now have equal access to immigration benefits. The scope of the Windsor decision extends to same-sex spouses of individuals pursuing employment-based immigration benefits, such as green card and nonimmigrant visa sponsorship. We will continue to monitor developments in the law and provide guidance on immigration options for LGBT families.

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In a Pro-Employee World, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Offer Employers Hope

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In a pair of important opinions released last week, both of which are helpful to employers, the U.S. Supreme Court raised the bar for employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, No. 12-484 (2013), the Court ruled that an employee claiming retaliation must do more than show that retaliatory animus was a “motivating factor” for discipline – it must be the “but-for” cause.  In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. _, No. 11-556 (2013), the Court ruled that for employers to be held vicariously liable for the actions of a “supervisor,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “supervisor” had power to take a “tangible employment action,” such as transferring or terminating the employee. Authority merely to direct aspects of the employee’s work will not suffice.

Nassar and Vance represent significant victories for employers faced with Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims. The heightened requirements that charging employees now face should enhance an employer’s prospects for obtaining summary judgment and, failing that, impose a more rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs at trial.

Nassar Imposes More Stringent “But-For” Causation Test for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff in Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent. The defendant university hired him as a member of its medical faculty, and under the terms of the university’s affiliation agreement with a local hospital, the plaintiff also worked at the hospital as a staff physician. The plaintiff alleged that the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine harassed him because of her discriminatory “bias against Arabs and Muslims.” The plaintiff ultimately resigned from the university faculty, and accused his superior of discriminatory bias in his letter of resignation, which he sent to the university’s chair of Internal Medicine and other faculty members. The chair was allegedly dismayed by the public accusations of discrimination, and said that the chief must “be publicly exonerated” of the charges against her. When he learned that plaintiff had been offered a staff physician position at the hospital, the chair objected that the affiliation agreement required all staff physicians to also be faculty members, and the hospital therefore withdrew its offer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he had been constructively discharged by reason of the chief’s discriminatory harassment, and that the chair subsequently allegedly retaliated against him for complaining of that harassment. A jury found for plaintiff on both claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed only as to the retaliation claim, holding that retaliation claims under Title VII required a showing merely that retaliation was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action rather than its “but-for” cause.

The Supreme Court vacated that decision, concluding that “the text, structure and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim … must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from the status-based discrimination ban, which utilizes the lesser “motivating factor” causation test, the “but-for” standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims. Accordingly, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” To establish a retaliation claim, employees must now show that their employer would not have taken the challenged employment action but for the employee’s protected activity.

Vance Limits “Supervisors” to Those with Power to Take a Tangible Employment Action

In a second critical decision for employers, plaintiff in Vance, an African-American woman, worked in the university’s Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Plaintiff alleged that a fellow employee, a white woman named Davis, harassed and intimidated her because of her race.  Plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that her white co-worker created a racially hostile work environment. “The parties vigorously dispute[d] the precise nature and scope of Davis’ duties, but they agree[d] that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”

The District Court granted defendant summary judgment, holding the university was notvicariously liable for Davis’s alleged actions because she could not take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff and therefore was not a “supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’” under Title VII. The Court held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII [only] if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim” and affirmed.

In analyzing when an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, the Court defined “tangible employment actions” to include effecting “‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” The Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s definition of “supervisor,” which tied “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work[,]” as “a study in ambiguity.” Hence, under Title VII, if an employee is not authorized to impose tangible employment actions against another, the employer cannot be vicariously liable for the subject employee’s alleged harassment.

Vance enhances an employer’s ability to limit the company’s responsibility for harassment. Employers should remain mindful of the duties of their employees, ensuring that only key management and supervisory personnel possess the power to effect a “significant change in employment status”. Clear definitions of an employee’s responsibilities should greatly limit any future claims of vicarious liability against employers. This more precise definition of “supervisor” should, like Nassar, increase the likelihood of dismissal at the summary judgment stage and help obtain favorable in limine and trial rulings.

Conclusion

Nassar and Vance afford significant advantages to employers defending against discrimination and retaliation claims.  Importantly, although the decisions themselves were concerned with claims arising under federal anti-discrimination (not just Title VII) laws, the Court’s reasoning may well find acceptance among state courts, which frequently apply the Title VII analysis to claims asserted under analogous state laws. Nassar and Vance are likely to prove valuable tools to employers defending against claims of discrimination and/or retaliation, increasing both the prospects of obtaining summary judgment and, if necessary, the odds of success at trial.

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Federal Court Stops Serial Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Plaintiff’s Latest Effort: Payne v. Chapel Hill North Properties

Poyner Spruill

The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina recently dismissed an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) case filed by Denise Payne, a Florida resident, and National Alliance for Accessibility, Inc. (“NAA”), a nonprofit Florida corporation (Payne is the founder of and a member of NAA).   Payne and NAA sued Chapel Hill North Properties, LLC (“CHNP”) alleging the company’s shopping center in Chapel Hill, NC did not comply with ADA requirements for accessibility to disabled individuals.  Poyner Spruill attorneys Nick Ellis and Kevin Ceglowski filed a Motion to Dismiss the case and a supporting brief for CHNP arguing that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Payne lacked standing to proceed.

Payne was seeking injunctive relief, requesting CHNP to remedy the alleged ADA violations.  In order to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must have constitutional standing to proceed with the lawsuit, which depends on showing a likelihood of future harm from the alleged violations.  Payne alleged she encountered architectural barriers when she visited the shopping center on June 10, 2010, April 1, 2012  and on September 27, 2012.  Payne alleged only vague future plans to visit the shopping center, saying she “intends to visit North Carolina again in June of 2013” and “intends to visit Defendant’s property once again.”  Payne’s Complaint alleged she intends to continue to meet with existing NAA members in Asheville, Wilmington, and Fayetteville, none of which are near CHNP’s property.  After CHMP filed its Motion to Dismiss, Payne filed an affidavit, hoping to avoid dismissal of her case, and in which she stated she specifically intended to return to the shopping center in June 2013.  In her Complaint, she alleged she stopped at the shopping center on her visits to North Carolina because it “has an attractive selection of goods and services” and “is convenient based on her travel patterns.”

CHNP argued the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently show that Payne would return to the property and, therefore, that they were unable to demonstrate she was likely to suffer any harm in the future.  Specifically, CHNP argued Payne lives over 700 miles from the property, lacks a reliable record of past patronage, and her alleged intent to return to the property in the future is not credible.  In order to evaluate this argument, the court used what is known as the proximity test – a set of factors for determining standing that takes into account (1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the defendant’s business; (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of the business; (3) definiteness of plans to return to the business; and (4) the frequency of the plaintiff’s nearby travels.

The court first examined the proximity factor because as the court said, “the further away a plaintiff ordinarily finds herself from a business, the less likely she is to suffer future harm.”  In this case, Payne lives over 700 miles from the shopping center, which the court decided weighed against finding she was likely to return and suffer harm.  More importantly, the court reviewed Payne’s filings in other ADA cases in North Carolina courts and determined her representations to the courts were not consistent from case to case.  Specifically as it related to this case, the court pointed out that Payne’s allegation that she passes through Chapel Hill on the way to see her attorney when traveling to North Carolina contradicted a sworn statement made in another case that her “first stop is always Greensboro.”  The court said, “the fact that Payne has submitted such clearly conflicting statements clearly calculated to avoid dismissal in these cases is very troubling and casts significant doubt on her claims.”

The court also examined Payne’s past patronage of the shopping center.  Although the court noted Payne had made only three past visits and did not explain why she chose this particular shopping center instead of many others on her route, it allowed this factor to weigh in her favor, if only slightly.

The court next examined Payne’s intent to return to the shopping center.  The court found this factor weighed against Payne and NAA because the shopping center is located on a 100-mile stretch of highway between the airport at which Payne arrives and her lawyer’s office, which is her alleged destination when she comes to North Carolina.  Moreover, several of the cities Payne alleged she intended to visit in the future (Fayetteville and Wilmington) are in the opposite direction from the shopping center. In sum, the court determined Payne did not express any definite reason she would return to the shopping center other than to test its compliance with the ADA.

Finally, the court assessed Payne’s frequency of travel to areas near the shopping center.  The court said Payne’s sporadic trips to North Carolina provided weak evidence she would suffer actual or imminent harm.  Beyond that, Payne’s frequent lawsuits worked against her efforts to maintain standing in this case.  The court noted it was implausible that in her one or two visits a year to North Carolina, Payne could return to each of the 80 plus properties she has sued in the state for alleged noncompliance with the ADA.  The court found this final factor weighed against finding that Payne had standing to proceed with her lawsuit.  After considering all the factors together, the court determined Payne was unlikely to suffer future harm at the shopping center and rules that she did not have standing to proceed and the lawsuit should be dismissed.

CHNP also argued that Plaintiff NAA lacked standing to proceed with the lawsuit because, as an association, its standing depended on an allegation that one or more of its members was suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the allegations in the Complaint.  Because Payne was the only member of NAA identified in the Complaint and the court decided she was not suffering immediate or threatened injury, the lawsuit was also dismissed as it related to allegations made by NAA.

The court’s opinion is a victory for CHNP, but also an example of how serial plaintiffs in ADA cases have credibility issues because the volume of lawsuits they file can create inconsistent “facts” they allege to be true.  The result in this case was also a strong rebuke against Payne’s dishonesty to the courts in an effort to maintain standing in her multitude of lawsuits against North Carolina companies.  (Payne has filed over 80 cases in NC.)  Businesses that find themselves facing ADA suits from out-of-state plaintiffs may find the arguments and result in this case helpful in defending those claims.

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